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I investigate why Taiwanese entrepreneurs who have invested in China exit. Viewed 
from the non-economic perspective, there are three main themes in this thesis. 
Theme A focuses on the non-economic variables in international exit. Theme B 
examines how incident-generated emotions shape entrepreneur’s actions in 
internationalization. Theme C presents an overview of the decision-making of 
international exit, summarizing the finding in Theme A and Theme B and revisiting 
the theoretical framework developed in literature chapter.  
Driven by the nature of the research questions, a multiple-case study methodology 
was adopted for the purpose of theory building. I employ the method of critical 
incident technique to explore firm’s critical events in internationalization and how 
entrepreneurs feel and respond to. In total, I identify five exit cases and two stay 
cases. 34 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with entrepreneurs and 
their stakeholders. Data was coded in an interactive manner, working back and forth 
between theory, emerging patterns and data. Other sources including annual reports, 
press release, webpage, meeting minutes and archives are used for data triangulation.  
Being positioned at the intersection of entrepreneurship and international business 
research paths, this research firstly examines international business literature and use 
theories in entrepreneurship field to explain my data. Following Gimeno et al.’s 
(1997) threshold of performance theory, entrepreneurs can terminate an 
economically profitable business since it no longer meets entrepreneur’s expectation. 
My finding shows in addition to organizational performance, entrepreneur’s personal 
goal, predisposition of China and family socio-emotional wealth can influence the 
international exit decision by changing entrepreneur’s threshold of performance and 
the non-economic value of the firm. This explains why some entrepreneurs shut 
down a profitable firm.  
Following entrepreneurial emotions literature (e.g. Baron, 2008; Foo et al., 2009), I 
examine how entrepreneur’s incident-generated emotions shape their behaviour in 
internationalization. Passion and confidence are positive for organizational growth 
while fear and disgust are negative for entrepreneur’s efforts in internationalization. 
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Empathy is positive for learning and adaption and anger encourages risky actions 
with optimistic prediction. This section provides empirical evidence to 
entrepreneurial emotion studies and connects empathy with entrepreneur’s learning 
and development of institution-specific capability. Finally, I revisit the international 
exit decision-making framework and redefine international exit. My finding shows 
entrepreneurs who have positive emotional memory and predisposition of China are 
easier to recover and learn from their international exit experience and use it to renter 
into China in the future.   
Taken together, this thesis provides fresh insights into an emerging debate relating to 
international exit, particularly on emerging market studies. It contributes to the 
international business literature by viewing from non-economic perspective, 
indicating why some entrepreneurs persist in a failing venture while others shut 
down a profitable venture. This research also adds to entrepreneurial emotion 
literature by providing an insight to positive and negative emotions and focusing on 
specific emotions rather than a broad category, describing six emotions and their 
effects on entrepreneur’s decision in internationalization. Implications for 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
Many entrepreneurs consider internationalization to be a symbol of their business 
success. The inception of internationalization usually begins with a motivation such 
as business expansion. It continues with a range of activities such as resource 
acquisition, market entry, and probably local cultural adaptation. Current studies 
focus more on exploring critical factors to a successful internationalization (Keupp 
and Gassmann, 2009; Jones et al., 2011). However, successful internationalization 
and international exit are twins. Instead of focusing on the early stage of 
internationalization like many other studies, this thesis explores the cause and effect 
of international exit; this has been an under-researched area (Benito, 2005; 
McDermott, 2010; Jones et al., 2011). 
This thesis argues international exit should not be viewed as an organizational 
response as suggested by IB scholars; instead, entrepreneurs are the key active agents 
in decision-making and my unit of analysis. Studies in the International Business (IB) 
field predict that firms remain abroad if it is profitable or strategically important 
(Boddewyn, 1983; Benito, 2005). A basic assumption of these studies is that each 
decision-maker is rational when aiming at achieving profit maximization. 
Consequently, the mainstream literature examines variables affecting firm’s 
economic value resulting in international exit. My research however challenges these 
basic assumptions of mainstream IB research and aims to demonstrate an alternative 
non-rational decision-making on international exit.  
This research argues what really determines an international exit decision is not 
environmental or organizational variables but the entrepreneurs themselves. It is built 
on three fundamental arguments: firstly, current international exit literature 
insufficiently explains the actual decision-making process of international exit. 
Individual (entrepreneurs) should also be included as active agents in decision-
making processes. Secondly, current international exit theory focuses on Western 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) is inapplicable to firms from emerging markets. 
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firms from dragon countries (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) is 
different from those from Western MNEs due to different resources and motivations 
(Mathews, 2009). Thirdly, the entrepreneur is a key active agent in the decision-
making process. Entrepreneurs’ individual differences such as personal goals and 
emotions should be viewed as essential elements influencing decision-making. Such 
influences should not be simply regarded as a disruption or negative impact as 
suggested by rational school (Baron, 2008). Researchers should centre-stage the role 
of entrepreneurs in decision-making process and hence explore individual and non-
economic variables affecting the decision-making on internationalization. 
This research uses theories from the Entrepreneurship field to explain phenomena in 
IB field. Theories and concepts of entrepreneurial emotions, socio-historical theory, 
socio-emotional wealth, and threshold theory are applied to investigate how 
entrepreneurs affect the decision-making on international exit and how their 
emotions shape their actions in internationalization. The data of this research is 
drawn from multiple case studies on Taiwanese entrepreneurs who recently exit 
China. I aim to contribute to current understanding of international exit by explaining 
this decision from an entrepreneurs’ perspective.  
In summary, this research argues international exit is an entrepreneur’s subjective, 
emotion-driven, and personal choice. Entrepreneurs need to achieve financial and 
emotional survival in their foreign operations- otherwise international exit is resulted.  
1.1 Subject of thesis 
My research is inspired by a recent trend that Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in 
China exit. To investigate this trend, I review the context using CIER reports (2008-
2013) and press release (e.g. business weekly, BBC) for background research (see 
section 1.2) and discuss with an experienced Taiwanese entrepreneur invested in 
China. An interesting theme, in addition to environmental and organizational 
variables suggested in CIER reports, emerged after the review that individual 
variables such as entrepreneurs’ management style, political preference, personal 
goals, family, and networks also seem to affect international exit decisions.  
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Following up this finding, I conducted a pilot study to uncover the international exit 
from an entrepreneurs’ perspective. This thesis did not begin as a study of viewing 
the international exit from non-economic and entrepreneurs’ perspective. It was a 
study examining the exit trend of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. My 
pilot study indicates the significant role of entrepreneurs and non-economic variables 
in decision-making that are under-researched. Although we are invited by economists 
to deduce important entrepreneurial decisions by computing costs versus benefits, 
few of us do so.  Instead, after ‘weighing-up’ the ‘hard’ information available, our 
choice is often emotional, I argue. Theories from Entrepreneurship field are applied 
to explain the phenomena, to provide a more balanced view of decision-making in 
internationalization. In short, I am arguing for the centrality of entrepreneur in 
decision-making; for the importance of non-economic variables (personal goals, 
predispositions, and socio-emotional wealth) and entrepreneurial emotions.  
1.2 Research context: Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China 
This research targets Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. Peng (2008) 
highlight the importance and shortage of emerging economies research. Turcan 
(2006) indicates current research of international exit only focus on large 
multinational companies invested/from in developed countries. The absence of 
literature on exit firms invested/from emerging economies is a gap in IB literature.  
Empirically, the Taiwanese Government reports indicate there is a significant change 
of investment trend in terms of motivation, industry and investment amount in China. 
I investigate this trend using the reports of Chung Hua Institution for Economic 
Research (CIER) from 2007-2012 have been used to review this phenomenon. CIER 
is a Taiwanese Government academic research centre; this series of reports 
investigating the foreign operation of Taiwanese firms by using surveys and 
government statistic data. This section provides a summary of the CIER reports in 
order to provide background information of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in 
China from economic, political and cultural perspective. The next section introduces 
the outward investment trend.  
   
4 
 
1.2.1 Taiwanese Entrepreneurs’ Outward Investment Trend 
Rapid globalization has inevitably changed the investment environment and national 
comparative advantages that affects the industry structure and facilitates Darwin’s 
natural selection process (Colantone and Sleuwaegen, 2010). The investment context 
constantly fluctuates, and this is more significant in the emerging economies such as 
China. According to the CIER reports (2007-2012), China is the most popular 
investment destination for Taiwanese entrepreneurs. 
 
Figure 1-1: Major investment destination, by cases, source: CIER (2007-2012) 
Among the top three investment destinations as shown in Figure 1-1 and Figure 1-2, 
the annual number of investment cases and amount in China is significantly higher 
than the other two countries from 2007-2012.  
 
Figure 1-2 Major investment destinations, by amount, Source: CIER (2007-2012) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
China 779 482 249 518 575 454
Vietnam 24 31 16 11 17 24
















Major Investment destinations, by cases
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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Unlike the other two destinations, market expansion in USA is the main reason for 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs to enter into this developed country. The motivation, entry 
mode, commitment level of investment in developed country (USA) is different from 
those in developing countries (China and Vietnam). China is the most popular and 
important production base for Taiwanese entrepreneurs (CIER, 2008), but the 
situation has been changed in recent years (CIER, 2012).  
 
Figure 1-3: Taiwan approved investment in China, by amount, Source: MOEA (1991-2013) 
Figure 1-3 indicates the investment amount has increased steadily from 1991 to 
2008. In 2009, there was a sharp decline of Taiwanese investment in China. 
Although the investment amount increased in 2010, it decreased again in the next 
year. To further investigate the investment trend, Figure 1-4 shows the investment 
cases from 1991 to 2013.  
In general, the investment cases have been steadily increased from 1999 to 2003. 
From 2004, there was a decline of investment cases in China. Although financial 
crisis may be the reason of decline (cases), CIER reports suggest it signals a change 
of investment trend in terms of commitment level and industry. Compared Figure 1-3 
with Figure 1-4, there is still an increase in investment amount from 2003 but a 












































































































Figure 1-4: Taiwan approved investment in China, by cases, Source: MOEA (1991-2013) 
This implies that after 2003, the commitment level of each investment case is greater 
than those before 2003. Small investments are relatively scarce after 2003. In 
general, there is a decline of Taiwanese investment in China in terms of cases. Early 
entrants are usually with smaller commitment while late entrants are with greater 
commitment. This fact implies China is not attractive as before for smaller firms and 
firms with greater resources have greater chance to survive in China.  
Figure 1-5 and Figure 1-6 present the Taiwanese investment in China by industries. 
Comparing the 2007 figure with 2013 figure, two major trends have been identified. 
First trend is the decline of manufacturing industry. In 2007, manufacturing industry 
accounted for 92% of Taiwanese investment in China while in 2013, manufacturing 
industry only accounted for 56%. Although China is still the most popular 
investment destination, Taiwanese entrepreneurs enter into China for other reasons. 
Second trend shows recent Taiwanese investment has been focus on service and 
financial industry. Wholesale and retail trade has been increased from 4% to 11% 
and financial and insurance industry has been sharply increased form 1% to 21 %. 
This implies Taiwanese entrepreneurs no longer consider China as a production base. 
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Recent investment trends are discussed in this section. The next section presents the 
cross-strait political and cultural relationship, which is considered to be influential 
for Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China.  
 
Figure 1-5: 2007 Investment in China, by industry, source: CIER (2007) 
 
Figure 1-6: 2013 Investment in China, by industry, source: CIER 2012 
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1.2.1.1 History and Culture 
The political relationship between Taiwan and China is complex and controversial. 
The Chinese Government claims Taiwan is part of China while the Taiwanese 
Government states that Taiwan is an independent nation. A 1992 consensus states 
“both sides (Taiwan and China) recognize there is only one China, but agree to 
different on its definition”. Figure 1-7 is a summary of key events happened in 
Taiwan and China following a chronological order. 
Although Taiwan is not recognized as a nation by most countries, Taiwan is a 
sovereign state governed by elected Taiwanese president. According to CIER reports, 
despite the political tension between the two governments, Taiwan is economically 
and historically intertwined with China. In addition to aboriginal people, most 
Taiwanese were immigrants from China after the 17th century and the civil war in 
1949. People in Taiwan and China share similar culture, but the situation has 
changed since 1895.  
Following military actions, Chinese ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895. Taiwan became 
a colony of Japan and strongly influenced by Japanese culture through a series of 
“becoming Japanese” activities such as using Japanese, replacing Chinese surname 
with Japanese and taking Japanese education. After 50 years’ governance by the 
Japanese Government, Taiwan was retrieved to Chinese administrative control after 
Japan surrender in 1945. Chinese civil war in 1949 divided China into Chinese and 
Taiwanese Governments. The former leader of China, Chiang Kai-shek, retreated to 
Taiwan and imposed the martial law to disconnect all communication, business 
activities, and transportation to China for national security. During 1950-1960, 
Taiwanese Government worked closely with the USA Government and received 
economic and military aid from USA. Taiwan also became a production base for 
many USA and Japanese MNEs (e.g. IBM and Sony).  
 





In 2001, the Taiwanese Government officially lifted the 50-year ban and reconnected 
the transportation, postal service and direct business activities to China. In 2008, the 
Taiwanese Government had a first formal meeting with the Chinese Government, 
The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was signed in 2010 to 
remove economic restrictions between Taiwan and China, aiming to improve 
competence and encouraging more outward investments of Taiwanese MNEs. In 
2013, a second stage of ECFA, the service trade agreement was signed but received 
strong opposition in the following year. Students in Taiwan occupied the parliament 
2008 June - First formal talks 
with China since dialogue was 
suspended in 1999. 
 
2010 June - Taiwan and China 
sign landmark free trade pact 
seen as most significant 
agreement in 60 years of 
separation. 
 
1895 - China cedes Taiwan 
among other territories to Japan 
after losing the First Sino-
Japanese War. 
 
1949 - Communist victory in 
Chinese Civil War leads to 
evacuation of Kuomintang 
Government to Taiwan, 
imposes martial law 
 
2001 - Taipei lifts a 50-year ban 
on direct trade and investment 
with China 
 
2014 March - Opposition 
supporters occupy parliament to 
against further economic 
collaboration with China.   
 
1683 - China's Qing Dynasty 
formally annexes Taiwan, 
which had governed by 
aboriginal kingdom, China, 
Dutch, and Europe before. 
 
1945 - US places Taiwan under 
Chinese administrative control 
after Japan surrenders. 
 
1950s-1960s - Rapid industrial 
development stimulated by 
export-oriented policy and US 
economic aid  
 
2013 June - Taiwan and China 
sign cross-Strait services trade 
agreement, which allows the 
two sides to invest much more 


















Figure 1-7: China- Taiwan Timeline, Source: BBC (2014) Taiwan Profile 
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to protest the service trade agreement and requested to stop further economic 
collaboration with the Chinese Government to protect Taiwanese sovereignty.  
Despite the confrontational political position, economic activities between Taiwan 
and China continue. The Chinese Government offer carrots and sticks to Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs. The Chinese Government performs missile tests during Taiwanese 
president election while offering tax breaks and concessionary price for land and 
other resources to attract Taiwanese investors. Political tendency is a controversial 
and a problematic topic for Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. The wisdom 
of dealing with political disputes remains a vital task for Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
(CIER, 2009).  
1.2.1.2 Political tension 
BBC Taiwan profile indicates “Taiwan is an island which has for all practical 
purposes been independent since 1950, but which China regards as a rebel region 
that must be reunited with the mainland - by force if necessary” (BBC, 2014). The 
attitude of the Chinese Government and actions they took to stop the Taiwanese 
Government from joining worldwide organization has irritated many Taiwanese. 
Historically speaking, Taiwanese and Chinese share similar culture and language, 
thus they should be psychically close. However, Taiwanese entrepreneurs still suffer 
from great cultural conflicts and liability of foreignness in China for two reasons. 
Firstly, Taiwanese culture is diversified and is a combination of aboriginal, Japanese, 
American, European (Dutch), and Chinese culture. Moreover, after the Chinese 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966, traditional Chinese philosophy, 
including Confucianism and religions, has been removed from culture and education 
system in Mainland China. In comparison, Taiwanese preserve and inherit most of 
traditional Chinese culture. These largely increased the psychic distance between 
Taiwanese and Chinese.   
Secondly, Taiwanese have suffered from the vague ethnic identity. The Chinese 
Government defines Taiwan as a Chinese province and uses diplomacy to deny the 
existence of Taiwan as a nation. Therefore, Taiwan has been isolated from important 
global events and diplomatic relationship. The long-term political oppression from 
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the Chinese Government has irritated Taiwanese nationalists, they protested to 
prevent further contacts and economic collaboration from the Chinese Government 
for national security and sovereignty. On 18th, March 2014, hundreds of Taiwanese 
university students and civil organizations occupied Taiwanese Parliament for 24 
days to protest the introducing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement. USA 
representative Chris Smith commented on this protest “The people of Taiwan can be 
proud of democratic freedoms that have flourished in Taiwan these past decades, but 
they must remain vigilant in safeguarding them”. These protests implied that some 
Taiwanese are emotionally detached from China although they are economically and 
historically bounded to China.  
Political tension between Taiwan and China is reflected in investment flows. In 1996, 
Lee Teng-Hui, the former Taiwanese president and the supporter of Taiwan 
independence claimed that a special state-to-state relationship existed between 
Taiwan and China. To protect national security and sovereignty, Lee Teng-hui 
restricted financial, insurance and some high technology industries to invest in China. 
In 2009, president Ma Ying-Jeou loosened the restriction of high technology industry, 
thus led to another peak of Taiwanese investment in China (see Figure 1-3). 
Taiwanese investment in China is not only driven by markets, but also by the 
political tension between these two governments.  
There are two political parties in Taiwan: Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and 
Kuomintang (KMT). Supporters of each party have different attitudes towards 
investment in China. DPP’s supporters fight for the independence of Taiwan. They 
believe the economic collaboration and contacts with the Chinese Government 
should be restricted to protect the sovereignty of Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs should diversify their investment to other countries so they do not 
overly rely on China. KMT’s supporters hold different views. They consider Taiwan 
to be an independent country, but prefer to maintain the current relationship with 
China instead of claiming its independence. KMT’s supporters see that economic 
development is the first priority for Taiwan; economic collaboration with the Chinese 
Government is thus a shortcut for Taiwanese to create another economic miracle. 
Each party introduces different policies in facing the China issue.   
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Taiwanese entrepreneurs may find it easier to enter China due to historical and 
cultural similarities. However, these similarities also create another controversial 
issue for entrepreneurs: their ethnic identity. They are forced to accept a new 
nationality given by the Chinese Government, and hence have to deal with the cross-
strait political tension and pressure from both home and host country. In addition, 
they have to manage a diverse workforce who no longer share same traditional 
Chinese culture as before and have opposite political view with them. These political, 
historical, and cultural complexities separate Taiwanese entrepreneurs from other 
foreign entrepreneurs in China, and thus bring new challenges that may influence the 
operation of Taiwanese firms in China.  
1.2.1.3 Entrepreneurship in Taiwan and China 
Bruton et al. (2010) argue the institutions have proven to be powerful in examining 
Entrepreneurship topics in cross-border activities, particularly in the context of 
emerging economies. Institutional environment limits entrepreneurial opportunities, 
thus affects new venture creation. The institutional distance between entrepreneurs 
and locals may create new findings that are not discussed in domestic context.  
In terms of the impact of formal institutions on entrepreneurship, Siu (2005) 
investigate 391 entrepreneurs in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan to uncover the 
effects of environmental difference on entrepreneurial behaviour and decision-
making. His findings shows entrepreneurs in China adopt relation-oriented (guanxi) 
strategies and commit great resources in building relationship with government 
agency due to the strong government influence in the market. The relationship with 
government is the shortcut to success for entrepreneurs operating in China (Zhou, 
2013). In comparison, entrepreneurs in Taiwan operate in a politically constrained 
but economically free environment. They tend to commit resources in business 
operation and foster relationship with suppliers and customers instead of government.  
In terms of the impact of informal institutions on entrepreneurship, Nguyen et al. 
(2009) examine the impact of culture on entrepreneurs’ desire, intention and 
confidences in entrepreneurial process. China is a transition economy and has 
relatively thin formal institutions, implying the informal institutions play a more 
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significant role in China (Siu, 2005).  In comparison, Taiwan is a newly 
industrialised economy that has legitimized and supported private firms for over half 
a century. As shown in section 1.2.1.1, Taiwanese culture is the combination of 
Chinese, Japanese and American culture that has significant impact on the 
entrepreneurship. In terms of Chinese culture, the Confucian values, followed later 
by similar values in Taoism and Buddhism, put strong emphases on the importance 
of society, group, and hierarchical relationships. Although entrepreneurs in China 
and Taiwan both share Confucian, Taoism, and Buddhism values, its impact is less 
significant in China due to the Cultural Revolution in 1970s (Hsing, 1998). 
Additionally, the Communism culture in China increase the difficulties for 
entrepreneurs due to the lack of private property rights, restrictive taxation, 
bureaucratic-administrative business culture and excessive administrative discretion 
and corruption in government offices (Puffer et al., 2010).  
In summary, entrepreneurs in Taiwan enjoy a relatively free and stable business 
environment due to the more complete formal institutions. Additionally, the special 
relationship between the US and Taiwan has a particular influence on the Taiwanese 
business culture. Compare with entrepreneurs in China, entrepreneurs in Taiwan are 
more contract-oriented than relationship oriented in doing business (Nguyen et al., 
2009). As shown in Hofstede’s index, they also shows less power distance (a society 
that believes that inequalities amongst people are acceptable) than entrepreneurs in 
China, implying a less hierarchical business environment and flat organizational 
structure. The above difference shows the institutional distance of entrepreneurs in 
Taiwan and China, suggesting potential difficulties for Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
invested in China.  
1.2.2 Review of the internationalization process- entry and exit 
Figure 1-8 presents a summary of the motivations of Taiwanese investment in China 
(CIER, 2007-2012). There are two major trends in Taiwanese investment in China. 
Firstly, the motivation is shifted from production to market expansion (see Figure 
1-8).  The labour and property costs in China have rapidly increased due to its fast-
growing economy. China is no longer a manufacturing paradise for labour-intensive 
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industries. CIER (2012) indicates the profits of manufacturing firms have been 
shrunk to 5% or less. Therefore in recent years, Taiwanese entrepreneurs enter China 
for market expansion rather than export-oriented production. The rising position of 
Chinese market in the world may change the investment plan of Taiwanese firms.  
 
Figure 1-8: Motivation to invest in China, Source: CIER reports 2007-2012 
Secondly, strategic importance has become a major motivation since 2011. This 
could be due to the modification of operation mode in China. In the early stage of 
internationalization, Taiwanese firms shift the production line to China while 
remaining headquarters in Taiwan. Recently, the strategic importance of Chinese 
market has significantly increased, together with the rise of Chinese education level, 
Taiwanese firms thus start to localise and relocate headquarter to China.  These two 
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aspects imply that the investment environment in China is changing. Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs are still interested in China; however, they tend to build up a 
management centre rather than a production base there. Entrepreneurs localise their 
firms to better meet local customers’ demand thus give more power to their local 
management team. In the near future, Chinese subsidiary is predicted to replace the 
position of Taiwanese headquarter and become Asian management centre due to 
expanded Chinese market and its strategic importance (CIER, 2007-2012).  
 
Figure 1-9: Difficulties in China, source: CIER reports (2008-2013) 
Despite the advantage of entering Chinese market as reviewed above, Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs still seek international exit from this country. This is not only due to 
financial loss but also other difficulties they experienced in China (CIER, 2012). 
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Figure 1-9 presents the difficulties that Taiwanese entrepreneurs experience in China. 
These difficulties may not only directly connect to Taiwanese firm’s financial 
performance but affect their long-term operation in China. The top 3 difficulties are 
labour costs, intense competition and institutional voids and hidden costs. Labour 
costs and competition level are directly connected to firm’s financial performance 
while poor performance results in international exit. Other difficulties such as 
institutional voids and hidden costs, employee-employer conflicts, financial 
regulations, delayed payment, overly bureaucratic custom, restricted financial 
channels and inefficient local government are all associated with Chinese institutions. 
Accordingly, Chinese institutions present major difficulties for Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs and may result in international exit. CIER (2008) suggests informal 
institutions largely substitute formal institutions thus increase the difficulties for 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs.  
This section provides an overview of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. 
Using CIER reports and the Taiwanese Government statistic data, the recent 
investment trend and historical and cultural background (section 1.2.1) and 
internationalization process are discussed. Although China is still a major investment 
destination of Taiwanese entrepreneurs, there is a decline for labour-intensive 
manufacturing industry. Secondly, the cross-strait relationship affects the investment 
trend. The recent political tension may have negative impact on cross-strait economic 
activities.  Thirdly, the motivation of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China has 
been shifted from low-cost production to market expansion. Finally, in addition to 
rising labour costs and intense competition, institutional problems are the main 
difficulty for Taiwanese firms to survive in China. Entrepreneurs are suffering from 
institutional distances despite the historical connections with China; moreover, the 
political tension may increase the distances.  
CIER reports collect data through surveys. The reports use individual firms as unit of 
analysis and target at the general investment trend. However, CIER reports fail to 
uncover the role of Taiwanese entrepreneurs in decision-making. For example, the 
political tension affects Taiwanese investment, but each entrepreneur may have 
different judgements based on their political preference (DDP vs. KMT). In addition, 
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these reports only represent the investment trend of large Taiwanese multinationals 
in China while lacking of exit samples and small-and-medium sized firms. These 
concerns thus inspire this research of investigating entrepreneurs’ mind-set in 
making exit decisions. The next section discusses my research motivations.  
1.3 Research motivation and pilot study 
Bruton et al. (2010) indicate the internationalization activities in emerging economies 
are an interesting and a fruitful area since their unique institutional environment 
shape entrepreneurial behaviours. This research was inspired by the Taiwanese 
government report showing the major exit trend of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested 
in China (see section 1.2.2). A number of reports from business press (Business 
weekly) and Taiwanese government (CIER 2007-2012) provide evidence of the trend 
of international exit. As suggested by Taiwanese government, investigating the exit 
trend of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China is an “urge and important” topic 
(CIER, 2012: 209) since China is the most important business partner. Additionally, 
this research was particularly motivated by McDermott (2010) and Jones et al. 
(2011) that firm’s post entry development remains a “neglected area a neglected 
area among the international business and business strategy academies”(McDermott, 
2010: 1).  
In response to the empirical and academic call, I conduct a pilot study to explore the 
question “Why do Taiwanese entrepreneurs who have invested in China exit” 
(see section 2.4). Meanwhile, I review international exit research and summarize a 
list of variables that may result in international exit (see Appendix A). Interestingly, 
those variables (environmental and organizational variables) I found in the 
international exit literature cannot fully explain the finding of my pilot study. The 
two entrepreneurs emphasized the role of their personal goals, family and 
predisposition of China in making the international exit decisions. Additionally, they 
connected their actions in internationalization with their emotions, highlighting the 
role of entrepreneur’s emotions in decision-making. The finding of my pilot study 
challenges current understanding of international exit: international exit is the 
organizational response the deteriorated environment (Boddewyn, 1963; Benito, 
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2005). Building on my finding of pilot study, this research use entrepreneurs as my 
units of analysis and investigate the impact of their personal goals, family, and 
predisposition of host country, and emotion on decision-making in 
internationalization.   
1.4 Research questions 
Building from the three research gaps (see section 2.1.3): (1) the role of decision 
maker in internationalization (2) internationalization research in emerging 
economies, and (3) post entry behaviours and finding in my pilot study, I concluded 
that international exit is entrepreneurs’ personal choice resulted from both economic 
and non-economic variables. Unlike other IB or strategic management research use 
organizations as units of analysis, the aim of this research is to understand why 
“entrepreneurs” make international exit decisions. My main research question is 
therefore: 
“Why do Taiwanese entrepreneurs who have invested in China exit?” 
Main research question: 
Why do Taiwanese entrepreneurs who have invested in China exit? 
Theme Theme topic Subsidiary research questions 
A Entrepreneurs’ non-economic 
variables resulting international 
exit (predispositions, family, 
personal goals) 
Why do entrepreneurs make international exit decisions? 
Viewed from an individual and non-economic 
perspective. 
B Entrepreneurs’ emotions and 
actions in internationalization 
process 
How do incident-generated emotions shape 
entrepreneurs’ actions in internationalisation process 
from entry, operations to exit decisions? 
C The decision making of 
international exit  
How do entrepreneurs make the decision of international 
exit and what is the outcome? 
Table 1-1: Research questions and themes 
Given the insights gained from my pilot study, three research themes are therefore 
developed. Theme A explore entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables resulting 
international exit, targeting entrepreneurs’ predisposition, family and personal goals 
suggested by my pilot study. Theme B examines how entrepreneurs’ emotions shape 
their actions since emotions are proven significant in decision-making in my pilot 
study. Theme C explain how entrepreneurs make the decision of international exit, 
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aiming to provide a comprehensive view of entrepreneurs’ decision making of 
international exit and add the non-economic perspective to Benito and Welch’s (1999) 
model. The reasons for these themes and subsidiary research questions are elucidated 
in section 2.5.Research significance: Why this thesis? 
My interest in international exit started from the empirical side. However, my pilot 
study challenges current IB theories such as foreign divestment (Boddewyn, 1973) 
and de-internationalization (Benito and Welch, 1999). This research argues 
international exit decision is not an organizational decision but an entrepreneur’s 
decision. Following my finding from the pilot study (non-economic variables and 
emotion), this thesis investigates international exit decisions from non-economic and 
individual perspective. To present the significance of this research, current 
understanding of international exit is firstly presented in section 1.4.1.  Research 
gaps are identified in section 1.4.2, showing what we do not know about 
international exit. Finally, section 1.4.3 shows how I fill these research gaps by 
introducing theories in Entrepreneurship field. 
1.4.1 Current understanding of international exit  
International exit is usually a difficult decision an organization has to make, and it 
occurs “when a firm loses one of the ownership, location or internalization 
advantages” (Dunning 1988:22). Benito (2005) suggests international exit is the 
result of unmet organizational performance or strategic changes. This argument is 
perceived from the economic and strategic management perspective; it claims that 
external changes result in poor performance and strategic renewal, thus organization 
chooses to exit host country for better performance. Studies of IB field view 
international exit decisions from an economic perspective (e.g. Boddewyn, 1983; 
Duhaime and Baird, 1987; Li, 1995; Mata and Portugal, 2000). That is, it is a profit 
maximizing decision to minimize the financial loss or pursue better performance.  
Benito and Welch (1997) define de-internationalization (international exit) as an 
organizational response to altered market or environment conditions. From this 
economic rational perspective, international exit is the consequence of poor 
organizational performance resulted from operative outcomes of changes in 
   
20 
 
transaction, production costs and sales revenue. This suggests that international exit 
is a failure associated with bad judgments, inappropriate strategies, and current 
incapability to problem-solving or an inferior future (Boddewyn, 1983).  
In addition to the “failure” perspective, other scholars consider international exit to 
be a strategic move regardless its success or failure; it is a belief that this move can 
somehow improve organizational performance (De Rond and Thietart, 2007). 
Therefore, it is possible for firms to divest a not “fit” whilst profitable ventures 
(Duhaime and Grant, 1984). In this case, international exit enables efficiency 
improvement (Fisch and Zschoche, 2012) and a pursuit of different organizational 
goals (Makino et al., 2007). Early studies of Foreign divestment (FD) mainly focus 
on large Western MNEs (e.g. Boddewyn, 1979, 1983; Duhaime and Grant, 1984; Li 
and Guisinger, 1991) and their foreign subsidiaries. These scholars claim that 
“subsidiaries are born, grow and die.” That is, foreign subsidiaries are born with 
certain missions, and they will be closed whenever their missions completed. Using 
Vernon’s (1966) life cycle theory to explain international exit, Benito and Welch 
(1997) suggests international exit is the last step for a declining industry, it is the 
natural route in an end-game situation. International exit is thus anticipated but not a 
shock, and it is not necessarily a de-internationalization but part of the 
internationalization process (McDermott, 2010).  
From different perspectives (failure and strategic choice), IB scholars conclude that 
international exit is based on a belief which this action can somehow improve a 
firm’s strategic management and organizational performance (Benito and Welch, 
1997; McDermott, 2010). IB researchers pay more attention to the economic value of 
a firm such as financial performance and strategic importance (Benito, 2005; 
McDermott, 2010; Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2013); hence, two types of variables 
are frequently discussed: environmental and organizational variables.  
A basic assumption of studies targeting on environmental variables is that 
international exit is the organizational response to deteriorated environment such as 
economic conditions (Box, 2008), institutions (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2009), 
industrial competition (Shaver et al., 1997), and rising costs (Fisch and Zschoche, 
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2012). Environmental/external condition would result in unmet organizational 
performance, which is strongly connected to international exit (Benito and Welch, 
1997). Researchers focus on organizational variables argue organizational resources 
have more immediate and direct impact on firm’s foreign operation (Geroski et al., 
2010). Organizational variables such as firm characteristics and resources (Li, 1995; 
Mata and Portugal, 2000; Westhead et al., 2001; Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007) and 
entry strategies (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997; Makino et al., 2007; Kronborg and 
Thomsen, 2009) are examined on foreign business closure. From their viewpoints, 
firms exit the host country in order to correct mistakes previously made, such as 
inappropriate strategic choices.  
In summary, international exit is viewed as a failure or strategic change and an 
organizational decision in current IB studies. The summary of these studies is shown 
in section 2.3 and Appendix A.   
1.4.2 Theoretical challenges: needs to focusing on individual level analysis and 
emerging economies 
This section shows two research gaps in current international exit literature: 
individual level analysis and the context of emerging economies. This thesis firstly 
argues international exit should not be viewed as an organizational response as 
suggested by IB scholars. Entrepreneurs should be the key active agents in decision-
making and unit of analysis. Benito and Welch (1997) use the term de-
internationalization to discuss phenomena including divestments, pulling-out of a 
market, downsizing foreign operation, switching from high to low commitment level, 
relocating and shutting down foreign ventures. Although de-internationalization 
discusses similar phenomena like this research, this research use the term 
international exit instead of de-internationalization for following reasons. Firstly, de-
internationalization is a broad term including a variety of activities listed above. 
However, my research only focuses on the most radical organizational change, 
international exit. Secondly, this research examines the exit behaviour instead of 
firms’ overall internationalization strategy. The main focus of this research is why 
“entrepreneurs” make this decision and what is the outcome for “entrepreneurs’, but 
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de-internationalization literature mainly targets at why “headquarters” make this 
decision and what is the impact on headquarters, firm’s strategic management and 
the degree of internationalization. Therefore, the term “international exit” is more 
appropriate than de-internationalization in this research.  
The first research gaps is addressed by my pilot study that international exit is an 
entrepreneurs’ response to poor organizational performance, strategic change and/or 
unmet personal expectations. IB literature typically examines venture closure from 
organizational and environmental levels, neglecting the continuous and pervasive 
interface between entrepreneurs’ cognition and emotions. Thus it is incapable to 
explain why entrepreneurs of my pilot study shut down a profitable and strategic 
important foreign venture. In strategic management literature, Gilmour (1973) 
suggests withdraw decisions are more centralized in decision-making and is 
characterised by less decision rationality. He argues it is more a personal choice of 
decision maker than a rational and organizational decision. This research shows the 
role of entrepreneur, but it is a domestic divestment research and the definition of 
decision rationality is not clear.  
In international entrepreneurship literature, Turcan (2006) indicates entrepreneurs’ 
escalation of commitment would procrastinate de-internationalization, thus result in 
blind persistence in poor performing foreign ventures. Although this research shows 
how entrepreneurs’ subjective evaluation affects their decision-making, it views it as 
the obstacle of making a rational and timely de-internationalization decision. It fails 
to explain the voluntary and perceived successful business closure in my pilot study. 
In business closure literature in Entrepreneurship field, DeTienne et al. (2008) 
indicate the fallacy of “only the strong survive”. They argue each entrepreneur have 
idiosyncratic threshold of performance; thus, they may make different decisions 
under the same situation. This research focuses on domestic business closure thus is 
insufficient to explain the impact of entrepreneurs’ predisposition of host country, 
proven to be key factory in the pilot study. 
Accordingly, the role of the entrepreneur in making international exit decisions is 
shown in strategic management, international entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship 
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literature, indicating the theoretical significance of this research. However, each 
strand of theories alone is insufficient to explain international exit since this research 
requires interdisciplinary knowledge including strategic management, 
internationalization, and entrepreneurship field.  
The second research gap is the lack of emerging economies research on international 
exit. My research targets international exit decisions of Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
invested in China, because the impact of radically changing and turbulent institutions 
in emerging economies is relatively under explored (Wright et al., 2005). A great 
deal of research on IB focuses on internationalization in the developed countries 
(Wright et al., 2005), which seems to have a stable institutional framework that 
usually requires less emphasis. However, emerging economies have become a major 
foreign investment destination in recent decades, and attract more attentions from 
scholars of IB studies (Peng et al., 2008a). The informal and formal constraints of an 
institution, regarded as the “rules of the game” (North, 1990) are the main force in 
shaping the strategy of a foreign firm (Wright et al., 2005). Thus, an institution-based 
view could be as important as the other two views (resource-based and industry-
based) for foreign firms engaged in emerging economies (Chung and Beamish, 2005; 
Peng et al., 2008a; Xu and Meyer, 2012). The research context of this thesis is 
expected to have significant impact on international exit decisions (see section 1.2).  
My research aims to shed the light on entrepreneurs’ impact on decision-making. 
Following my pilot study, I explore the impact of entrepreneurs’ non-economic 
variables (personal goals, predispositions and family) and emotions on decision-
making in international exit. To understand international exit from non-economic and 
emotional perspective, I found it necessary to integrate the IB and Entrepreneurship 
theory to achieve a more satisfactory explanation of entrepreneurs’ decision-making 
of my pilot study. The shortcomings of IB research are addressed by two 
entrepreneurship theories: Threshold theory (Gimeno, 1997), entrepreneurial emotion 
(Baron, 2008; Cardon et al., 2012), and learning theory (Vygotsky, 1997). The next 
section presents Entrepreneurship theories that used in each theme.  
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1.4.3 The role of entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables in international exit 
decisions 
This section introduces concepts and theories used in this thesis. Firstly, Theme A is 
inspired by Gimeno et al. (1997) and Detienne et al. (2008) that organizational 
performance is not the only criterion in making an exit decision, entrepreneurs are 
seems to have idiosyncratic threshold of performance to examine the value of the 
firm and make exit decisions accordingly. The value of a firm is composed by firm’s 
economic and non-economic value (Zellweger and Astrachan, 2008). Entrepreneurs 
may be less sensitive to financial loss (economic value) if they perceive higher non-
economic value of the firm. For example, higher socio-emotional wealth of family 
firms reduce the threshold of performance thus affect exit decisions (DeTienne and 
Chirico, 2013).  
My pilot study shows three non-economic variables that compose the non-economic 
value of the firm: predispositions, personal goals and family. Vygotsky’s (1997) 
learning theory is applied to explain entrepreneurs’ predispositions, showing that 
entrepreneurs’ social and historical experience construct their predispositions of host 
country and these predispositions would shape their interpretation of next social and 
historical experience. The state of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) theory is introduced 
to explain the role of entrepreneur’s personal goals, indicating entrepreneurs are 
driven by things they are interested in and enjoy (Chrisman et al., 2012). The family 
socio-emotional wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) is applied to explain the role of 
family since entrepreneurs may lower the threshold of performance if the venture 
have higher socio-emotional wealth (Detienne and Chirico, 2014). In summary, 
economic perspective in IB field alone unlikely helps explain entrepreneurs’ 
decisions in my pilot study. A non-economic perspective and theories in 
Entrepreneurship field are introduced to achieve a more satisfactory explanation.    
In Theme B, entrepreneurial emotion literature shows how emotions shape 
entrepreneurs’ behaviour in terms of opportunity recognition (Welpe et al., 2012), 
commitment (Foo et al., 2009), and entrepreneurial process (Baron, 2008). The 
individual’s emotional state is expected to have the greatest influence on 
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entrepreneurial cognition under the conditions of high uncertainty and risk or making 
complex decisions given limited time and information (Forgas and George, 2001; 
Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). As a foreign entrepreneur who makes decisions on 
emerging markets, Taiwanese entrepreneurs face higher risk and uncertainty due to 
the institutional distances. Hence, entrepreneurs’ emotions may provide an 
alternative explanation to entrepreneurs’ actions in internationalization in addition to 
economic rational perspectives. International exit can therefore be influenced by both 
economic and non-economic variables.  
To investigate the international exit journey holistically from entrepreneurs’ 
perspective, a theoretical framework is developed, tested, and revised in Theme C. 
This framework is built on Benito and Welch’s (1997) decision-making model of de-
internationalization and revised by threshold theory in Theme A (Gimeno et al., 1997) 
and entrepreneurial emotion literature in Theme B to provide an alternative 
explanation to entrepreneurs’ decisions in internationalization in addition to 
economic rational perspectives. This section provides overviews of the research 
arrangement and key concepts. The next section presents the research questions.    
1.5 Research process and summary of method 
I started my research with Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China for the 
following reasons: practical importance and theoretical significance. Practically, as 
discussed in section 1.2, Taiwanese government and the press identified the exit 
trend of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. Since China is the most 
important business partner, Taiwanese government call for more in-depth 
investigation of this trend. To investigate international exit, a lengthy literature 
review was conducted on 136 articles on foreign business closure, foreign 
divestment/divestiture, de-internationalization and international exit (see Appendix 
A). Meanwhile, the pilot study was conducted on two Taiwanese entrepreneurs who 
have exited China. Surprisingly, the theories normally explaining international exit in 
IB and strategic management literature proved inadequate to explain the empirical 
finding of my pilot study. Hence new theories were considered and fed back to revise 
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the following fieldwork. This process continued until the new theories are capable to 
explain the new findings.  
This is a multi-disciplinary research using theories and concepts from IB (e.g. de-
internationalization, foreign divestment, international strategic management, 
institutions) and Entrepreneurship (entrepreneurial exit, business failure, 
entrepreneurial emotions, family business) field. Individual learning theories are also 
applied to explain the decision-making process. Each theory can explain some 
features of entrepreneurs in making international exit decisions, but falls short of a 
comprehensive explanation. Thus, empirical findings of this research highlight the 
needs of integrating theories in IB and Entrepreneurship and present in a uniform 
body- my theoretical framework (Figure 4-1). 
To answer the research questions, I used data collected from multiple case studies 
including interview and achieves. I use five criteria (section 4.3.2) to ensure a 
balanced sample selection and characteristics of the firms. A total of seven cases 
were selected including five exit cases and two stay cases. Primary empirical data are 
from in-depth interviews with the entrepreneurs. Other data come from interviewing 
entrepreneurs’ family, staff, business partners and friends, company achieves, annual 
reports, press release and websites are studied to provide supplementary data and 
data triangulation (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Critical incident technique was 
applied to conduct interviews, based on interviewees’ accounts of their previous 
experience from their memories (Turcan, 2006). This technique allowed me to 
collect data from entrepreneurs’ perspectives and in their own words without any 
given framework and hence identify rare incidents to discover the causes and 
outcomes of decision-making on the international exit.   
This research topic was relatively new in IB and Entrepreneurship field as the 
attention is only recently moved to international exit and entrepreneurs’ emotions 
(Benito, 2005; Cardon et al., 2012).  Therefore, this study intends to contribute to 
theory building rather than theory testing. Multiple case studies methodology was 
used to conduct the data collection since it is suitable for theory building research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). This methodology enabled me to clarify the process that how 
entrepreneurs construct and adjust their cognition through their emotions, and 
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allowed me to compare the idiosyncratic process of each entrepreneur (Zahra et al., 
2005).  








International exit is entrepreneurs’ response to poor 
organizational performance, strategic change and/or 
unmet personal expectations. It is the process by which 
entrepreneurs of privately held firms discontinue the 
operation of their foreign ventures and completely exit 
the host country 
Entrepreneur Section 3.1 I define an entrepreneur as an active owner-manager who 







Section 2.3 Environmental and organizational variables are called 
economic variables in this research. Because they affect a 
firm’s economic value- financial performance and 






Section 3.1 Individual variables refer to entrepreneurs’ reasons of 
making international exit decisions. In this research, 
individual variables are considered to be non-economic 
ones since they are less relevant to organizational 
performance but are important for entrepreneurs to make 
international exit decisions. Entrepreneurs’ non-economic 
variables affect entrepreneurs’ perceived non-economic 
value of a firm and may result in international exit. 
Predispositions 
to host country 
Section 3.1.1 Entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country refer to a 
liability or tendency to act in a particular way or hold a 
particular attitude toward the host country.  
Personal goals Section 3.1.2 Personal goals reflect entrepreneurs’ attitudes, values, 
and intentions of the organizational operation. They can 
be economic or non-economic; this research mainly 





Section 3.1.3 Socio-emotional wealth refers to the non-economic 
aspects of the firm that meet the family’s affective needs. 
Entrepreneurs’ 
Emotions 
Section 3.2 Emotion is the affect, mood or feeling of entrepreneurs 
that is information, moderator, and consequence of 
international exit. This research identifies six incident 
generated emotions: passion, confidence, empathy, anger, 
fear and disgust. Section 4.6.2.1 shows the definition of 
each emotion. 
Table 1-2: Definition of key concepts, source: author 
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Eight key concepts are reviewed and defined in this study. Detailed accounts of each 
concept are provided through different chapters. Table 1-2 is a summary of these 
concepts and the sections where they are discussed. 
1.7  Structure of the thesis 
Figure 1-10 is a glance of the thesis chapters.  
Chapter 2: Understanding international exit literature in IB field 
This chapter offers detailed theoretical view, starting from reviewing the mainstream 
theories of internationalization and international exit in IB field; this aims at 
understanding the evolution of this field. It defines international exit and reviews 
published work in different geographic contexts and level of analysis. From the 
literature review, three research gaps are identified: the shortage of post-entry 
research, individual level analysis and emerging economies research.  The role of 
entrepreneur in making international exit decision is found, but what and how 
entrepreneurs affect decision-making remains a question. To fill the three research 
gaps and answer questions, a pilot study was thus introduced to refine and portray the 
subsidiary research questions. Empirical findings in pilot study formulated the 
research themes and subsidiary questions. Additionally, these findings inspire me to 
apply theories and concepts in Entrepreneurship field to explain the entrepreneurs’ 
international exit decisions, which cannot be explained by current international exit 
theories in IB field. This chapter concludes by introducing research questions and 
themes that will be answered by other strands of literature in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3: Integrating Entrepreneurship theories 
This chapter gives a detailed review of international exit by three identified themes. 
Theme A examines individual variables of international exit using threshold theory 
in business closure literature. Theme B explains the role of entrepreneurs’ emotions 
in shaping their actions by entrepreneurial emotion literature. Theme C summarizes 
the previous two themes. Building on Benito and Welch’s (1997) de-
internationalization decision-making model and revised by theories in 
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Entrepreneurship field, a theoretical framework of entrepreneurs’ decision-making 
on international exit is proposed.  
Chapter 4: Methodology 
This chapter presents detailed review of the research design. This research employs a 
multiple case study approach to explore the usefulness of the theoretical framework. 
Case companies are carefully selected following 5 sampling criterion and different 
sources of data are used through the analysis. The data was collected from interviews 
with entrepreneurs, stakeholders, websites, videos and archival data until reached the 
point the data saturation. Examples of data coding and analysis are shown in this 
chapter.  
Chapter 5: Finding of case companies 
This chapter presents the empirical part of the thesis and gives an overview of the 
cases and their internationalization process. The data presentation structure is based 
on each theme: general information of the case company and entrepreneur, individual 
variables (Theme A), positive and negative emotions as well as actions (Theme B), 
and entrepreneurs’ definition of international exit and its outcomes (Theme C). Six 
emotions are selected since they are frequently appeared and connected to 
entrepreneurs’ decision-making in internationalization (Doern and Goss, 2014). This 
chapter provides data for further discussion in the discussion chapter.  
Chapter 6: Discussion 
This chapter provides the analysis and discussion of the data informed by the 
literature review in order to answer the research questions under each theme. It tests 
the usefulness of theoretical framework suggested in Chapter 3, and revised 
according to my empirical finding in Chapter 5. This chapter responds to research 
questions: Why do entrepreneurs make international exit decisions (Theme A)? How 
do incident-generated emotions shape entrepreneurs’ actions in internationalization 
process from entry, operations to exit decisions (Theme B)? How do entrepreneurs 
make the decision of international exit and what is the outcome (Theme C)? A 
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revised framework of decision-making in international exit is also presented based on 
the data analysis 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
This chapter concludes the thesis and discusses the research’s theoretical 
contributions on the field of IB and Entrepreneurship. The integration of IB and 
Entrepreneurship theories provides a better explanation of the international exit of 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. This thesis underlines the role of 
entrepreneurs in making international exit decisions, showing how their personal 
predispositions and needs (family and goals) diverge their decisions from rational 
optimal. Although organizational performance is important, there are something 
more important than financial performance in an entrepreneur’s mind. Additionally, 
this research emphasises the centrality of entrepreneurs’ emotions, which are rarely 
discussed or viewed as a disruption to make rational decisions in IB and strategic 
management literature. The research shows the attractiveness of entrepreneurs’ 
emotions and what kinds of emotions are related to opportunity pursuit, individual 
learning, and international exit decisions. 
In summary, this section shows international exit is not an organization’s decision. 
Alternatively, it is an entrepreneur’s subjective, emotion-driven, and personal choice. 
Entrepreneurs not only need to achieve financial survival but also emotional survival 
in their foreign operations. It is time to acknowledge emotions are as important as 
cognition, which usually assumed purely rational. Emotions and cognitions are parts 
of each other; therefore, the decision-making of international exit is the merger of the 
two.  
This chapter also recommends to practitioners (entrepreneurs/managers and policy 
makers), suggesting how to learn and adapt in the institutional distant country and 
how they may manage their emotions for opportunity pursuit and long-term survival 
in foreign country. The thesis ends with suggestions for future research and possible 
potential publications. 
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Theory      Fieldwork 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Thesis subject, motivations, research process and key concepts. 
 The research context of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China 
Chapter 2: Review of IB theory 
 The evolution of internationalization theory 
 Definition of international exit 
 International exit research in different geographic contexts 
 International exit research from economic perspectives: environmental and organizational variables  
Research gaps: post entry research, individual level analysis, emerging economies 
Pilot study 
 3 non-economic variables: personal goals, predispositions of host country, and family 
 The role of emotions in shaping entrepreneurs’ action 
 
Research questions and three research themes 
Chapter 3: Integrating Entrepreneurship theories 
Provides further insights into how to address gaps 
identified by pilot study: 
 Theme A: Why do entrepreneurs make 
international exit decisions?  
Threshold theory, business closure and 
entrepreneurial exit literature  
 Theme B: How do incident-generated emotions 
shape entrepreneurs’ actions in internationalization 
process from entry, operations to exit decisions? 
Entrepreneurial emotion literature 
 Theme C: How do entrepreneurs make the 
decision of international exit and what is the 
outcome? 
Decision-making process of international exit  
Concludes with a theoretical framework to provide an 
integrative approach to explain the role of entrepreneurs in 
making international exit decisions.   
 
Chapter 4: Methodology 
 Paradigm: Critical realism 
 Approach: Qualitative, retroductive 
 Research design: Multiple case study of Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs invested in China 
 Data collection: Multiple sources/triangulation 
 Data analysis: within case and cross case analysis 
 Data presentation: tables, figures and critical 
incidents in Appendix C 
 
Chapter 5: Findings 
The data presentation structure is based on each theme.  
 5 exit cases and 2 stay cases 
 Case company overview and organizational 
structure 
 Individual variables (Theme A) 
 Positive emotions and actions (Theme B) 
 Negative emotions and actions (Theme B) 
 Entrepreneur’s definition and reasons of 
international exit (Theme C) 
Chapter 6: Discussion 
Theme A: Why do entrepreneurs make international exit decisions?  
 Entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables (predisposition, family, personal goals) affect the non-economic value of 
owning the firms, thus change entrepreneurs’ threshold of performance. The unmet new threshold of performance 
result in international exit.  
Theme B: How do incident-generated emotions shape entrepreneurs’ actions in internationalization process from entry, 
operations to exit decisions? 
 Identify 6 different emotions and discuss what actions they may result.  
Theme C: How do entrepreneurs make the decision of international exit and what is the outcome? 
 Test the usefulness of the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, and revised it according to my data.  
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 Theoretical contribution, managerial implication and policy implication 
 Evaluation of the thesis and future research directions 
Figure 1-10: Structure of the thesis, source: author  
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Chapter 2 : Understanding international exit-                                        
An International Business perspective 
 
Chapter 2 examines the role of entrepreneurs in international exit by systemically 
reviewing studies on internationalization, current debates on international exit, a pilot 
study and research gaps. Figure 2-1 presents the structure of the literature review 
(Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). This chapter focuses on international exit literature in 
International Business (IB) field and identifies 3 main research gaps:  the shortage of 
international exit research, individual level analysis and emerging economic research 
(see section 2.3.3). To address these research gaps, the main research question is 
proposed guided by three research themes. Chapter 3 examines each research theme 
using literature in Entrepreneurship field.   
This chapter starts by a brief discussion of the evolution of internationalization 
theories and the behavioural turn in the International Business (IB) field (section 2.1).  
Section 2.2 then moves to review theories and definitions of international exit by 














Internationalization: section 2.1 
 
International exit: section 2.2 
IB perspective: section 2.3 
Entrepreneurship perspective: section 3.1 
Entrepreneurial emotion 
actions: section 3.2 
Figure 2-1 Structure of Literature review, source: author 
International exit decision-
making: section 3.3 
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International exit is the result of unmet organizational performance or strategic 
changes (Benito, 2005). This argument is based upon an economic and strategy 
management perspective in which external changes lead to poor performance and 
strategic renewal thus organizations exit host country for better performance.  
Environmental and organizational variables have been examined in section 2.3 since 
these variables affect organizational performance and survival.  Guided by the 
research gaps, a pilot study is conducted to examine the decision-making of 
international exit from entrepreneurs’ perspective. The result is presented in section 
2.4; inspiring three main themes and subsidiary research questions to further 
investigate the role of entrepreneur in making international exit decisions in section 
2.5. The next section gives an overview of theories and concepts of 
internationalization.  
2.1 Theories and Concepts of Internationalization  
This section gives an overview of the theory development in International Business 
(IB) field, highlighting the behavioural turn in internationalization research. Scholars, 
business experts and Government officers have encouraged firms, including 
established and new ventures, to internationalize.  Internationalization is considered 
to be a critical decision for firms and a symbol of success.  It is defined as “the 
process of increasing involvement in international markets” (Welch and Luostarinen, 
1988:333).  Internationalization can be presented in many ways: export, joint 
ventures, licensing, acquisition and foreign direct investment (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1993).  To internationalize, firms firstly need to have the motivation and secondly 
need to develop international strategies to decide a destination country, an entry 
mode, and to what extent a global production chain is established and maintained. 
Finally, firms need to acquire necessary resources to implement internationalization.  
2.1.1 Internationalization: Rational Perspective 
This section examines the economic rational model of decision-making, suggesting 
decision makers rely on the objective analysis to make a profit maximization 
decision. Since the mid-1970s, IB research has been focused on how, why and when 
firms internationalize.  Internationalization is a strategic decision.  Jones et al. (2011) 
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and Keupp and Gassmann (2009) conclude that most IB literature focuses on the 
antecedents and outcome of internationalization in terms of environmental, 
organizational, or individual levels. Studies on internationalization can be broadly 
categorised into two main themes: rational and bounded rational perspectives.  The 
classic example of rational perspective is John Dunning’s eclectic paradigm model 
(OLI model), he suggests internationalization is the static pattern of investment in 
foreign countries that should be designed by the economic analysis of transaction 
costs (Dunning, 1988b). Hence, internationalization should be a profit maximising 
decision. 
A rational decision requires comprehensive and scientific analyses of current 
environment and resources (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997).  Decision makers 
need to seek all alternatives by accessing relevant information, evaluate possible 
outcomes of these alternatives and current resources, and hence select the best option 
(Allison and Zelikow, 1971; Ansoff, 1977; Andrews, 1987). Strategic decision-
making is a formal, linear, optimizing and systemic planning process (Ansoff, 1977). 
Scholars adopting rational perspective borrow concepts from economic models to 
objectively analyse the situation and make decisions. Theories emerged from 
economics concepts are used to explain the internationalization of large Western 
MNEs. For example, OLI model (Dunning, 1988b), transaction cost (Coase, 1937), 
and internationalization theory (Rugman, 1981; Buckley and Casson, 1998) using 
economic models to explain the international entry decision.  
A rational perspective means that the decision-making matches firm’s resources with 
external environment to achieve profit maximization. In line with rational 
perspective, Dunning’s OLI model (1988) explains internationalization citing three 
advantages: ownership, internalization and location.   The core concept of this model 
suggests international production pattern is the eclectic choice among ownership, 
internalization and location advantages to achieve maximum profit (Dunning, 1988). 
A researcher studying internationalization using rational perspective usually focuses 
on environmental and organizational level analysis and examines cause and effect 
relationship. A basic argument of rational perspective is that decision makers are 
rational and aim to achieve profit/utility maximization.  The next section challenges 
   
35 
 
this view by presenting the behavioural turn- the emergence of Uppsala model, 
International Entrepreneurship (IE) field and LLL model. 
2.1.2 Internationalization: the behavioural turn 
The other group of scholars has disputed the rational perspective.  For example, Dean 
and Sharfman (1993) argue that the degree of decision rationality depends upon the 
task complexity and environmental uncertainty.  In reality, decision makers are 
surrounded by information more than they can comprehend (Mintzberg, 1978). From 
this point of view, Mintzberg (1978) argue that decision making is not a cause and 
effect relationship, rather it is a closely intertwined process.  Pettigrew (1992) agrees 
with this critique and states the strategy planning is not a scientific calculation but a 
pool of evolutional thoughts from various dimensions to consider how they can differ 
the organization.  The decision-making is not a rational process of searching an 
optimal choice; instead, as Schwarz (2011) notes, it is a bounded rational process of  
searching the first satisfied option.  
Schwarz (2011) argues individuals are partly rational and use heuristics to make 
decisions.  The process of obtaining critical knowledge of decision-making is in fact 
a procedure of perceiving, selecting, and interpreting. In line with this view, Ocasio 
(1997: 188) explains: “what decision-makers do depends on what issues and answers 
they focus their attention on”.  Cognitive biases and selective perception limit the 
information and options considered, thus decision makers use a simplified model and 
restrict searching behaviour to make decisions, which is the first satisfactory 
outcome rather than rational optimum suggested by rational perspective (Cyert and 
March, 1963b; Schwenk, 1989).  Therefore, full access to information and rational 
analysis is a fantasy rather than reality.  
The bounded rational school argues that decision makers are limited individuals 
rather than omniscient computers.  Although there is a dispute between rational and 
bounded rational perspective and most of strategists assume decision makers are 
rational- people aim to achieve highest level of decision rationality, a rational 
decision is impossible. Echoing Simon (1955), behavioural finance scholars view 
psychological, social, cognitive and emotional variables have an impact on 
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investment decisions (e.g. Taffler, 2010).  They challenge the assumption of investor 
rationality and accept that decision makers do make mistakes: Behavioural Finance 
researchers give an insight into non-rational mind by viewing the decision maker as 
an active agent.       
This behavioural turn also appeared in International Business (IB) field. 
Scandinavian scholars proposed the Uppsala model to explain the 
internationalization process based on behavioural and organizational theories 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Johanson and Vahlne (1990) suggest their model 
predicts the pattern of internationalization: the neighbouring investment and the 
learning-by-doing strategy. The neighbouring investment refers MNEs usually invest 
in successively greater psychic distances style and in one or few countries each time. 
The learning-by-doing strategy means the investment is deliberate and internal 
people who learn from operating in the market: internal people who carry the 
knowledge are the key for internationalization.  
Focusing on the behavioural aspect within a firm, which is not seen as a single entity 
but as a set of shifting coalitions composed of different individuals, each of them has 
their own set of objectives. This approach acknowledges the dynamic and complex 
nature of decision-making process and examines factors that have been excluded 
from rational perspectives. It suggests the existence of uncertainty and accepts the 
constraints on the human decision maker (Casson, 1982). Under the uncertainty, 
“different individuals…under similar circumstances, would make different 
decisions” (Casson, 1982:24).  Entrepreneurs, who are often key decision makers, 
make subjective judgement because they have different access and interpretation of 
information.  
Researchers adopting bounded rational perspective consider decision makers’ unique 
cognition and thinking to be a critical resource influencing decision making and 
strategic process (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  For example, entrepreneurs’ personal 
experience and background (e.g. marketing, technical, social, and returnee 
entrepreneurs) bring different tacit knowledge thus influence firm’s 
internationalization (Jones and Casulli, 2014a). Moreover, entrepreneurs’ orientation 
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(Filatotchev et al., 2009), network (Coviello, 2006) and background (Andersson and 
Wictor, 2003) can also influence their decision-making on internationalization.  
In summary, IB researchers are aware of the role of decision makers in making 
internationalization decisions that economic models are insufficient to explain this 
dynamic context. However, there is a shortage of individual level analysis in this 
field (Jones and Coviello, 2011; McDougall-Covin et al., 2014). In response to the 
call of increasing individual level analysis in internationalization, Benjamin Oviatt 
and Patricia McDougall opened a new scholarly field in 1994: International 
Entrepreneurship (IE) that bridges the International Business (IB) and 
Entrepreneurship field acknowledging the importance of managers and entrepreneurs.   
2.1.2.1 International Entrepreneurship  
This section gives an overview of IE literature; an emerging field that bridges IB and 
Entrepreneurship field and highlights the role of individuals. IE research is 
phenomenological-based: compared to the Uppsala model, IE aims to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of internationalization from different phenomenon. 
International New Ventures (INVs) “seek to derive significant competitive advantage 
from the use of resource and the scale of output in multiple countries” (Oviatt and 
McDougall, 1994:31). INVs attempt to identify, evaluate, and exploit opportunities 
with ownership advantages in an entrepreneurial way through rapid 
internationalization (Di Gregorio et al., 2008).  In line with bounded rational 
perspective, McDougall‐Covin et al. (2014) indicates this area has drawn attention to 
decision makers such as entrepreneurs and mangers in internationalization.  
Moreover, a successful INV requires a leader with international experience, global 
coordination skills, and ownership advantages.  
Keupp and Gassmann (2009) and Jones et al. (2011) suggest that IE has to some 
extent uncovered the impacts of individual knowledge, experience, background, 
networks, and entrepreneurs’ mind-set in internationalization. Some classic models 
have been revised in response to the development of IE.  For example, Johanson and 
Vahlne (2009) revised the 1977 Uppsala model and emphasize the role of network in 
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reducing liability of outsider ship in internationalization. They state that " the 
correlation between the order in which a company enters foreign markets and 
psychic distance has weakened… individuals have acquired more general knowledge 
of foreign environments… this instils in them greater confidence in their ability to 
cope with psychic distance" (2009:1421).   
IE is considered to be effective at examining different concepts, phenomena, and 
issues on internationalization. It acknowledges the role of entrepreneur in 
internationalization and intends to open the black box of internationalization research. 
Emphasis to individual characteristics, behaviours and cognition is in consistent with 
recent behavioural turn in decision-making literature. Additionally, IE focuses on 
different types of firms that form the global economy in terms of their origins, 
operating modes and strategies. Certainly IE examines large MNEs, which usually 
based in USA or Western countries, but IE tends to target at INVs, SMEs and firms 
attract fewer attentions before and aim to uncover their uniqueness (Jones et al., 
2011). The uniqueness of these firms is expected to change conventional model in IB 
field. To give an example, the next section presents Mathews (2002; 2006)’s LLL 
(Linkage, Learning and Leverage,) model, showing how emerging market data 
changes the conventional OLI model.  
2.1.2.2 LLL model 
Illustrations of the LLL model intend to show that current IB models are not 
applicable to emerging economies. Mathews (2002) labels MNEs from emerging 
economies as latecomer MNEs. He develops framework to explain how MNEs from 
dragon countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea) develop catch-up 
strategies to compete with Western giants. The OLI model is regarded insufficient to 
explain current internationalization. Thus, the LLL model is developed as a 
complementary to the OLI model.  The LLL model is based on a resource-based 
view and challenges that the OLI model is incapable of explaining of these 
latecomers since they are unlikely to possess ownership advantages like those 
Western giants. LLL model focuses on how to acquire advantages externally to 
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compensate the lack of ownership advantages (Yiu, 2011). This differs from the OLI 
model as it emphasises firm’s own advantages of internationalization.  
Three main reasons are considered to lead to the introduction of the LLL model.  
Firstly, MNEs from emerging markets are latecomers and are lack of competitive 
advantages in global market.  Secondly, developed countries’ MNEs are established 
in a relatively stable business environment with lower level of government 
interference. In comparison, governments of emerging markets take more or even 
full control of their MNEs. Thirdly, complex institutional environment brings 
different characteristics to their MNEs. LLL model offers a new perspective of 
understanding internationalization of these MNEs. Despite the above difference, the 
OLI and LLL model are actually complementary rather than competing (Mathews, 
2006). Yiu (2011) further suggests the necessity to explore different types of 
emerging economies’ firms since Mathews mainly focuses on dragon MNEs.  In 
addition, Mathew (2006) highlights the difficulties of learning faced by firms due to 
high psychic (institutional) distances. In the context of emerging economies, the 
relationship between learning and institutional distances remains an interesting topic 
for future research.  
As suggested by many IE scholars (e.g. McDougall-Covin et al., 2014; Kiss et al., 
2012 ), different types of firms and business contexts may lead to different types of 
internationalization, it is necessary to revisit conventional theories or even develop 
new theories fitting in emerging economies’ firms. This is also a main research aim 
of this thesis. The next section reviews the development of internationalization 
theories.  
2.1.3 Identifying research gaps from the development of internationalization 
theories 
In general, three research gaps are identified based on the review so far: the role of 
decision maker in internationalization, a model based around emerging markets and 
why entrepreneurs make international exit decisions. In response, this research 
considers entrepreneur to be key active agents that affect the decision-making 
through their cognition, emotions and learning.  Therefore, this research examines 
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the decision-making on internationalization in the context of Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs invested in China.  
The three research gaps are developed on reviewing the OLI model, Uppsala model, 
IE and LLL model. Firstly, the role of decision maker in internationalization is an 
under-researched area.  IE emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs and suggests their 
motivation and resources can contribute to the speed and mode of 
internationalization.  More research are thus called explore on entrepreneurs’ 
cognition, motivation, and goals in internationalization (McDougall-Covin et al., 
2014). This implies a need to shift research focus from rational to bounded rational 
or even non-rational perspectives. A rational perspective, although it is simple and 
logical to indicate the best route of internationalization, is built on the (unfounded) 
presumption that every decision maker is rational.  To provide a more real-life image 
of internationalization, researchers should embrace the fact of individual subjectivity 
and explore how these constraints and biases influence the decision-making on 
internationalization.  
The term commitment is used to describe internationalization instead of investment in 
Uppsala model because internationalization is more than a financial investment 
(Johanson and Vahle, 2009).  It is rather an action with promise and obligation, and 
is emotional attached to the entrepreneur. However, most scholars consider 
internationalization to be an investment and mainly examined from economic and 
strategic perspectives. There is a shortage of internationalization studies regarding 
how entrepreneurs emotionally attached to their foreign ventures. Cardon et al. (2012) 
indicate the impact of entrepreneurial emotions on opportunity recognition, venture 
creation and venture termination.  Entrepreneurs may be driven by their emotions 
instead of economic variables to establish foreign ventures. Moreover, empirical 
evidence from Neuroscience (Damasio, 1994) and Psychology (Goldie, 2000) 
present a complex nature of decision-making that there is no rational decision and 
each decision is accompanied by cognitive biases and emotions.  Although rational 
decision-making has dominated the internationalization literature, I disagree with the 
assumption that decision-making process is rational and consciously analytic.  This 
thesis views entrepreneurs as key active agents that affect the decision-making 
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through their cognition, emotions and learning: the first research gap to which I draw 
attention. 
A second research gap is an absence of models based around emerging markets. 
Mathews (2006)’s LLL model indicates the difference of Western and emerging 
economies’ MNEs in terms of the motives, methods and background of 
internationalization. Peng and Yuan (2008) further indicate the institutional distances 
lead to different strategies, thus conventional internationalization theories fail to 
explain the unique environment of emerging economies. From this viewpoint, 
scholars test existing theories with empirical data from emerging countries. Peng et 
al. (2008b) highlight the strong impact of government on foreign operation and 
foreign venture survival. For example, political connection has been view as an 
important resource in emerging markets that is not found in developed countries (Xu 
and Meyer, 2012). These studies imply the necessity to review the current 
internationalization theories, which may not fully explain or inapplicable to the 
situation in emerging economies.  In response to this call, this research thus looks at 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China.   
How do companies operate in foreign markets?  This question has been considered to 
be the centre of International Business (IB) studies for four decades.  However, most 
studies focus on pre-internationalization instead of post-entry development (Benito, 
2005). Therefore, the question of why entrepreneurs change their mind after 
internationalization and withdraw their commitments is under-researched and thus 
it is the third gap in current research I highlight. This thesis examines firm’s post-
entry development and why entrepreneurs make international exit decisions. Next 
section gives an overview of international exit and defines it from different 
perspectives.   
2.2 Internationalization and International Exit 
Foreign investment, especially foreign direct investment (FDI) indicates a long-term 
commitment to foreign operation. International entry refers to careful evaluation, 
resources commitment and a goal to achieve better organizational performance. 
Therefore, why are foreign organizations still divested or shut down?  
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International exit is quite different from international entry.  Although they are both 
dramatic and significant decisions for firms, they are different in essence in several 
ways.  Firstly, international entry is behaviour of expansion, which is supported by 
internationalization advantages. In contrast, international exit is to reduce or to get 
rid of existing commitments (Gilmour, 1973). Shepherd (2009) suggests venture 
creation has been seen as a success, expansion and excitement event for 
entrepreneurs while venture closure has been seen as an admission of failure, retreat, 
incapable, and grief events.  Therefore, emotionally making an international entry 
decision is easier than making an exit decision.  Secondly, exit barriers (e.g. 
economic/ structural/ managerial factors) are different from entry barriers (e.g. 
liability of foreignness/newness) (Porter, 1980). Exit is then quite different from 
playing the film of entry backwards. 
Thirdly investment decision, divestment decision is more centralized in decision-
making and has fewer of decision rationality comparing to investment decisions 
(Gilmour, 1973). Divestment is more a personal choice of a decision maker than a 
rational decision of that organization:  "The fact that the analyses were personal 
rather than organizational and in the nature of crisis reactions rather than change 
anticipations, means that they cannot be interpreted as being outcomes of strategic 
analysis in the sense intended in the model" [Gilmour 1973:26]. Benito and Welch 
(1997) indicate the change of management team can lead to strategic renewal and 
relocation. Exit decisions are usually associated with poor performance and/or 
strategic changes; therefore, new management team may have new goals that result 
in international exit.  This implies the role of individual interpretation and goals in 
making exit decision, indicating a lack of relevant knowledge. This would be further 
explored in section 3.1.2.  
In summary, international entry and international exit are two distinct behaviours due 
to their nature (Gilmour, 1973), different barriers (Porter, 1980) and the role of 
decision maker (Gilmour, 1973). To give an in-depth understanding of international 
exit and the role of individual in making exit decisions, next section defines 
international exit from International Business (IB) perspectives and Entrepreneurship 
perspectives.  
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2.2.1 Defining International exit 
This section defines international exit from International Business (IB) and 
Entrepreneurship perspectives, suggesting the authority of entrepreneurs in decision-
making should be acknowledged. International exit is often associated with 
significant financial losses and/or dramatic strategic changes: outcomes that most 
firms seek to avoid. International exit is usually a difficult and painful decision an 
organization has to make, and it occurs “when a firm loses one of the ownership, 
location or internalization advantages” (Dunning 1988: 22).  Scholars in the IB field 
use different terms to describe this situation, such as de-internationalization, 
relocation, divestment, divestiture, business closure, or exit. These terms can be 
broadly categorised into two types: decreasing commitment (e.g. divestment and 
divestiture) and shut down (e.g. de-internationalization, relocation, closure of foreign 
units, international/ market exit) (see Table 2-1). 
 Terms Studies 
Shut down Relocation Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2000); Belderbos and Zou 
(2006); Fisch and Zschoche (2011)  
Closure of foreign 
units 




Jackson et al. (2005); Coucke and Sleuwaegen 








Divestment Boddewyn (1979; 1983), Duhaime and Grant (1984), 
Li and Guisinger (1991), Belderbos and Zou (2006), 
Nenito and Welch (1997) 
Divestiture Mata and Portugal (2000) 
Table 2-1: Two types of de-internationalization, source: author 
In general, IB scholars view international exit as “the organizational response to 
deteriorated environment such as economic conditions (Box, 2008), institutions 
(Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2009), industrial competition (Shaver et al., 1997), and 
rising cost” (Fisch and Zschoche, 2012).  In comparison, Entrepreneurship scholars 
define exit as “the process by which the founders of privately held firms leave the 
firm they helped to create; thereby removing themselves, in varying degree, from the 
primary ownership and decision-making structure of the firm” (Detienne, 2010: 203).   
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That is, IB scholars use their organization as the unit of analysis (Benito, 2005) while 
Entrepreneurship scholars acknowledge individual volition and decision-making 
autonomy thus use entrepreneur as their unit of analysis (Wennberg and DeTienne, 
2014).  The following sections review different definitions of international exit in 
these two scholarly fields.  
2.2.1.1International Business perspective on international exit 
This section argues international exit should not be viewed as an organizational 
response as suggested by IB scholars. Entrepreneurs should be the key active agents 
in decision-making and unit of analysis. Benito and Welch (1997) use the term de-
internationalization to discuss phenomena including divestments, pulling-out of a 
market, downsizing foreign operation, switching from high to low commitment level, 
relocating and shutting down foreign ventures. Although de-internationalization 
discusses similar phenomena like this research, this research use the term 
international exit instead of de-internationalization for following reasons. Firstly, de-
internationalization is a broad term including a variety of activities listed above. 
However, my research only focuses on the most radical organizational change, 
international exit. Secondly, this research examines the exit behaviour instead of 
firms’ overall internationalization strategy. The main focus of this research is why 
“entrepreneurs” make this decision and what is the outcome on “entrepreneurs’, but 
de-internationalization literature mainly targets at why “headquarters” make this 
decision and what is the impact on headquarters, firm’s strategic management and 
the degree of internationalization. Therefore, the term “international exit” is more 
appropriate than de-internationalization in this research.  
The evolution of theory  
Jean Boddewyn (1976; 1979; 1983) was the early contributor of Foreign Divestment 
(FD) studies; his studies mainly focus on developed countries MNEs, especially on 
USA MNEs.  He indicates the rising trend of foreign divestment and examines this 
trend from home country perspective (e.g. Boddewyn, 1979), host country 
perspective (e.g. Boddewyn, 1976), and the insight of FD (e.g. Boddewyn, 1983). 
Boddewyn suggest two types of FD: voluntary and involuntary.  Voluntary FD is the 
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deliberate liquidation or sale of part of or all foreign ventures.  It is mainly driven by 
market mechanism. In comparison, other forces such as government interruption 
usually drive involuntary FD. The FD is irrelevant to firms’ performance or strategic 
choice, examples such as nationalizations and expropriations (Boddewyn and 
Torneden, 1973).  
Most studies focus on voluntary FD rather than involuntary FD due to the fact that 
voluntary FD is more common than involuntary one.  This also reflects that most of 
FD studies target on MNEs in developed countries, where the level of institutional 
uncertainty and government interruption are much lower than emerging countries. 
Today, more investors are interested in some emerging economies for their economic 
growth and great markets.  Firms are investing in emerging markets where there is a 
much higher level of government power and institutional void and uncertainty 
(Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2009).  As a result, involuntary FD may increase and FD in 
emerging markets is required for more systemic investigation for the lack of 
comprehensive understanding of the role of institutional in FD (Belderbos and Zou, 
2006).  
In general, the FD literature mainly targets on the divestment of a business, product 
lines, assets, and divisions instead of the exit from an entire international market.  As 
suggested by Haynes et al. (2003), the major purpose of FD is to achieve firm’s 
optimal level of diversification, and international exit is just one method to achieve 
this goal. In comparison, Benito and Welch (1997) focus on de-internationalization 
activities and summarise three types of causes: economic reasons, strategic 
management, and internationalization management. This study adopts Chow and 
Hamilton (1993)’s corporate divestment study and target on why large MNEs de-
internationalize.  Current FD literature does not explicitly distinguish FD from other 
divestment. The de-internationalization literature emphasizes the difference of home 
and host country and explains why firms choose to de-internationalize from varied 
perspectives. This stream of literature suggests de-internationalize could be strategic 
change or internationalization management instead of economic reasons as suggested 
by FD literature.  
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Benito and Welch (1997) suggest two types of de-internationalization: partial and 
full de-internationalization. Partial de-internationalization refers to partially 
withdraw from internationalization while full de-internationalization means terminate 
all foreign operation. Recently, Benito et al. (2009) connect de-internationalization 
with changing foreign operation modes, presenting foreign operation “evolve in 
response to foreign market involvement and developments over time, displaying the 
characteristics of evolutionary dynamics” (Benito et al., 2009: 1464). From this point 
of view, international exit is part of natural evolution process.  
Therefore, the enablers of international exit have been shifted from a failure resulted 
from inadequate judgements and poor performance to natural evolution in 
internationalization. However, both FD and de-internationalization literature are 
based on the data from large Western MNEs. Turcan (2006) argues that the de-
internationalisation process and variables of large MNEs are different from SMEs by 
indicating three constructs: commitment of entrepreneurs, change in networks and 
time. His research indicates the influence of entrepreneurs’ cognitive and 
psychological state on making de-internationalization decisions.   The actions, belief, 
and attitude of entrepreneurs should be taken into consideration to have a more 
realistic view of decision-making. 
In summary, IB scholars examine international exit from organizational level, 
viewing it as an organizational responses to poor performance (failure perspective) or 
a natural strategic move (strategic management). Next section discusses these two 
perspectives in detail.   
Failure or strategic move 
As illustrated above, researchers presume that financial problems are the main 
reasons for international exit (Boddewyn, 1983).  From this traditional economics 
perspective, international exit is the consequence of poor organizational performance 
resulted from operative consequence of changes in transaction, production costs and 
sales revenue.  This view suggests international exit is a failure associated with 
previous bad judgments, inappropriate strategies, and current incapability to solve 
problems or an inferior future (Boddewyn, 1983; DeTienne et al., 2008). Aharoni 
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(1966) suggests decision maker’s predictive capability is small and their knowledge 
is limited in making foreign investment decisions, thus they are in fact likely to make 
poor pre-investment analysis and form inadequate international entry strategies that 
resulted in poor performance and business failure. However, most international exit 
studies still adopted rational perspective and economic evaluation. A behavioural 
approach is more needed to understand how international exit decisions are made 
(McDermott, 2010).  
In addition to the “failure” perspective, the other group of scholars consider 
international exit to be a strategic move regardless firm’s success or failure; it is a 
belief that this change can somehow improve organizational performance (De Rond 
and Thietart, 2007; DeTienne and Cardon, 2012).  Therefore, it is possible for firms 
to divest a “strategically unfit” but profitable ventures (Duhaime and Grant, 1984).  
In this case, international exit enables efficiency improvement (Fisch and Zschoche, 
2012) and the pursuit of different strategic goals (Isobe et al., 2000).  From strategic 
management perspectives, subsidiaries are born, grow and die. That is, foreign 
subsidiaries are born with certain missions, and they will be closed whenever their 
missions completed. Using Vernon’s (1966) life-cycle theory to explain international 
exit, Benito and Welch (1997) suggests, international exit is the last step for a 
declining industries, it is the natural route in end game situation. International exit is 
anticipated but not a shock, and it is not necessary de-internationalization but part of 
internationalization process (McDermott, 2010).  
Perspective Studies Reasons of International 
exit 
Research Gaps 
Failure Boddewyn (1983); Li 
and Guisinger (1991); 
Welch and Wiedersheim-
Paul, (1980) Jackson et 
al. (2005); Coucke and 
Sleuwaegen (2008) 
Previous bad judgments, 
inappropriate strategies, 
current incapability to 
solve problems or an 
inferior future due to 
limited rationality 




McDermott (2010); Fisch 
and Zschoche (2012); 
Tsang and Yip (2007), 
Isobe et al. (2000) 
A strategic move, to 
pursue different goals and 
efficiency improvement 
SMEs research and 
individual level 
analysis 
Table 2-2: Comparison of failure and strategic choice perspective, Source: author 
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The strategic management perspective is widely accepted by recent scholars 
examining the FD of large MNE (e.g. Benito and Welch, 1997; Isobe et al., 2000; 
Belderbos and Zou, 2006). However, there has been a lack of studies offering 
comprehensive understanding of international exit of SMEs (Turcan, 2006). For 
large MNE with rich resources, international exit may result in poor performance in 
annual reports, but for SMEs, it could be a life-and-death issue. SMEs entrepreneurs 
should have different belief, attitude, and psychological state in making exit 
decisions. Table 2-2 compares the failure and strategic move perspectives.  
The focus of international exit research should shift from rational and economic 
perspective to more behavioural and non-economic perspectives; to connect with the 
real world decision-making by embracing the fact that individual is subjective. In 
line with this view, Staw (1981) argues entrepreneurs may persist in an 
underperforming venture for self-esteem, future prediction, or other personal reasons. 
Conversely, they may divest a profitable and strategic fit firm for unmet personal 
goals (Headd, 2003). These two non-rational actions cannot be explained from 
organizational perspective alone but make sense on considering entrepreneurs’ role. 
This implies the centrality of entrepreneurs in making international exit decisions, 
the key argument of this thesis.  
To reveal the role of entrepreneur in decision-making, the next section defines 
international exit from Entrepreneurship perspective. 
2.2.1.2 Entrepreneurship perspective on international exit 
Although foreign divestment (FD) and de-internationalization literature examine 
international exit from rational perspective, these studies do acknowledge the role of 
entrepreneur/ management team in decision-making.  Boddewyn (1983) emphasised 
the role of individual in international exit decision that “the foreign investment 
decision process, then, does not begin with a well-defined problem, and it does not 
proceed through full searches and rational analyses to a final decision. Instead, a 
number of physical (lack of time), economic, and organizational constraints restrict 
the number of alternatives considered and explored; the final decision is further 
affected by the participants' personality, power, subjective expectations, and decision 
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precedents” (Boddewyn, 1983:25). Duhaime and Schwenk (1985) agree with this 
concept and further explore how decision maker’s cognitive process influences their 
divestment decision. More recently, Benito and Welch (1997) suggest the change of 
management team can also lead to international exit since each decision makers have 
their own goals and interpretation of organizational performance. Although 
International Business (IB) researchers highlight the role of individuals in 
international exit decision, they do not examine individual’s impact on decision-
making. 
In response to this call, this section explores international exit on Entrepreneurship 
perspective that view entrepreneurs as active agents in decision-making.  Existing 
research analysing entrepreneurial exit is targeted the exit of individual (Sullivan et 
al., 1997; Bates, 2005; Hessels et al., 2011) or the exit of the venture from the Market 
(Gimeno, 1997; Headd, 2003; Detienne and Chiroco, 2014). IB researchers tend to 
focus on the exit of the organization and largely overlook the impact of the key 
decision maker- entrepreneurs (Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014).  In comparison, 
Entrepreneurship researchers tend to focus on either exit of self-employed 
individuals or exit of firms by applying psychological and sociological theories to 
explore the critical and dynamic component of the entrepreneurial process. 
 
DeTienne (2010) explores the intersection of these two levels of analyses and 
develops a theoretical framework to bridge entrepreneurs’ exit intentions with their 
exit routes. She defines entrepreneurial exit as “the process by which the founders of 
privately held firms leave the firm they helped to create; thereby removing 
themselves, in varying degree, from the primary ownership and decision-making 
structure of the firm” (203).  The focus of her entrepreneurial exit research is 
entrepreneurs’ decision to exit the firm such as business succession and liquidation. 
The focus of this research is entrepreneurs’ decision to exit China using strategies 
such as business sale and liquidation. Business succession is not an international exit 
strategy since entrepreneurs or their family still have control to the business.       
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Defining successful and unsuccessful venture    
Most Entrepreneurship and IB studies view business closure as failure (Headd, 2003).  
However, Headd (2003) and Bates (2005) argue that one-third of entrepreneurs view 
their venture as a success at business closure. Ucbasaran et al. (2010) further 
indicates these entrepreneurs feel exited and satisfied about their business closure.  
This implies business closure and failure are two distinct ideas for entrepreneurs.  
Shepherd and Wiklund (2006) indicate firm failure is synonymous with firm exit 
while exit is not always a failure.  Entrepreneurs may close a venture for shift of 
personal goals (DeTienne and Cardon, 2012), retirement plan (Headd, 2003) or 
alternative employment opportunities (Detienne, 2010).  This view is consistent with 
IB literature that the shift of organizational goals (strategic changes) may result in 
international exit.  
 
In Entrepreneurship, business closure can be the outcome of poor financial 
performance and/or unreached subjective assessment. Discussions of the causes of 
poor performance can be found in Shepherd and Wiklund (2006) and section 2.3. 
Subjective assessment refers to entrepreneurs’ subjective interpretation of 
organizational performance. Using Gimeno’s (1997) threshold theory to explain, 
each entrepreneurs has idiosyncratic threshold of performance building on their 
human capital (Gimeno et al., 1997), personal goals (McGrath, 1999), intentions 
(Detienne and Cardon, 2012) and family interests (Detienne and Chirico, 2013). The 
threshold of performance is the minimum performance level that entrepreneurs are 
willing to accept.  This explains why given the same level of performance, some 
entrepreneurs may shut down a venture while others do not. Section 3.1 provides an 
in-depth review of threshold theory and variables affecting it.  
 
In summary, IB researchers defines international exit as an organizational responses 
to poor performance or strategic change. Entrepreneurship researchers view exit as 
an entrepreneurs’ response to a failure or subjective interpretation of organizational 
performance.  This emerging threshold theory (Gimeno et al., 1997) provides an 
alternative explanation to international exit by viewing entrepreneurs as a 
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heterogeneity group in decision-making. My research is consistent with this 
argument and aims to extend the view by exploring individual variables. My 
definition of international exit is presented in the next section.  
2.2.1.3 My definition of international exit 
To define international exit, I synthesise the definition of exit literature from IB field 
(Benito and Welch, 1999) and Entrepreneurship field (DeTienne et al., 2008).   
“International exit is entrepreneurs’ response to poor organizational 
performance, strategic change and/or unmet personal expectations. It is the 
process by which entrepreneurs of privately held firms discontinue the 
operation of their foreign ventures (in China) and completely exit the host 
country (China)”.  
This research targets the exit of foreign ventures instead of the exit of entrepreneurs. 
In this research, international exit means Taiwanese ventures completely exit China. 
All branches, subsidiaries and business units in China relevant to this venture should 
be discontinued. The venture should completely exit China. Entrepreneurs may have 
other investments in China as long as they are independent from the exit venture. 
This thesis highlights the decision-making authority of entrepreneurs thus focuses on 
the last cause of international exit: unmet personal expectation. Section 3.1 presents 
entrepreneurs’ subjective assessment of performance and section 3.2 examines the 
impact of emotions on international exit decisions. The next section reviews 
international exit research using geographical scope.  
2.2.2 International exit: Developed and developing countries 
Echoing section 2.1.3, this section indicates the shortage of emerging economies 
research and the role of institutions in current international exit studies.  
Table 2-3 shows 3 major types of international exit studies: studies based on USA, 
other developed countries and emerging/newly industrialised studies. 
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Boddewyn and Torneden (1973), 
Boddewyn (1979; 1983; 1985) 
Duhaime and Grant (1984), Li and 
Guisinger (1991) Mitchell et al. 
(1994; 1997), Li (1995), Shaver 
(1998), Shaver and Flyer (2000) 
Mainly 
large 




National, industrial and 
organizational variables 
Viewed international exit as a 
failure 
Implementation process of 
international exit 







Norway (Benito, 1997) Japan (Delios 
and   Beamish, 2001; Belderbos and 
Zhou, 2006; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 
2009; Kim, Lu and Rhee, 2011) UK 
(Padmanabhan, 1993) Greece 
(Fotopoulos and Louri, 2000) 
Portugal (Mata and Portugal, 2000; 
2002) Belgium (Sapienza et al., 2005; 
Coucke and Sleuwaegen, 2008) 
Singapore (Tsang and Yip, 2007) 
Germany (Swoboda, Olejnik and 








organizational variables.  
Viewed international exit as a 
failure or strategic changes.       
Identify the role of 
institutional distances 
Impacts of international exit 
(subsidiary) on headquarters 








Hungary (Steensma and Lyles, 2000), 
Bulgaria (Manolovaa et al., 2010) 
Hong Kong (Child et al., 2003) China 
(Isobe et al., 2000) Taiwan (Cheng 
and Wu, 1996) 
Mainly 
large 
MNEs      
INVs 
(Manolova




highlighting the role of 
institutional distances 
 
Table 2-3: Comparison of USA, other developed countries and developing countries studies, source: author 
Boddewyn (1983) indicates that institutional force is one of the major differences in 
Foreign Divestment (FD) between developed and developing country. Peng et al. 
(2008) argues the internationalization theory should be adjusted by the context of 
internationalization.  In line with this view, Mathews (2006)’s LLL model indicates 
that MNEs from emerging markets have different approaches and motivations of 
internationalization. Accordingly, the unique institutional environment of the host 
and home country is expected to have an impact on international exit decisions. 
2.2.2.1 USA  
Early contributors of international exit studies mainly target large MNEs in USA. 
Boddewyn and Torneden (1973) publish an empirical study focusing on FD in USA 
during 1967-1971. They target Fortune 500 companies and the FD of their 
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subsidiaries.  Duhaime and Grant (1984) survey USA based company from Fortune 
500 companies listed during 1975-1980 to uncover the factors that lead to FD.  In the 
later stage, Li and Guisinger (1991) explore foreign firms in USA during 1978-1988 
and indicate that foreign firms fail less often than local firms due to their unique 
ownership advantages. These early FD studies focus on the USA or USA-based firms 
because of the prosperous USA economy in late 20 centuries, indicating foreign 
ventures with unique ownership advantages enjoy higher survival rate in the USA 
compare with other countries. 
These USA based studies focus on country, industry and firm level variables 
resulting in FD. Boddewyn (1983) concludes seven causes of FD: financial 
considerations, poor pre-investment analysis, adverse environmental conditions, lack 
of fit and resources, structural and organizational factors, external initiating pressure, 
and cultural difference. Although Boddewyn provides an overview of FD, his model 
is based on Fortune 500 firms, which are mostly USA based firms. Boddewyn’s 
finding is not a generalizable truth for all countries since the USA market is 
relatively stable and provides an open environment for foreign entrepreneurs. In 
addition, he views FD as a failure thus only examines variables resulting in poor 
financial performance. The strategic management perspective is under-researched in 
USA based research.  
2.2.2.2 Other Developed Countries  
Another group of scholars examine FD of MNEs from other developed countries 
including Norway, Japan, UK, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Singapore, and Germany 
(see  
Table 2-3).  A great deal of research focuses on large MNEs, examining variables 
resulting in international exit and the impact of international exit on headquarters. 
Comparing with USA based research, variables have been examined from different 
perspectives; units of analysis range from regions and countries, via industries, to 
organizations, and even individuals.  In general, these studies apply economic and 
strategic perspectives to explain international exit. But these studies are more 
fragmented, inconsistent and lack of comprehensive overview due to different 
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context of country, culture and institutions. The role of institutional distances is 
identified but lack systemic research (e.g. Belderbos and Zou, 2006; Tsang and Yip, 
2007). So, my argument includes this point and now goes on to argue the role of 
institutions in my research context: emerging economies.  
2.2.2.3 Emerging/ Newly Industrialized Countries 
This section reviews the role of institutions, particularly informal institutions, in 
research focusing on emerging and newly industrialised countries. Emerging and 
newly industrialised economies are assuming an increasingly important role in the 
global economy. Xu and Meyer (2012) indicate that the contexts of emerging 
economies are different from developed economies including less efficient market, 
government interruption, network/guanxi-based behaviours, and higher risks and 
uncertainty due to political and institutional reasons.  These facts imply that existing 
theories building on developed economies are insufficient to explain emerging 
economies.  
Moreover, although rational perspective is debatable, most of international exit 
studies are based on the assumption that every decision maker is rational. In 
emerging economies, Xu and Meyer (2012) argue rational perspective is less 
appropriate to examine the decision-making in internationalization due to cultural 
differences and institutional voids and uncertainty.  Ji and Dimitratos (2013) further 
examine how Confucian dynamism diverge the decision-making of East Asian 
entrepreneurs from rational optimism.  Meanwhile, entrepreneurs are lack of 
information and usually make decisions under uncertainty due to thin formal 
institutions. This greatly reduces the degree of rationality.  These special phenomena 
highlight a need to find a more appropriate approach to address the decision-making 
of international exit.  
Child et al. (2003) investigate 615 Hong Kong firms in China. Instead of focusing on 
organizational factors, they explore the “fit” between environmental contingencies 
and internal organization and indicate that international exit is in fact a natural 
selection process. Manolova et al. (2010) explore the survival of INVs rather than 
established MNEs in Bulgaria. They indicate personal and inter-firm networks can 
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facilitate the speed of internationalization in transition economy, and increase the 
survival rate of these INVs. Zhou (2013) supports with this view and suggests that 
political connection is a shortcut to success for entrepreneurs invested in China.  
Personal network and political connection have a greater impact on business 
operation in thin formal institutions.  Peng et al. (2009) state that “where formal 
constraints are unclear or fail, informal constraints will play a larger role in 
reducing uncertainty, providing guidance, and conferring legitimacy and rewards to 
managers and firms (198). In emerging economies, network-based strategy is 
predominant in establishing the informal relationship (Wright et al., 2005).  
Although more IB scholars have acknowledged the importance of studying emerging 
economies, there has been a lack of systemic and up-to-date research offering a 
comprehensive understanding of exit in emerging economies (Peng and Yuan, 2008). 
The role of institutions such as the institutional distances between host and home 
country, the institutional-specific strategies and resources and the thin formal 
institutions are expected to have an impact on strategic decision-making. Having 
argued the role of institutions in emerging economies, the next section summarises 
current research gaps.  
2.2.2.4 Summary of Three Types of Studies 
A series of USA FD studies are conducted examining large MNEs from financial 
perspective, suggesting FD is a failure resulted by inappropriate decisions, poor 
performance or deteriorated environment (Boddewyn, 1983).  Benito and Welch 
(1997) present studies of de-internationalization explaining the international exit of 
other developed country MNEs. They extend USA based model and argue 
international exit could be a failure, strategic changes, or internationalization 
management. However, similar to USA based studies, de-internationalization 
research focuses on large MNEs and use firm as the unit of analysis.  
Studies of emerging and newly industrialised economies are scarce and lack of 
systemic investigation.  These studies focus on institutions of emerging economies 
and explore how these firms compete with Western MNEs with their unique 
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approaches and resources (e.g. network, political connection, and learning by OEM). 
To uncover the uniqueness of emerging markets, scholars should develop emerging 
economies assumption theories with reference and comparison of Western 
mainstream theories rather than simply apply conventional ones (Peng and Yuan, 
2008).   
Conventional theories (e.g. Boddewyn, 1983) based on developed countries MNEs 
cannot provide comprehensive understanding to those in emerging countries. As 
indicated in 
Table 2-3, most studies of international exit are based on data in USA or other 
developed countries. Belderbos and Zou (2006) indicate the lack of emerging market 
studies not only exists in early internationalization but also in international exit 
studies. Moreover, most studies focus on large and established MNEs instead of 
other types of ventures. Our current understanding of other types of ventures (e.g. 
INVs and SMEs) and their decision-making in international exit has been limited 
(Mudambi and Zahra, 2007; Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2013).  
In summary, this section identifies three research gaps.  Firstly, there is a shortage of 
emerging market research in international exit focusing on institutions. Secondly, 
there is a shortage of smaller firm’s research in international exit. Together with 
research gaps identified in section 2.1.3: The role of entrepreneur in decision-
making of international exit, this main research question of this thesis is below:  
Why do Taiwanese entrepreneurs who have invested in China exit? 
This thesis uses an individual and emotional perspective to explore international exit 
decisions, and selects five Taiwanese entrepreneurs of privately held SMEs exiting 
China for data collection (see section 4.3.2).  
2.3 International Exit: International Business perspective  
This section reviews international exit literature in IB field, suggesting international 
exit is a rational optimal decision building on the belief that it improves company’s 
strategic, organizational and financial performance (Benito and Welch, 1997; 
McDermott, 2010). My research argues international exit is the outcome of 
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entrepreneurs’ subjective assessment of performance. Before examining individual 
variables affecting the subjective assessment, it is important to understand what 
variables affecting organizational performance. Therefore, all variables discussed in 
this section are economic variables since they change (future) organizational 
performance and this economic outcome may result in international exit. A review of 
environmental and organizational variables is presented in Appendix A. The next 
section presents environmental variables resulting in international exit.  
2.3.1 Environmental Variables  
Environment, including national economic and industrial condition, is the source of 
threats or opportunities affecting international exit decisions (Boddewyn, 1983). A 
basic assumption in these studies is that international exit is the organizational 
response to deteriorated environment such as economic conditions and rising costs 
(Box, 2008; Fisch and Zschoche, 2012), institutions (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2009) 
and industrial competition (Shaver et al., 1997). These variables may result in poor 
organizational performance, which then likely lead to international exit (Benito, 
2005).  
2.3.1.1 Economic conditions and rising costs 
In general, macroeconomic expansion is positive to firms’ survival while economic 
downturn is negative (Box, 2008), and it is a long-term rather than immediate effect 
on exit rate (Geroski et al., 2010). Labour costs are another significant indicator of 
international exit, particularly for manufacturing industry. Fisch and Zshoche (2012) 
examine Germany MNEs and claim that firms shift production to locations with 
opposite labour cost development. Moreover, the economic gap between home and 
host country influence firm’s survival rate as well. Tsang and Yip (2007) examine 
the subsidiaries of Singaporean firms and discover subsidiaries enjoy higher survival 
rate in less developed host countries.  The greater the economic distances leads to 
better survival rate.  
Geroski et al. (2010) indicate firms that internationalize for low labour cost will need 
to constantly relocate their production to country with lower cost. International exit is 
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an inevitable choice and a mean of survival. Appendix A presents studies regarding 
economic condition and rising costs. In general, studies of developed and emerging 
economies indicate that deteriorated economic conditions and rising costs increase 
international exit rate (Geroski et al., 2010). The next section discusses institutions, 
which is the highlight of this section.  
2.3.1.2 Institutions 
Echoing section 2.2.2, this section views that institutions are impactful for 
international exit studies in emerging economies. Emerging economies such as China, 
India, Brazil and Russia are attractive FDI destinations for firms due to the low 
production cost and potential markets.  However, institutional voids and uncertainty 
in emerging economies are major reasons for international exit (Chung and Beamish, 
2005). The investment environment is changing, and it is even more rapid in 
emerging economies. Peng et al. (2008a) indicate that although institutional voids 
and uncertainty received little attention in conventional studies focusing on 
developed country; it is a common and powerful factor in developing countries.  
 
North (1990) Examples Scott (1995) 
Formal institutions Laws Regulative pillars 
Regulations 
Rules 
Informal institutions Ethics Cognitive pillars 
Culture 
Norms Normative pillars 
 
Table 2-4: Definitions of institutions, source Peng et al. (2009) 
Table 2-4 presents the definition of institutions using Scott (1995) and North (1990). 
Scott (1995) introduced the three-pillar conception of institutions: regulative, 
normative and cognitive. The regulative dimension includes: laws, regulations and 
government policies. The regulative dimension is vital for foreign ventures since it 
provide guidelines for operation. Regulative pillar is usually accompanied by written 
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documents, regulations with clear definitions and descriptions, such as laws and rules, 
which help foreign ventures to enter and survive in the host country (Bruton et al., 
2010). The cognitive pillar is more individual, which includes the tacit knowledge 
and skills that derived from the cognitive turn in social science. Bruton et al. (2010) 
comment this pillar that it is usually operates in individual culture and language. 
Normative pillar is the perception amongst the population of a country. 
For example, on setting up a business, regulative pillar means formal institutions, 
referring to documents and regulations one needs to follow in venture creation. 
Normative and cognitive pillars are the informal institutions: the former refers to 
individual belief, value, and norms while the latter mean the habitus and tradition of 
the population.  According to Bruton et al. (2010:423) “institutions guide behaviour 
by defining what is appropriate or expected in various social and commercial 
situations”.  Institutions are the rules of the game for firms entering into a foreign 
country.  In terms of formal institutions, Fischer and Reuber (2003) state that 
government incentives are positive to firm’s early stage of survival. In terms of 
informal institutions, Begley and Tan (2001) suggest entrepreneurs from different 
institutions are motivated by different reasons that are rooted in their culture.  Their 
study shows that American entrepreneurs aim to be innovative and are more risk-
taking since they try to “stand out from the crowd” (Begley and Tan, 2001:549). On 
the other hand, their study also suggest “in shame-based East Asian cultures, people 
uphold community norms, draw signals on appropriate behaviour from groups and 
authorities, and seek to blend into the group” (Begley and Tan, 2001:549).  
Therefore, entrepreneurs from different culture use different approaches to set up 
business. It is thus very possible that they would be motivated by different variables 
to shut down their ventures due to institutional distances. 
The impact of radically changing and turbulent institutions in emerging economies 
has relatively under explored (Wright et al., 2005). Emerging economies become 
major foreign investment destinations in recent decades, and attract more attentions 
from scholars of IB studies (Peng et al., 2008a).  The informal and formal constraints 
of an institution, regarded as “rules of the game” (North, 1990), are the main force in 
shaping the strategy of a foreign firm (Wright et al., 2005). An institution-based view 
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could be as important as, or even more important than, the resource based view 
(Barney, 2001) and industry based view (Porter, 1980) for foreign firms engaged in 
emerging economies (Chung and Beamish, 2005; Peng et al., 2008a; Xu and Meyer, 
2012).    
This section shows how institutions play a role in decision-making process. In 
addition to its impact on strategic direction and motivation, Mathews (2006) argues 
institutional distance impede the learning process in internationalization, thus may 
increase the exit rate. This concept is one of my core arguments and will be 
elucidated in section 2.3.2.2. The next section reviews industrial competition and 
international exit.  
2.3.1.3 Industrial competition 
Mitchell et al. (1994) indicate extremely high or low industrial competition and 
foreign presence are negative to new venture survival. Figueiredo and Silverman 
(2012) and Geroski et al. (2010) use longitudinal database to track the influence of 
competition level on the survival rate of new entrants. They observe a U-shaped 
relationship of exit rate and competition level that medium competition level 
provides the greatest survival chances for firms.  Study industry life cycle is a major 
approach for strategic management literature to examine the international exit (e.g. 
Klepper, 2002; Lin and Huang, 2008; Suarez and Utterback, 1995).  Harrigan (1985) 
proposes four strategies for company in a declined industry: to take the leading 
position, to take a niche market, to harvest and to divest quickly. From the product 
portfolio approach (Porter, 1986), international exit/divestment is to ensure the firm 
to refocus on core business that is in a promising industry. It is a strategic choice 
from a corporate governance perspective.  
Marketing research challenges the life cycle theory by suggesting it is a metaphor 
rather than reality. Although Klepper (2002) indicates products in declining stage 
would exit and seek for another new market, firm can still use Innovation and 
Marketing to revitalise the product (Doyle, 1992). This implies international exit is 
affected not only by deteriorated external environment but also by inadequate 
organizational response. Scholars emphasize the “strategic fit” between 
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environmental contingencies and internal organisation (Child et al., 2003; Prange and 
Verdier, 2011) and the capability to efficiently response to fast-changing 
environment and to constantly capture opportunities.  This capability is the dynamic 
capability to learn, to integrate, to build and to reconfigure internal and external 
competencies, and it helps firms efficiently respond to challenges in rapid changing 
environment and reduce organizational mortality rate (Prange and Verdier, 2011).  
This section reviews environmental variables that may result in poor performance or 
strategic change and hence lead to international exit. Although environmental 
variables do play a role in international exit, the influence is passive and incremental 
in a long-term (Geroski et al., 2010). Firms’ internal condition such as strategic 
actions, resources, capabilities and firm’s characteristic have more immediate and 
direct impact on international exit, and this explains why some firms survive during 
economic recession while others do not. The next section moves to look at 
organizational variables. 
2.3.2 Organizational Variables 
Organizational resources have more immediate and direct influence on the foreign 
operation although external environment has impact on organizational survival 
(Geroski et al., 2010). This section explores organizational variables resulting in 
international exit including firm characteristics, resources, and entry strategies 
(Appendix A). The learning perspective is highlighted in reducing institutional 
distances.  
2.3.2.1 Organizational characteristics and resources 
Using a resource-based view, Bercovitz and Mitchell (2007) suggest that large and 
profitable firms are less likely to exit foreign market due to resource richness, 
economic scale and scope.  Firms with rich resources are more flexible and capable 
of maintaining internationalization (Audia and Greve, 2006; Geroski et al., 2010); 
moreover, these firms are less sensitive to institutional changes and transaction costs 
misalignment (Audia and Greve, 2006).   
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From organizational learning perspective, Mitchell et al. (1994) and Li (1995) point 
out knowledge and experience can reduce international exit rate.  Sapienza et al. 
(2006) suggest learning helps firms to cultivate the capability to effectively exploit 
internal resources to respond to environmental changes and explore potential 
opportunities. Experience, knowledge and learning are not only beneficial for 
international entry but also for survival.  Interestingly, IB research uses the 
organization as the unit of learning although organization cannot really learn. 
Echoing Oviatt and McDougall (1994), this highlights the role individual in 
international decision-making, Section 3.1.1 examines individual (entrepreneurs’) 
learning and how it affects decision-making.  
Network has been considered to be a key resource to initiate and facilitate the speed 
of internationalization in Uppsala model, INV theories and LLL model. In 
international exit literature, scholars recognize the importance of network (Bruderl 
and Preisendorfer, 1998; Manolova et al., 2010; Sheng et al., 2011; Zhou, 2013). 
Compared with studies of developed countries, studies of developing countries 
emphasize the positive impact of networks.  Zhou (2013) examines the business ties 
and political ties in China.  These ties, which also called Guanxi in other studies, are 
positive to firm’s performance and development since they can compensate the lack 
of resources in emerging economies (Sheng et al., 2011).  
This statement is contradicted to Bruderl and Preisendorfe’s (1998) finding; however, 
their data was based on a developed country (Germany) while Sheng et al.’s (2011) 
data was based on a developing country (China). Networks, especially political 
networks, are usually more influential in developing countries with thin formal 
institutions. Firms with strong political ties can enjoy more protection in terms of 
intellectual and other properties. However, the influence is diminishing over time 
when government gradually establish institutional system (Zhou, 2013). This 
explains why political ties are more effective in developing countries than in 
developed countries. Because informal institutions largely substitute thin formal 
institutions in emerging economies (Peng et al., 2008), it may argue that network 
become a critical resources to survive and operate in these economies.  
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2.3.2.2 Strategy and management issues 
Inadequate strategy results in poor performance (Boddewyn, 1983), in this section, 
four variables resulting in inadequate strategies are summarised: entry time, entry 
mode, location choice and product strategies (see Appendix A). The role of learning 
in reducing liability of foreignness and personal goal in shaping strategy is 
highlighted.  
Although being a first mover is a risky decision, first mover advantages allow firms 
to shape the market and establish reputation proving positive to organizational 
performance and survival (Isobe et al., 2000; Kronborg and Thomsen, 2009). 
Sapienza et al. (2006) indicates early entrants with entrepreneurial orientation are 
more likely to promote learning culture, enhancing firm’s capability of fighting 
environmental challenges and hence gradually reduce mortality risk (Zaheer and 
Mosakowski, 1997). However, studies of both developing (e.g. Isobe et al., 2000) 
and developed country (e.g. Kronborg and Thomsen, 2009) claim that early entrant is 
positive to firm’s survival only when this action is strategically important. There is 
no best entry strategy for firms. Instead, a good strategy is the “fit” between 
environmental contingencies and internal organization (Shaver, 1998).  This implies 
that each strategic movement should be consistent with organizational goal and 
resources; otherwise it is an inappropriate strategy.  
Nevertheless, organizational goals are not the only goals shaping strategic direction. 
Dunkelberg et al. (2013) argue, as the key active agent in decision-making, 
entrepreneurs and their goals also play a vital role in shaping strategies. Ocasio (1997) 
explains that options related to the entrepreneurs’ goals could attract more attention 
than others. Entrepreneurs’ goals reflect their beliefs, attitudes and value (Cyert and 
March, 1963a), and this personal goal is part of subjective assessment of 
organizational performance (DeTienne and Cardon, 2012) influencing decision-
making. This argument implies organizational goals are not the only goals shaping 
international exit decisions.  Section 3.1.2 presents how do entrepreneurs’ goals 
affect decision-making in internationalization.  
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Liability of foreignness is a major difficulty in internationalization in Uppsala (1977) 
model. Zaheer (1995:342) defines liability of foreignness as “the costs of doing 
business abroad that result in a competitive disadvantage for an MNE subunit”.  He 
indicates four types of costs: costs directly associated with the distance such as 
transportation, firm specific costs due to unfamiliar local environment, costs from the 
host country environment such as lack of legitimacy and costs from home country 
environment such as restricted FDI policy. From economic perspectives, firms 
choose to enter the market only when expected profit exceeds liability of foreignness. 
After entry, firms choose to the exit the market if the liability of foreignness is 
greater than actual profit. In addition to financial costs, this research argues 
entrepreneurs’ emotional costs should also be included in liability of foreignness. 
Foreign entrepreneurs may generate additional emotional costs than local 
entrepreneurs due to the institutional distances. Entrepreneurs’ commitments and 
sacrifices should also be considered in making exit decisions (Kozan et al., 2012).  
Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) agree that liability of foreignness may lead to foreign 
exit, but its impact has been decreased overtime. Liability of foreignness can be 
overcome when firms have or have gained more international operating experience 
(Li, 1995; Shaver et al., 1994; Delios and Beamish, 2001; Kim et al., 2012). 
However, organizations cannot learn. It is entrepreneurs (or managers) who learn 
from international experience and use it to minimise liability of foreignness, and 
learning from experience is not an automatic and immediate action (Shepherd and 
Cardon, 2009). The heterogeneity in learners should be highlighted, and the role of 
individual learning in reducing liability of foreignness (including emotional costs) 
remains an interesting topic for this research. Further discussion of individual 
learning in internationalization is in section 3.1.1.   
In summary, this section shows variables result in strategic changes and poor 
performance, suggesting two individual variables likely shaping strategic direction: 
personal goals and individual learning. The next section concludes section 2.3 and 
summarises current research gaps.  
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2.3.3 Summary of international exit literature in IB field 
From the ‘failure perspective,’ international exit is a forced behaviour due to 
resource scarcity, inappropriate strategy or deteriorated environment, correcting a 
previously inadequate strategy and achieving better performance.  From the strategic 
management perspective, Makino et al. (2007) points out that firms voluntarily exit 
when the goal is accomplished. Appendix A presents a variety of economic variables 
that are associated with international exit. It is agreeable by literature that 
deteriorated economic condition; rising costs, intense competition, and lack of 
resources are connected with international exit. Other variables such as institutions, 
liability of foreignness and strategic fit raise several issues for further discussion.  
Firstly, the role of institutions is not explicitly identified in studies of developed 
country. Taken network/political ties/guanxi for example, network is considered as a 
shortcut to compensate the resource scarcity and its role is more significant in weak 
formal institutions in emerging economies, (Zhou, 2013). Peng et al. (2009) argue, in 
the country with thin formal institutions, informal institutions provide the guidance 
to managers and firms. Network is a crucial key to learn and follow the informal 
institutions. However, there is a shortage of relevant studies.  The role of informal 
institutions in emerging market and how entrepreneurs respond to it need further 
research.  
Secondly, liability of foreignness is a major obstacle for entrepreneurs to make entry 
decision as reviewed in the previous section. Much research on this variable focus on 
its negative impact on internationalization, however, studying the process to 
overcome liability of foreignness can provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
learning perspective in internationalization. This is a significant but under-researched 
variable in international exit literature (Sapienza et al., 2006).  In addition, Shepherd 
(2009) argues entrepreneurs may not learn from every experience and Jenkins (2012) 
further indicate entrepreneurs’ elicited emotions affecting their learning. Huy (1999) 
also develops a dynamic change model suggesting emotions influence individuals’ 
learning and adaptation to changes.  
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In what circumstance that entrepreneurs are more likely to learn from their 
internationalization experience and overcome liability of foreignness remains an 
interesting topic. As indicated above, Liability of foreignness here includes the 
financial and entrepreneurs’ emotional costs. Section 3.1.1 discusses how 
entrepreneurs’ predispositions affect their learning while Section 3.2 shows how 
incident generated emotions shape entrepreneurs’ behaviour including learning.  
Research 
gaps 











The role of informal institutions 
in emerging market and how 




The role of 
decision maker 
(entrepreneur) 
 Entrepreneurs’ goals in decision-
making 





exit research  
 Individual learning and liability of 
foreignness- in what circumstance 
that entrepreneurs are more likely 
to learn from their 
internationalization experience 
and overcome institutional 
distances, using a learning and 
emotional perspective 
Table 2-5: Research gaps, Source: Author 
Finally, mainstream literature indicates the “fit” between environmental 
contingencies and internal organization is a good strategy. That is, entrepreneur 
should make the exit decision only when it is consistent with external environment 
and organizational goals. Nevertheless, organizational goals are not the only goals 
shaping strategic direction; as discussed in the previous section, entrepreneurs and 
their goals also play a vital role in shaping strategies (Dunkelberg et al., 2013). 
Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997) indicate the lack of individual cognition research 
in strategic decisions. Much international exit research uses the rational perspective 
to examine this decision and underestimate the role of managerial behaviours, 
cognition and non-economic reasons of decision- making. Echoing this research gap, 
entrepreneurs’ goals in making exit decisions create a subjective threshold of 
performance to judge the organizational performance (Makino et al., 2007; Headd, 
2003). Therefore, the entrepreneurs’ goal may be viewed as a non-economic variable 
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affecting international exit decisions. Together with the finding in pilot study in the 
next section, other non-economic variables such as entrepreneurs’ family and 
predispositions should be examined.  
In summary, coupled with the research gaps identified in previous sections, Table 2-
5 presents the research gaps in International exit literature in International Business 
field.  
2.4 Pilot Study  
Three research gaps were identified from IB literature: the shortage of post-entry 
study, individual level analysis, and emerging market research. To fulfil these gaps, I 
review 136 articles on foreign business closure, foreign divestment/divestiture, de-
internationalization and international exit (see Appendix A). Meanwhile, guided by 
the main research question: Why do Taiwanese entrepreneurs who have invested 
in China exit, a pilot study was conducted on two Taiwanese entrepreneurs who 
have exited China.  The main objective of this pilot study is to understand the role of 
entrepreneurs in making international exit decision as indicated in Table 2-5.  
A pilot case study allowed me to observe different phenomena from a variety of 
angles, to refine data collections plans and to develop relevant lines of research 
questions (Yin, 2009; Hatem, 2012).  The criteria used in my pilot case were 
geographic proximity and case accessibility. As indicated by Shepherd (2009), exit is 
a negative and grief event for entrepreneurs. It is not easy to approach to 
entrepreneurs who experience this uncomfortable event and collect detailed 
information. I selected the entrepreneur of Firm B and Firm X (pilot participant), as 
they were willing to share experiences in China and talk about reasons for 
international exit.  I collected the data using unstructured interviews.  The openness 
of this approach allows potential issues to emerge (Kirk and Miller, 1986).  Such 
issues can in turn feed into the development of the research questions (Yin, 2009). 
Each interview lasted between 150-180 minutes. The two entrepreneurs described the 
establishment of their venture and the internationalization in China.   
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Surprisingly, the theories normally explaining international exit in IB and strategic 
management literature proved inadequate to explain the empirical finding of my pilot 
study. Hence new theories were considered and discussed below.   
2.4.1 Observations from pilot study 
The pilot study demonstrated how entrepreneurs make decisions in 
internationalization. The fact that entrepreneur of Firm B shut down a profitable and 
strategically important venture challenges current IB literature. A research question 
emerged from this finding: why do entrepreneurs make a non-economic and non-
rational decision? This new finding presents a good fit with the arguments of 
threshold theory in Entrepreneurship literature. Gimeno et al. (1997) indicate 
entrepreneurs have unique threshold of performance and Zellweger and Astrachan 
(2008) suggest the perceived value of the venture depends on both economic and 
non-economic variables. That is, entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables could be the 
reason that entrepreneurs shut down a good performing and important venture. 
According to my pilot study, entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables may include the 
role of entrepreneurs’ brother/children (family), personal goals and interests and 
the perception of China (predispositions).  
The role of family 
Entrepreneur of Firm X shut down his building materials company and exited China 
in 2000. The role of his family appeared when discussing the entry, expansion and 
exit strategy.  
 “My brother wants to do some business with his Chinese friends, so I gave him 
some technicians and set up Suzhou office to take orders” (Entrepreneur, Firm X). 
This statement suggests he entered into China for his brother’s requests and network. 
The entrepreneur inherited Firm X from his father. He is in charge of Taiwan 
headquarter and wants to set up a new venture for his brother. Thus, he offered 
funding and experts for his brother to pursue business opportunities in China. The 
idea of Chinese investment was generated by his brother’s requests and network. 
This finding is consistent with family business literature that families expand the 
   
69 
 
resources available to access international opportunities, and these opportunities are 
usually closely related to family members’ personal background, interests, and 
resources (Hatem, 2012). This finding indicates the need to integrate family business 
literature in examining entrepreneurs’ decision-making in internationalization. 
Personal goals 
In addition to family, the entrepreneur’s personal goals were mentioned in terms of 
speeding up the expansion. 
 “I want to achieve something big. I am the market leader in Taiwan market but I 
feel unsatisfied. My brother told me China is a good chance… Okay, I expanded to 4 
provinces and opened more than 20 outlets in one year. I like to amaze people” 
(Entrepreneur, Firm X).  
Entrepreneur’s ambition to be a market leader and the desire to prove himself 
resulted in a rapidly expansion strategy, which was proven wrong in later stage 
(according to entrepreneur’s personal statements).  
This finding is consistent with non-economic goals literature that those 
entrepreneurial goals affect resources allocation and strategic decisions (Dunkelberg 
et al., 2013).  Moreover, Choo and Wong (2006) argue that entrepreneurs’ non-
monetary goals are more influential than monetary goals for Singaporean 
entrepreneurs. Thus, entrepreneurs’ goal should be viewed as an individual variable 
affecting internationalization decisions.  
Predispositions to host country 
This finding highlights the importance of research context. The above two variables, 
personal goals and family, are discussed in Entrepreneurship literature but 
predisposition is my new finding in this thesis. The impact of institutions is more 
significant in emerging economies than in developed economies (Peng et al., 2008). 
Additionally, this research focuses on “international” exit, which highlights the 
impact of institutional distances between entrepreneurs (home country) and locals 
(host country). As indicated in research context (section 1.2), the formal and informal 
institutional distances between Taiwan and China is the major obstacle for 
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Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. Thus, the influence of entrepreneurs’ 
perception of host country was found in my pilot study.   
A negative predisposition to Chinese Government was noticed in the interview. As 
the entrepreneur felt “threatened” by Chinese Government.  
“I agree with my brother that Chinese Government is greedy. The policy changes, 
corruptions and tax officers destroy my company. They want our technology. Now 
they learn everything so they force us to leave. We have to exit otherwise the 
government will take everything” (Entrepreneur, Firm X) 
This quote highlights two variables resulting in international exit: Chinese 
institutions and entrepreneurs’ predispositions. The negative predispositions to 
Chinese Government increase the risk perception and mislead the conclusion that 
Chinese Government will shut down his venture. His predispositions are built on his 
learning from his and other people’s (e.g. his brother) experience (Vygotsky, 1997), 
forming a particular attitude towards certain event. An individual learning 
perspective will be applied to examine this variable. It is evident that learning and 
adaptation can decrease liability of foreignness and increase survival rate (Sapienza 
et al., 2006). However my finding suggests the negative impact of individual learning 
(negative predispositions) on internationalization. The development and impact of 
individual predispositions to host country on internationalization decisions remain to 
be understood. 
In addition to answer why entrepreneurs make decisions, how entrepreneurs make 
decisions remains an interesting question. Current international exit decision-making 
models only explain why organizations make exit decisions. In my pilot study, 
entrepreneurs kept referring to their emotions when discussing their decision-making 
in internationalization. It is agreeable that entrepreneurs make decisions according to 
their judgement of situation. In my findings, entrepreneurs’ emotions seem to 
represent their subjective judgements of the situation (economic or non-economic 
variables). They respond to the situation according to their generated emotions. The 
impact of entrepreneurs’ emotions on their behaviours has been highlighted in the 
pilot study. 
 




The entrepreneur of Firm B frequently mentioned his negative emotions including 
stress; disgust, anger, and fear during the interview and the entrepreneur of Firm X 
suggested,  “exiting China was an emotional event from which takes him several 
years to recover ”. They described their passion, excitement and confidence in 
international entry, their sadness, fear, anger and anxiety during internationalization 
and the grief, relief and fatigue arising from international exit. For example, the 
entrepreneur of Firm B decided to downsize his venture due to his fear of local 
institutional problems including the lack of intellectual property rights and cultural 
conflicts. Furthermore, he exited China for his disgust of the host country, including 
institutions and living environment (see section 5.1.2 for further discussion). This 
finding implies the linkage of emotions and decision-making in internationalization, 
thus I turn to entrepreneurial emotion literature for further investigation (Section 3.2).  
My findings in pilot study highlight entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables and their 
emotions in decision-making in internationalization. This finding challenges current 
international business literature, suggesting an individual and non-economic 
perspective is required to investigate international exit. The next section discusses 
the three research themes emerging from pilot study and the need to integrate other 
literature.  
2.5 Emerging Themes from Pilot Study and Summary  
Drawing on the findings of pilot study and the research gaps, this section proposes 
three research themes and subsidiary research questions. Table 2-6 compares the 
findings of my pilot study with current IB literature, showing current IB literature is 
inadequate to explain to my pilot study findings; thus, theories from 
Entrepreneurship field including threshold theory, personal goals, family business, 
entrepreneurial emotion and individual learning are integrated to provide a satisfied 
explanation to my data. 
 





What Element of Theme Is 
Explained by IB  
What Pilot Case Has, but Is Not 
Explained by IB 
Integrating 
Entrepreneurship 
field theory into 
IB 
A: What causes 
international exit 
Organizational and 
environmental variables Gap 
identified: the role of informal 
institutions on international 
exit 
Individual variables including 
entrepreneurs’ predispositions, 
family and personal goals 
Subjective 
assessment and 






Does not mention. Gap 
identified: the role of 
individual learning in reducing 
liability of foreignness 
Entrepreneur exits China for 





Organizational goals and 
strategic fit, Gap identified: the 
role of personal goals in 
decision- making 
Entrepreneurs described their 
personal interests and goals in 




A3: Family Does not mention 
Entrepreneurs set up and shut down 








Does not mention 
Entrepreneurs described their 
passion, excitement and confidence 
in international entry, their sadness, 
fear, anger and anxiety during 
internationalization and the grief, 
relief and fatigue in international 









Models view international exit 
as a failure or strategic change.   
Entrepreneur view the international 
exit as “a rational decision for my- 
self and not my company “.  It is a 
subject and personal choice.  
Baron (2008) the 





Table 2-6: Emerging themes, Source: author 
According to my pilot study, there are three research themes in this thesis. Theme A 
focuses on the causes of international exit since my pilot study suggests the role of 
entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables in decision-making. International exit 
literature in IB field presents environmental and organizational variables affecting 
international exit. McDougall-Covin et al. (2014) highlight the need for individual 
level research and my pilot study suggests three individual variables affecting 
international exit: predispositions, personal goals and family. Thus, Theme A 
examines these three individuals’ non-economic variables using threshold theory in 
Entrepreneurship field and argues international exit is entrepreneurs’ personal 
choices. 
Theme B targets how entrepreneurs’ emotions shape their actions in 
internationalization since my pilot study shows entrepreneurs’ emotions are closely 
related to their decision-making international exit. Damasio (1994) discovers people 
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are difficult to make decisions without emotions in spite of their excellent rational 
and logical problem solving skills. Entrepreneurs also described their actions with 
emotions in my pilot study. However, the role of emotions is an under explored area 
in IB field. Thus, Theme B integrates the emerging entrepreneurial emotion literature 
in Entrepreneurship field to explore entrepreneurs’ emotions.  
Main research question: 
Why do Taiwanese entrepreneurs who have invested in China exit? 
Theme Theme topic Subsidiary research questions 
A Entrepreneurs’ non-
economic variables 
resulting international exit 
(predispositions, family, 
personal goals) 
Why do entrepreneurs make international exit decisions? 
Viewed from an individual and non-economic perspective. 
B Entrepreneurs’ emotions 
and actions in international 
process 
How do incident-generated emotions shape entrepreneurs’ 
actions in internationalisation from entry, operations to exit 
decisions? 
C The decision making of 
international exit  
How do entrepreneurs make the decision of international exit 
and what is the outcome?   
 
Table 2-7: Research questions and themes 
Finally, Theme C explores the decision-making process of international exit. IB 
literature views international exit as a failure or a strategic change.  This view is 
challenged by my pilot study findings that the entrepreneur of Firm B said exiting 
China is “a rational decision for myself and not my company”. This statement 
supports threshold theory in Entrepreneurship field that exit is the outcome of 
entrepreneurs’ subjective assessment and highlights the need to revise international 
exit decision-making model. Thus, Theme C aims to revisit current models (e.g. 
Benito and Welch, 1997) and develop a more comprehensive one.  
To address the research gaps and answer the main research question, the subsidiary 
research questions are developed in Table 2-7.  The next chapter will discuss current 
understanding of each research theme. 
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Chapter 3 : Understanding international exit- An Entrepreneurship 
Perspective 
 
Following the trend of recent International Entrepreneurship (IE) and 
Entrepreneurship literature emphasizing the role of entrepreneurs, this chapter 
examines the role of entrepreneurs in decision making using three themes (see Table 
2-7). To answer the subsidiary question in Theme A: Why do entrepreneurs make 
international exit decisions? Viewed from non-economic perspective, three non-
economic variables are examined including entrepreneurs’ predispositions, goals and 
family. Section 3.2 answers the subsidiary research question in Theme B: How do 
incident-generated emotions shape entrepreneurs’ actions in internationalisation. 
The essence of emotions in decision-making is firstly highlighted in Section 3.2.1. 
Then Entrepreneurial emotion literature is presented in terms of its role in 
opportunity discovery (Foo et al., 2009), risk perception (Shepherd, 2003) and 
business closure (Jenkins et al., 2014). Section 3.3 answers my final subsidiary 
research question in Theme C: How do entrepreneurs make the decision of 
international exit and what is the outcome?  An overview of decision-making on 
international exit is firstly presented, and then a conventional framework is built up 
based on Boddewyn (1983) and Benito and Welch (1997). However, I argue they fail 
to explain the role of individual in international exit decision-making and how 
individual shapes its outcome. Therefore, in Section 3.3.2, a new theoretical 
framework of decision-making of international exit is presented.  
  
3.1 Theme A: Individual variables resulting in international exit 
Theme A suggests that international exit is an entrepreneurs’ decision rather than a 
rational and organizational decision. That is, objective criteria including performance 
and strategic importance are not the only criteria in making exit decisions. Viewed 
international exit from entrepreneurs’ perspectives, this section examines three 
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Section 3.1.1 examines entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country using an 
individual learning perspective. Entrepreneurs’ practice (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 
2009), learning theories in management (Simon, 1955) and IB (Sapienza et al., 2006) 
fields are reviewed. The individual learning is highlighted and explained using 
Vygotsky’s (1997) socio-historical theory. This section suggests entrepreneurs learn 
from their experiences and use the learning outcome to make decisions (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 2006). Thus, in the context of internationalization in emerging 
economies, the learning outcome of local institutions (entrepreneurs’ predispositions 
to host country) may affect their decision-making in internationalization.  
Section 3.1.2 discusses entrepreneurs’ personal goals of decision-making by 
examining Ocasio’s (1997) attention-based theory, Latham’s (2004) goal theory and 
Chrisman’s (2012) intangible goal studies in Family business. This section explains 
why individual goal affect decision-making by using Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) state 
of flow theory claiming that people enjoy the greatest happiness through contributing 
to something interested in and good at; they are fully immersed and passionate about 
an activity. Thus, people may be driven by personal goals instead of organizational 
goals on making decisions to obtain/maintain the state of flow.  
Section 3.1.3 looks at how family affects entrepreneurs’ decision-making. Due to 
cultural difference, family seems to have a stronger role in emerging economies 
particularly in Confucianism society (Sui, 2014). Hatem (2012) highlights the role of 
family in opportunity identification and internationalization speed in firms from 
emerging economies. It is evident that family plays a role in individual decision-
making. Detienne and Chirico (2013) state how socio-emotional wealth affects 
entrepreneurial exit strategies. This section thus argues family influence in decision-
making using a socio-emotional wealth perspective.  
Section 3.1.4 concludes Theme A by explaining how the three individual variables 
result in international exit decisions using threshold theory (Gimeno et al., 1997). 
This section argues that each venture has its non-economic value, which is built on 
individual variables. The non-economic value of firms can be viewed as the 
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substitute of economic value (organizational performance) and hence affect 
entrepreneurs’ threshold of performance.  
3.1.1 Entrepreneurs’ predispositions to the host country 
This section argues entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country affect international 
exit decisions.  Entrepreneurs’ predispositions refer to a liability or tendency to act in 
a particular way or hold a particular attitude. It is part of entrepreneurs’ habitus- a set 
of acquired and durable predispositions, which are generative (in the sense of being 
interrogated in the light of new events or acts) and dynamic (unlike habit) (Bourdieu, 
2000). Predispositions are internalised without articulation and are followed because 
they seem to make practical sense; in addition, predispositions bring the past into the 
present (Swartz, 2002) since it can be changed through experience and learning. The 
term “entrepreneurs’ predispositions” is used instead of individual habitus since it is 
a board term and operates at many levels and fields. I target the impact of 
entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country on international exit, thus I stick with 
predispositions on terminology.  
Studies on internationalization usually examine psychic distances using Hofstede’s 
(1980) cultural theory, viewing the cultural distances in regional/national level. 
However, as indicated in section 1.2.1.2, Taiwanese have different predispositions to 
Chinese Government referring to their political preferences. Thus, it may argue that 
each Taiwanese entrepreneur was affected by collective belief such as Taiwanese 
culture, but the transposition from collective beliefs to internalised individual 
predispositions is not a static event but a dynamic process inter-mixing different 
habitus and contrasting them into unique configuration arising from their deployment 
in the circumstances individual find themselves (Reay, 2004). Entrepreneurs gain 
experience from different sources, and they would store in their short-term memory. 
After a series of perception, discovery, and learning, these experiences may move to 
long-term memory and become entrepreneurs’ knowledge, which is the database and 
shortcut (heuristics) for decision-making. Entrepreneurs’ predispositions are one of 
these intelligences in decision-making and the outcome of individual learning 
(Jarzabkowski, 2004).  
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Hence, each entrepreneur has his own arena of practice in strategizing since practice 
is established in the habitus, a set of individual predispositions (Bourdieu, 1990). 
Vygotsky’s (1997) suggests three sources of this intelligence: the experience of 
previous generation (historical experience), the experience of other people (social 
experience) and the repeated experience (doubled experience). Firstly, historical 
experience is associated with personal experience including working and education. 
Secondly, social experience refers to experience of other people, being transferred 
through communication. For example, entrepreneurs can know China by reading and 
without actually visit China. The doubled experience means the individual behaviour 
is firstly formed in the head and then adapt to the real world like designers create a 
draft in head and reproduce it. Lantolf (2004) comments on Vygotsky’s (1997) 
research that it is  “a theory of mind…that recognizes the central role that social 
relationship and culturally constructed artefacts play in organizing uniquely human 
forms of thinking”. That is, cognitive person is the centre of social learning.  
In terms of the impact of entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country on 
internationalization, McDougall and Oviatt (1994) indicate an experienced 
entrepreneur is the key of successful internationalization. Experienced entrepreneurs 
have large amount of knowledge gained from their previous work and 
entrepreneurial experience. Compared with novice entrepreneurs, they have their 
own practice (habitus) of interpreting, making and implementing decisions. Sapienza 
et al. (2006) agree with this view indicating that entrepreneurs’ experience reduces 
the liability of newness and enhance opportunity recognition. Hence, as the outcome 
of individual learning of host country, entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country 
should have an impact on foreign venture survival, but this impact is not necessarily 
positive.   
The impact of entrepreneurs’ experience on internationalization is debatable. My 
pilot study suggests entrepreneurs’ negative predispositions to Chinese government 
increase their risk perception and result in exit. Fern et al. (2010) indicate 
entrepreneurs’ experience would constraint firms’ strategic choice thus limit future 
development. Hung and Whittington (1997) extend this view by arguing Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs’ social experience, including political and cultural experience, also 
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affect their decision-making. These views suggest the impact of entrepreneurs’ 
experience on internationalization is not necessarily positive. In addition, IB 
literature assumes entrepreneurs automatically gain experience through 
internationalization (e.g. Johanson and Vahle, 1977). Shepherd et al. (2009) argue 
individual learning is not an immediate and automatic process. Some entrepreneurs 
can learn from their experiences while other cannot. Take failure experience for 
example, Ucbasaran et al. (2011) suggest that strong emotions generated by failure 
prompt entrepreneurs to blame others more than themselves for protecting self-
esteem.  Thus this attribution bias limits entrepreneurs’ learning from their 
experience (Jenkins, 2012). Therefore, entrepreneurs should be viewed as a 
heterogeneous group in learning and their learning outcome (e.g. predispositions) 
should have different impact on internationalization.  
In summary, this section provides an overview of the source of entrepreneurs’ 
predispositions (social and historical experiences) and how their predispositions may 
affect decision-making (serve as a habitus/ heuristics). Entrepreneurs’ predispositions 
to host country reflect their social and historical experience in the host country. It is 
evident that entrepreneurs’ predispositions enable them to perceive process and 
interpret information in different ways (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) but the 
impact of entrepreneurs’ predispositions on international exit needs further 
investigation. How do Taiwanese entrepreneurs’ predispositions to China affect 
international exit decisions and what are the outcomes will be my first focus in 
Theme A. The next section introduces the second individual variable: entrepreneurs’ 
goals 
3.1.2 Entrepreneurs’ Goals  
This section argues entrepreneurs’ goal affects international exit decisions, 
considering international exit to be entrepreneurs’ response when this venture has 
fallen short of their expectations. IB literature mainly discusses the impact of 
organizational goals and the strategic fit of external environment and organization on 
international exit.  However, each individual will have multiple goals, arising from 
their personal histories, preference, and positions within the firms; these sets of 
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objectives cannot be reduced to any simple overall statement explaining what the 
organization as a whole is attempting to achieve. Entrepreneurs are the key active 
agents in making international exit decisions; hence, their personal goals should have 
a critical impact on decision-making.  
Entrepreneurs have multiple even contradictory goals when they establish their 
ventures, and these goals include economic and non-economic goals. Entrepreneurs’ 
non-economic goals reflect their attitudes, values, and intentions of the 
organizational operation (Cyert and March, 1963a). Chrisman et al. (2012) suggest 
the essential role of non-economic goals needs further exploration. Non-economic 
goals vary, and some of them are less relevant to organizational development such as 
personal achievement, personal interest, or avoiding working for others. Morton and 
Podolny (2002) and Dunkelberg et al. (2013) indicate non-economic goals affect the 
resource allocation, strategic direction and commitment level in the firm. Ocasio 
(1997) explains this phenomenon using attention-based view, stating that options 
related to the entrepreneurs’ goals could attract more attention than others. That is, 
people are usually more interested in information relevant to their personal 
commitments thus would selectively perceive relevant information and ignore others 
since human brain can only process limited amount of information each time. In line 
with this argument, Latham (2004:126) asserts, “one’s conscious goals affect what 
one achieves”. Therefore, entrepreneurs’ personal goals, including economic and 
non-economic, would drive the direction of organization by constraining the 
information that they perceive.  
Non-economic goals have been considered to have a negative impact on 
organizational development since they are non-rational forces diverging outcome 
from rational optimum. However, Chrisman et al. (2012) and Gedajlovic et al. (2012) 
argue that non-economic goals are not always in conflict with economic goals; 
alternatively, with effective management of these two, they can lead to a synergy.  
Entrepreneurs whose non-economic goals are consistent with economic goals may 
actually harvest substantial economic benefits and hence increase the efficiency of 
business operation.  
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Hence, why entrepreneurs’ non-economic goals can drive/impede international exit 
decisions? Gimeno et al. (1997) find entrepreneurs who enjoy psychological benefits 
such as the feeling of achievement are willing to accept lower financial returns. 
Using the flow theory (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) to explain this phenomenon that  
people enjoy the greatest happiness from contributing to what they are interested in 
and good at. They are fully immersed and passionate about those activities; therefore, 
the existence of background noise is temporarily suspended. Accordingly, 
entrepreneurs would accept lower performance if they are in the state of flow, 
obtaining compensation from achieving their non-economic goals. The satisfactory 
of organizational performance is determined by both economic and non-economic 
goals.  
Applying this argument in making exit decisions, Headd (2003) argues the key to 
determine whether the operation is worth the efforts depends on entrepreneurs’ goals. 
Entrepreneurs would exit for reasons, which are irrelevant to business operation but 
vital to entrepreneurs. For example, entrepreneurs who exit for health or family 
concerns, for better opportunities or for lack of family succession. Gómez-Mejía et al. 
(2007) found entrepreneurs would shut down the venture if they considered current 
activities threaten their own reputation or their control of this firm that are contradict 
to their non-economic goals. A simple examination by environmental and 
organizational perspectives would regard these exits as failures. However, a more in-
depth analysis would indicate these exits are successes from the perspectives of 
achieving entrepreneurs’ personal goals.  
In summary, this section highlights the role of entrepreneurs’ goals by showing what 
(e.g. personal achievement and interests), how (attention-based view), and why (the 
state of flow) it may result in international exit. Furthermore, Gedajlovic et al. (2012) 
suggest entrepreneurs’ goals can dominate the decision-making under some 
conditions. The value of entrepreneurs’ goals should have been acknowledged long 
ago but neglected. Hence, how do Taiwanese entrepreneurs’ goals affect 
international exit decisions will be my second focus in Theme A.  The next section 
presents the third individual variable: entrepreneurs’ family.  
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3.1.3 Entrepreneurs’ family 
This section argues entrepreneurs’ family affects international exit decisions 
particularly for Taiwanese entrepreneurs who have strong family-oriented culture. 
Most firms are begun as a family business, particularly firms in Asian countries 
including Taiwan, China, and Japan sharing strong family-orientated culture rooted 
in Confucianism (Sui, 2014). However, most of studies focus on the economic side 
of internationalization instead of the non-economic variables (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011). Although many entrepreneurs establish firms to support their families by 
hiring family members and passing the business on with their family, 
internationalization studies rarely reveal the family variables influencing these 
decisions (Kontinen, 2011). 
Family business is a business owned and/or managed with the intention of shaping 
and pursuing “a family notion of a better future for the family, with the business 
operated as a vehicle to help achieve that desired future state” (Chua et al., 
1999:24). Why entrepreneurs’ family play a role in making exit decisions? The non-
economic value of possessing a business has been viewed as explanations of 
unexpected decisions in family business (Sharma and Irving, 2005; Gomez-mejia et 
al., 2011; Chrisman et al., 2012; Gedajlovic et al., 2012). Gimeno et al. (1997) argue 
that entrepreneurs have idiosyncratic threshold of performance in making exit 
decisions. Zellweger and Astrachan (2008) further suggest that a value of a business 
is built on financial and emotional gain of entrepreneurs. In line with the two 
arguments, Detienne and Chirico (2013) develop a conceptual framework explaining 
how the socio-emotional wealth in family business drives the exit strategies. Viewing 
from the non-economic gain (e.g. socio-emotional wealth) of owning a firm, the 
connection of family and decision-making are identified.  
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) argue family firms usually value non-economic gains 
more than economic gains. He argues the loss of socio-emotional wealth is usually 
the most important reference point in making major decisions. Socio-emotional 
wealth (SEW) refers to “the non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s 
affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence and the 
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perpetuation of the family dynasty” (Gomez-Mejia, 2007: 106). Detienne and Chirico 
(2013: 1302) depict SEW as “the family control and influence, family member’s 
identification with the firm, binding socio ties, emotional attachments and transgene 
ration sustainability”. Gomez-Mejia (2011) indicates family owners may accept low 
performance or economic performance to protect the SEW.  
Although SEW concept explains how family plays a role in strategic decision-
making, it is an organizational concept which builds on the notion that family firms 
behave differently to other firms (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011). The impact of SEW on individuals is still unknown. However, the findings in 
my pilot study suggest entrepreneurs do consider their family in the decision making 
process. For example, entrepreneur of Firm X entered into China for his brother’s 
ambition and positive prediction. This finding is consistent with Gomez-Mejia et 
al.’s (2011) argument that family businesses take actions to protect family interests 
and to meet family member’s needs. Although the concept of SEW is currently used 
in organizational level studies, the findings of my pilot study suggest it is also 
applicable to family business owners. The needs of family members, including 
affective and financial ones, should play a role in entrepreneurs’ decision-making.   
In addition to family needs, the role of family can also show in entrepreneurs’ 
ownership. Pierce et al.’s (2001) article proposes the idea of psychological ownership, 
suggesting individuals generate emotions when their ownership of certain 
tangible/intangible object is invaded. Psychological ownership can be found in three 
main motives: to be in control, the expression of self-identity, and individual 
commitment. This theory indicates individual may feel negative emotions when their 
psychological ownership of company is challenged. Brundin et al. (2014) apply this 
theory in family business ownership logic and suggest it is one of the core 
characteristics. Hence, it is no doubt that entrepreneurs (family business owners) will 
generate negative emotions once the psychological ownership, including family 
control, identity and commitment is challenged by non-family members. These 
negative emotions may drive them to make radical decisions. 
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According to the literature above, family may affect entrepreneurs’ decision-making 
in the form of family needs and family ownership. Additionally, the context of this 
cross-border activity research should deepen current understanding of the role of 
family in strategic decision-making. Internationalization can be viewed as a method 
of diversification, and Rosa (1998) indicates the diversification of business is not 
only to sustain diversification but also to accommodate family members’ needs and 
expectations. Entrepreneurs may internationalise their business for family. 
Conversely, they may also exit China for the same reason.  
However, family business is often viewed as a homogeneous group. Chrisman et al. 
(2005) and Chua et al. (1999) highlight the research gap of investigating behavioural 
difference among family firms. Echoing to this call, Hatem (2012) argues family 
members in emerging market family firms are influential in internationalization 
including opportunity identification, networking and resource seeking by using their 
experiences abroad. She highlights the second generation’s involvement in the 
business triggering rapid internationalization through their education or venturing 
experience abroad. Her research distinguishes the strategy, resources and process of 
family business firms in developing economies from developed economies.  
In summary, this section discusses why and how family may affect international exit 
decisions. Hatem’s (2012) research highlights the research gap of internationalisation 
process of family business from emerging economies. Hence, how does family affect 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs’ international exit decisions will be my third focus in 
Theme A. The next section summaries 3 individual variables and explain how the 3 
variables resulting in exit decisions.  
3.1.4 Summary of individual variables 
Theme A introduces 3 entrepreneur level variables from literature and my pilot study: 
entrepreneurs’ predispositions, goals and family. These three individual variables 
argue that international exit is an entrepreneurs’ response when this venture has 
fallen short of their expectation. This expectation is entrepreneurs’ idiosyncratic 
threshold of performance, shaped by entrepreneurs’ non-economic gain of the firm.  
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The threshold theory developed by Gimeno et al. (1997) is applied to explain why 
non-economic variables may result in international exit. Gimeno et al. (1997) 
challenge conventional view that equate exit with poor performance and failure (e.g. 
Boddewyn, 1983; Li, 1991). They argue that a firm’s exit is determined by both 
economic performance and entrepreneurs’ threshold of performance- “the level of 
performance below which the dominant organizational constituents will act to 
dissolve the organization” (Gimeno et al., 1997: 750). Zellweger and Astrachan 
(2008) suggest the value of a business is built on financial and emotional gain of 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, the non-economic (emotional) gain of owning the firm 
should shape entrepreneurs’ threshold of performance.  
If entrepreneurs enjoy high non-economic gains of their firm, they may accept low or 
even negative financial performance (reduce the threshold of performance) and are 
less likely to make exit decisions. Staw (1981) and DeTienne et al. (2008) use this 
concept to explain the persistence of underperforming firms. Alternatively, if 
entrepreneurs experience high non-economic loss of the firm, they may ask for 
higher performance to compensate their loss (increase threshold of performance). 
This action may result in international exit if the organizational performance cannot 
meet the increased threshold of performance.   
Accordingly, the economic gain of the firm does not singularly determine its 
survival. The 3 individual variables may affect the non-economic value of owning 
the firm, thus drive international exit decision-making. The three individual variables 
and threshold theory should provide a fresh insight into this area. Three main focuses 
are identified in Theme A, summarized below:  
1. How do Taiwanese entrepreneurs’ predispositions to China affect the exit 
decision?  
2. How do Taiwanese entrepreneurs’ goals affect international exit decisions? 
3. How does family affect Taiwanese entrepreneurs’ international exit 
decisions?  
 
The next section, Theme B, examines entrepreneurs’ decision-making from 
emotional perspectives, focusing on how entrepreneurs’ emotions shape their actions 
in internationalization.  
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3.2 Theme B: Entrepreneurs’ emotions and actions in international 
exit 
Conventionally, emotions, if considered at all, often have been considered to be a 
source of interruption of rational thinking in most decision-making and cognition 
theories (e.g. Simon, 1955). Emotion is a rarely discussed topic in decision-making 
of internationalization. Mayer and Salovey (1993) conclude the tradition in Western 
thoughts has viewed emotions as disorganized interruption of mental activity 
resulting in a complete loss of intellectual control and no trace of conscious purpose. 
Emotion is not considered to be a force that may affect international exit decision 
since there is a lack of literature support in International Business (IB) field. 
However, my pilot study told a different story and highlighted the role of emotions in 
decision-making. Interviewees frequently described their emotions toward certain 
events and how they took actions in response to emotions. The need for exploring the 
role of emotions in decision-making has been evidenced. The pervasive influence of 
emotions on the way we see the world is also found by examining literature from 
other fields.  
To portrait the role of entrepreneurs’ emotions in their actions in internationalization, 
Section 3.2.1 highlights the essential role of emotions in decision-making. Section 
3.2.2 then discusses how emotions shape entrepreneurs’ decisions and actions using 
the emerging entrepreneurial emotion literature. Following Baron’s (2008) model of 
entrepreneurial emotions and entrepreneurial process, current literature explores how 
entrepreneurial emotions shape entrepreneurs’ opportunity evaluation and pursuit 
(Hayton and Cholakova, 2012; Welpe et al., 2012), commitment level (Foo, 2011) 
and after-failure learning (Shepherd, 2009; Jenkins et al., 2014). There is a shortage 
of research on how entrepreneurs’ emotions affect their post-entry development such 
as business operation, learning and adaptation and decisions of exit (Cardon et al., 
2012). Section 3.2.3 summaries Theme B and presents research gaps.   
3.2.1 The Essence of Emotions in Decision-making 
This section discusses the absence of the emotional perspective in IB literature and 
argues it is inclusive in decision-making. Emotion, if mentioned at all, is viewed as a 
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residual category or disruption in decision-making for scholars who are interested in 
economic models and rational decision-making (Elster, 1998). Although Simon 
(1957) discusses emotions in his bounded rationality research, his focuses on the 
obstacle to receive full information instead of emotion itself. Conventional decision-
making literature has paid little attention to the role of emotions.  
Instead of considering emotion to be a disruption, Damasio (1994) discovers patients 
with damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex that interferes with their normal 
affective reactions were found to have severe impairment in decision-making and 
judgment, in spite of their excellent rational and logical problem-solving skills. 
Accordingly, emotion is a crucial component for decision-making rather than 
disruption as has long been assumed. In recent behavioural turn of decision-making 
literature, Frank (1988) highlights the role of emotions in strategic decisions and  has 
made a call for relational and cultural aspect of organizational structure and 
DiMaggio (2002) “endogenising animal spirits” in economic analysis. In one of the 
rare reviews on emotions, Behavioural Finance researchers give insights into non-
rational mind by viewing the decision maker as an active agent and write on 
emotions and finance (e.g. Pixely, 1999; 2004, Taffler, 2010). 
Bandelj (2009) examines emotions and economy literature and summarised three 
main strands: (1) emotional management in occupational roles, (2) emotional 
intelligence and job performance, and (3) emotions as heuristic for rational economic 
action. Pierce (1995) and Hochschild (2012) argue that service workers can manage 
their emotions and manifest them to those emotions that they are supposed to have in 
occupational (economic) role, such as a smiling face of a flight attendant. In terms of 
emotional intelligence (EI), it is “the capability to process emotional information 
accurately and efficiently, including that information relevant to recognition, 
construction, and regulation of emotion in oneself and others” (Mayer and Salovey, 
1993: 197). EI is defined as a type of individual capability in dealing with emotional 
information, and in Mayer and Salovey’s (1993) research, they consider emotions to 
be part of decision-making process. Through effectively managing emotional 
information, people can achieve flexible planning and creative thinking, and hence a 
better organizational (economic) performance. Accordingly, in the real business 
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world, emotions and decision-making are not separated as suggested by economic 
theories.  
The third strand, emotion as heuristic, shows how emotions assist economic 
decision-making.  Damasio’s (1994) research highlights emotions are compulsory for 
decision-making. In line with this view, Forgas (1995) proposes affect-infusion-
model showing how individual use emotions to make judgement. Slovic et al. (2004) 
and Kahneman (2011) indicate emotions serve as a heuristic. The three strands argue 
that the economic decision-making school underscores the relational nature, which 
generates emotional response to economic transactions (Bandelj, 2009). Economic 
actions are social actions (Weber, 1978); it is not possible that economic transaction 
would happen differently.      
Banglj (2009) indicates most current research adopts an atomistic perspective in 
examining emotions and economic actions. She proposes that researchers should pay 
attention not only to how emotions shape an individual’s utility or economic role of 
performance, but also what emotions result from and are influenced by interactions 
that an individual has with other social actors during economic processes. Vygotsky 
(1997) notes that emotions are shaped by culture.  From this Vygotskian perspective, 
emotions are as important as any other perception to cognitive processes.  As Wells 
(2002) states, learning involves all aspects of the learner – acting, thinking and 
feeling. This view of learning differs from behaviourist or cognitivist western 
schools, which use what Brothers (1997) calls the isolated mind i.e. insulated from 
social factors and feelings: it is closer to Confucian traditions of holistic learners 
(cite): “learning occurs in relation to other people and inseparably from one’s 
affective state – learning is a lived emotional experience not the result of a 
mind/body dichotomy”. For Vygotsky (1997:373) intellect and emotions are fused in 
a unified whole.  
The centrality of emotion in economic processes is further confirmed in 
organizational studies. Huy (1999) and  Brundin (2002) examine emotions and 
strategic changes. They view emotions are driving/restraining forces of 
organizational changes. More recently, Luthans et al. (2007) view emotions as 
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psychological capital, an individual resource that may affect financial performance. 
They argue the investment of psychological capital may yield substantial returns, 
thus it is as important as other traditional forms of capital investment such as 
financial, human and social capital. Accordingly, individual psychological capital 
should drive the decision-making in internationalization like other organizational 
resources suggested in Barney (1991).   
Positive psychological capital refers to “an individual’s positive psychological state 
of development and is characterized by: (1) having confidence (self-efficacy) to take 
on and put in the necessary effort to succeed at challenging tasks; (2) making a 
positive attribution (optimism) about succeeding now and in the future; (3) 
persevering toward goals and, when necessary, redirecting paths to goals (hope) in 
order to succeed; and (4) when beset by problems and adversity, sustaining and 
bouncing back and even beyond (resilience) to attain success” (Luthans et al., 2007, 
p. 3). Csikszentmihalyi (1990) note that such psychological capital is developed 
through a pattern of investment of psychic resources that result in obtaining current 
reward and future benefits. This theory views an emotion as a capital, the resource 
that can be develop and manage through the learning process. Unlike other resource 
theory focusing on organizational resources (e.g. Barney, 1991), the theory examines 
individual’s emotional capital and its impact on job performance satisfaction and 
financial performance.  
For example, Peterson and Luthans (2003) found store manager’s hope is positively 
contribute to the financial performance and employee’s job satisfaction in fast food 
industry. This argument is supported by research in other context. Luthans et al. 
(2005) found the hope level of Chinese workers are related to their supervisory-rated 
job performance and wage. Additionally, positive psychological capital can enhance 
resilience, which is an individual's ability to properly adapt to stress and adversity. 
Luthans and Youssef (2007) indicate employees’ satisfaction and happiness can 
enhance their resilience which enable them to effectively renew efforts after failed 
attempts and balance the impact of negative emotions. In summary, positive 
psychological capital, the state of positive emotions has impact on individual job 
performance and resilience.  
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However, this research will examine entrepreneurs’ “positive emotions” instead of 
“positive psychological capital” for following reasons. Firstly, it is the accumulated 
positive emotions including hope, optimism and confidence. This research focuses 
on the impact of single emotion on decision-making. Secondly, studies of positive 
psychological capital target the impact of employees’ psychological capital on 
individual job performance while this research target entrepreneurs’ positive 
emotions on strategic decision-making. Finally, the concept of “capital” implies the 
emotions can be accumulated, developed, and stored for future use. This research 
does agree with this viewpoint by introducing the concept of entrepreneurs’ 
predisposition (section 3.1.1), the learning outcome of previous experience. 
Entrepreneurs’ positive psychological capital may be part of their positive 
predisposition of host country, which enables them to have positive attribution 
(optimism) about succeeding now and in the future. Nevertheless, the emotions I 
discuss in this thesis refer to entrepreneurs’ incident generated emotion instead of 
preserving emotions (positive psychological capital). I use the term positive emotions 
to avoid misunderstanding.    
 Firstly, it is the accumulated positive emotions including hope, optimism and 
confidence. This research focuses on the impact of single emotion on decision-
making. Secondly, studies of positive psychological capital target the impact of 
employees’ psychological capital on individual job performance while this research 
target entrepreneurs’ positive emotions on strategic decision-making. Finally, the 
concept of “capital” implies the emotions can be accumulated, developed, and stored 
for future use. This research does agree with this viewpoint by introducing the 
concept of entrepreneurs’ predisposition (section 3.1.1), the learning outcome of 
previous experience. Entrepreneurs’ positive psychological capital may be part of 
their positive predisposition of host country, which enables them to have positive 
attribution (optimism) about succeeding now and in the future. Nevertheless, the 
emotions I discuss in this thesis refer to entrepreneurs’ incident generated emotion 
instead of preserving emotions (positive psychological capital). I use the term 
positive emotions to avoid misunderstanding.    
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In summary, Theme B focuses on the role of entrepreneurs’ emotions on their actions 
in internationalization. It is an individual level analysis and only investigates the 
impact of entrepreneurs’ incident emotions on strategic decisions but not on other 
people such as staff. The next section directs the attention to entrepreneurial emotion 
literature, focusing on how entrepreneurs’ emotions shape firm’s development.  
3.2.2 Entrepreneurs’ emotions and actions 
This section argues although scholars have paid some attention to emotions in the 
economy, this area is still under-researched. The emerging entrepreneurial literature 
shed light on the role of entrepreneurs’ emotions on economic actions. An overview 
of this literature is presented in this section.  
Non-cognitivists view emotions as the feeling caused by awareness of bodily 
changes (e.g. James, 1884). This research examines emotions from philosophical 
rather than psychological perspective. Instead of viewing emotions as feelings caused 
by awareness of bodily changes, I view emotions as the exhibiting intentionality 
(Hutchinson, 2009: 61) and characterised by certain cognitions such as judgements, 
evaluations and interpretations. Although emotion is used as an umbrella term, I 
follow the definition of Cardon et al. (2012) in entrepreneurial emotion literature 
defining emotion as a reaction of entrepreneurs to a critical incident (stimulus) that 
has consequences for decision-making (cognition) or actions (behaviours) in 
internationalization. Although I follow entrepreneurial emotion literature, the term 
“entrepreneurs’ emotions” is used instead of “entrepreneurial emotions”. This 
research targets how entrepreneurs’ incident-generated emotions shape their actions 
in internationalization such as international exit. Thus, “entrepreneurs’ emotions” is 
a more appropriate term. 
Most studies of entrepreneurial emotion explore how emotions influence cognition 
and how emotions exert impacts on individual decision-making. Emotions influence 
cognition through the process which information is entered into memory, processed 
and retrieved for later use (Forgas, 1995; Forgas and George, 2001), and the interface 
between emotion and cognition is continuous and pervasive. The emerging 
entrepreneurial emotion literature bridges emotion and entrepreneurial process.  
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Despite that recent research has made a progress over the last few years, most work 
in this area targets the early or the end stage of a business. Research on early stage 
business discusses the opportunity pursuit and evolution. Baron (2008) provides a 
complete picture of the role of emotions in entrepreneurial activities. He argues that 
entrepreneurs with positive emotions tend to prefer effective strategies, and are more 
likely to enhance creativity and the ability of resource acquisition and problem 
solving. His later research explores how emotions affect innovation process (Baron 
and Tang, 2011). Foo (2011) and Hayton and Cholakova (2012) evaluate the effect 
of positive and negative emotions on the pursuit of entrepreneurial ideas. Dimov 
(2010) and Welpe et al. (2012) further explore the impact of specific emotions 
(confidence, anger, fear, and joy) on venture emergence. Researchers target early 
stage of entrepreneurial process argue that emotions influence cognition, and 
cognition has been shown to predict opportunity identification and evaluation, thus, 
emotions shape entrepreneurial exploitation through cognition.  
Studies of the late stage of business highlight venture closure is an emotional event 
since entrepreneurs view ventures as the extension of their identity (Shepherd, 2009). 
Shepherd and his colleagues have developed conceptual frameworks and these them 
empirically on entrepreneurs’ emotional reactions (grief), recovery and learning after 
failure (Shepherd and Cardon, 2009; Shepherd et al., 2009; Shepherd, 2009). In line 
with Shepherd’s finding, Jenkins et al. (2014) use appraisal theory to explain the 
emotional response to failure (grief and relief), and its impact on learning process 
and re-entry. They argue that learning from failure is not an automatic and immediate 
process (Jenkins et al., 2014). When a person faces a major loss, it is easier for that 
grief person to make sense of the failure but not the loss (Shepherd, 2009). People 
can do nothing that increases the negative emotions and hence slow down the grief 
recovery and learning process. For example, with the death of a loved one, people 
may become tongue-tied for fear of spreading the grief to others. In this case, it slows 
down the grief recovery process since asking the emotional supports and talking 
about the loss within their social network (e.g. family members) can help a person to 
work through the grief (Davis et al., 1998). Accordingly, Shepherd (2009) highlights 
the individual difference in grief recovery of business failure and Jenkins et al. (2014) 
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extend this view suggesting how entrepreneurs perceive the causes of their failure 
will affect their learning processes.   
This section gives an overview of entrepreneurial emotion literature. The next 
section summarises Theme B and discusses the identified research gaps.  
3.2.3 Summary of Entrepreneurs’ Emotions  
This section highlights two research gaps: how emotions affect the holistic 
international entrepreneurial process and what emotions may occur in 
internationalization and their impact on entrepreneurs’ actions. In addition to the 
early and end stage of business research, Foo et al. (2009) examine the impact of 
entrepreneurs’ negative and positive emotions on long-term and short-term efforts 
and Brundin and Gustafsson (2013) targets the confidence, hope, embarrassment and 
strain in the propensity to continue investment. Emotions have been proven to play a 
role in leadership (Brundin et al., 2008) and strategic changes (Brundin, 2002; Huy, 
2005). 
Huy (1999) examines the role of emotions in organizational changes. His empirical 
data suggests entrepreneurs elicit emotions when they perceive the conflict of 
expected outcome and reality. Their emotions change the receptivity to change, 
which refers to the willingness to sense and accept the change. Different emotions 
would lead to different degree of receptivity, thus it influence the outcome of 
organizational changes. Brundin (2002) explores the influence of emotions in a 
radical strategic change process. She views emotions as the direct/indirect driving 
and restraining forces within the process. Her research shows how the effect of 
emotions that are interpreted and transformed in a way that advances the progress of 
radical changes. It indicates emotions are contagious and help to create energy, and 
thus facilitates or inhibits effect during the strategic change process. Therefore, 
emotions are expected to influence the exit process, which is a radical strategic 
change. Investigation of the exit decision-making process also responds to Cardon et 
al. (2012) call of “in the middle” process and an overview of whole entrepreneurial 
process between opportunity and exit. 
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The context of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China is expected to contribute 
to entrepreneurial exit literature. Doern and Goss (2014) highlight the importance of 
social environment in which entrepreneurs operate by exploring shame-related 
appeasement behaviours of Russian entrepreneurs. Emotions occur in response to a 
stimulus, and this stimulus can be related to others (Smith and Lazarus, 1993). In the 
context of entrepreneurial process in foreign countries, different emotions may occur 
since entrepreneurs need communicate and interact with people from different 
cultural backgrounds. Bruton et al. (2010) argue the institutions have proven to be 
powerful in examining Entrepreneurship topics in cross-border activities. 
Institutional environment limits entrepreneurial opportunities, thus affects new 
venture creation. The institutional distances between entrepreneurs and locals may 
elicit other emotions that are not discussed in domestic context. Combined with the 
argument in section 3.1.1 and section 3.2.1 that learning is a crucial element in 
internationalization, emotional elements of individual learning - how emotions and 
individual learning interact in the context of internationalization would be examined.  
In summary, two research gaps are combined into one subsidiary research question in 
Theme B:  
How do incident-generated emotions shape entrepreneurs’ actions in 
internationalisation? 
3.3 Theme C: The decision making of international exit  
This section gives an overview of current decision-making models of international 
exit. Combined with my arguments in Theme A and Theme B, a revised decision-
making framework is developed.  
3.3.1 An overview of international exit decision-making models 
This section examines Boddewyn (1983) foreign divestment model and Benito and 
Welch (1997) de-internationalization model. A new theoretical framework based on 
conventional international exit model and my arguments is developed for further 
testing in discussion section (see Figure 3-3).  





Figure 3-1: The Divestment decision process model, Source: Boddewyn (1983:26) 
How do companies operate in foreign markets? This question has been at the centre 
of international business studies for four decades. However, Benito and Welch (1997) 
indicate that most studies focus on pre internationalization instead of post entry 
development. Therefore, the question of why entrepreneurs change their mind after 
internationalization and withdraw their commitments is lack of systemic research. 
Gilmour (1973) develops the domestic divestment decision-making model, and 
Porter (1980) introduces the concept of exit barriers. Building on their research, 
Boddewyn (1983) develops the international divestment decision-making process 
(see Figure 3-1).  
Boddewyn’s (1983) model is simple and linear (Figure 3-1). However, this model is 
difficult to apply in real international exit decision-making for the following reasons. 
Firstly, this process is linear and straightforward for making one-time decision. Due 
to the dynamic nature of business environment, each process could be reversed and a 
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more detailed process is needed to explain how discrepancy prevails over exit barrier 
and make decision makers “perceive” the need to change their operation mode, to 
decrease commitment or to close the venture. What decision makers experience and 
how they change their mind leave an interesting gap for further examination.  
Secondly, this model is based on the assumption that exit is the result of poor 
organizational performance. Headd (2003) indicates this is not applicable for 
successful and voluntary closures. Entrepreneurs would terminate a profitable and 
promising venture to accomplish their intangible goals, which could be irrelevant to 
organization and environment. Organizational performance is not the only criterion 
of venture closure and entrepreneur level variables should also be included. Shepherd 
(2009) suggests international exit is like a divorce. It is the people who make the 
decision but not the variables. Thus some situations may occur; for example, 
entrepreneurs would rather increase their financial costs to recover from their high 
emotional costs. The acknowledgement and acceptance of a bad marriage is a long 
and struggling process, thus it implies a complicated nature of international exit and 
the oversimplification of Boddewyn’s (1983) model. 
Figure 3-2 presents the de-internationalization model proposed by Benito and Welch 
(1997). This model assumes that company performance (input) and strategic change 
(input), including current development and changes in management team result in 
decisions to de-internationalize, to maintain or to expand the business (outcomes). 
Benito and Welch (1997) suggest the change of management team may lead to de-
internationalization. A new management teams may have new organizational goals 
resulting in strategic changes such as international exit. However, the role of decision 
makers is still underestimated since they assume decision makers can make objective 
assessments and decisions to achieve their new organizational goals.  
Boddewyn’s (1983) and Benito and Welch’s (1999) models do not, however, provide 
a comprehensive understanding of the decision-making process due to the lack of 
systemic research of the role on entrepreneurs. A more dynamic, individual -based 
model is needed to present the sophisticated nature of this process. The next section 
presents my revised framework.  





Figure 3-2: De-internationalization Model, Source: Benito, 1997: 20 
 
3.3.2 Theoretical framework of international exit decision-making 
This section presents the theoretical framework and how it was developed (see 
Figure 3-3). There are five stages in making international exit decisions: (1) 
information, (2) incident generated emotions, (3) evaluations, (4) outcomes, and (5) 
learning from the actions. As shown in Figure 3-2, Benito and Welch (1999) assume 
international exit is an organization’s response to past commitment and outcomes 
(organizational performance) and current development (strategic directions). This 
decision model should then involve environmental and organizational variables 
THEME A         
Individual variables 
THEME B                     
How entrepreneurs make 
decisions? 
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(Element 1, Figure 3-3,)  objective assessment of performance (Element 4, Figure 
3-3,)  actions including investment, divestment, surviving and exit (Element 5, 
Figure 3-3) and organizational learning from previous actions (Element 6, Figure 
3-3). Building on my arguments, my theoretical framework has the following 
modifications. I add two new elements: individual variables (Element 2, Figure 3-3) 
and entrepreneurs’ emotions (Element 3, Figure 3-3) to the framework and replace 
entrepreneurs’ objective assessment with subjective assessment of performance 
(Element 4, Figure 3-3) and organizational learning with individual learning 
(Element 6, Figure 3-3) 
Theme A argues international exit is an entrepreneurs’ response when this venture 
has fallen short of their expectation thus highlights three individual variables that 
may affect international exit decisions. Therefore, the first modification is the added 
individual variables in my framework (Element 2, Figure 3-3). In addition, Theme A 
argues international exit is an entrepreneurs’ response based on their subjective 
assessment of organizational performance (Gimeno et al., 1997). Therefore, Benito 
and Welch (1997)’s model is modified again, suggesting international exit is the 
outcome of subjective assessment of organizational performance and strategic 
development (Element 4, Figure 3-3).  
Theme B argues emotions shape entrepreneurs’ actions in internationalisation. An 
emotional perspective should be applied in decision-making process. Huy (1999) and 
Brundin (2002) highlight entrepreneurs’ emotions can serve as direct/ indirect 
driving and restraining forces within the strategic change process. An emotional 
perspective is adopted in examining how entrepreneurs make decisions on 
internationalization including investment, divestment, doing nothing (surviving) or 
even exit. The third modification, entrepreneurs’ incident-generated emotions are 
therefore added in Figure 3-3 (Element 3). Finally, the fourth modification views 
entrepreneurs as a heterogeneous group and argues that entrepreneurs may have 
different extent of learning building on their accumulated social and historical 
experiences and emotions (Vygotsky, 1997; Jenkins et al., 2014). Hence, individual 
learning is more appropriate than organizational learning. 
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To illustrate the framework, five stages of decision-making are presented as follows. 
First stage is the information. Conventionally, IB literature examines environmental 
and organizational variables, and concludes that these variables result in two 
enablers- poor performance and strategic change, thus lead to international exit (see 
section 2.3). The basic assumption of this argument is that each strategy is 
determined by both environmental situation and organizational condition (Shaver, 
1998). The environmental variables closely intertwine with organizational variables 
and provide information to decision-maker (see Figure 3-3, Element 1 for variables). 
However, this view is challenged by Theme A and individual variables are added as 
entrepreneurs’ non-economic and personal reasons resulting in international exit. 
Environmental, organizational, and individual variables are the information (critical 
incidents) that may result in international exit. This research focuses on individual 
variables.   
Second stage is the processing of information, looking at entrepreneurs’ emotions. 
Huy (1999) and Brundin (2002) highlight the role of emotions in strategic changes.  
Emotions may be viewed as the direct/ indirect driving and restraining forces within 
the process. In my theoretical framework, critical incidents (information) elicit 
entrepreneurs’ emotions, and entrepreneurs make judgement based on their 
emotional response to the information (Baron, 2008). Cardon et al. (2012) indicate 
that emotions can shape entrepreneurs’ behaviour, in my theoretical framework, the 
generated emotion may lead to entrepreneurs’ actions including divestment, 
investment, doing nothing or even exit (fourth stage).  
The third stage is evaluation. Entrepreneurs have their subjective assessment of 
performance (Gimeno et al., 1997) and this evaluation result in different actions in 
fourth stage. The fifth stage is individual learning since each action (outcome) 
contributes to future organizational performance and entrepreneurs’ assessment of  





* Benito and Welch (1999): Element 1-> 4(objective assessment) -> 5-> 6 (organizational learning) 
*Added/ modified elements: Element 2. Individual variables (Section 3.1); Element 3.Entreneurs’ emotions (Section 3.2) 
Element 4: Objective assessment-> Subjective assessment (Section 3.1); Element 6: Organizational learning->individual learning (Section 3.1 and Section 3.2) 
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Figure 3-3: Theoretical framework of decision-making of international exit, source: author 
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future decisions. Echoing Vygotsky (1997) and Shepherd and Cardon (2009), 
entrepreneurs do not automatically and immediately learn from their experience; the 
degree of learning and learning outcome are varied. To understand why and how 
entrepreneur make decision on international exit, it is necessary to explore actions 
they take in internationalization and examine the correlation of each action and the 
decision of international exit.  
3.3.3 Summary  
Theme C answers the subsidiary research question:  How do entrepreneurs make 
decisions on international exit and what is the outcome? Hence, Figure 3-3 is 
developed, building on Benito and Welch (1999)’s model and arguments in Theme A 
and B. The research focus of each theme is presented in Table 3-1. To answer the 
research question and test the usefulness of the theoretical framework, Chapter Five 
reviews the research methodology applied in this research. The main research 
question and subsidiary research questions guide the methodology employed.  





Why do entrepreneurs make 
international exit decisions? 
Viewed from an individual and 
non-economic perspective.  
 
Section 3.1 
Predispositions: Vygotsky, 1997; Bourdieu, 
1990, Shepherd, 2009; Jenkins et al. 2014 
Personal goals: Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Morton 
and Pony, 2006; Chrisman et al., 2012; 
Dunkelberg et al., 2013 
Family: Sharma and Irving, 2005; Gomez-mejia 
et al., 2011; Chrisman et al., 2012; Gedajlovic et 
al., 2012, Detienne and Chirico, 2014 
Subjective assessment: Gimeno et al., 1997; 
Headd, 2003; Chrico and Detienne, 2014 
Theme B How do incident-generated 
emotions shape entrepreneurs’ 
actions in internationalisation from 
entry, operations to exit decisions? 
Section 3.2 
Entrepreneurial emotions: Shepherd, 2003; 2009; 
Baron, 2008; Foo, 2009; 2011; Dimov, 2007; 
2010; Cardon, 2012, Welpe et al., 2013 
Emotions in strategic changes: Huy, 1999; 
Brundin, 2006; Brundin and Sharma, 2012 
Theme C How do entrepreneurs make 
decisions of international exit and 
what is the outcome?   
 
Section 3.3 
Decision-making model: Boddewyn, 1983; 
Benito and Welch, 1999; Huy, 1999 
Table 3-1: Subsidiary research questions and literature, source: author 




Chapter 4 : Methodology 
 
This chapter reviews the research method and methodology used in this study. The 
main research question and subsidiary research questions in each theme are firstly 
introduced (section 4.1). The research paradigm, the basic belief system that builds 
on ontological, epistemological assumptions and methodology are discussed to 
present the worldview of the researcher (section 4.2). This is a multiple-case study 
based on critical realism research paradigm. The selection of case companies, data 
collection methods and analysis techniques are also presented (section 4.3 and 4.5). 
Finally, this chapter concludes with the reflection on the appropriateness of the 
applied research methodology (section 4.7). The structure of this chapter is shown in 
Table 4-1.  
 
Section  Summary 
Research 
Question 
Section 4.1 The main research question and subsidiary research 
questions for Theme A, B, and C  
   
Research 
Paradigm 
Section 4.2 Ontological assumption 
Epistemological assumption 
Methodology 
   
Multiple case 
study and data 
collection 
Section 4.3 and 
Section 4.4 
Unit of analysis 
Sampling strategy 
In-depth interview and critical incident technique 
Data collection process 
Data triangulation 
   
Data analysis Section 4.5 Within case analysis 
Cross case analysis 
   
Reflection and 
Ethics 
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Theme A: Economic and Non-economic variables of international exit  
Theme C:  The decision making of international exit and outcomes  
Theme B: Emotions and Actions 
Figure 4-1: Theoretical frameworks and themes, source: author 
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4.1  Research Question 
Building from my literature chapter and pilot study, I concluded that international exit 
is entrepreneurs’ personal choice influenced by environmental, organizational, and 
individual variables. My main research question is therefore: 
“Why do Taiwanese entrepreneurs who have invested in China exit?” 
Given the insights gained from the literature chapter and my pilot study results, the 
theoretical framework in literature chapter is developed for investigation (Figure 4-1). 
To test the usefulness of the framework, I develop three themes for conducting an in-
depth analysis as shown in Figure 4-1. The subsidiary research questions are 
presented in Table 4-2. The description and research gaps of each theme are shown in 
section 2.5. 
Main research question: 
Why do Taiwanese entrepreneurs who have invested in China exit? 
Theme Theme topic Subsidiary research question 
A Entrepreneurs’ non-




Why do entrepreneurs make international exit 
decisions? Viewed from an individual and non-
economic perspective. 
B Entrepreneurs’ emotions and 
actions in internationalization 
process 
How do incident-generated emotions shape 
entrepreneurs’ actions in internationalisation from 
entry, operations to exit decisions? 
C The decision making of 
international exit  
How do entrepreneurs make the decision of 
international exit and what is the outcome?   
 
Table 4-2: Research questions and themes, source: author 
The choice of research paradigm is informed by research questions. The nature of my 
topic suggests its research design. This research is carried out under a critical realism 
research paradigm. The following section reviews methodological consideration.  
4.2 Research Paradigms: Critical Realism 
A research paradigm represents a worldview that defining the nature of the world and 
the possible relationship to that world and its parts (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). In this 
section, I discuss my paradigm, the basic belief system that builds on ontological, 
epistemological assumptions. This is a qualitative and multiple-case study research 
based on critical realism that located between constructivism and positivism (Healy 
and Perry, 2000).  
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The positivist paradigm has dominated International Business (IB), International 
Entrepreneurship (IE) and Entrepreneurship research (Coviello and Mcauley, 1999; 
Jones et al., 2011; Morais, 2011; Welch et al., 2011). Many IB researchers use case 
study for inductive theory building in positivist view aiming to develop testable 
hypothesis and theory which are generalizable across setting (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Eisenhardt (1989) assumes that the investigation process can be objective by 
achieving validity and reliability through the minimization of bias. In general, 
positivists consider reality is real and value-free. In comparison, constructivism views 
truth as a particular belief system held in a particular context (Healy and Perry, 2000).  
Researchers are part of the world they study. Stake (1995) argue “particularization” is 
the goal of case studies. Instead of generalizing findings, researchers using case study 
as interpretive sense making in order to embrace context, narrative and personal 
engagement.   
The choice of research paradigm is informed by research questions. Positivist strategy 
is inappropriate to this research since I aim to examine why and how entrepreneurs’ 
non-economic variables and emotions affect their decision-making processes. 
Constructivism approach could be my choice, however, I aim to explain why 
entrepreneurs make decisions of international exit and provide a causes-and-effects 
explanation. I need to be both casual (as does the positivist) and interpretive (as does 
the constructivist); thus, critical realism approach is considered to be the most suitable 
one to answer my research questions since Bhaskar (1978) provides a way to 
reconcile explanation and understanding. Research questions of critical realism 
studies are usually in the form of “What caused the event associated with the 
phenomenon to occur” (Eaton, 2010:200). This research aims to explore what causes 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs to exit China and how they make decisions. Therefore, this 
research question confirms the appropriateness of using critical realist case method.  
There are three themes of this research. In general, three themes are critical realism 
and using retroductive strategy. Retroduction refers to the identification of 
mechanisms that explains what caused particular events to occur (Blaikie, 2010). 
According to Blaikie (2010), the inductive strategy aims to establish descriptions of 
characteristics and patterns of phenomena. Theory-building takes place after data 
collection and drawing generalization from data. In comparison, deductive strategy 
begins by putting forward a hypothesis or proposition from a theory and tests it by 
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gathering appropriate data. For research adopting retroductive strategy, collecting data 
is likely to be an interactive one. This approach is cutting edge because it continues to 
ask “why” questions. 
For instance, the research question is why do entrepreneurs make international exit 
decisions? To find out the cause of this event, I analysed the empirical data and 
identified the role of non-economic value of the firm. Then I asked the next question: 
why and how does non-economic value of the firm result in this decision? I went back 
and forth between theories and data to understand the cause of the event.  
Theme A begins with a surprising contrast, triggered by the realisation that an 
observed outcome is different from what had been anticipated. Welch et al., (2011: 
748) suggest a new casual factor is in operation or a mismatch between an existing 
theory and an empirical observation through this strategy, resulting in “re-description” 
or “re-contextualisation” of the phenomenon. My theory building process indicates a 
critical realist way of thinking; in this view, theorising is a process not of discovery 
but of conceptualisation (Sayer, 1992).  
4.2.1 Ontological assumptions 
Ontology refers to what exists and what is the nature of the reality (Healy and Perry, 
2000). This research follows the concepts of critical realism presented by Welch et al. 
(2011) and Guba and Lincoln (1994), namely post-positivism. Accordingly, there 
exists a “real” reality but only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehendable (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994:109).  A critical realist views social phenomena as interpretations 
by researchers, although knowledge is not exclusively linguistic, however this impact 
must be account for in the evaluation of scientific knowledge.  
Unlike positivism, critical realism makes the distinction between the actual and the 
real domain of reality. “We see the tip of an iceberg but that doesn’t mean that the 
invisible three-quarters is not there or is unconnected to what we see” (Eaton, 2010: 
199). Critical realism uses causal language to describe the world and choose the most 
satisfactory explanation considering empirical data and existing theories (Morais, 
2011). In this thesis, I approach the “real” reality by investigating empirical events. I 
examine the decision-making of international exit by looking at actual events 
(Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China) among my case firms and discuss 
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abstract notions that could make sense of what took place. For instance, the non-
economic value of the firm and the incident-generated emotions of entrepreneurs 
make it possible to explain the non-rational decisions (failed to achieve maximum 
economic returns) of entrepreneurs.     
4.2.2 Epistemological assumptions 
Epistemology refers to what constitutes knowledge and the criteria of deciding when 
knowledge is adequate and appropriate (Blaikie, 2010), constrained by ontological 
assumptions. That is, if the researcher assumes a “real” reality, then the knower must 
take an objectivist posture.  As suggested by Easton (2010), critical realists construe 
rather than construct the world. As a critical realist researcher, I accept my 
explanations are interpretive. Critical realism differs from constructivism since 
critical realist accepts the possibility of knowing the “truth”, albeit provisional and 
partial. In comparison, the constructivist rejects the possibility of truth and 
concentrates on uncovering the constructions of making social events and actions. 
Since observation is fallible, I examine the same data through the different theoretical 
lenses (e.g. theories in International Business and Entrepreneurship field), moving 
back and forth between empirical data and theories and eventually reach a satisfactory 
interpretation of the phenomenon. Following Easton’s (2010) suggestion, I collected 
further data and discuss with other researchers. Only by viewing the same data 
through lenses of different researchers, I can gain an understanding of some of the 
features of the real world.  
4.2.3 Methodology 
Methodology refers to how can the inquirer approaches the problem and find out what 
can be known. Again, this is constrained by ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. For example, Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggest a real reality pursued by 
an objective researcher selects a manipulative methodology (e.g. natural experiment), 
whether the methods are qualitative or quantitative. This implies a researcher’s ability 
to be objective and a real world to be objective about. They further indicate that the 
methodology of “critical realism aims to redress problem by investigating in a more 
natural setting, collecting more situational information and reintroducing discovery as 
an element in inquiry” (1994:110). Sayer (1992) suggests all these aims require an 
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intensive research strategy which are typically qualitative techniques including in-
depth studies of “individual agents in their casual contexts”.  Therefore, case study 
approach serves these aims well.   
Critical realist case study is applied in my research. Case study, according to Easton 
(2010:119), refers to “a research method that involves investigating one or a small 
number of social entities or situations about which data are collected using multiple 
sources or data and developing a holistic description through an interactive research 
process”. Critical realist case study is a more recent development in IB and IE field. 
Healy and Perry (2000) indicate realism is neither value-free (positivism) nor value-
laden (constructivism). Realism researchers are value-aware that consider a 
participant’s view as a window to reality through which a picture of reality can be 
triangulated with other perceptions (Healy and Perry, 2000: 123).  
Compared to positivist case study addressing the abstract construct or generic 
phenomenon (facts) (Eisenhardt, 1989) and constructivism focusing on the particular 
features of the case (values) (Stake, 1995), critical realist case study is prone to 
instrumental than intrinsic since its ultimate goal is the “postulation of objective 
casual mechanism instead of taking subjective accounts of experiences as the point of 
departure for an iterative and retroductive explanatory effort” (Danermark et al., 
2002: 109). This statement distinguishes critical realism from constructivism and 
critical theory. Bhaskar (1978) indicates that causalities play a role in this tradition, 
but it is not merely a search of event regularities; instead, researchers need to go 
beyond the event to understand the nature of the objects. This statement distinguishes 
critical realism from positivist, implying that cause-effect relationships do not 
consistently produce regularities in an open system (Welch et al., 2011).    
The next section justifies my selection of multiple case studies and introduces the case 
selection criteria and process, source of evidence from each case, and critical incident 
technique matching critical realist way of thinking and providing rich data to answer 
research questions.   
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4.3 Multiple Case Studies 
The criteria of selecting the case study methodology are the followings: the context of 
this research, the newness of the topic, the fit between critical realism and the case 
study design, and the findings from the pilot study.  
1) The context of this research: Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China  
How to perform successful internationalization in China has been a topic attracting 
much attention (Peng et al., 2008). Nevertheless, IB research on China has largely 
been interpreted from the perspectives of Western institutions since more than 80% of 
the authors of the most-cited papers are from USA, Canada and European Unions 
(Tan and Nojonen, 2011). Methodologically, most of these studies apply quantitative 
rather than qualitative methods. These facts reflect that most of the studies on China 
are theory testing rather than theory building. China is a testing ground to mainstream 
theories developed from Western institutions. However, Western assumptions may 
result in biases due to the distinctiveness of Chinese institutions (Peng and Yuan, 
2008); as a result, a more exploratory method is needed. To better understand the 
business operation in China, case study approach is considered more appropriate for 
theory building research (Tan and Nojonen, 2011) and hence it is applied in this 
research.  
2) The newness of the topic: using entrepreneur as the unit of analysis and 
studying non-economic variables and emotions. 
Why Taiwanese entrepreneurs make international exit decisions is seen as 
complicated phenomena requesting more than statistical explanation. There is a need 
to examine these reasons to understand the story of these Taiwanese firms in China. 
Additionally, I intend to investigate how these firms changed over time in response to 
fast-changing institutions in China: to understand the dynamic nature international 
operation in emerging economies (Peng et al., 2008a). However, the existing models 
of international exit (e.g. Benito and Welch, 1997) do not allow me to fully 
understand my case companies because they were not developed for the type of firms 
being investigated. Current models also use organization as the unit of analysis 
instead of individuals (entrepreneurs).  
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Since research in international exit and entrepreneurial emotions only emerged 
recently (Benito, 2005; Cardon et al., 2012), I aim to conduct a theory building 
research rather than a theory testing one since there is a shortage of individual level 
analysis and emotional decision-making model. Using multiple-case studies enables 
me to clarify the process of how entrepreneurs construct and adjust their cognition by 
emotions and compare the idiosyncratic process of each entrepreneur (Zahra et al., 
2005).  
3) The fit between critical realism and the case study design:  see section 0 for 
discussion 
This research addresses Taiwanese firms’ internationalization process from the 
beginning to the end. In relation to the choices made in this research, international 
exit is a complex phenomenon because it is influenced by entrepreneurs’ non-
economic variables and their emotions. Different cases can reveal constructs as well 
as theoretical advances through data triangulation collected from multiple sources. 
Multiple case studies make it possible to identify the similarities and difference within 
a collection of cases (Morais, 2011; Welch et al., 2011).   
4) The findings from the pilot study showed case study approach is an 
appropriate choice 
Hatem (2012) indicates the pilot study guides the methodological choice of the 
research. The findings from the pilot study showed that the multiple case studies are a 
suitable choice for its capability of examining the research questions in a bound 
context (Miles and Huberman, 1994). As shown in my pilot study, the role of 
entrepreneurs in decision-making is highlighted and the context of emerging 
economies plays a vital role in shaping entrepreneurs’ predispositions and 
international exit decisions. The case study focuses on “understanding the dynamics 
present within a single setting” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534), and it is recommended to 
understand the decision-making process (e.g. Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; 
Pettigrew 1992). The case study enables me to take into account the environmental 
context (Hatem, 2012) that is vital for research targeting on emerging economies 
(Peng and Yuan, 2008).  
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The findings from the pilot study also indicated the use of a comparative approach. 
Multiple case studies are adopted instead of single case study. In my pilot study, two 
entrepreneurs suggested different definitions of their international exit. This implies 
the need to replicate this finding by conducting a second, third and even more 
experiments (Yin, 2009). Multiple case studies enable me to carefully select cases that 
predict similar/contrasting results to confirm/disconfirm theories.  
4.3.1 Unit of Analysis 
Although the firm is the main unit of analysis in internationalization studies (Coviello 
et al., 2011), this study focus on the entrepreneur not organization. McDougall-Covin 
et al. (2014) indicate the new trend in the International Entrepreneurship (IE) field 
that shift the research focus from macro environment and organization to decision 
makers, entrepreneurs. Additionally, Coviello et al. (2011) call for more micro level 
studies using theories in Entrepreneurship field to IE field. Section 2.3.3 highlights 
the role of entrepreneurs and the need of individual level research.   
4.3.2 Sampling Strategy 
Selection of the cases follows sampling strategy, as the case study is purposive and 
not random (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007:27) also 
suggest that when “the purpose of the research is to develop theory, not to test it, and 
so theoretical (not random or stratified) sampling is appropriate”. Multiple case 
studies typically yields more testable and robust theories than single case study, and 
the choice is based more on the contribution to the theory development than on the 
uniqueness of a given case (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The theoretical reasons 
including replication, extension of theory, contrary replication and elimination of 
alternative explanations (Yin, 2009). The sampling strategy of this qualitative 
research is therefore purposive and theory-driven. Following Hatem’s (2012) 
theoretical sampling strategy, Table 4-3 below is the summary of the selection criteria. 
The first criterion reflects the research questions and context. The second criterion is 
to highlight the influence of entrepreneurs’ variables and emotions on decision-
making. This research examines individual (entrepreneur) instead of group decision-
making and only targets on privately owned foreign ventures rather than international 
joint ventures. In addition, Mata and Portugal (2000) indicate firm’s entry mode 
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affects its international exit decision. To eliminate alternative explanations of 
international exit and ensure the centrality of entrepreneurs, the second criterion is set.  
The third criterion is suggested by CIER (2012) since some Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
invest in foreign countries for financial management and tax avoidance. This research 
only targets those interested in doing business in China. 
Sample selection criteria 
Criteria Choice of criteria is 
based on  
Justification 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in 
China 
Research question 
and research context  
The nationality of entrepreneurs 
and their investment profiles  
Firms should enter into China by foreign 
direct investment- The venture is fully 
owned by the entrepreneur and the 
entrepreneur is the key decision maker 
Mata and Portugal 
(2000), entry mode 
and international exit 
 
 
Doern and Goss 
(2014), the centrality 
of entrepreneurs 
Indicates case companies 
internationalising into China and 
the influence of firm’s entry 
mode on international exit 
 
Indicates the influence of 
entrepreneurs’ variables and 
emotions on decision-making.   
Firms should have strong financial 
supports, attractive business ideas and 
strategies. In other words, entrepreneurs 
should commit in their Chinese 
operations. 
CIER (2012) Enables identification of 
entrepreneurs invested in China 
for doing business instead of tax 
avoidance.   
For exit cases, firms should exit Chia after 
2011 and before 2017. Firms should be 




Benito and Welch 
(1997) 
Enables identification of critical 
cases 
 
Enables identification of exit 
cases instead of divestment cases 
For stay cases, firms have no exit plans for 
the next 5 years. 
Porter (1980); Turcan 
(2006) 
Indicates exiting China is not the 
short, medium and long-term 
plan for stay cases 
Table 4-3: Sample selection criteria, source: author 
The fourth criterion is because of recent significant fluctuation of Chinese investment 
environment and the shift of Taiwanese entrepreneurs’ motivations. The two facts are 
suggested in CIER (2012) and findings from the pilot study. Patton (2002) states that 
this timeframe acts as a “critical case”. I excluded 2 old cases that exited in 2000 
(Firm X) and 2003 (Firm Y) since they did not match the fourth criterion. The fifth 
criterion is to ensure entrepreneurs of stay cases have no intention to exit China. 
Western companies in general are more open to academic research and often provide 
access to researchers. Whereas Chinese companies are less willing to offer research 
access for fear of leaking sensitive information to public and competitors (Tan and 
Nojonen, 2011). Case selection in China and Taiwan is a matter of relationships (Tan 
and Nojonen, 2011). Therefore, utilizing personal networks is an effective strategy to 
gain access to company. Additionally, using personal networks such as family and 
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work connections can enhance trust between interviewees and the researchers. 
Interviewees may become more open to discuss their experiences.   
Shepherd et al. (2009) suggest exit is a grief and negative event for entrepreneurs. 
This fact significantly reduces entrepreneurs’ willingness of participating in the 
research. To overcome this problem, a snowballing sampling strategy is employed 
(Turcan, 2006) through the recommendation of personal networks. This approach 
encourages entrepreneurs to be more open about the topic (Tan and Nojonen, 2011). 
The snowballing strategy helps identify significant cases from those who know the 
“right” people and information-rich cases. (Patton, 2002). Moreover, with a reference 
(usually from a friend, business partner or an employee of the entrepreneur) or a 
personal network, entrepreneurs are more open to discuss their international exit 
decisions since they know the researcher beforehand.  












Exit time Investment 
(£) 
A 200+ No FDI 2001 2017 (est) 400,000+ 
B 70+ No FDI 1992 2015 (est) Confidential 
C 120+ No FDI 2005 2011  800,000+ 
D 100+ No FDI 2009 2013 120,000+ 
E 20+ Yes FDI 2009 2012 140,000 
F  1000+ No FDI 1999 Stay case Confidential 
G 20+ Yes FDI 2011 Stay case 40,000 
Table 4-4: Information of case companies, source: author 
Based on the sampling strategy, I identified 6 exit cases and 2 stay cases. However, 
one of my interviewees withdrew interviews (Firm Z). In the end, I had 5 exit cases 
and 2 stay cases (see Table 4-4). The interviewees included entrepreneurs (owner-
managers), business successors (entrepreneurs’ children), managing directors, 
department managers, business partners, entrepreneurs’ family members, business 
partners and friends who have the in-depth understanding of internationalization, 
operations and the reasons of international exit (see Table 4-5). 
 
 






























A 6(8) Entre (3) 5 X  X X 
B 3(5) Entre (2) 
Successor 
(1) 
2 X X X X 
C 3(4) Entre (2) 2 X  X  
D 3(4) Entre (2) 2 X X X X 
E 4(5) Entre (2) 3 X X X  
F 3(4) Entre (2) 
Successor 
(2) 
2 X X X X 
G 3(4) Entre (2) 2 X   X 
Table 4-5: Source of evidence from each case firm, source: author 
4.4 Data Collection 
I collected both primary and secondary data. Primary data was gathered from in-depth 
interviews and the secondary data come from companies’ financial reports, press 
releases and archives. Although I investigate the relationship of non-economic 
variables and emotions on decision-making, this is an IE study not a psychological or 
neuroscience study. Therefore, following Brundin (2002) and Doern and Goss (2014), 
I investigated entrepreneurs’ mind-set and emotions through face-to-face interview 
rather than conducting a psychology experiment or testing entrepreneurs’ reactions by 
equipment.  
4.4.1 In-depth interview 
Face-to-face semi structured interview is regarded as the most popular method to 
collect primary data (Welch et al., 2002; Welch et al., 2011). This research explores 
the entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables and their emotions and I collected relevant 
data through contacting entrepreneurs, managers and business partners in the seven 
cases. Qualitative interviewing collects primary data, which is not recorded and 
available in other places (Soulsby, 2005). Besides, interview is beneficial to explore a 
new area or uncover implicit information, for instance, people’s value and belief 
(Welch et al., 2002).  
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4.4.1.1 Elite interview and access to case companies 
Our interviewees are the “elite” of companies, those who have impact on important 
strategic decisions (Smith, 2006). Corporate elites usually prefer to communicate with 
people directly rather than filling a survey, joining focus group, or participating 
experiments (Kvale, 1996). In addition, face-to face interview ensures that the 
information is obtained from the expected person but not from secretary or less 
involved persons.  
It is a challenging process to gain access and to select appropriate number of 
informants, even more difficult to find entrepreneurs willing to talk about their exit 
experience. In general, I used two ways to gain access to my case companies. Firstly, 
my personal network and working experience allow me to gain access to Firm X, A 
and B. The three entrepreneurs then kindly introduce me to Firm C, G and Y. 
Although Firm Y was not selected for sampling criteria, the entrepreneur sent me to 
Firm D and the entrepreneur of Firm D sent me to Firm E (snowballing strategy as 
shown in section 4.3.2). Additionally, I sent cold emails to possible case firms and 
gained access to Firm F and Z (drop due to limited access).  
To make informants (particularly entrepreneurs) reveal as much as possible. I tried to 
build a rapport with them before the interview. I have a great advantage from my 
previous job in my family business, which has operated in China for more than 20 
years. The network of my family business and my pre-understanding of the “realities” 
of operating in Chinese is helpful in creating the trust. My experience and knowledge 
of investing in China also enable me to use the “keywords”, inviting entrepreneurs to 
talk more about sensitive topics (e.g. bribery). For example, to collect their 
predispositions to China, I usually begin with sharing my experience in China and 
asking for their comments. In addition, I know some entrepreneurs for many years 
(e.g. Firm A, B) or heard their stories before (e.g. Firm C, G). The friendship and my 
pre-understanding of their business made the entrepreneurs more willing to reveal 
their “secrets”, share the emotional side of the story and be honest with me.   
4.4.1.2 Location, time and the choice of language 
Kvale (1996) and Mason (2002) argue that the location of interview will affect the 
interviewees’ attitude and their answers. The location of interview is carefully 
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selected to avoid the interruption of family, colleagues and other people (Healey and 
Rawlinson, 1993). Interviewees may feel stressful in an isolated room while they may 
be distracted in an open place (Mason, 2002). All people have their own preference of 
locations. Thus, I consulted interviewees’ preference before choosing the venue of 
interview in order to build up a relaxing and comfortable atmosphere. All the 
interviews took place in the location entrepreneurs suggested to maximize their 
degree of openness (Harvey, 2010). The interviews, including follow-up interviews, 
took place from August 2012 to September 2014. Table 4-5 summarizes detailed 
interview arrangements by case firms. The first round interviews were face-to-face 
ones. Due to the time limit and financial constraints, a number of follow up interviews 
were conducted through phone or Skype. It took between 120-180 minutes to 
interview each entrepreneur, between 30-90 minutes to interview others.  
The choice of language in which to conduct interview is Chinese. Marschan-Piekkari 
and Reis (2004) recommend the language used should be for participant advantage 
since it provides a more comfortable environment, which can affect the dynamics of 
the interview situation. Due to language differences, some of interviews cannot 
readily be translated into English, particularly those entrepreneurs using 
Confucianism terms or Taiwanese dialect to describe their experience in China. To 
minimise this problem, I asked these entrepreneurs to define the meaning of the word 
and consult the particular sentence with experts who have in-depth understanding of 
Taiwanese dialect, Chinese language and English translation.  
To translate the transcript from local language (Chinese) to English, I follow Skofos 
theory suggested by Reiss and Vermeer (2014) that translation is a form of 
communicative interaction rather than a narrow linguistic transfer. I focus on the 
meaning not the literal transfer. The role of the translator is regarded as a cross-
cultural expert aiming to achieve functionally adequate in target culture instead of 
technician faithful to the original (Chidlow et al., 2014). As argued by Reiss and 
Vermeer (2014), it is not possible to produce a target-language text that is fully 
equivalent in all its features due to cultural and linguistic difference. By applying 
Skopos theory in translation, meaning is ultimately cultural in nature (Chidlow et al., 
2014). It is unavoidable to change its value when transmitted from Chinese 
(Taiwanese) culture to English culture. 
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4.4.1.3 Using Critical Incident Technique in interview and interview instruments 
Vygotsky (1997) indicates that decision-making is to learn from previous decisions. 
This means that the past shapes the future. To capture critical past events that result in 
international exit decisions, I employed Critical Incident Technique (CIT) developed 
by Flanagan (1954) to conduct the face-to-face interviews. This technique has been 
used in Turcan’s (2006) de-internationalization study of high-tech SMEs and Cope’s 
(2006) entrepreneurial learning research.  
Insights gained from the pilot study suggested the use of CIT (Critical Incident 
Technique). During the interview, entrepreneurs found difficult to recall detailed 
memory in relation to internationalization. They required the researcher to describe 
the circumstances or give a keyword. Additionally, the experiences they described 
were mostly significant for themselves or firms. The findings from pilot study 
suggested an unstructured interview is inappropriate for data collection. Entrepreneurs 
need instructions and keywords to improve their memory recall processes. CIT is 
frequently used to collect data based on previous experience reported from memory. 
A critical incident is an important event for entrepreneurs but not necessarily a 
dramatic one. It may elicit emotions and trigger changes to entrepreneurs’ mind-set 
and make them reconsider and re-evaluate the foreign investment. CIT allows the 
researcher to collect data from entrepreneurs’ perspectives and identify rare incidents 
(Cope and Watts, 2000). Furthermore, it increases the accuracy of data since the 
perceived criticality of the incident makes entrepreneurs easier and better to recall 
their memories (Turcan, 2006).  
CIT collects information such as the cause, process and outcome of critical incident, 
as well as the feeling and perception of incidents and changes in response to incidents 
(Flanagan, 1954). CIT relies on self-report and memory. To ensure the accuracy and 
authenticity, the guidance of CIT in Flanagan (1954) has been strictly followed to 
design interview instruments. Use of statement such as “Think of the last time you 
experienced something significant….”, “I wonder if you could think of…” and a brief 
description of the circumstances also helped entrepreneurs to recall their memory.  
Cope and Watts (2000) indicate that it is more important to study critical events than 
crisis. Finding positive critical incidents are as important as negative critical incidents 
since both have an impact on decision-making process. Questions emerged from the 
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conversation itself is considered to be the most powerful way of collecting insights 
from people’s experience (Cope and Watts, 2000). Therefore, the interview should be 
relatively unstructured allowing entrepreneurs to self-report their salient moments by 
asking general questions like “How did it (critical incident) happen? …How did you 
feel...What you did...?” Moreover, I try to be a good listener during the interview that 
allows entrepreneurs to do most talking. 
4.4.2 The process of data collection 
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incident table checked 
by entrepreneurs, ask 
other people to re-
describe each critical 
incident to verify the 
data.    
Data triangulation  
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Compared first and 
second round data, ask 
entrepreneurs to verify 
the data and finding.  










ur and his 
family and 
staff 


















To follow up and 
verify the data.  
x x x 
*Note: Firm A decided to exit China after the third round interviews. Firm A has 4th rounds 
interview to collect up-to-date information.  
Table 4-6: the process of collecting data, source: author 
As shown in Table 4-6, firstly, I interviewed the entrepreneur of each firm. They were 
asked to recommend at least two informants who would have in-depth knowledge of 
the studied phenomenon. The recommended interviewees participated in second 
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round interviews. The third round interview was usually over the phone with 
entrepreneurs, discussing any mismatch data of the first and second round as well as 
any new themes or variables identified by the second round interview. The process 
continued until entrepreneurs and other informants achieved a mutual agreement of 
critical incidents. Table 4-6 presents data and themes emerged from different stages of 
data collection.   
Interestingly, some variables including personal goals (gaining face) and emotions 
(fear and empathy) did not appear in the first round interviews with entrepreneurs, but 
indicated by other informants. Entrepreneurs agreed with other informants’ 
viewpoints only in the third round interviews. The reason may be, according an 
entrepreneurs’ partner, entrepreneurs feel ashamed to admit their fear. 
4.4.3 Data triangulation 
Subjectivity is inevitable in CIT since it is based on entrepreneurs’ memories and 
researchers’ interpretation of the data (Cope, 2011). To maximise the data validity, I 
strengthened the grounding of theory by triangulation of evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Firstly, Blaikie (2010) indicates that memory can be fallible but Flanagan (1954) 
argues individual can recollect with high accuracy critical events. To minimise the 
effect of retrospective bias, three rounds of interviews were conducted with different 
informants. The critical incident table was firstly checked by entrepreneurs and then 
reviewed by other informants in the second round interviews. Entrepreneurs reviewed 
the revised critical incident table in third round interview. This process continues until 
entrepreneurs and other informants agree on the table.   
Entrepreneurs explicitly reported most of emotions and variables in the critical 
incident table. Other informants suggested about 30% of emotions and variables, but 
entrepreneurs agreed with them at the later stage. For most emotions we have come to 
a mutual agreement. Some emotions were denied thus were requested to change by 
entrepreneurs. I also ignored some of the denials when other evidence strongly 
suggested otherwise.  
Additionally, access to materials related to the firms provides data triangulation (see 
Table 4-5). Data were collected during interviews, websites, company archives, press 
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release, meeting minutes and annual reports in order to ensure data triangulation. 
Table 4-7 above shows examples of data triangulation.  
Example 1: Firm C  
Critical incident: CC7 
Individual variable: negative 
predispositions to China 
Emotion: Disgust 
Source: Entrepreneur, General 
manager, Entrepreneurs’ business 
partner  
Entrepreneur:  
“Entering China is a big mistake. It’s a waste of money and 
time…. It was so unpleasant to run a business in China, I can’t 
do it anymore” 
“Yes I never like Chinese. They take advantage on Taiwanese, 
you heard what they called us, Taiwan, the province of 
China…Also, I heard too many stories about how Chinese steal 
the company design, money even the ownership. Chinese people 
are just like their government” 
General manager:  
“My boss doesn’t like Chinese government, so whatever happen, 
he blames on the government, which makes things worse”  
Entrepreneurs’ business partner: 
“We all know he wouldn’t stay long in China, he is green party 
(Taiwan independence supporter). Usually they can’t survive in 
China or never go to China. They hate China and always think 
pessimistically, how can they succeed in China?” 
Example 2: Firm D 
Critical incident: CD7 
Emotions: Passion and Confidence 
Individual variable: personal goals 
Source: Entrepreneur, 
Entrepreneurs’ wife, 





“I plan to open bakery chains in China… I see opportunities…. I 
am very excited….” 
“I am always confident about my product, maybe too 
confident…” 
Entrepreneurs’ wife 
“My husband is very confident and optimistic about his 
investment, although he doesn’t make any money. He spent 
more than 20 years in cake and pastry. I know he is looking for 
another chance to prove himself…” 
Entrepreneurs’ notebook:  
A list of successful bakery in China and more than 50 pages of 
investigation and interview transcript with successful 
entrepreneurs about how to operate a bakery in China.  
Press release:  
An article showing the entrepreneurial process of the 
entrepreneur and his next plan (bakery).  
Table 4-7: Example of data triangulation, source: author 
4.5 Data Presentation 
There are four stages to assemble the finding and analysis: finding gathering and 
presentation, within case analysis, cross case analysis, and comparison of finding with 
current literature. This section details the forms of data presentation. 
Table 4-8 shows different forms of data presentation. Firstly, the story of each case 
company is presented in chronological order in critical incident tables in Appendix C. 
Following Turcan (2006), critical incident table presents what happened, when it 
happened, how the entrepreneur felt, what actions the entrepreneur took and 
entrepreneurs’/other people’s description of this critical incident. To answer the 
subsidiary research questions of each theme, Chapter 5 will present the story of each 
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entrepreneur and firm by showing the company profile and organizational structure. 
Guided by the thematic within case analysis and drawn from critical incident tables, 
the individual variables resulting in critical incidents (Theme A), emotions and 
actions (Theme B) are presented in table format in each case. Finally, entrepreneurs’ 
definition, reasons and outcome of international exit are described in each case, to 
provide the information for Theme C. A detailed description of data presentation in 
each case is discussed in section 4.6.1. 
Display format: texts and 
figures  
Display in Focus on 
Company profile and 
organizational structure, the 
first section in each case 
Chapter 5, the first 
section of each 
case 
Why entrepreneurs entered into China and 
entrepreneurs’ personal background 
Entrepreneurs’ definition, 
reasons, and consequence of 
exit 
Chapter 5, the last 
section in each 
case 
Why entrepreneurs exit China and the 
outcomes of international exit.  
 
Display formats: table Display in Focus on 
Company basic information,  Table 4-4 Peak number of employees, previous 
experience in China, entry mode, entry 
time, exit time, investment (£) 
Critical incidents in 
chronological order,  
Appendix C Critical incidents suggested by 
entrepreneurs  
Individual variables Chapter 5, the 
second section of 
each case 
What individual variables 
(predispositions, family, personal goals) 
result in critical incidents and why?  
Three incident-generated 
positive emotions and actions  
Chapter 5, the 
third section of 
each case 
How entrepreneurs feel about critical 
incidents (passion, confidence, empathy) 
and what actions they take? 
Three incident-generated 
negative emotions and actions 
Chapter 5, the 
fourth section of 
each case 
How entrepreneurs feel about critical 
incidents (fear, anger, disgust) and what 
actions they take. 
Table 4-8: Data presentation, source: author 
4.6 Data Analysis 
The case studies were analysed using both within-case and cross-case methods as 
recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994). The method used in data analysis was 
content analysis of interview transcripts and secondary data with coding categories 
derived from CIER reports and mainstream IB, IE and Entrepreneurship literature. 
The main objective is to minimize the evidence bias by source–by-source and case-
by-case data triangulation (Table 4-7). During the process of data analysis, I sought 
advice from industrial experts and other researchers with different personal, national, 
cultural and professional backgrounds (e.g. the chairperson and members of 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs association in Nanjing and researchers in Taiwan National 
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Cheng Kung University). Guided by the elements derived from the literature, pilot 
study, CIER reports and theoretical framework, I went back to the research site 
collecting more data until epistemological closure (Eaton, 2010), and revisited the 
transcript, for the primary data coding until few new insights occurred (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  
Data reduction is the first step of the data analysis, “Data reduction is not something 
separate from analysis… (It) is a form of analysis that sharpens, sorts, focuses, 
discards, and organizes data in such a way that “final” conclusions can be drawn 
and verified” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 11). The data were selected, processed, 
and simplified by writing a detailed case history of each firm (critical incident table). 
Organizing incoherent aspects in chronological order is a crucial step to reveal the 
relationship between events (Pettigrew, 1990). This approach allows me to uncover 
the shift of entrepreneurs’ goal, non-economic value of the firm, entrepreneurs’ 
response to rapidly changing institutional environment in China, and the process of 
making exit decisions. The sub-topics of the identification and categorization derived 
from the research questions. This research employ both deductive and inductive 
coding phase (Eaton, 2010). Codes were added until a more appropriate explanation 
of the identified entrepreneurs’ behaviour emerged. Data coding includes content 
analysis of primary data (interview) and secondary data (archives, email, press release 
etc.).  The structure and variables of theoretical framework were retained, modified, 
deleted, or added with the empirical evidence.   
Data displays are the second step of analysis. The relevant data were collected in 
graphs, charts and within tables using Microsoft words or excel. Each case company 
is presented with four tables suggesting the reasons of entry, positive emotions and 
actions, negative emotions and actions, and reasons and definition of exit (Table 4-8). 
These tables and figures help with data organization, comparison and categorisation 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994).   
The following section presents the process and techniques of within and cross-case 
analysis. The seven cases were firstly analysed individually in order to comprehend 
their complexities and originality while cross-case analysis allowed me to go beyond 
initial impressions through the use of structured and diverse views on the data 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).          
   
 
122 
4.6.1 Within Case analysis 
Within-case analysis involves detailed case study write-ups for each site. These write-
ups are used for explanation, description and prediction. The overall aim is to analyse 
each case as an entity and allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge before 
cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). Following Krippendorff (2012), the content 
analysis researcher, I use the following steps for within case analysis:  (1) Using excel 
and Nvivo as supporting tools to take notes when interesting information is found in 
transcripts and secondary data. (2) List the finding and categorise with different 
display formats. (3) Try to find a linkage between categories and my research 
questions/themes. (4) Compare and contrast categories. (5) Repeat this process in 
each case (6) Review all the categories and find out whether some categories can be 
merged or if some need to be sub categorised. (7) Revisit the transcript to ensure all 
the information that need to be categorised has been done so. The coding rules of 
individual variables, emotions, and actions are presented in the Appendix B.   
As the volume of the data was large, I was guided by the thematic within-case 
analysis suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), Table 4-8 shows the display 
formats. The selection of display formats depends on what I try to understand. Each 
display format provides information for research themes for cross case comparison. 
Following the critical incident table, the evolution of entrepreneurs’ goals, emotions, 
predispositions and actions has been captured. All the critical events in 
internationalization were illustrated in critical incident table. Direct quotes were used 
to support my findings and to illustrate the “underlying phenomena” which this study 
was attempting to examine and discuss (Sinkovics and Ghauri, 2008:695).   
In Chapter 5, information is presented in-details and is primarily descriptive following 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) suggestion. This approach allows me to become familiarise with 
each case and examine each case as “standalone entity” before generalising cross-case 
patterns.         
4.6.2 Cross case analysis 
Within each case, a network of coding patterns started to emerge when all relevant 
patterns were integrated sequentially. This process allows me to understand the 
unique pattern of each case and generalise them across the cases (Huberman and 
Miles, 1994). I employed different lenses to examine the data and followed 
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suggestions from industrial experts and Taiwanese experts in this area to make good 
cross-case comparisons. Dimensions of each theme are suggested by subsidiary 
research questions and literature, and CIER reports. The cases were then paired on 
the post-entry strategy (exit or stay), entrepreneurs’ goals, predispositions, family, 
entrepreneurs’ emotions and actions to observe the similarities and differences. 
Finally, data from different sources and types (e.g. entrepreneurs’ and managers’ 
opinions) are divided and compared to exploit the unique insights (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
To present the cross-case analysis, I use cross-case tables and figures to illustrate 
entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables, emotions and actions. Cross-case tables are 
considered to be one of the finest ways to interpret a core concept because its unique 
nature can be highlighted in different contexts (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For 
example, for examining how entrepreneurs’ emotions shape their actions, I located 
emotions and actions of each critical incident in the table and looked at each row and 
column to explore the linkage between emotions and actions. The actions and 
emotions are categorised into different types (Appendix B). To draw conclusions, I 
calculated how many times each emotions shape certain type of actions. These steps 
help to see the patterns from the cross-case analysis. To give an example, the next 
section shows how I collected, triangulated, categorised, coded, compared and 
presented the data in Theme B.  
4.6.2.1Theme B: Entrepreneurs’ emotions and actions-an example 
Theme B investigates entrepreneurs’ incident-generated emotions and how emotions 
shape actions. I coded the transcripts according to the following questions as 
suggested by Doern and Goss (2014): (1) How do entrepreneurs feel in each critical 
incidents? (2) What positive/negative emotions are frequently appeared and how these 
connected to entrepreneurs’ decision-making? (3) What actions, if any, are connected 
with these emotions? In this research, all emotions refer to incident-generated 
emotions instead of mood. Emotions are generated by critical incidents of the 
international entrepreneurial process and they are entrepreneurs’ remembering 
emotions instead of experiencing emotions. That is, emotions in this research is the 
one that entrepreneurs remembered instead of what they really experienced since 
Kahneman (2011) suggests remembered emotion is the one that affects decision-
making (see section 4.7.3 for further discussion).    
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Entrepreneurs may generate more than one emotion in a critical incident. In this 
situation, I did not try to separate emotion by emotion since entrepreneurs’ emotions 
were intertwined and one action could be the result of several emotions. Alternatively, 
I followed Doern and Goss’s (2014) suggestion and asked entrepreneurs to re-
describe each emotion and explain how it related to the action taken in detail. Then I 
consulted with other informants who have in-depth knowledge of the critical incident 
to confirm the finding. This process continued until entrepreneurs and other 
informants all satisfied with the critical incident table. In some complicated cases, I 
reviewed the emotions and actions taken with other researchers and consulted with 
literature before any kind of agreement could be made.  
One limitation of such an approach is the risk of attribution error that entrepreneurs 
may attribute the action to other emotions to protect their self-image or self-esteem. 
Although such biases cannot be completely avoided, the detailed nature of the 
interview and the data triangulation-in particular, the interview with other informants 
who are familiar with entrepreneurs and their internationalization processes-make an 
artificial story difficult to sustain (Doern and Goss, 2014).   
The categorization of Positive and negative emotions 
After within and cross case analysis, six emotions were identified from my data since 
they were the most frequently appeared emotions and connected to entrepreneurs’ 
decision-making in internationalization. The categorization of six emotions was based 
on PANAS-X (Positive affect and negative affect) scales developed by Watson and 
Clark (1999) and the prototype analysis of the emotion by Shaver et al.(1987). The 
prototype analysis is the classic measurement of positive and negative emotions. 
Shaver et al. (1987) measure and define 213 emotions and categorise them into six 
basic level categories: love, joy surprise, fear, sadness, and anger. In comparison, 
PANA-X scale is designed for self-report responses and suggests eleven specific 
types of emotions: fear, sadness, guilt, hostility, shyness, fatigue, surprise, joviality, 
self-assurance, attentiveness, and serenity. Additionally, it has been used in studies 
measuring Chinese emotions (e.g. Yik and Russell, 2003, see Table 4-9). Since there 
is no agreement on a formal definition of the emotions (Shaver et al., 1987), PANA-X 
and prototype analysis are both adopted to categorise my six identified emotions.  
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This research investigates six emotions: passion, confidence, empathy, anger, fear and 
disgust. The categorizations and definitions of each emotion are summarised below. 
Detailed definitions and coding rules are shown in Appendix B.  
Passion 
Passion is the first emotion identified from my data. Six entrepreneurs felt passionate 
in their international entry and five entrepreneurs continuously identified passion in 
internationalization. Cardon et al. (2009) define passion as an intense positive 
emotion relating to a diverse range of positive emotions such as pride, love, 
enthusiasm and joy. In prototype analysis, passion is a positive emotion under love 
category. Although passion is not found in PANAS-X scale, emotions under the 
joviality category including joy, excitement, enthusiasm, and energy are all part of 
passion (Bird, 1989; Cardon et al., 2009). Thus, it is agreeable that passion is a 
positive emotion.  
Confidence 
Confidence is an important and frequently appeared emotion in my data. All 
entrepreneurs felt confident in internationalization particularly in increasing 
commitment and opportunity pursuit. Dimov (2010) defines confidence as 
entrepreneurs’ belief in the venture and their own abilities. In prototype analysis, 
confidence is not shown in the six basic categories but Shaver et al. (1987) suggest a 
loving person tend to feel self-confident. It is a positive output of love. In PANAS-X 
scale, confidence is a positive emotion under the category of self-assurance. Therefore, 
confidence is viewed as a positive emotion in my research.  
Empathy 
Empathy involves internalising the frame of reference of another (Triandis, 1980). 
Although two of my entrepreneurs did not feel empathy in internationalization, other 
entrepreneurs highlighted it. They view empathy as the most important emotion that 
enables them to adapt, learn and survive in China. Both prototype analysis and 
PANAS-X scale do not measure empathy. The reason could be that empathy is a 
recently found emotion and scholars sometimes confuse empathy with sympathy 
(Gladstein, 1983). Following Gladstein (1983) and Krznaric (2014), I used 
entrepreneurs’ willingness of doing things, of putting themselves in other people’s 
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shoes, of learning, of improving the situation to portrait an empathetic entrepreneur 
and distinguish empathy from sympathy. My informants used a Chinese term to 
describe this emotion, and empathy is the closest match based on their description 
after translation. Empathy and sympathy both have the meaning of recognition of 
other person’s suffering; however, instead of recognizing and comforting the 
suffering, empathetic entrepreneurs tend to do something to improve the situation. For 
example, an entrepreneur restructured the organization the meet Chinese staff’s 
requirements. Thus, empathy is a more appropriate term to describe the emotion when 
entrepreneurs recognize, learn, understand, and act to help with others’ difficulties.  
Empathy is not mentioned in both scales. Shaver et al. (1987) suggested empathy 
usually come with/after sadness since people show empathy to others suffering.  
However, a more recent study Hendler and Shamay (2012) argue individual can be 
empathic to other people’s joy.  Accordingly, Bernhardt and Singer (2012) indicate 
empathy should not be view as a negative emotion. It is a relatively neutral emotion.  
The category of empathy is debatable; however, recent organization studies often 
view empathy as a positive emotion since it is positive to organizational learning and 
receptivity to changes (e.g. Huy, 1999; Kinder et al., 2014). Therefore, empathy is 
categorised as a positive emotion in this research. 
Fear 
Six out of seven entrepreneurs felt fear in internationalization. This emotion is usually 
connected with institutional problems in China. Welpe et al. (2012) define fear as a 
typical negative and an avoidance-oriented emotion signals threat and the incapability 
to control the situation. In prototype analysis, fear is a negative emotion and one of 
six basic level categories. Shaver et al. (1987) indicate fear comes in two major forms:  
horror and anxiety. They suggest it is difficult to distinguish between the two forms, 
thus this research view both horror and anxiety (worries) as fear. Fear is also a basic 
negative emotion in PANAS-X scale and it is being afraid, scared, frightened, nervous, 
jittery, and shaky. As a result, fear is viewed as a negative emotion in my research.  
Anger 
Anger has been found when the self has been offended or injure; additionally, another 
person (not the self) should be responsible for this negative event (Lerner and Tiedens, 
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2006). All entrepreneurs felt angry after international entry. Angry entrepreneurs 
seem to have more strength to deal with adverse situations. In prototype analysis, 
anger is a negative emotion and one of six basic level categories. There are other 
emotions under anger category including irritation, exasperation, disgust and envy. 
But anger in this thesis only refers to its core definition, rage. Other subcategories 
such as envy and exasperation are excluded and disgust is discussed separately. Anger 
is under hostility category in PANAS-X scale. It also appears in guilt category in the 
form of angry with self. This thesis only discusses angry at others/external forces, 
thus anger is a negative emotion under hostility category.  In summary, anger is 
viewed as a negative emotion in my research.  
Disgust 
Although not all the research’s entrepreneurs felt disgust in internationalization, this 
emotion is strongly connected with their international exit decisions. Entrepreneurs 
kept referring to their disgust of host country or certain events and connected it with 
their exit decisions. Rozin et al. (2008) define disgust as a defensive mechanism to 
avoid psychic incorporation or further contacts with a repellent object. In prototype 
analysis, disgust is under the anger category and viewed as a basic negative emotion. 
Disgust usually comes with anger, but it can be distinguished from anger by the 
strong feeling of hate (Shaver et al., 1987). Anger is under hostility category in 
PANAS-X scale. It also appears in guilt category in the form of disgusted with self. 
This thesis only discusses disgust with others/external forces, thus disgust is a strong 
negative emotion under hostility category.  In summary, disgust is viewed as a 
negative emotion in my research.  
The definition and coding rules of the six emotions are shown in Appendix B. 
Entrepreneurs described critical incidents, and emotions were identified when 
entrepreneurs stated the keywords. I wrote down the stated emotions and confirmed 
with the entrepreneur in the end of the interview. Moreover, I showed the critical 
incident table to other interviewees in the second round interviews. Each incident-
generated emotion was triangulated by other source of evidence. Other emotions such 
as determined, tired, relaxed, amazed, ashamed, lonely were also mentioned by some 
of informants but excluded in Theme B since they were not found in other cases or 
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less relevant to decision-making in internationalization. These emotions may be 
investigated for future research. 
General dimension scales 
Negative affect (10) Afraid, scared, nervous, jittery, irritable, hostile, guilty, ashamed, upset, distressed 
Positive affect (10) Active, alert, attentive, determined, enthusiastic, excited, inspired, interested, proud, strong 
Basic negative emotion scales 
Fear (6) Afraid, scared, frightened, nervous, jittery, shaky 
Hostility (6) Angry, hostile, irritable scornful, disgusted, loathing 
Guilt (6) Guilty, ashamed, blameworthy, angry at self, disgusted with self, dissatisfied with self 
Sadness (5) Sad, blue, downhearted, alone, lonely 
Basic positive emotion scales 
Joviality (8) Happy, joyful, delighted, cheerful, exited, enthusiastic, lively, energetic 
Self-assurance (6) Proud, strong, confident, bold, daring, fearless 
Attentiveness (4) Alert, attentive, concentrating, determined 
Other affective states 
Shyness (4) Shy, bashful, sheepish, timid 
Fatigue (4) Sleepy, tired, sluggish, drowsy 
Serenity (3) Calm, relaxed, at ease 
Surprise (3) Amazed, surprised, astonished 
Note: the number of terms comprising each scale is shown in parentheses 
Table 4-9: Item composition of the PANA-X scale, source: Watson and Clark (1999: 2) 
 
4.7 Reflections on the appropriateness of this research 
Healy and Perry (2000) suggest six quality criteria for case study research within the 
realism paradigm in business field (see Table 4-10): ontological appropriateness, 
contingent validity, multiple perceptions of participants and of peer researchers, 
methodological trustworthiness, analytic generalisation, and construct validity. Using 
this table, this section discusses the appropriateness of this research in terms of its 
research design.  
4.7.1 Ontological appropriateness: internal validity 
Considering ontological appropriateness, the research investigated the complex social 
phenomena involving “reflective people” (Healy and Perry, 2000: 121). My research 
question: “why and how Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China make the 
decision of international exit” is consistent with the typical form of critical realist 
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research: “What caused the events associated with the phenomenon to occur” (Eaton 
2010: 19) and the criteria in Table 4-10. The decision-making process of international 
exit is a complex phenomenon involving multiple influences; an in-depth 
understanding should be obtained through collecting people’s narratives in the sense 
that they recall past events critically (e.g. listing critical incidents) and discuss them 
with the researcher and other people in the firm (Kontinen, 2011). 
In contrast to positivism researchers’ view that the world is a laboratory in which 
direct cause and effect paths can be created, a critical realism researcher is dealing 
with open fuzzy boundary systems and discovering knowledge of the real world by 
naming and describing the generative mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1978). To achieve the 
contingent validity (internal validity) suggested in Table 4-10, I focus on answering 
in-depth and mostly how and why questions. The context of each case and critical 
incidents were describes as fully as possible to increase the contingent validity.  
The contingent validity is also called internal validity (e.g. Yin, 2009; Miles and 
Huberman, 1995). It is related to the casual relationship between variables and results. 
Yin (2009:42) indicates researchers may “incorrectly conclude that there is a casual 
relationship between X and Y without knowing that some third factor Z may actually 
have caused Y.” This issue is particularly important for this research since I am 
searching for the casual relationship. To enhance the internal validity, firstly, I 
reviewed 136 articles in international exit and identified most of external factors 
beforehand (Appendix A). Secondly, I developed a clear research framework (Figure 
3-3), compared patterns found in this research with those in literature (literature in 
Chapter 3), triangulated the data (Section 4.4.3), and compared with rival 
explanations to establish internal validity in addition to thick description. To enhance 
the internal/contingent validity of this research, information summarized in Table 4-
11 was followed through the data analysis. 
 
 




Table 4-10: Quality criteria of realist case study research, source: Healy and Perry (2000:122)




How context-rich and meaningful (“thick”) are the descriptions? 
Does the account “ring true”, make sense, seem convincing or plausible, enable a “vicarious presence” 
for the reader? 
Is the account rendered a comprehensive one, respecting the configuration and temporal arrangement 
of elements in the local context? 
Did triangulation among complementary methods and data sources produce generally converging 
conclusions? If not, is there a coherent explanation for this? 
Are the presented data well linked to the categories of prior or emerging theory? Do the measures 
reflect the constructs in play? 
Are the findings internally coherent; are concepts systematically related? 
Were rules used for confirmation of propositions, hypotheses, and so on made explicit? 
Are there areas of uncertainty identified? (There should be some.) 
Was negative evidence sough for? Found? What happened then? 
Have rival explanations been actively considered? What happened to them?  
Have rival explanations been replicated in other parts of the database than the one they arose from? 
Were the conclusions considered to be accurate by original informants? If not, is there a coherent 
explanation for this? 
Were any predictions made in the study, and how accurate were they?  
Table 4-11: Queries of internal validity, Source: Miles and Huberman (1994: 279) 
4.7.2 Epistemological appropriateness 
As suggested in Table 4-10, realism is neither value laden nor value free, rather, I am 
value-aware. I agree that there is a real world to discover, however it is imperfectly 
and probabilistically apprehendable (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Therefore, I was 
aware of the relationship between me and the informant whereby I became immersed 
in the research through interpretation. However, a participant’s perception is not 
reality as suggested by constructivism, instead, it is a window to reality whether or 
not I can triangulate with other perceptions, including triangulation with other data 
sources or other researchers’ interpretation (section 4.4.3). Furthermore, to increase 
the epistemological appropriateness, I employed critical incident technique to avoid 
an over-narrow focus.  
4.7.3 Methodological appropriateness: reliability, external validity and 
construct validity 
Table 4-10 presents three criteria of methodological appropriateness: methodological 
trustworthiness, analytical generalization, and construct validity. The limitation of 
this research in relation to reliability is “case study research procedures have been 
poorly documented, making external reviewers suspicious of the reliability of the 
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case study method” (Yin, 2009:45). Thus, a good guideline for doing case studies is 
necessary for later researchers to replicate the research (Healy and Perry, 2000). To 
increase the methodological trustworthiness (reliability) and to minimize the random 
error, I described the process of case selection, data collection, and interview in 
detail and summarized my data with tables, figures and timelines to enhance the 
transparency (Yin, 2009). Thus, later researchers can come to a similar conclusion by 
following the same steps. It should be noted that the emphasis is on doing the same 
case over again not on replicating the results of previous cases since the attempt to 
replicate the data collection may not succeed for the subjective participants (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985).    
The second criterion is analytical generalization (external validity). It is related to the 
extension of the observed phenomena in a specific context to other setting. The 
limitation of this research in relation to external validity is case study research does 
not permit statistical generalization (Yin, 2009). However, Healy and Perry (2000) 
indicate case study researchers should use analytical generalization to examine 
external validity. That is, the researcher aims to generalize a particular set of results 
to some border theories instead of a larger population. To enhance the external 
validity, I use replication logic in multiple-case studies (Yin, 2009). Different kinds 
of data are collected for the same explanation. Following Kontinen (2011), I used the 
question “Why do Taiwanese entrepreneurs who have invested in China exit? ” to 
conduct the pilot study and identified the role of entrepreneurs’ non-economic 
variables and emotions. I then formulated an interview protocol using critical 
incident technique to extend the theories found applicable to the research issues. I 
aimed to confirm/disconfirm existing theories, and build theories on the decision-
making of international exit.  
The last criterion, construct validity, refers to how well information of the constructs 
in the theory building is measured in the research (Healy and Perry, 2000). Construct 
validity is described as “a procedure which refers to the quality of conceptualisation 
or operationalization of the relevant concept” (Gibbert et al., 2008:1466). Yin 
(2009:41) indicates case study researchers fail to develop a “sufficiently operational 
set of measures and that subjective judgement are used to collect the data”. To 
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enhance the construct validity, I follow Yin’s (2009) suggestions and use multiple 
sources of evidence (see Table 4-5), establish a chain of evidence (conceptual 
framework), and have key informants review the draft case study report (verification 
of critical incident tables by entrepreneurs).       
4.7.3.1 The self-report and remembered emotions  
In addition to the above criteria suggested by Healy and Perry (2000), I justify the 
types of emotions collected in the interviews. Kahneman (2011) Illustrates two types 
of emotions: experienced emotions and remembered emotions. Experienced 
emotions refer to immediate emotions, which should be measured and collected in 
the created moment. Remembered emotions refer to emotions elicited by recalling 
the memory. For example, experienced happiness is about how happy the person 
lives, whereas remembered happiness is how satisfied and pleased the person is when 
thinking about the life. Since individual may mistake their feeling due to pre-existing 
state, the experienced emotions may be incorrect and irrelevant to the event 
(Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman, 2011).  
There are two main reasons why I choose to collect remembered emotions instead of 
experienced emotions from entrepreneurs. Firstly, Kahneman (2011) argues 
experienced emotions have no voice in decision making because people tend to 
forget or ignore the real experience and remember only the ending. The emotional 
memory is what people actually use to make decisions. Examining remembered 
emotions can reduce the influence of irrelevant factors since individuals are alerted 
to the actual source of emotions (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). Furthermore, when 
predicting future outcomes, individuals think about expected emotions of the action 
but not emotions they will experience during the process. 
Secondly, this research focuses on Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. This 
is an International Entrepreneurship research not a psychological one. Due to the fact 
that entrepreneur’s use remembered instead of experienced emotions to make 
decisions, it is neither applicable nor possible to conduct an experiment to collect 
entrepreneurs’ experienced emotions of each critical incident. As a critical realism 
researcher, I disagree that the context of making decisions can be recreated in the 
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laboratory. Therefore, collecting entrepreneurs’ remembered emotions through 
interview are more appropriate than using psychological experiments.  
4.8 Ethics 
I confirm that I have carried out the School Ethics self-audit in relation to my 
research “Understanding international exit from a non-economic and emotional 
perspective: the case of Taiwanese entrepreneurs exit China” and that no 
reasonably foreseeable ethical risks have been identified.  
Interviews with business owners or general managers may disclose confidential 
company data (Richards, 1996). Thus, I prepared research consent forms, explaining 
and ensured all participants were informed before signing the form (see Appendix D). 
Company names and informants’ name were changed to protect commercial secrets. 
All the secondary and tertiary data were used only under permission.  
4.9 Summary 
Table 4-12 presents the selected methods of this thesis. Informed by research 
questions, this research follows a critical realist philosophical assumption and 
follows Healy and Perry (2000), Easton (2010) and Miles and Huberman (1994) to 
build theory from multiple case studies. The research used a qualitative approach 
based on multiple case studies of Taiwanese firms invested in China. Following five 
sample selection criteria (Table 4-3), this study selected and examined five exit cases 
and two stay cases. 
In-depth interviews with entrepreneurs are the primary source of my data. Other 
sources such as interviews with entrepreneurs’ family, staff, business partners and 
friends, annual reports, press release, websites were used to triangulate the data. 
Additionally, I consulted members of Taiwanese entrepreneurs association in China 
and researchers in Taiwan National Cheng Kung University to enhance the validity. 
The data analysis followed with-case and cross-case methods and coding rules were 
presented in Appendix B. Themes, patterns, trends were identified through the 
content analysis.  
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Paradigm Critical realist 
Approach Qualitative 
Reproductive 
Research Design Multiple case studies, Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China 
Data Collection In-depth interview, 5 exit cases and 2 stay cases 
Elite interview using critical incident technique  
Apply Skopos theory in translation 
Multiple sources of evidence provide data triangulation: 
Interviews with Entrepreneurs 
Interviews with Entrepreneurs’ staff, family, business partners, and 
friends 
Company financial reports and market shares 
Company’s records, archival data and documents, meeting minutes 
Public sources of information; newspapers, websites, TV interview, 
video records 
Follow up emails, Skype, or line messages 
Analysis   Within-case and cross-case analysis 
Content analysis to identify themes, trends and patterns 
Coding rules, PANAS-X and literature, see Appendix B 
Reflections Ontological appropriateness 
Epistemological appropriateness 
Methodological appropriateness 
The collection of self-report and remembered emotions  
Ethics 
Table 4-12: Selected research methods, source: author 
Next chapter presents the within-case analysis of each firm. It presents in-depth 
information of each firm following the critical incident table and four topics (reasons 
of international entry, positive emotions and actions, negative emotions and actions, 
entrepreneurs’ definition, reasons, and consequence of exit). Direct quotes are used 












Chapter 5 : Findings 
 
To answer the research questions developed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, this chapter 
presents data collected from case company to familiarise the reader with the detailed 
findings. Analysis and discussion are in Chapter 6. This chapter firstly presents exit 
cases and then stay cases. The data presentation structure is based on each theme (see 




Why do Taiwanese entrepreneurs who 
have invested in China exit? 
Data demonstrating themes  
Theme A Why do entrepreneurs make the 
international exit decision? Viewed from 
an individual and non-economic 
perspective. 
The individual variables section of 
each case 
Theme B How do incident-generated emotions shape 
entrepreneurs’ actions in 
internationalisation from entry, operations 
to exit decisions? 
The positive emotions and actions 
section of each case 
The negative emotions and actions 
section of each case  
Theme C How do entrepreneurs make the decision 
of international exit and what is the 
outcome?   
The Entrepreneur’s definitions of 
exit and its consequences 
Table 5-1: subsidiary questions and data of each theme, source: author 
The following data are presented to answer the subsidiary research questions: 
The individual variables (Theme A): This section focuses on three entrepreneurs’ 
variables resulting in significant actions of internationalization. They are identified 
from critical incidents which entrepreneurs felt important for their international exit 
decision-making. Three variables: predispositions, family and personal goals are 
identified and discussed.  
The positive/negative emotions and actions (Theme B): This section explores how 
entrepreneurs felt about critical incidents and what they act in response to their 
emotions. Six emotions emerged from the data: passion, confidence, empathy, fear, 
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The entrepreneur’s definitions of exit and its consequences (Theme C): This section 
explains why entrepreneurs exited China and their definitions and outcome of this 
action.   
Due to the large amount of data, each variable is supported by more than 10 critical 
incidents. Thus, this chapter mainly presents the summary of the data with key 
quotes. For detailed finding, each case has a critical incident table showing what 
happened, how entrepreneur felt, and what actions they took in response to each 
critical incident in Appendix C. The critical incident table serves as a timeline of the 
company and presents a more in-depth story. Readers may trace back to this table for 
detailed information. The next section presents the exit case profiles. 
Additionally, the companies’ and the entrepreneurs’ true identities are concealed for 
confidentiality purposes because the findings and discussion chapters will discuss the 
entrepreneurs’ views, opinions, company strategies and secrets. Henceforth in the 
following chapters firms will be referred to as Firm A, Firm B, Firm C, etc. and 
entrepreneurs will be referred to as Entrepreneur Brush, Entrepreneur Machine, and 
Entrepreneur Paint, etc. to disguise their particulars. To highlight the centrality of 
entrepreneurs and separate firm level and individual level data, I use the industry of 
the firm to name the entrepreneur instead of the alphabet.  
Firm  Entrepreneur Gender 
Firm A Entrepreneur Brush Male 
Firm B Entrepreneur Machine Male 
Firm C Entrepreneur Paint Male 
Firm D Entrepreneur Food Male 
Firm E Entrepreneur Fruit Male 
Firm F Entrepreneur Metal Male 
Firm G Entrepreneur Construction Male 
Table 5-2: Firms and Entrepreneurs 
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5.1 Exit Cases 
As indicated in International Business literature (section 2.3), poor performance and 
strategic change are the two most frequently cited reasons of international exit from 
economic perspectives. Thus, I categorised 5 exit cases in Figure 5-1. The location of 
each firm is determined by financial statements, market shares and the strategic 
direction on the year they decide to exit and confirmed by entrepreneurs. Firms 
located in Quadrant I are strategically important with good performance. From 
economic perspectives, Entrepreneur Brush and Machine should not exit China since 
this decision cannot achieve profit maximization. The non-rational action of 
Entrepreneur Brush and Machine implies the existence of other variables that may 
influence the international exit decision.  
 
Figure 5-1: Typology of international exit, source: author 
Firms located in Quadrant II are strategically important but with poor performance. 
Entrepreneur Food considered China as an important market, but he had to exit 
China for poor performance and other reasons.  Firms located in Quadrant III are less 
strategically important with poor performance. From economic perspectives, this 
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Firm E had been persisted in operation for 5 years. Firms located in Quadrant IV are 
less strategically important with good performance. Firm C is located in the middle 
of Quadrant I and IV due to the conflict views between general manager and 
entrepreneur. General Manager insisted on the strategic importance of Chinese 
market while the entrepreneur thought otherwise. They agreed that Firm C should be 
located between Quadrant I and IV.  
In general, firms located in Quadrant I contradict mainstream international exit 
literature in International Business (IB) field. This thus highlights the role of 
entrepreneurs and their non-economic variables. Although Quadrant II and III can be 
explained by economic reasons in terms of strategic importance and organizational 
performance, in my data, entrepreneurs provided different reasons and definitions of 
their exit decisions. To understand why entrepreneurs exit China, the following 
sections show the summary of each exit case.  
5.1.1 Firm A and Entrepreneur Brush 
Firm A is a leading brush maker and distributors in Taiwan that accounts for 70% of 
Taiwanese brush market. Firm A was founded in 1986 and started as a trader of 
Chinese paint brushes. In the beginning, Firm A indirectly imported Chinese brushes 
and sold to retailers, wholesalers and distributors. In 2001, Entrepreneur Brush 
decided to become a manufacturer rather than a sole trader, and he set up a factory in 
Danyang (China) manufacturing brushes. In 2007, Entrepreneur Brush set up the 
second factory in China for handle manufacturing. This factory was located in the 








































Figure 5-2: Organizational structure and management of Firm A, source: author 
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Entrepreneur Brush was an early entrant into China. To overcome the liability of 
foreignness and newness, he employed Bao, a Chinese general manager with 10 
years’ industrial experience, rather than directly managing the firm (see Figure 5-2). 
Bao had a full control of Danyang factory. Entrepreneur Brush said “hiring local 
managers is better than sending Taiwanese managers because they know how to 
manage local workers and suppliers” The relationship between Entrepreneur Brush 
and Bao was more like a partnership rather than a superior and subordinate. The 
following sections present the summary of Firm A critical incident table.  
 
5.1.1.1Individual variables 
Table 5-3 presents the individual variables in making internationalization decisions.  
Critical incidents and actions Why Code 
CA6 Communicate with Anhui 
government for mutual 
understanding and expansion 
Entrepreneur believes local government 
is friendly to foreign investors, and he 




CA11 Staff corruption, explore the 
reasons and invest in IT system 
Entrepreneur trusts his Chinese staff. He 




CA1 Entered into China and set 
up plant 
Want to provide a better life for family Family 
CA7 Reject an acquisition offer 
from a MNE 
Want to leave to business to his children  Family 
CA8+CA12+CA13+CA14 Serious 
conflicts with general manager due 
to company shares. Decide to exit 
China and relocate to Vietnam 
Only family member can hold company 
shares. To ensure full control of 
company.  
Family 
CA1+CA2Entered into China, 
expand to Anhui  
Want to be the champion of Taiwanese 
market 
Personal goal 
CA6 +CA7 Rising cost and restart 
Anhui plant, reject acquisition 
offer from a MNE 
Want to increase international market 
share and dominant the global market 
Personal goal 
CA14 Exit China and relocate to 
Vietnam  
Want to dominant the global market and 
develop a sustainable business for 
children 
Personal goal  
Table 5-3: Individual variables, summary of Appendix, Firm A critical incident table, source: author 
Entrepreneur Brush entered China for the following reasons: (1) incentives offered 
by Chinese Government (2) The cheap labour cost and raw materials (3) His 
knowledge and network of brush industry in China (4) He was young and ambitious 
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and wanted to offer a better life for family. Entering China was his best chance to 
dominate the Taiwanese market. To pursue this dream, he set up Anhui factory 
(timber handle manufacturing) in 2007 for vertical integration but shut down in 2009 
due to serious conflicts with locals and the pressure from local government. In 2011, 
Entrepreneur Brush re-started Anhui as a brush factory to increase the production 
capability and solve the rising cost issue in Danyang. Table 5-3 summarises three 
individual variables and supporting evidence.   
Positive predispositions 
Although Entrepreneur Brush did not clearly state his predispositions of China, his 
attitude toward staff corruption and Anhui government implied he had positive 
predispositions to China. He believed Chinese Government and people were friendly 
to Taiwanese investors. Thus, he made a great effort to understand the reasons 
behind conflicts, aiming to achieve a mutual agreement and understanding (see 
empathy in section 5.1.1.2 for discussion).  
Family 
Entrepreneur Brush entered China to provide a better life for his family (CA1). 
Family interests and the wish to pass Firm A to his children affected his decision-
making. He rejected an attractive and profitable acquisition offer for his children and 
family control of this company.   
“If I am for my own good or for my business’s own good, I could sold my company 
to those American (largest paint brush manufacturer), they gave me really good 
offer and I could be part of them…but what I am going to give my children and how 
about my staff? I have to be responsible although it is not easy…” (Quote A7, 
entrepreneur) 
Entrepreneur Brush refused to share the company with non-family members, 
including Bao (CA8). In 2012, Bao decided to quit the company unless Entrepreneur 
Brush gave her 20% of company shares. To ensure full family control of the firm, 
Entrepreneur Brush accepted Bao’s resignation despite the importance of Bao.  
“I have no choice…I have to choose between her or my children’s future… I have to 
ensure the control of my company; I am not giving anyone my company shares…” 
(Quote A2, entrepreneur) 
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Although Entrepreneur Brush had no exit plan previously, in 2013, to ensure the full 
family control and minimise Bao’s impact from resignation, he decided to exit China 
and relocated to Vietnam (CA13). He rather took a risky decision than allowing a 
non-family member (Bao) to hold company shares. The relocation to Vietnam might 
be viewed as a strategic move for better performance; nevertheless, it was more like 
a compulsory step to protect the family control of the company.  
Personal goals 
Entrepreneur Brush set up Danyang and Anhui for multiple reasons (CA1). He 
entered China not only for economic variables but also for individual variables 
including providing a better life for family and his ambition- become the market 
leader. His personal goals encouraged him to pursue new opportunities, restarted and 
expanded Anhui plant (CA6), and rejected a profitable acquisition offer from a large 
MNE (CA7). He said, “being a survivor is not enough, I like to be the champion”.  
In the late stage of internationalization, in addition to being a global market leader, 
Entrepreneur Brush also wanted to develop a sustainable business for his children. 
Although organizational performance was important, Entrepreneur Brush said the 
family interests were his “inviolate zone” in making decisions (CA7, CA8, CA13). 
The conflicts with Bao endangered the family interests. This explains why 
Entrepreneur Brush shut down a good performing firm with high strategic 
importance.  
5.1.1.2 Positive emotions and actions 
I identified three positive emotions from critical incidents: confidence, passion, and 
empathy. Table 5-4 shows sources of entrepreneurs’ emotions and their actions. 
Entrepreneur Brush’s passion is connected with venture creation, expansion, and 
dramatic strategic changes. Entrepreneur Brush indicated that his passion had been 
originated from the desire to dominate the market and prove himself (CA1). Now his 
passion was originated from the wish to leave a sustainable and profitable venture for 
his children and staff.  
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Passion Confidence Empathy 
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CA: critical incident of firm A, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment/ opportunity identification, A2: no changes, A3: 
decreased commitment, A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for 
coding rules) 
Table 5-4: Positive emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm A critical incident table, source: 
author 
Confidence is about the venture creation, expansion, increased commitment and 
strategic changes. Entrepreneur Brush told me confidence was important in making 
major decisions (CA1, CA14). He received many objections, particularly from his 
wife and friends in making decisions including increasing commitment, fully 
empowerment to Bao, plant expansion, Bao’s resignation, and relocation to Vietnam. 
His experience, knowledge, resources, and future prediction allowed him to stay 
positive and confident about his actions. For Entrepreneur Brush, passion was built 
on his dream that showed the picture of promising future. His confidence gave him 
energy to overcome the difficulties despite opposite views from others.   
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 “My husband is too optimistic I can’t remember how much he loss by being 
optimistic…I and his staff warned him about Bao but he never listens. He thought we 
were biased and narrow-minded. He always says everything works well …no he 
wouldn’t change this character (being confident and optimistic), this is just his 
style” (Quote A8, entrepreneurs’ wife) 
Firm A showed that empathy is associated with forgiving, understanding, and taking 
actions to change the situation. Two major issues were identified in Firm A: 
institutional problems and employee-employer conflicts. Taken Anhui closure for 
example (CA4CA6), Anhui had 5 hand-cutting accidents and 2 serious injuries in 
the first year operation. One of the injured workers was the cousin of local 
government authority, and he sent blackmails and requested for triple compensation. 
Anhui plant suffered from a violence riot for 3 days. To solve this problem, 
Entrepreneur Brush sent Bao to negotiate with local government but failed. He 
decided to shut down Anhui factory. 
Entrepreneur Brush experienced serious conflicts with local government since they 
permitted worker’s violence riots. However, after his meeting with local government, 
he understood the difficulties of local government and learnt of the unspoken rules. 
He re-built the relationship with Anhui government and received their invitation and 
incentives to expand Anhui in 2009. 
In addition to Anhui conflict, Entrepreneur Brush showed his empathy to purchasing 
manager’s unethical behaviour of taking commission (CA11). Empathy allowed 
Entrepreneur Brush to use a more positive attitude to take actions. 
“Being a boss, you have to close your eye sometimes particularly in China… of 
course I was angry but I kind of understand. The traditional Chinese management 
style is everything unclear and no one wants to take responsibility. They follow 
orders instead of regulations. There is a reason for it…I think it’s time to change. 
My staff is used to my management style and Taiwanese system, thus I want to 
incrementally make some changes... don’t judge them by your moral standard...You 
should rely on a proper management system but not the morality of staff. I will build 
a good system and everything will be fine” (Quote A4, entrepreneur) 
Another example is his conflict with Bao (CA12, CA13). Bao resigned in 2012 but 
regretted her decision and wanted to return. This resulted in serious conflicts among 
Bao, Entrepreneur Brush and the new management team. Entrepreneur Brush 
decided to exit China and relocates to Vietnam to minimise the conflict with Bao. 
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Despite the serious conflicts, Entrepreneur Brush still showed empathy to her 
situation and understood her aggressive actions. He paid additional compensation to 
comfort her by selling the Danyang plant. 
“I know she is hard to accept this, managing factory for 20 years and no one speaks 
for her when she quit…she commits a lot, almost the best time of her life and 
sacrifices her family time, she stay in the factory from Monday to Sunday 6:00am to 
10 pm…she is emotional attached with the company and must feel upset and 
angry…I know why she wants some shares and she deserves it. But I can’t give 
her…the only thing I can do is to sell Danyang and share (the money) with her” 
(Quote A9, entrepreneur) 
Entrepreneur Brush stated that showing empathy to others allowed him to think from 
the other way.  
“You should blame on yourself before blaming on others, and treat other people as 
you would yourself. By thinking in this way, you can win the loyalty and respects 
from your staff and learn how to operate in China” (Quote A13, entrepreneur).  
5.1.1.3 Negative emotions and actions 
I identified three negative emotions from critical incidents: fear, anger and disgust. 
Table 5-5 shows sources of entrepreneurs’ emotions and their actions. In Firm A, 
fear referred to worry and uncertainty of future. Fear usually associated with passive 
actions found in this case such as monitoring, protection, avoiding or no actions in 
response to changes. The implementation of two major policies: labour insurance and 
China western development signalled the higher production cost (CA3, CA5). 
Entrepreneur Brush was worried about the future of his company but took no 
immediate actions until Anhui government offered incentives in 2009.  
Moreover, despites Bao’s interference with daily operation, Entrepreneur Brush took 
a more defensive strategy such as sending monitoring staff and protecting customer 
information instead of aggressive and legal actions (CA12). Although fear enabled 
Entrepreneur Brush to be alerted about the problems and passively responded to 
some issues, the dramatic changes are usually accompanied with the other negative 
emotion, anger.  
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CA: critical incident of firm A, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment/ opportunity identification, A2: no changes, A3: decreased 
commitment, A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding rules) 
Table 5-5: Negative emotions and actions, summary of Appendix C, Firm A critical incident table, source: 
author 
Anger refers to being irritable due to conflicts, problems or external forces. Anger is 
usually connected with strategic changes, new directions, investment, and 
organizational restructuration. Similar to confidence, anger seemed to give 
Entrepreneur Brush strong motivation to take actions and solve problems. 
Entrepreneur Brush seems to make big decisions after anger (CA10). For example, 
Entrepreneur Brush restructured Firm A to minimise Bao’s impact.  
“My boss usually announces a new policy after shouting with Bao, particularly when 
Wu (second GM) quit the company and Bao told him no one can manage the 
company except her…my boss slapped the door and told her he will do it ” (Quote 
A10, manager) 
   
147 
 
Disgust refers to a strong negative emotion that makes Entrepreneur Brush want to 
escape from current situation. In the first Anhui closure, he was extremely stressful 
due to the hand-cutting accidents, riots, and conflicts with government (CA4). 
Although everything was under control, Entrepreneur Brush still decided to shut 
down the factory to avoid staff injuries despite the great financial loss. Entrepreneur 
Brush said he could improve factory performance and government relationship, but 
he could not tolerate tragedies anymore. Hand-cutting accidents are common in 
timber handle manufacturing industry, thus he was determined to shut down Anhui 
plant.   
“Anhui is not ready for production and foreign ventures…I was sick of hearing any 
hand-cutting accidents, these people never follow the rules” (Quote A5, 
entrepreneur) 
The international exit decision was also related to disgust. Entrepreneur Brush had 
serious disputes with Bao since she wanted to return the company but was rejected.  
The feeling of Entrepreneur Brush towards this was complicated. On the one hand, 
he was angry, scared and disgusted by her actions (see Quote A3). On the other hand, 
Entrepreneur Brush showed empathy to her situation (see Quote A9). They were 
business partners for 20 years and Entrepreneur Brush could understand how 
frustrated and desperate she must have felt after her resignation.  Thus he did not 
take aggressive actions to stop her (e.g. legal actions). He tried to comfort her and in 
one of his email, he wrote to his staffs “everyone should respect Bao and try to meet 
her requirement…she built up the factory”. However, he could understand and 
forgive her actions but he could not give her what she wanted (company shares). 
These endless conflicts disgusted him thus he aimed to resolve the conflicts by any 
means (except giving her company shares), including exit China (CA12).  
Disgust was connected with decreased commitment (Anhui) and international exit in 
this case. For Entrepreneur Brush, disgust was associated with a strong desire to 
escape from the current situation regardless of the financial cost to obtain emotional 
peace. Actions motivated by anger are usually with a sense of control and the 
capability to solve the problem. In comparison, actions motivated by disgust are 
avoiding, desperate and hopeless behaviours (e.g. the endless conflict with Bao). 
   
148 
 
Interestingly, although incidents resulted in fear do not have direct connected with 
aggressive actions such as exit, those incidents would become the supporting 
evidence to make sense of entrepreneurs’ actions resulted from anger or disgust. For 
example, Entrepreneur Brush did not take action immediately in response to the fear 
of rising costs, but he considered it to be evidence supporting his decision to exit 
China (CA14).        
5.1.1.4 Entrepreneurs’ definitions of exit and its consequences 
Entrepreneur Brush’s exit decision is sudden and surprising for everyone, even to 
himself. Although Entrepreneur Brush was worried about the rising cost issue in 
China, he planned to solve this problem by Anhui relocation. Entrepreneur Brush 
suggested he was “too old to make big changes” but his conflicts with Bao drove him 
to make the exit decision. Interestingly, Entrepreneur Brush suggested that he did not 
see the potential of Vietnam before conflicts with Bao. He limited his expansion plan 
in China. The conflicts with Bao drove Entrepreneur Brush to change the strategic 
direction from increasing investment in China (Anhui expansion) to exiting China 
(Vietnam relocation). Entrepreneur Brush’s emotions, family and personal goals play 
a vital role in this strategic move.  
For Entrepreneur Brush, Firm A was a successful venture since it met his initial goals 
–dominated Taiwanese market and entered global market. Entrepreneur Brush was 
satisfied with his international exit decision since it was consistent with his goals and 
generated great profits by selling lands and properties. Although he felt upset to exit 
China, he viewed it as a necessary step to protect the most important thing, his family.  
“I have no vacations and no personal life in the past 20 years, I fully committed to 
my business and my wife and children had to come to my factory to help in the 
weekend, we spent all our leisure time in this company...this is how I create and 
maintain my venture…shutting down Danyang is a sad decision, but it is a necessary 
step to protect and continue my business. I know Bao and I don’t think my children 
and handle her in the future. We commit so much in this, I can’t take any risks (of 
losing family control)…although I feel sorry for her, I must do it.” (Quote A11, 
entrepreneur) 















































Thus, the exit of Firm A highlights the role of entrepreneurs’ family and emotions 
(empathy, disgust, passion and confidence). Economic rationality does not fully 
explain international exit, entrepreneurs’ emotions actually do.  
5.1.2 Firm B and Entrepreneur Machine  
Firm B is the manufacturer of ice cream machine and is the second market dominator 
in China. Firm B was founded in 1978 in Taiwan and its China operation was 
launched in 1992. The Nanjing factory was export-oriented initially. In 1996, 
Entrepreneur Machine set up a Marketing office in Nanjing and entered local market. 
Entrepreneur Machine indicated his products were much cheaper than Italian ones 
but more stable than Chinese ones. Thus he successfully entered into Chinese market 






In 2000, Entrepreneur Machine moved to USA with his family. The development of 
Machine follows in the footstep of Entrepreneur Machine. Entrepreneur Machine set 
up a R&D centre in USA and successfully developed several core technologies.  
Entrepreneur Machine travelled between China and USA. His stay in USA had not 
only improved the R&D capability of Firm B but also changed his life style. He 
started to consider the quality of life and tried to find the balance between work and 
leisure.  
 “I love my work and commit much of my time in, I was just like a working 
machine…In USA, I found there were something interesting…I visited Metropolitan 
Museum of Art every weekend and walked in the Brooklyn Bridge…I found life can 
be so peaceful and easy…”(Quote B2, entrepreneur) 
USA R&D 
office 
Figure 5-3: Organizational structure and management, Firm B 
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His new life style and personal goals brought changes to Firm B. The following 
sections present the summary of Firm B critical incident table. 
5.1.2.1 Individual variables 
Table 5-6 presents the individual variables in making internationalization decisions.  
Critical incidents and actions Why Code 
CB3+CB8 Similar designs in the 
market, strictly control access to 
product design and in CB4 relocates 
the R&D office to USA. 
View it as an institutional problems 
and the result of money-oriented 




CB5+6 SARS in China, Entrepreneur 
Machine want to reduce his stay in 
China thus downsize the company  
The power of Chinese government 
and the manipulation of media, 
entrepreneur worried about personal 
safety and property right.  
Negative 
predispositions 
CB7+8 Shut down Nanjing marketing 
office  
Unethical staff stole blueprints and 
customer lists for profits. 
Entrepreneur distrusts staff.  
Negative 
predispositions 
CB9+10+11+12 Exit China and 
become a trader instead of a 
manufacturer 
Aversion to Chinese government, 




CB13 Reject promising and profitable 
collaboration opportunities in China 
Aversion to Chinese government, 
staff, institutions and living 




CB1 Entered into China and set up a 
factory 
Provide a better quality of life for 
family 
Family 
CB4 Entered into USA and set up 
R&D office 
Family members immigrates to USA Family 
CB 9 Exit China and become a trader 
instead of a manufacturer 
Daughter rather be a trader than a 
manufacturer in China 
Family 
CB1 Enter into China and set up a 
factory 
The desire to prove himself and being 
an outstanding entrepreneur 
Personal goal 
CB2 Set up a Nanjing marketing 
office for Chinese market 
The desire to prove himself and being 
an outstanding entrepreneur 
Personal goal 
CB4 Enter USA and set up R&D 
office 
In the turning point of his life and 
wanted to change living environment 
Personal goal  
CB6 Want to reduce his stay in China, 
divestment  
Making money is not his first priority 
now. Happiness is more important 
(living environment) 
Personal goal  
CB 9 Exit China and become a trader 
instead of a manufacturer 
Looking for a more relaxing and 
pleasant lifestyle 
Personal goal 
Table 5-6: Individual variables, summary of Appendix, Firm B critical incident table, source: author 
Entrepreneur Machine set up a studio to design machines for food industry in 1978. 
He was ambitious and confident about his design, and he was not satisfied to be a 
studio owner in Taiwan. To pursue greater achievement, Entrepreneur Machine 
entered China in 1992 for following reasons: (1) incentives from Chinese 
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Government (2) cheap labour costs, property and materials (3) the desire of prove 
himself (4) a better life for family. Entrepreneur Machine indicated the strongest 
motivation were the desire to make more money and be an outstanding entrepreneur. 
Thus he made a risky choice to enter into China while others still hesitated (CB1). 
Negative predispositions 
Entrepreneur Machine’s negative predispositions mainly build on his negative 
experience in China such as overly bureaucratic government, political system, 
conflicts with staff and living environment. In 1997, Entrepreneur Machine found 
similar designs in Chinese market (CB3). Although he did not have direct evidence, 
he concluded that his staff stole the blueprints for profit. He strictly controlled the 
access to core technology, and outsources key components to difference suppliers. 
However, similar incidents re-occurred in the following years (CB8). These two 
incidents strengthen his negative predispositions to China in terms of intellectual 
property right and staff’s unethical behaviours (he considered to be the result of 
money–oriented culture). In 2002, Entrepreneur Machine faced another turning point 
in China (CB5+CB6). SARS (Severe acute respiratory syndrome), a highly 
contagious, serious and potentially life-threatening disease caused a serious health 
problem in China. Entrepreneur Machine was isolated at the hotel for 5 days without 
any external communication. Surprisingly, Entrepreneur Machine did not see any 
relevant news in Taiwanese media since Chinese Government tried to lock the news. 
Entrepreneur Machine was overwhelmed by power of Chinese Government and their 
manipulation of the media.  
“I know the truth and I know it (SARS) was very serious, but Chinese Government 
manipulate the media and rewrite the story, it was much worse …there was no 
freedom of speech, at least not in the public, they (Government) can do anything and 
pretend nothing happen … I am scared of this kind of power” (Quote B3) 
Entrepreneur Machine’s negative predispositions to China significantly reduced his 
willingness to commit to China (CB9+10+11+12). Despite his rich resources, 
networks, knowledge and market potential in China, he was not interested in 
opportunity exploitation (CB13). Entrepreneur Machine’s business partner, Lee, 
indicated Entrepreneur Machine could be the market leader in China or even in the 
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global market if he expanded his factory. But Entrepreneur Machine’s negative 
experiences and predispositions prevented him from increasing commitment (see 
section 5.1.2.3 for discussion).  
“My Italian friend invited me to open a business selling gelato, gelato ingredients 
and equipment in China, I know there was a market and very possible to succeed… 
but I was exhausted and don’t want run more business in China” (Quote B5, 
entrepreneur) 
The “exhausted” should be resulted from “China” instead of the business itself (see 
above quotes). This may be viewed as the result of his negative predispositions to 
China; it is uncomfortable (emotional costs) to stay in a country you do not like.   
Family 
Entrepreneur Machine also entered China to provide a better life for his family (CB1). 
In 2000, his family immigrated to USA. Following his family, he set up a R&D 
centre in USA (CB4). In making exit decision (CB9), the attitude of his daughter also 
affected his future plan for firm B (see section 5.1.2.4 for discussion).  
Personal goals 
In the early stage of internationalization, Entrepreneur Machine was ambitious and 
wanted to prove himself (CB1). However, in the mid to late stage of 
internationalization, his personal goal was shifted from being an outstanding 
entrepreneur to enjoying his life (CB4). Thus he became less tolerant to the poor life 
quality in China. He operates the business for family and responsibility instead of 
passion and ambition (CB6). Thus, his main target is to maintain the business by 
exploiting current resources rather than exploring opportunities.  
5.1.2.2 Positive emotions and actions 
I identified three positive emotions from critical incidents: confidence, passion, and 
sympathy (see Table 5-7). Entrepreneur Machine’s passion was connected with 
venture creation and expansion. It was usually accompanied by his ambitions and 
goals. Entrepreneur Machine was an expert in machine design and was ambitious to 
expand his business in 1992 (CB1). He was passionate and confident about his 
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venture and aimed to prove his design was practical and valuable. In 1996, 
Entrepreneur Machine discovered the market potential in China and set up Nanjing 
marketing office to enter into Chinese market (CB2). However, despite the good 
performance, Entrepreneur Machine’s passion about managing the factory 
diminished quickly. He considered himself to be an inventor rather than a manager, 
thus managing Chinese workers frustrated him.  
“I am driven by responsibility instead of passion now, I have to feed my family and 
my workers have to support their families too…I hired local mangers to help 
me…but they still disappointed me sometimes, I think I will never use to the Chinese 
way of doing things” (Quote B1, Entrepreneur) 
Entrepreneur Machine’s confidence was associated with the capability, resources, 
and competitiveness of Firm B and its leading position. Entrepreneur Machine was 
confident about his business and proud of his design that enabled him to become 
second market dominator in China.  
“My design has best CP (cost/performance) value in the industry…I never worry 
about the increasing cost and competition. I strongly believe that technology and 
innovation can compensate the negatives” (Quote B11, Entrepreneur) 
Firm B was healthy, leading and prestigious. Although Entrepreneur Machine lost his 
passion about operation in China, he was supported by his confidence and 
responsibility to family and firm. Due to the lack of passion, the main company 
strategy was for survival instead of expansion. Although Entrepreneur Machine 
identified the opportunities and was capable for expansion, he preferred to maintain 
the status quo (CB13). 
Unlike Entrepreneur Brush, Entrepreneur Machine did not show empathy in critical 
incidents. He understands the situations and the reasons behind uncomfortable events, 
but he cannot accept and approve the events. Thus, Entrepreneur Machine’s attitude 
is more like sympathy instead of empathy (section 6.3.1.3). Entrepreneur Machine 
indicated the fast-changing environment in China and his incapability of managing 
the changes. Taken corruption for example, Entrepreneur Machine indicated Chinese 
government was more humble in 1992. Recently, Chinese, including government and 
people, are driven by money and acted without ethical boundaries (CB11). 
Entrepreneur Machine understands this is the transition of a developing country but 
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cannot accept the change. These uncomfortable events depressed Entrepreneur 
Machine’s and strengthen his negative predispositions to China.  
Passion                     Confidence Empathy 
























  CB4 Entrepreneur 
moved to USA for 
3 years 
A1 Set up USA 
R&D office 
  
CB: critical incident of firm B, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased commitment, 
A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding rules) 
Table 5-7: Positive emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm Machine critical incident table, 
source: author 
5.1.2.3 Negative emotions and actions 
I identified three negative emotions from critical incidents: fear, anger and disgust 
(see Table 5-8). Entrepreneur Machine showed strong and intense negative emotions 
in Chinese operation. His fear was associated with Chinese government, institutional 
problems, and poor living environment. Entrepreneur Machine was shocked by the 
power of Chinese government and how they manipulated with media during SARS 
(CB5+6). He was worried about his property right in China and felt unsecure. In 
addition, the political tension between Taiwan and China enhanced this feeling. 
Unlike Entrepreneur Brush considered each negative incident to be a single and 
independent case, Entrepreneur Machine generalized negative incidents to other 
events and viewed it as a formal/informal institutional problem thus significantly 
deteriorated his predispositions to China (CB11). His fear of China reduced his 
willingness to commit in Firm B despite the market potential. Although his fear did 
not lead to an immediate action, it played a role when Entrepreneur Machine 
evaluated opportunities or made decisions (CB13).  
In the early stage of his internationalization (before SARS), Entrepreneur Machine 
was willing to increased commitment to solve the problem (in response to his anger, 
CB3).  
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“My competitors keep stealing my new design. I am so furious that I doubled my 
R&D budget to speed up the innovation process. These dirty players will never catch 
up with me” (Quote B9, Entrepreneur) 
But his anger turned to fear/disgust in the mid-late stage of internationalization. He 
said he was in “vulnerable position” and there was nothing he can change. Thus, he 
avoided further contacts with locals and isolated himself (CB10).  
The good financial performance, large market shares and Quote B11 show 
Entrepreneur Machine’s negative emotions are irrelevant to economic reasons. 
Entrepreneur Machine’s business partner said “No one can compete with him in 
China”. The source of his negative emotions was the Chinese institutions and living 
environment. Entrepreneur Machine was not used to the life in China in terms of 
living style, environment and food. The situation deteriorated after his stay in USA 
and SARS. He prefers more relaxing and healthy life style and was scared by the 
frequent food contamination and poison incidents in China (CB12). He said he only 
consumed food and beverage delivered from Taiwan, which made his life in China 
difficult. Moreover, Entrepreneur Machine found difficult to communicate with 
younger generation, particularly for those who born after 1990 (CB10). Due to the 
one child policy and growing Chinese economy, Entrepreneur Machine found 
younger generation is more money-orientated and self-central, thus they can steal 
company secrets for profits without the sense of guilty. 
Entrepreneur Machine indicated SARS is the turning point of his predispositions to 
China. With his fear of current China, Entrepreneur Machine standardized 
production procedure, downsized, outsourced, used remote communicate and emails 
to reduce his stay in China, from 6 months to 2 months per year (CB6). Entrepreneur 
Machine sacrificed revenue and production efficiency for this change.  
“All my friends warned me about the production efficiency …my neighbour (the 
owner of nearby factory) told me my staff finishes early everyday… but I am happy 
with the performance now; there is a room to improve, but I rather stay in Taiwan” 
(Quote B7, entrepreneur) 
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Fear Anger Disgust 





A4 Strictly control 











CB6 Want to 
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set up a joint 
ventures 
A2 Reject     
CB: critical incident of firm B, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased commitment, 
A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding rules) 
Table 5-8: Negative emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm B critical incident table, source: 
author 
Entrepreneur Machine described he was “extremely depressed” when he stayed in 
China.  The financial income is insufficient to compensate his emotional costs. 
Besides, Entrepreneur Machine suggested he made enough money for rest of his life 
(CB9). Thus he incrementally divested in China and had no intention to expand. His 
negative emotions and predispositions led to passive strategy, divestment and 
international exit. Moreover, his daughter did not want to take over his business in 
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China. Thus, in 2012, he decided to shut down his factory in China and become a 
designer and trader instead of a manufacturer. 
5.1.2.4 The entrepreneur’s definitions of exit and its consequences  
Entrepreneur Machine’s exit decision was more like a personal choice.  He exited 
China for following reasons: firstly, escaped from his emotional suffering in China 
(negative predispositions). Secondly, prepared for business succession (family). 
Finally, looked for a more relaxing, healthy and comfortable life style (personal goal). 
In 2010, Entrepreneur Machine’s daughter joined the management team in China. 
Entrepreneur Machine planned to leave the business to his daughter. In 2012, 
Entrepreneur Machine’s daughter refused to manage the plant in China for personal 
reasons. Thus, Entrepreneur Machine decided to exit China despite the large market 
shares and strategic importance.  
Although he understood his firm (in Taiwan) might not survive in the long-term 
without a factory in China, he still felt relief to exit China. He experienced intense 
negative emotions during his stay in China, and he thought the financial income was 
insufficient to compensate his emotional costs anymore. Thus, exit was a wise 
decision for himself, but a non-rational one for the firm. His business partner, Lee, 
called it a “suicide mission”.  
 “Shut down my China factory means the end of my all business within 10 years…it 
is very difficult to survive without factory now but we don’t want the factory 
anymore…I sold my designs to my suppliers…I have a valuable customer 
database…now we are offering service instead of product, and I am satisfied for this 
change” (Quote B4, entrepreneur)  
He considered his exit to be a success since he achieved the initial goal including 
promotes his design to the world, becoming a successful entrepreneur and providing 
a good life for his family.  
 “For me, making money is not my first priority anymore, I have enough money…my 
daughter is young and she should have a try in China, but she rejected…it is time to 
shut down the factory…it’s not worthy to sacrifice my life for money” (Quote B8, 
entrepreneur) 
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Accordingly, in this case, financial performance is not the reason for exiting China. 
As suggested by Entrepreneur Machine, “exiting China is a rational decision for 
myself and not for my company”.  
5.1.3 Firm C and Entrepreneur Paint  
Firm C is a paint manufacturer that accounts for 30% of Taiwanese market. 
Entrepreneur Paint set up the Taiwanese headquarter in 1974 and entered China in 
2005 for market expansion. Entrepreneur Paint was invited by his customers and 
business partners to enter into China in 1997. He visited China in 2002 and 
purchased land for expansion, however, his investment plan was postponed by SARS 
and political tension between Taiwan and China. The political tension in 2002 (see 
section 1.2) irritated Entrepreneur Paint, a supporter of Taiwanese independence. 
Most of Entrepreneur Paint’s competitors and customers entered China and had good 
performance. This provided Entrepreneur Paint enough confidence of resuming his 
entry plan in 2005. Despites the negative predispositions to Chinese Government, 
Entrepreneur Paint sent Chen (General Manager) to set up Jiangsu factory for market 
expansion. Firm C was a late entrant to China, which significantly increased the 
difficulty and expense to enter into Chinese market. Unlike Entrepreneur Brush hired 
local managers, Entrepreneur Paint sent a Taiwanese management team to build up 
the factory and sales system (see Figure 5-4). In 2006, Entrepreneur Paint set up 
second sales office in Shanghai but closed it in 2008 for multiple reasons (see 
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The following sections present the summary of Firm C critical incident table. 
5.1.3.1 Individual variables  
Table 5-9 presents the individual variables in making internationalization decisions. 
Entrepreneur Paint entered China for multiple reasons: (1) following customers and 
competitors for market expansion, (2) self- achievement and face. Face also called 
“main-zi” in Chinese; it refers to individual ego and successful image in front of 
other people. It is the combination of dignity and positive reputation.  
Critical incidents and actions Why Code 
CC5+CC10 Shut down 
Shanghai office, divestment, 
and exit China 
Entrepreneur assumed that all Chinese staff 
is unethical for his negative experience in 







aversion and new personal 
goal, exiting China 
Entrepreneurs’ aversion to Chinese 
institutions, government, policies preference 
(against Chinese government, before entry). 
CC11 Reject promising and 
profitable collaboration 
opportunities in China 
Entrepreneurs’ distrust to Chinese people 
CC1+CC2 Entered into China 
and set up a factory and sales 
office 
Self- achievement and face  
 
Personal goal 
 CC6 Entrepreneurs’ aversion 
and new personal goal, exiting 
China 
Entrepreneur is interested in construction 
business in Taiwan and wants to expand this 
business. 
Table 5-9: Individual variables, summary of Appendix, Firm C critical incident table, source: author 
Negative predispositions 
Unlike Entrepreneur Machine who had negative predispositions to China after entry, 
Entrepreneur Paint had negative predispositions before entry. His political preference 
resulted in his distrust of Chinese government, people and his action of late entry. 
Entrepreneur Paint said his political preference strongly influenced his 
predispositions to China. He was a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporter 
considering China as a threat to Taiwan due to Chinese Government’s claim that 
“Taiwan is part of China”. Being a DPP supporter, he believes China will take over 
Taiwan if Taiwanese overly relies on Chinese market for economic development. 
Although Entrepreneur Paint entered China for his business, he was not emotionally 
committed in this venture. His business partner indicated his political preference 
   
160 
 
made him see things pessimistically. This results in a negative impact on Firm C 
operation.  
“Entrepreneur Paint supports green party, that’s why he never likes Chinese 
Government…Entrepreneur Paint thinks it is a conspiracy that Chinese government 
trying to take over Taiwan through economic collaboration. He entered into China 
reluctantly and always thinks from the pessimistic side, he could have made things 
better… “(Quote C3, entrepreneurs’ business partner).   
Firstly, Entrepreneur Paint’s negative predispositions delayed his entry plan. Late 
entry was costly and makes branding more difficult. Entrepreneur Paint spent great 
efforts to enter Chinese market and found this market was extremely competitive. 
Firm C needed to compete with Western giants including Deluxe and Du Pont along 
with numerous local brands. Deluxe created a luxury image by intense advertisement 
and was the appointed brand by end users. In comparison, local brands had lower 
production costs thus could offer more commissions to distributors by selling their 
brands.  
Secondly, Entrepreneur Paint’s negative predispositions to Chinese prevented him 
from taking the “shortcut” (CC11) like his competitors. Entrepreneur Paint rejected 
the collaboration with locals although it was the best way to minimize liability of 
foreignness and entered markets. Chen said the collaboration with locals could 
significantly reduce entry costs and was a popular strategy that most Taiwanese firms 
chose on entry Chinese market.  
“We had an offer from A (the niece of authority), he was interested in our products 
and controlled the distribution channel of B city…Other company also used same 
strategy to enter into C city…but my boss rejected because he didn’t trust locals…” 
(Quote C6, general manager) 
In addition, Entrepreneur Paint sent management team from Taiwan instead of hiring 
locals. Chen said this resulted in higher operation costs and more cultural conflicts 
with local workers. Entrepreneur Paint’s negative predispositions to Chinese 
Government and Chinese influenced his entry time, entry mode, interpretation of 
opportunity, future development and risk perception. He decided to exit China in 
2011 despite positive prediction of future performance and Chen’s strong objections 
(CC6). Entrepreneur Paint sold the land and property to obtain funding for his 
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construction business in Taiwan. Interestingly, Chen (Entrepreneur Construction) did 
not exit China after business closure but resigned and opened Firm G in China.  
Personal goal 
From the viewpoint of Chen and Entrepreneur Paint’s business partners, 
Entrepreneur Paint should have entered China in 2002. They suggested Entrepreneur 
Paint missed the best timing to enter into China but still insisted in this plan for his 
face. Firm C was underperformance from 2005 to 2008 but Entrepreneur Paint 
persisted in his Chinese operation. This may be explained by his future prediction of 
the firm. Chen also indicated another reason of Entrepreneur Paint’s persistence 
(CC1+CC2) 
“My boss is afraid of losing face…after all, he is a successful and rich entrepreneur 
in Taiwan, and everyone will make fun on him if he exits China …besides, Y (their 
main competitor) is successful in China and my boss doesn’t want to surrender”   
(Quote C1, general manager) 
Other informants (Entrepreneur Paint’s customers and friends) also agreed with 
Chen’s viewpoint. They suggested Entrepreneur Paint persisted for his “face”. Afraid 
of losing face means afraid of showing the negative and failure side and in front of 
others, thus people tend to deny their failure and disguise the failure with other 
reasons to protect their ego.  Entrepreneur Paint’s persistence was proven to be right 
since Firm C was on the right track with good performance. Despite all efforts he 
committed before and his fear of losing face, he closed a profitable firm and exited 
China. Section 5.1.3.4 presents his reasons of international exit.   
5.1.3.2 Positive emotions and actions 
Table 5-10 presents the positive emotions and actions. Entrepreneur Paint did not 
experience many positive emotions in China. Most of memories were negative and 
painful. For Entrepreneur Paint, the investment in China was a mistake. He did not 
express any sign of passion during interview. Interestingly, Chen showed passion in 
managing business in China and seemed to enjoy his life in China. Entrepreneur 
Paint confidently entered into China since he identified the lack of medium-price 
products in China (CC1). High-end products such as Deluxe and low- end products 
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like local brands dominated Chinese market. There was a shortage for the middle 
range, which was his cash cow in Taiwan. Additionally, his competitor Y entered in 
1995 and achieved great success. These all increase his confidence in Chinese 
operation.  
Chen and Entrepreneur Paint’s business partners suggested Entrepreneur Paint had 
negative predispositions to Chinese government (CC7). He was affected by the failed 
stories of his friends thus believed Chinese Government would not fairly treat 
Taiwanese investors. Additionally, Entrepreneur Paint showed no intention to 
understand and learn Chinese culture. He showed neither sympathy nor empathy and 
was intolerant to negative incidents and cultural conflicts.  
Passion                                     Confidence Empathy 
Incidents Actions Incidents Actions Incidents Actions 
  CC1 Company 
expansion 
A1 Entered China    
  CC2 Company 
expansion 
A1 Shanghai Sales 
office  
  
CC: critical incident of firm C, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased commitment, 
A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding rules) 
Table 5-10: Positive emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm C critical incident table, source: 
author 
5.1.3.3 Negative emotions and actions 
I identified three negative emotions from critical incidents: anger, fear and disgust 
(see Table 5-11). Anger is associated with Entrepreneur Paint’s dissatisfaction with 
Chinese informal institutions. After entry, Entrepreneur Paint soon discovered the 
unspoken rules of the paint industry in China. The regulation to sell paint was 
different from Taiwan. For example, paint can only be transported by specialized 
vans and there are some “facilitation fees” to pay to obtain the shipping permission. 
Entrepreneur Paint was not aware of these thus paid a great tuition fee. He spent a 
great effort to establish the sales system. Although Entrepreneur Paint was angry, he 
was also confident that he could correct this mistake in the early stage of his 
internationalization (before Shanghai closure, e.g. CC3, CC4, CC5).  
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Fear referred to scary and lack of security, it was originated from Entrepreneur 
Paint’s distrust of Chinese government and Chinese. The distrust of local staff 
resulted in higher operational costs and his lack of commitment in China. After 2006, 
Entrepreneur Paint rejected most of investment proposals to improve performance 
(CC11). For example, Chen suggested the collaboration with local authority’s niece 
could win government support and make market entry easier. This was a popular and 
efficient strategy for Taiwanese entrepreneurs to enter local market. But 
Entrepreneur Paint rejected for his distrust and fear to collaborate with locals. In 
addition, Entrepreneur Paint’s fear prevented him from opportunity discovery and 
implementation. Although the performance was significantly improved after 2008 
and Chen requested for expansion, Entrepreneur Paint rejected. 
“Chen’s suggestion is okay…I am making money and there is a potential…but is it 
worth? I can’t have a good sleep in night time and I am always worried about my 
business in China, I am worried about my sales, the government, the taxation 
officers, the workers…” (Quote C5, entrepreneur) 
In the mid to late stage of the internationalization, Entrepreneur Paint’s fear, anger 
and negative predispositions to China eventually turned into disgust and aversion. 
Chen indicated Shanghai office closure (CC5) was the turning point.  
“My boss doesn’t like Chinese government, so whatever happen, he blames on the 
government, which makes things worse” (Quote C3, general manager). 
For example, Chen considered unethical behaviours of sales to be a management 
problem that can be improved. However, Entrepreneur Paint concluded all staff tried 
to steal money from the firm whenever possible.  
“It was unbelievable, my full-time sales works for my competitors for commissions. 
Everyone thinks they work for my competitors. They are so greedy and always try to 
take advantages of others…I am not surprised if Chen told me they (sales) run away 
with my money and inventory…  No, I don’t have expansion plan; it’s scary to leave 
my business to these people. They are just like their government and I can’t trust 
them. I hate/ dislike doing business with them”.  (Quote C4, Entrepreneur) 
In the mid/ late stage of internationalization, Chinese institutions, people and 
government disgusted Entrepreneur Paint. Disgusts are strongly connected to his exit 
(China) decision. Due to his negative predisposition of China, Entrepreneur Paint 
was pessimistic about the future development in China. He agreed China was a 
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growing economy and potential market, but he also indicated Chinese economy 
would collapse one day due to lack of democracy, corruption, income inequity and 
real estate bubble. 
Fear                    Anger Disgust 
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CC: critical incident of firm C, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased 
commitment, A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding 
rules) 
Table 5-11: Negative emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm C critical incident table, source: 
author 
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5.1.3.4 The entrepreneur’s definitions of exit and its consequences  
This international exit was due to the following reasons. Firstly, the shift of 
Entrepreneur Paint’s personal goals resulted in international exit. His business 
partner said Entrepreneur Paint was fully committed in construction industry in 
Taiwan and paid less attention to his paint business. Entrepreneur Paint exited China 
and sold Chinese factory in order to expand his construction business in Taiwan in 
spite of Chen’s opposition and the good performance of Firm C 
Secondly, Entrepreneur Paint’s business partners suggested his exit was inevitable. 
They indicated Entrepreneur Paint entered China too late, thus significantly increased 
the difficulty and operational costs. In addition, Chen suggested Entrepreneur Paint’s 
negative predispositions prevented him from taking the shortcut. They spent more 
expenses and effort to enter Chinese market than their competitors. With all these 
efforts, Firm C finally entered local market and start to make profit. Chen felt 
disappointed that Entrepreneur Paint decided to shut down a growing and healthy 
venture for a new business with high risk and uncertainty (CC6).  
Entrepreneur Paint defined Firm C as the “big mistake”.  
“Entering China is a big mistake. It’s a waste of money and time. You can make 
money from many businesses, like my construction business, I am building villa in 
Taiwan and its very interesting. It was so unpleasant to run a business in China, I 
can’t do it anymore … Chinese government ask for money, my sales steal money, my 
suppliers always delay, my customer never pay on time, people is the biggest 
problem when investing in China. I rather make money in other ways” (Quote C2, 
Entrepreneur) 
Entrepreneur Paint agreed the performance is good but there are “other ways” of 
making money.  This implied he was not satisfied with Firm C and he had a better 
option. From economic perspective, it seemed too risky to give up a profitable and 
growing venture for a new venture. However, this decision made sense according to 
individual’s variables including Entrepreneur Paint’s negative predispositions, shift 
of personal goals and emotional costs in China.  
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5.1.4 Firm D and Entrepreneur Food 
Firm D is the pastry and cake manufacturer in Taiwan. In 1999, Entrepreneur Food 
established a dessert company in Taiwan selling French pastry and cakes. His 
product, Mille Crepe became a super star in Taiwanese market. With the confidence 
of Mille Crepe and his new design fresh fruit jelly, Entrepreneur Food set up Firm D 
(a French dessert store) in Taiwanese Product Shopping Mall (TPSM) in Nanjing, 
which was sponsored by local government and a large Taiwanese MNE (Company 
H). TPSM was built for Chinese Government’s policies of improving cross-strait 
relationship through business activities. Chinese government offered many incentives 
to attract Taiwanese entrepreneurs to set up a business in TPSM. TPSM was a 
success in the first year but 80% of Taiwanese entrepreneurs left TPSM in the second 
year due to disputes with their landlord; Company H. Entrepreneur Food is one of 








Entrepreneur Food imported products from Taiwan headquarter and sold to 
organizations or individuals. With the support from local government and intense 
media presence, Entrepreneur Food enjoyed a great success in the first year and 
expanded his store. In 2010, he attended the food exhibition in Sichuan province and 
opened second store in Sichuan with a local partner. In 2011, with the invitation from 
his friends, Entrepreneur Food opened another French pastry store in Shanghai 
department store. Figure 5-5 presents the organizational structure and management in 
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Firm D.  The following sections present the summary of Firm D critical incident 
table. 
5.1.4.1 Individual variables 
Table 5-12 presents the individual variables in making internationalization decisions. 
Entrepreneur Food is passionate about the French dessert.  He entered China with the 
goal of introducing the Mille Crepe to more people. Entrepreneur Food has been 
committed to Mille Crepe for more than 10 years. He wanted to introduce his best 
seller to more markets not only for economic reasons but also for self-achievement. 
Entrepreneur Food wanted to achieve something big again before retirement, and he 
selected China to be his stage.  
Critical incidents and actions Why Code 
CD6+CD9 Entrepreneur 
consults experienced friends 
and read Chinese history, join 
local community to 
solve/understand cultural 
conflicts, unspoken rules, and 
employee and employer 
conflicts  
Entrepreneur believes these problems are 
common in business world; he tries to be fair 
and open-minded in dealing with cultural/ 




Entered into China, set up 
Nanjing, Sichuan and 
Shanghai store 
Entrepreneurs’ love in French dessert, his 
dream to introduce it to more people and his 
ambition to “achieve something big” 
Personal goal 
CD7 Visit successful 
entrepreneurs in bakery 
industry and search for new 
opportunities 
To understand local market and what local 
taste. His passion in French dessert drives him 
to develop a brand new product for local 
markets. 
Personal goal 
CD8 Exit China for unmet 
performance and shift of 
personal goals 
In addition to poor performance, entrepreneur 
found a better opportunity for Chinese market. 
He exits to prepare for future re-entry.   
Personal goal  
Table 5-12: Individual variables, summary of Appendix, Firm D critical incident table, source: author 
Predispositions 
Entrepreneur Food acknowledged many Taiwanese entrepreneurs had negative 
image to Chinese due to institutional distances and unethical behaviours of staff.  He 
held a different attitude toward these conflicts (CD6+CD9). Entrepreneur Food 
suggested many Taiwanese entrepreneurs enter into China to make quick money and 
exploited local staff (CD5). Their behaviours destroyed the reputation of Taiwanese 
and increased the difficulties for latecomers to enter into local market. As a 
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latecomer, he should use a more positive attitude, be open-minded and try to improve 
the image of Taiwanese entrepreneurs. Entrepreneur Food was more tolerant to 
cultural conflicts and used a positive attitude to interpret negative critical incidents.  
 “I was unhappy about the disputes with my local business partners (Shanghai and 
Sichuan) such as the bribery, unreasonable commission, delay payment…but after 
the conflicts with Company H, I felt it was nothing to complain about Chinese, even 
my own people tried to take advantage of me, how I can complain about Chinese. 
We are not better than them. This is human nature and real business world, it 




Entrepreneur Food’s two personal goals, achieving something big and promoting 
French dessert, drove him rapidly expanded his market (CD1+CD2+CD3). 
Entrepreneur Food indicated he was passionate in dessert industry, particularly 
French dessert.  
“I visited Paris 20 years ago and I tasted local dessert and bread, I was astonished 
by the amazing flavour and I want my family and friends to taste it too. I felt my old 
job (instant food industry) was so boring and I want to sell dessert. Taiwan was a 
traditional market and only accepts sponge cakes that time. I spent years in kitchen 
to develop a new recipe that Taiwanese likes… I found substitute for cream and 
cheese and developed a special way to preserve fresh fruit to extend expire date…I 
experienced some failures but now people (Taiwanese) like my products. ..It is exited 
that people like my cakes. I want to promote it to more people, I enjoy in seeing 
people eating my cake”. (Quote D1, entrepreneur) 
Entrepreneur Food’s personal goals also made him less sensitive to poor financial 
performance. Firm D was underperformed since establishment. Entrepreneur Food 
persisted in this venture for 5 years (see the next section for discussion). His non-
economic gains from Firm D (including achieving personal goals and his passion) 
somehow compensated the financial loss thus supported Entrepreneur Food to persist 
in an underperforming venture.   
In addition, Entrepreneur Food’s personal goals enabled him to identify and 
implement new opportunities. In 2013, he visited different entrepreneurs to search 
for new opportunities. He found a new opportunity and also realized his products 
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were not suitable for current Chinese market (CD7). Other entrepreneurs suggested 
him to change ingredients to cheaper substitutes and reduce the price.  
“Natural and high quality food does not have market here. If I add some chemical 
flavorings and lower the price, I can definitely find lots of customers, I can definitely 
find lots of customers… But this is not French dessert anymore. I want to sell real 
French dessert and sell good food… ” (Quote D8, entrepreneur) 
Entrepreneur Food insisted on in his original recipe, but then realized China was not 
ready for this type of products. He decided to exit China and prepare for a re-entry 
(CD8). He will restart with French bakery, which is more popular in China, and 
promotes dessert in the future. 
5.1.4.2 Positive emotions and actions 
I identified three positive emotions from critical incidents: confidence, passion, and 
empathy (see Table 5-13). Entrepreneur Food’ passion was associated with venture 
creation and opportunity identification while confidence was associated with the 
venture creations and expansion. His passion was from his love to the French pastry 
and his confidence was built on his knowledge and 20 years’ experience in food 
industry. Entrepreneur Food’s wife said he was passionate about discovering, 
improving and introducing new dessert recipes. He carried a notebook with him to 
record every dessert he tried and how to improve his recipes accordingly. The 
notebook looked like an encyclopaedia of dessert containing pictures, recipe, detailed 
information and his comments.  
Entrepreneur Food was confident about his products. His confidence and passion 
drove his expansion plans in Shanghai, Sichuan and Nanjing 
(CD1+CD2+CD3+CD4).  He agreed that he was too impulsive in setting up the 
Shanghai store (CD8). He failed to identify the real reason that Shanghai citizen 
purchase French dessert (for the feeling of outstanding).  
 “I know this is my problem…if I am very excited about something, I am blind… I 
was too confident about my product and thought I could compete with French brand 
including Paul and Laduree there (Shanghai) with much lower price…I followed my 
feeling and it was proven wrong (laugh)…I think sometimes you need to be crazy to 
open a venture”(Quote D2, entrepreneur) 
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His confidence allowed him to have a positive future prediction, thus enabled him to 
persist in an underperforming venture for 5 years.  
 “I mean, sometimes financial performance means little to me, I believe everything 
would be fine. If you persist and keep going, you can be successful one day” 
(QuoteD6, Entrepreneur) 
             Passion             Confidence Empathy 

































































































CD: critical incident of firm D, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased commitment, 
A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding rules)  
Table 5-13: Positive emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm D critical incident table, source: 
author 
Entrepreneur Food showed strong empathy in response to negative critical incidents 
(CD6). In 2012, Entrepreneur Food’s staff had a car accident on the way to work and 
requested for compensation. She had miscarriage and her family requested for double 
compensation since they considered the 2 months baby also sacrificed for the work. 
Her family members stood in front of store every day and disturbed customers. 
Entrepreneur Food was irritated by the threats and consulted experienced Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs to solve this problem. After the consultation, Entrepreneur Food 
understood due to the one child policy, losing a baby in China is an extreme tragedy 
for the whole family. Law and regulation were not applicable in this situation, and it 
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was not a wise decision to challenge an angry local family. Thus, Entrepreneur Food 
found local authority to negotiate with that family, showed his sincere apology and 
provided compensation for their emotional costs. 
Entrepreneur Food experienced cultural conflicts, unspoken rules and bribery in 
China (CD9). He was angry and sometimes scared of these incidents. But he aimed 
to understand the local institutions. He read Chinese history and consulted 
experienced entrepreneurs. He also joined local community by attending social 
events. These events allowed him to learn from locals and built up useful relationship. 
By understanding Chinese culture, he became more open-minded and capable in 
dealing with institutional problems.    
5.1.4.3 Negative emotions and actions 
I identified two negative emotions from critical incidents: angry and fear (see Table 
5-14). Entrepreneur Food did not show disgust during his stay in China. He seemed 
to accustom to Chinese institutions. Although he experienced several conflicts and 
was angry or scared at first, he learned and adapted. Entrepreneur Food tended to 
look things from the bright side except the conflicts with his landlord in Nanjing 
(CD5). TPSM was supported by Nanjing Government and operated by a large 
Taiwanese MNE, Company H. Due to inadequate pricing strategy and poor 
management, the visitors of TPSM has been dropped from more than 10 thousands 
per day to less than 100 per day. In 2011, Entrepreneur Food organized Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs to negotiate with Company H but received no reply. Entrepreneur 
Food was irritated by Company H and relocated to Nanjing department store.   
 “Do you know how these people make money?  They kept the price label and just 
changed Taiwanese dollar to RMB…they were xxx (emotional language) crazy and 
treated Chinese like idiots who paid 5 times more to buy the same product…H 
company knew the situation and ignored it…in fact H company was one of these 
greedy company…they took advantage on their own people and Chinese. That’s why 
this shopping mall closed…and I felt embarrassed that this was not the only case in 
China.  This explains why Chinese are rude to Taiwanese…because we are bad to 
them too…  ” (Quote D3, entrepreneur) 
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Fear                                     Anger Disgust 





A4 Consult the chairman 
of Taiwanese 
businessman association, 
professionals and read 
Chinese history books and 
relevant reports 
CD5 Disputes with 
landlords in Nanjing 




  CD6 Employee-
Employer conflicts 
A4Consult 
experienced friends  
  
  CD9 Informal 
institutions 





professionals and read 
Chinese history books 
and relevant reports 
  
CD: critical incident of firm D, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased commitment, 
A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding rules) 
Table 5-14: Negative emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm D critical incident table, source: 
author 
 
This incident not only resulted in relocation but also allowed Entrepreneur Food to 
be empathetic toward conflicts with Chinese. 
5.1.4.4The Entrepreneur’s definitions of exit and its consequences 
Entrepreneur Food concluded the reasons for his exit were: (1) wrong products (2) 
unmet performance (3) shift of personal goals. He indicated the shift of his goal, to 
open a bakery, was the critical reason for him to make the exit decision. Although all 
his stores had been under performance since establishment, he still persisted in the 
operation and aimed to improve the performance. He believed in his products and 
had positive future prediction.  
In 2013, Entrepreneur Food visited friends in Hangzhou to seek advice on improving 
his operation in China (CD7). He learned the trend of current Chinese food market 
and found Chinese customers were not ready to pay for natural and organic 
ingredients. He did not want to compromise the quality for his passion of “real” 
French dessert.  
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“Natural and high quality food does not have market here. If I add some chemical 
flavorings and lower the price, I can definitely find lots of customers, I can definitely 
find lots of customers… But this is not French dessert anymore. I want to sell real 
French dessert and sell good food… ” (Quote D8, entrepreneur) 
Thus, he set up a new goal of opening a bakery chain. He decided to sell dailies such 
as bread, rolls and baguette to attract customers and incrementally introduce French 
dessert, which is considered to be luxury and only for occasional event in China. To 
pursue his new goal, Entrepreneur Food closed Firm D and exited China in 2013. He 
returned to Taiwan, searched for new partners and prepared for the re-entry in the 
near future. 
“I am always confident about my product, maybe too confident (laugh)…I mean it’s 
upset to realize my current products were too advanced for Chinese market but it’s 
okay…Chinese follows the trend of Taiwan, about 5-10 years difference. I still have 
chance, if I open a bakery and stay here, maybe I can introduce Mille Crepe again 
in the future ” (Quote D5, entrepreneur)      
Entrepreneur Food’s business partners defined his exit as a failure due to the 
financial loss. Interestingly, Entrepreneur Food had different interpretation of failure 
and considered his exit as a valuable lesson for future success. The different 
definitions may result from Entrepreneur Food’s self- protection system, which 
disguised the failure with other reasons to protect his ego. Additionally, it may be 
because he enjoyed in this experience and received something valuable including 
emotional gain, knowledge and a new future direction. These non-economic gains 
compensated the economic loss thus enabled Entrepreneur Food to redefine his 
international exit, from the failure to “the process to success”.  
 “I always think what is failure…I think it could be just a process…I sold Mille-
crepe 10 years ago but lost lots of money because Taiwanese only likes sponge cake. 
I insisted in this product and everyone thought I was crazy. Surprisingly, 3 years 
ago, Mille-crepe became a super star…if I shut down my venture before, than I was 
failed. But I persisted and survived, I am succeed…I mean, sometimes financial 
performance means little to me, I believe there is a timing, if you persist and keep 
going, you can be successful one day…I think the real failure is when you can’t see 
the future, you don’t believe in future, or yourself doesn’t want that future…I don’t 
think my exit is a failure (laugh), maybe 50-50…I did learn a lot from this 
experience, and I see new opportunity (bakery industry)… I will be back” (Quote 
D6, entrepreneur).  
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In short, poor financial performance was not the main reason for international exit; 
Entrepreneur Food’s personal goal was the key that drives this action. 
5.1.5 Firm E and Entrepreneur Fruit  
Entrepreneur Fruit was an experienced Taiwanese entrepreneur who has 22 years’ 
experience in China. Firm E was a Taiwanese fruit retailer and wholesaler that 
imported Taiwanese fruit and sold to individuals and organizations. Like 
Entrepreneur Food, Entrepreneur Fruit began with the Taiwanese product shopping 
mall (TPSM) in Nanjing and achieved great success and became the icon of fine 
Taiwanese fruit. Firm E was one of Entrepreneur Fruit’s investments in China. 
Entrepreneur Fruit was the manufacturer of hardware tools and had three factories in 
China. Firm E was Entrepreneur Fruit’s personal investment registered under his 










Entrepreneur Fruit was born in a farmer family. He always wants to contribute to 
society. As a son of farmer, he understood the difficulties of farmer to survive in a 
small market like Taiwan. Thus, he aimed to help Taiwanese farmers to promote the 
prestigious Taiwanese fruit to China. In 2009, Entrepreneur Fruit learnt the news of 
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knowledge to open a fruit shop in the TPSM in Nanjing. Although he had no 
experience in agriculture and retailer industry, he was exited and confident about the 
fruit shop due to his knowledge in Chinese market. Entrepreneur Fruit committed 
financially and emotionally in Firm E. He spent 70% of his working time and 
sacrificed his weekend for this business.  Figure 5-6 presents the management of 
Firm E and Entrepreneur Fruit’s other business.  
The following sections present the summary of Firm E critical incident table. 
5.1.5.1 Individual variables 
Table 5-15 presents the individual variables in making internationalization decisions. 
Entrepreneur Fruit indicated the main purpose of Firm E was not for making money. 
Firstly, he wanted to contribute the Taiwanese farmers and promote Taiwanese fruit. 
Secondly, he tried to go into other industries for his daughters. Entrepreneur Fruit 
was a successful entrepreneur in manufacturing industry; however, his daughters 
were more interested in catering and restaurant business. Firm E served as a 
springboard for future investment in Chinese food industry. Thirdly, Entrepreneur 
Fruit enjoyed in meeting people and making friends. Opening a small store like Firm 
E was his dream. 
Critical incidents and 
actions 
Why Code 
CE1 Identify new 
opportunity and enter 
into China  
Entrepreneur thinks Chinese are friendly to 
Taiwanese and likes Taiwanese fruit. In addition, 
Chinese government would help his business for 
political reasons.  
Positive 
predispositions 
CE9 Entrepreneur learns 
and follows unspoken 
rules 
Entrepreneur thinks Chinese are friendly to 




CE1 Identify new 
opportunity and enter 
into China  
Enter into other industry for his daughters who are 
interested in food industry. 
Family 
CE8 Shut down Firm E Entrepreneur was too busy and his daughters show no 
interest in this business. 
Family 
CE1 Identify new 
opportunity and enter 
into China  
Entrepreneur wants to contribute the Taiwanese 




Entrepreneur gains face in first store. For his 
reputation, he feels obligated to expand his store to 
dominant the market.     
Personal goal 
Table 5-15: Individual variables, summary of Appendix, Firm E critical incident table, source: author 




Entrepreneur Fruit’s positive predispositions to Chinese Government allowed him 
interpret the political tension between Taiwan and China from a positive perspective 
(CE9). He believed Chinese Government would not take any action unless 
Taiwanese Government announced the independence of Taiwan. He was the 
supporter of KMT (Kuomintang), a political party which agree with the 1992 
consensus that “both sides (Taiwan and China) recognize there is only one China, but 
agree to different on its definition.” In general, Entrepreneur Fruit and other KMT 
supporters are positive to the future political and economic development of China 
(see section 1.2).  
“Those people (DPP) always talked about independence of Taiwan, of course 
Chinese government has to warn them …most Chinese people agree that Taiwan is 
an independent country and they like us, so no need to be afraid or be aggressive to 
all Chinese people… In fact, Chinese Government is nice to Taiwanese 
(entrepreneurs); we enjoy more benefits than other foreign ventures…  ” (Quote E6, 
entrepreneur) 
Built on his positive predispositions and knowledge of China, Entrepreneur Fruit set 
up Firm E (CE1). He was open-minded and learnt from experience. Although he was 
angry at some incidents such as receiving black mails, he analysed the background of 
these incidents and solved the problem by a more positive attitude.  The empathy 
section presents more data. In general, Entrepreneur Fruit had positive 
predispositions to Chinese and Chinese Government. This enabled him to minimise 
the institutional distances, stay positive and explore opportunities in China.  
Family 
Entrepreneur Fruit set up Firm E for his daughters to understand the food market in 
China (CE1). He also closed Firm E because his daughters were not interested in this 
business, and he was not willing to hire a professional manager (non-family member) 
to manage his business (CE8).  
 
 




Initially, Entrepreneur Fruit defined Firm E as his leisure activity. Thus, with 
government incentives and other non-economic reasons, Entrepreneur Fruit opened 
Firm E to pursue his dream (CE1).  
 “I want to do something interesting. I like to talk to customers, the consumers, and 
promote the product face to face. It’s boring to communicate through emails and 
fight for 2% or 3 % profit…I saw opportunity in TPSM, No need to pay rent for the 
first six months, which meant I just need to pay the labour costs and electricity, this 
was the best chance for me to try something new…” (Quote E1, entrepreneur) 
Entrepreneur Fruit’s daughter also agreed her father open Firm E for personal goals. 
“My father likes to talk to different people particularly Chinese who are interested 
in Taiwanese culture and stuffs. He invited Chinese he met on the plane and be their 
tour guides in Taiwan at least 5 times. One time, I went out with him to buy lots of 
mangos and pineapples for his new Chinese friends. He said they were complaining 
about the quality of Taiwanese mango, and he wanted to reverse their image. My 
father found what they ate before was fake Taiwanese mango sold by unethical 
retailer. The retailer changed the origin of the mango and destroyed the reputation 
of Taiwanese mango.  I think this may be the reason he wants to open the fruit shop, 
and we supported him although we disagreed with his crazy expansion. But he is the 
boss…” (Quote E2, entrepreneurs’ daughter) 
In addition to his personal goal of promoting Taiwanese fruit, Entrepreneur Fruit 
gained face in front of friend since he becomes the celebrity in Nanjing by his 
success of first store (first 3 months). For his face the reputation, he felt obligated to 
expand his store and dominant the fruit market in Jiangsu province (CE3+CE5). 
Although Firm E underperformed since 2010, Entrepreneur Fruit insisted in 
expansion plans and introduced more product lines. The non-economic value of the 
Firm E including his positive predispositions, family, face and personal goals 
provided emotional energy for Entrepreneur Fruit to persist in an underperforming 
firm.   
5.1.5.2 Positive emotions and actions 
I identified three positive emotions from critical incidents: confidence, passion, and 
empathy (see Table 5-16).  
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Passion                 Confidence Empathy 




and wish to 






























































A4 Learn and 
follow 
CE: critical incident of firm E, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased 
commitment, A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding 
rules) 
Table 5-16: Positive emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm E critical incident table, source: 
author 
Entrepreneur Fruit had passion in doing this business because of his background and 
personal goals. Firm E was his dream venture, which satisfied his wishes to meet 
people and contributed to society. He spent most of his time in this shop and feels 
exited although Firm D unperformed.  
“I felt very relax and happy in Firm E, it was interesting to meet so many different 
people, stood on the top of bench and explained how to select and eat Taiwanese 
fruit…They (Nanjing people) loves me and loves my Taiwanese accents (laugh). I 
had 5 TV, 3 newspaper, and 1 magazine interviews, I am the celebrity in Nanjing 
and everyone knows me (laugh)…It was a great fun and I feel so proud in front of 
my friends” (Quote E3, entrepreneur) 
Despite Entrepreneur Fruit’s excitement, Entrepreneur Fruit’s wife held different 
views. 
“He enjoyed a lot in opening a fruit shop, but he didn’t think carefully before 
opening 2nd and 3rd shop… The fruit shop was like a big hole, my husband kept 
pouring money into and nothing came out...” (Quote E4, entrepreneurs’ wife) 
The initial success of Firm E made Entrepreneur Fruit felt confident about the future 
development of Firm E. He was an experienced entrepreneur in China and had 
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sufficient funding. He was confident about his capability to minimise the institutional 
problem and even take advantages on it. He said: 
“Well it’s true that they take bribery, and it’s not acceptable in many countries …but 
this is the Chinese way and I learnt to accept it and follow it. Corruption never 
bother me, I am accustomed to the Chinese way of doing business. It’s a big problem 
for those who are not familiar with. For me, it’s like a shortcut to success. To think 
of it, it is much cheaper and more effective in achieving my goals.”  (Quote E9, 
Entrepreneur) 
Entrepreneur Fruit believed he could dominate Nanjing market even expanded to 
whole Jiangsu province with the prestigious brand name and his institution-specific 
capability (CE3+CE5). Thus, he rapidly expanded Firm E although it 
underperformed. Entrepreneur Fruit admitted he did not evaluate carefully for the 
expansion plan, thus resulted in over expansion and financial loss.   
As an experienced entrepreneur with positive predispositions to China, Entrepreneur 
Fruit showed empathy to most of institutional problems (CE9). For example, many 
entrepreneurs complained about the corruption government and unspoken rules, but 
he understood and learnt the Chinese way of doing things. Instead of viewing it as a 
threat, he considered the ability to handle corruption to be his advantage compared 
with other foreign entrepreneurs.  
“In general, Chinese are very friendly to Taiwanese. I heard many failed stories and 
owners blamed on corrupted government and unethical staff. It is not right. The 
reason why they have chance to destroy your company is because of yourself. There 
people go to erotic places or treat their staff like a donkey. Of course they failed… 
Yes they are different from us and they take bribery sometimes…but this is the 
Chinese way and I learn to accept it and follow it…corruption never bother me, I am 
okay with this (corruption) and I know how to do it…it is a cheaper and more 
efficient way of doing things”(Quote E5, entrepreneur) 
Cultural conflicts might change Entrepreneur Fruit’s management style but have no 
negative impact on his predispositions to China.  Entrepreneur Fruit was accustomed 
to the life in China and enjoyed the Chinese ways of doing business.  
5.1.5.3 Negative emotions and actions 
I identified one negative emotion, anger, from critical incidents (see Table 5-17). In 
general, Entrepreneur Fruit did not have many negative emotions. He did not feel 
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fear in China because he was familiar with the country and capable of handling most 
problems. He did not showed disgust in critical incidents too.  
Fear                                     Anger Disgust 
Incidents Actions Incidents Actions Incidents Actions 
  CE2 Black mails A4 Modified the price   
  CE4 Unethical 
staff 
A4 Improve the 
accounting system 
  
  CE6 Disputes 
with landlords in 
Nanjing 
A3 Shut down 1st 
Nanjing store 
  
  CE7 Poor 
inventory control  
A4 Outsource fruit 
import and preservation 
to professionals 
  
CE: critical incident of firm E, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased 
commitment, A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding 
rules) 
Table 5-17: Negative emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm E critical incident table, source: 
author 
Entrepreneur Fruit felt angry about unethical behaviours of staff (CE4), black mails 
(CE2) and disputes with landlords (CE6). But his anger is usually short-term and 
seldom had negative impact on his commitment in China. On the contrary, the anger 
actually motivated him to improve organizational structure for better performance. 
With Entrepreneur Fruit’s understanding and empathy of Chinese culture and 
institutions, he transformed the negative emotions to positive forces to solve the 
problem. For example, his accountant made counterfeit financial statements for own 
profits and resulted in financial loss. Entrepreneur Fruit was irritated. His knowledge 
and empathy enabled him to learn from this experience and improve his accounting 
system. In general, anger provides an emotional energy for Entrepreneur Fruit to take 
actions for better performance.  
“It (counterfeit financial statement) was a shock…I was angry with my accountant, 
but I knew this is a common thing if you didn't establish a proper accounting system 
in China, she only earned 3,000 yuan per month and it was normal that she was 
lured to do this, particularly when she knew I seldom checked the financial 
statement  …to solve this problem, I spent a fortune to establish a proper accounting 
system and sent another accountant to check financial statements regularly”(Quote 
E7, entrepreneur) 
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5.1.5.4 The entrepreneur’s definitions of exit and its consequences 
Entrepreneur Fruit defined the closure of Firm E as a failure. He listed following 
reasons for international exit such as unmet performance and lack of experience. He 
indicated his lack of knowledge in fruit preservation caused serious inventory 
problems and financial loss. Moreover, sales decreased significantly since the 
visitors of TPSM have been dropped from more than 10 thousands per day to less 
than 100 per day. Additionally, he told me he needed to concentrate on his core 
business and had no time to manage Firm E. His daughters were not interested in and 
he did not want to hire non-family member to manage the firm.  Entrepreneur Fruit 
felt upset and pity for the business closure. Although Firm E underperformed, he was 
still positive to the future development of Firm E. 
 “No I am not regretting about this (set up Firm E), it’s a great fun…of course I lost 
a lot (money), too ambitious; I was not familiar with this industry and knew little 
about fruit inventory control and preservation. Although I outsourced this to a 
professional company but I was too busy to manage it… Now I have experience, 
equipment and network, actually I was going to invest in ice cream made by 
Taiwanese fruit last year, but no one can manage the shop… It’s interesting to open 
a small store selling something I like” (Quote E11) 
Entrepreneur Fruit defined his exit as a failure from economic perspective. However, 
he highlighted the non-economic gains from Firm E including gaining face, 
excitement and happiness. With these non-economic gains, Entrepreneur Fruit may 
restart the fruit shop and introduce ice cream, beverage, and afternoon tea made by 
Taiwanese fruit in the future. Doing business in China is his habits and expertise, and 
he never gives up. 
5.2 Stay Cases 
Figure 5-7 presents the position of the two “stay” cases in the typology. Firm F and 
Firm G have long-term operation plan in China and do not have intention to exit 
China. Following Turcan (2006) and Benito and Welch (1997), strategic importance 
and performance are two economic reasons for firms to stay in host country. Firm F 
and Firm G seem to stay in China for economic reasons. However, Entrepreneur 
Metal has other reasons to stay in China while Entrepreneurs Construction stays in 
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China for individual variables. He agrees that Firm G makes profit in China, but he 
enters and stays in China for individual variables.  
 
Figure 5-7: Typology of stay cases, source: author 
5.2.1 Firm F and Entrepreneur Metal  
Entrepreneur Metal is the chair of Taiwanese Entrepreneur Association in Nanjing 
who has 27 years experiences in China. As a chair in the association, he is the bridge 
of members (Taiwanese entrepreneurs) and Nanjing Government. He provides 
suggestions, offers assistances, and resolves disputes. Entrepreneur Metal has in-
depth understanding of Taiwanese entrepreneurs in China through his and other 
members’ experience.  
Entrepreneur Metal set up a factory in Taiwan in 1989, focusing on animal feed 
production. His friend, a general manger of a Germany MNE invited him to set up a 
factory in China to produce metal wires for his company. Although Entrepreneur 
Metal did not have relevant experience in this industry, in 1999, he recruited two 
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oriented that supplied metal wires to Germany market and soon expanded to USA, 
Belgium, France, UK, and Japan. 
Entrepreneur Metal realized the advantage of low labour costs would decline in the 
near future due to the fast-growing Chinese economy. He hired Jo and his team to 
develop high value-added products. They successfully developed special clothing 
fabric to reduce the influence of electromagnetic radiation and obtained patents in 
China and USA. Firm F had been incrementally transformed from manufacturer of 







In 2008, Entrepreneur Metal received an invitation from the Chinese air force to set 
up a joint venture in city H to produce a special uniform for army. Entrepreneur 
Metal obtained this chance through his personal network: his second son married to 
the granddaughter of the authority in the army. In the same year, Entrepreneur Metal 
set up a subsidiary in Germany for this collaboration. Due to the confidential 
agreement, I will not reveal detail information about the joint venture and Germany 
subsidiary. Figure 5-8 shows the organization structure and management of Firm F. 
The headquarters were relocated from Taiwan to Nanjing due to the strategic 
importance of China. Sam is Entrepreneur Metal’s first son and assistant, and he will 
inherit Firm F.  
The following sections present the summary of Firm F critical incident table. 
Sam  
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5.2.1.1 Individual variables and reasons to stay in China 
Table 5-18 presents the individual variables in making internationalization decisions.  
Critical incidents and actions Why Code 
CF1 Entered into China and 
set up a factory 




CF5 Rising costs and exit 
trend, but entrepreneur 
choose stay and innovate 
instead of relocate to other 
country 
Entrepreneur has positive future 
prediction of China. In addition, he 
doesn’t want to exit China for his 
personal attachment to this country. 
Positive 
predispositions 
CF10 Entrepreneur learns 
and accepts corruption, 
unspoken rules and cultural 
conflicts 
Entrepreneur uses Zhongyong to face 
cultural conflicts. He likes Chinese and 
uses a humble and considerable attitude 




CF7 Collaborate with Chinese 
army and set up second 
factory 
Develop a new business for his second 
son and collaborate with second son’s 
father in law 
Family 
CF10 Entrepreneur learns 
and accepts corruption, 
unspoken rules and cultural 
conflicts 
Entrepreneur uses Zhongyong to face 
cultural conflicts. His family is rooted in 
China. He must stay in China.  
Family 
 
CF1 Entered into China and 
set up a factory 
Establish a large and influential MNE Personal goal 
CF2+3 Worked with 
university lads and developed 
green products 
To have his own design instead of 
buying patents from other country 
(OEMODM) 
Personal goal 
CF5 Rising costs and exit 
trend, but entrepreneur 
choose stay and innovate 
instead of relocate to other 
country 
Establish a large and influential MNE, 
thus chooses to innovate high value 
added product instead of relocation. His 
responsibility and commitment to his 
staff 
Personal goal 
Table 5-18: Individual variables, summary of Appendix, Firm F critical incident table, source: Author 
There were multiple reasons for Entrepreneur Metal to enter into China, including 
networks, low labour and property costs, and government incentives. However, the 
most critical reason for Entrepreneur Metal to invest in an unfamiliar industry was 
his ambition and attachment to China. Taiwanese market was small and constrained; 
there was not much chance for Entrepreneur Metal to pursue his dream- establishing 
a large MNE. Entrepreneur Metal was optimistic about the future development of 
China and he liked China due to the historical connections. He made a risky decision 
to enter a new market and an unfamiliar industry. 
Entrepreneur Metal was determined to stay in China. He indicated the following 
reasons: (1) positive predispositions and personal attachment to China, (2) his family 
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and family assets in China, (3) his personal goal, ensuring the operation of company 
for his staff until the last minute. Although he had no relevant experience and 
knowledge about this industry, he successfully created the business and transformed 
from labour-intensive to high value-added industry. Entrepreneur Metal told me 
industrial knowledge and skills were not critical factors to set up a business, instead, 
his expertise in management and his attitude were the reasons for his success in 
China.   
Positive predispositions 
Entrepreneur Metal entered into China for his attachment to this country. He is the 
second generation of Chinese immigrants, thus he views China as the hometown of 
his family. His positive predispositions to China not only drove him to set up a 
factory in China but also supported him to stay in China.  For example, Entrepreneur 
Metal was aware of the rising production costs in China (CF5). Many of his friends 
relocated to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand. Entrepreneur Metal had to choose 
between business relocation and transformation. His attachment to China drove him 
to stay in China, together with his personal goals, he rapidly increased R&D budget 
and hired professionals to develop high value-added products.  
In addition, Entrepreneur Metal’s predispositions to China enabled him to use a more 
humble and considerable attitude to solve institutional conflicts (CF10). He uses 
Zhongyong, the Doctrine of the mean in Confucianism, to learn and adapt to Chinese 
environment (see empathy in next section for details). Entrepreneur Metal is 
emotionally attached to China and his ventures.  
“My wife, my sons, and my grandchildren are all here, I am rooted in Nanjing…I 
am a Taiwanese and I love Taiwan, but Nanjing is my home and I must stay here. I 
commit so much in China and I will stay here… There are still chances in China, 
this is a huge market and we have advantages…yes I agree with my son that there 
are problems, but compared to other markets like USA and Europe, China is much 
better. Every country has their own problems; I think Chinese government can 
manage it”. (Quote F3, entrepreneur) 
Entrepreneur Metal’s positive predispositions to China provided emotional energy to 
persist in China. China was more than an investment destination; it was Entrepreneur 
Metal’s home and life. Entrepreneur Metal’s positive predispositions to China 
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increase the non-economic value of the firm and lower his risk perception. This 
enhanced his determination to stay in China, drove him to commit in R&D and 
explored opportunities. In comparison, Sam held different views about China. He 
had negative predispositions to China. Staying in China was not his decision but a 
promise and responsibility to his father. Sam was pessimistic about the future 
development of China and he might exit China in the future.  
“I don’t like China. I spent 5 years in USA and lived in UK with my wife for 5 years. 
I don’t like the living environment in China.  But as a son, it’s my responsibility to 
take care of my father’s business since this company is just as important as his life… 
I wouldn’t make any changes before my father leave, but I am thinking about other 
options… I feel stressful in China, everything is so complicated particularly 
interpersonal and government relationship…There were too many problems in 
China such as the huge debt of corrupted local government; this will cause a huge 
problem, maybe another financial crisis in the future.  …I respect my father that he 
can learn from Chinese institutions and used to it.  But I can’t. I may sell the 
business in the future” Quote F5, Entrepreneurs’ son Sam) 
Entrepreneur Metal and Sam’s statements implied Firm F might exit China once Sam 
had full control of the company. This finding was consistent with Benito and Welch 
(1997)’s research that the change of management team may lead to international exit 
due to strategic change. The strategic change was resulted from Sam’s subjective 
interpretation of future development.  
Family 
In addition to positive predispositions, Entrepreneur Metal’s family enhanced his 
determination to stay in China. Entrepreneur Metal’s family members and assets 
were all in China and his two sons married to Chinese. For his second son, he 
collaborated with Chinese army to set up second plant although he understood the 
army might take full control one day (CF7). He aimed to build a good government 
network for his second son’s career. 
Personal goals 
Entrepreneur Metal entered China to build a successful Multinational company. 
According to his market shares and company performance, his goal was 
accomplished. Now he stays in China for his family, his attachment to China, and his 
promise to his staff.  
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Entrepreneur Metal viewed his employees as part of his family and appreciated their 
contribution. He told me it was unethical to exit China and laid off employees for 
strategic changes or performance. Although the relocation to Southeast Asian 
countries could reduce the production costs, he was satisfied with current 
performance.  
 “I have more than 1000 employees, and this means 1000 families are rely on me. It 
is a heavy burden, but it is also my responsibility to ensure the operation of my firm. 
I am an old-fashion person, and I don’t like to fire my employees for efficiency and 
performance, that’s American way not Chinese way. Entrepreneurs should be 
responsible for their people. When they enter your company, it is your job to 
carefully manage your company and support their life; it is a heavy load and a long 
road. I told my two sons if they want to sell my business in the future, they have to 
find a way to settle down these employees. They should to be appreciated because 
employees make the money to support their (his two sons) life. ” (Quote F4, 
entrepreneur) 
Firm F’s high non-economic value was built on Entrepreneur Metal’s positive 
predispositions, family interest and personal goals. It is economically, strategically, 
and emotionally important for Entrepreneur Metal. He said, “Nanjing (China) is my 
home”.  
5.2.1.2 Positive emotions and actions 
I identified three positive emotions from critical incidents: confidence, passion, and 
empathy (see Table 5-19). Entrepreneur Metal’s passion and confidence were closely 
related to opportunity identification and implementation (CF1+CF2+CF3). His 
passion was originated from two sources: his expertise in management and his love 
and attachment to the life in China. In the early stage of development, although 
Entrepreneur Metal did not have relevant knowledge in metal wires production nor 
anti-electromagnetic radiation products, he was confident since he understood how to 
efficiently manage Chinese experts and staff to achieve best performance. 
Entrepreneur Metal enjoyed his life in Nanjing and deeply rooted in. He was 
passionate to pursue opportunities to sustainably maintain his business in his new 
home. The passion of doing business in Nanjing also encouraged him to be the chair 
of Taiwanese entrepreneur association, to offer assistances to Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs interested in Nanjing market. 
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in China  
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finance Jo’s lab 
  













  CF7 Invitation 
from Chinese air 
force to set up a 
joint venture 
A1 Second 
factory in city H, 
joint venture 
with Chinese air 
force 
  
  CF9 Disputes 







“kicked out” by 
the army 
  
CF: critical incident of firm F, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased commitment, 
A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding rules) 
Table 5-19: Positive emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm F critical incident table, source: 
author 
Entrepreneur Metal experiences mostly positive emotions in China. For instances, 
employee and employers conflicts are common issues for Taiwanese entrepreneurs. 
But when I discussed with Entrepreneur Metal about this issue, he showed strong 
empathy during the discussion and suggested entrepreneurs themselves should be 
blamed for these conflicts (CF10). Entrepreneur Metal explained the dramatic 
changes of recent Chinese society, which significantly influenced his management 
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style. Being considerable, humble and understanding your staffs are compulsory to 
survive in present China. He explains by his meditation experience.  
“I solved at least 30 cases of employer and employee conflicts. Although I am a 
Taiwanese, I have to say we are wrong. They are lack of “Zhongyong”… Most of 
cases were because of the attitude of Taiwanese entrepreneurs. They were too 
arrogant, lack of communication and tried to train their staff like a machine. This 
(management style) worked well 20 years ago but not now. Due to the one child 
policy, the young generations are the precious of family; you can’t imagine what 
Chinese parents can do for their child…Thus, the old fashion way is not working 
anymore, you have to respect your staff, listen to their opinions, and use rewards 
instead of punishments. 20 years ago, Chinese workers could work 16 hours per day 
to make money, but now, if you ask your workers to take extra hours they may just 
quit… They are the boss now. Many Taiwanese don’t see this change and use 
militaristically formal management style, that’s why they experienced so many 
problems. You need to be considerable, humble, understanding your staffs and most 
importantly, build up a systemic management style and be hard-working to be their 
model…”  (Quote F2, entrepreneur) 
Entrepreneur Metal indicated to survive in China; an entrepreneur must follow 
“Zhongyong”, the Doctrine of the mean in Confucianism. In this case, Zhongyong is 
based on 3 principles: (1) self-control, self-learning, and self-regulated (2) empathy 
and forgiveness (3) being sincere and faithful. Zhongyong was Entrepreneur Metal’s 
discipline in interpersonal relationship and management. Zhongyong allowed 
Entrepreneur Metal to be peaceful, humble and empathy to difficulties and conflict, 
moreover, be accustomed and learns from Chinese culture and institutions.  
5.2.1.3 Negative emotions and actions 
Table 5-20 presents the negative emotions and actions in critical incidents. I 
identified fear and anger in critical incidents. Fear refers to worry and uncertainty of 
future. Fear usually associated with passive actions except CF5. Entrepreneur Metal 
was determined to stay in China, thus he increased commitment in R&D despite 
high-risk perception. It is true that fear usually associated with passive strategy (like 
previous cases). But Entrepreneur Metal’s “must” stay in China drove him to take 
actions thus transferred his fear of rising costs to confidence (the development of 
high-value added products).  
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Fear               Anger Disgust 
Incidents Actions Incidents Actions Incidents Actions 
CF8 Army 










to relocate plants 
A4 Relocate the 
factory to new 
outskirt of Nanjing, 







CF9 Disputes with 
Army about 
management  
A4 Diversified the 
company, use 
current network to 
prepare for “kicked 
out” by the army 
  
  CF11 Copy right 
issues, imitation 
A1 Commit more in 
R&D, faster than 
the competitors 
  
CF: critical incident of firm F, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased commitment, 
A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding rules) 
Table 5-20: Negative emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm F critical incident table, source: 
author 
In general, Entrepreneur Metal did not have many negative memories in China. He 
experienced anger in some events but seemed to accept it quickly and found a 
solution. In 2005, Entrepreneur Metal was requested by Nanjing Government to 
relocate to outskirt of Nanjing for urban planning (CF4). Nanjing government 
promised compensation and land for this relocation. However, Entrepreneur Metal 
did not receive compensation and he found his old location became a small park and 
a large supermarket, which was owned by the relatives of a government authority. 
Entrepreneur Metal was irritated at first but soon accepted the reality. He understood 
this is Chinese way of doing thing. Although the government might pay 
compensation or returned the land if he fought for it, it was not a wise decision to 
challenge the authority. Entrepreneur Metal rather gave “face” to the authority to 
show his respects and enhanced political ties. He indicated the importance of “face”, 
which also called Mian-zi in Chinese culture. In China, compromise can transfer a 
conflict to a friendship, particularly with government.  
Entrepreneur Metal’s in-depth understanding of China prevented him from disgust. 
By following Zhongyong, he enjoyed his life in China. Although his son, Sam, had 
negative interpretation of some incidents, this section mainly discussed Entrepreneur 
Metal’s interpretation since he was the key decision maker of Firm F. In summary, 
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Entrepreneur Metal was attached and determined to stay in China for his positive 
predispositions, family and personal goals. Although this decision was not rational 
optimal from an economic perspective, this was a satisfied decision for Entrepreneur 
Metal.  
5.2.2 Firm G and Entrepreneur Construction 
Entrepreneur Construction was the ex-general manager of Firm C. He resigned from 
Firm C in 2011 and established a construction company (Firm Construction), 
focusing on interior decoration.  Entrepreneur Construction set up Firm G for his 
experience, knowledge, networks in this industry and most importantly, his family in 
China. Entrepreneur Construction married a Chinese in 2010 and had a 2 years’ old 
boy. Entrepreneur Construction decided to settle down in Nanjing and set up Firm G 
to support his family.  
Entrepreneur Construction was continuously seeking for opportunities in China. In 
addition to his construction business, Entrepreneur Construction used his networks to 
promote innovative building materials and decorating tools (CG2, CG3). He became 
the broker who introduced foreign companies to right distributors and demonstrated 
new materials to designers. Firm G was famous for innovative, chic and modern 
interior decoration using quality and innovative materials. Entrepreneur Construction 
described the uniqueness of Chinese market and his entrepreneurial experience. 
“China is a very unique market; they have been isolated for years that create very 
unique consumer behaviours…Innovative and good products are not necessary work 
in China. The most important thing is how you share the profit with distributors and 
how you promote. Promoting a product is not by imagination and it is unpredictable. 
This is why many large foreign companies visit me for market information and 
collaboration. I know how to modify the product to Chinese style and how to 
communicate with Chinese distributors.” (Quote G3, entrepreneur) 
Figure 5-9 presents the organizational structure of Firm G. Entrepreneur 
Construction developed his consulting business by utilizing his network and 
knowledge in this industry.  
 





The following sections present the summary of Firm G critical incident table. 
5.2.2.1 Individual variables and reasons to enter and stay in China  
Table 5-18 presents the individual variables in making internationalization decisions. 
Although Entrepreneur Construction entered China for economic reasons such as his 
network, knowledge, and the potential of construction business, the most critical 
reasons were to stay and support his family. Due to family reasons, staying in China 
was Entrepreneur Construction’s only and best option. Firm G allows Entrepreneur 
Construction to spend more time with his family; moreover, being an employee for 
20 years, he wanted to experience the life as an entrepreneur. His first priority was 
the family, and then his ambition. 
“I can do business everywhere; I can go back to Taiwan stay in Firm C or create my 
business. I can go to Vietnam with my friends. I can go to Thailand. My customers 
invite me to be the consultant. But I just want to stay in Nanjing because my family is 
here. My baby is just 2 years old and I want to participate his childhood. I don’t 
have high expectation for my life. I only need a house, a car, a dog and enough 
money to support my family. I don’t have much ambition and don’t need much 
money. I only hope my family can be happy and healthy every day, that’s it.”(Quote 
G2, entrepreneur) 
For Entrepreneur Construction, staying in China was not an economic or strategic 
decision. It was the most important decision in his life and it was a personal choice. 
This decision might not be the best option for his career, but it was the most suitable 
one for his life. Entrepreneur Construction was optimistic about company 











Figure 5-9: Organizational structure and management, Firm G, source: author 
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Critical incidents and actions Why Code 
CG1 Entered into China and set up 
Firm G 
Entrepreneur likes China and 
married a Chinese  
Positive 
predispositions 
CG4+CG5 Learn and adapt to Chinese 
culture, environment, unspoken rules 
and overly bureaucratic government 
Entrepreneur likes China and 
must stay in China.  
Positive 
predispositions 
CG1+CG2 Entered into China and 
explore opportunities 
Entrepreneur likes China and 
married a Chinese, want to stay in 
China with his family 
Family 
CG1 Entered into China and set up 
Firm G 
The goal to be an entrepreneur Personal goal 
CG3 Collaborate with foreign 
companies and become a broker 
The goal to be an entrepreneur 
and interests in innovative paint 
Personal goal 
Table 5-21: Individual variables, summary of Appendix, Firm G critical incident table, source: author 
Positive predispositions  
As the ex-general manger of Firm C, Entrepreneur Construction was strongly 
influenced by his working experience in China. Unlike Entrepreneur Paint, 
Entrepreneur Construction had positive predispositions to China. Entrepreneur 
Construction told me he enjoyed the hospitality from Chinese. His positive 
predispositions allowed him to have positive future prediction, showed empathy to 
negative incidents including institutional problems or overly bureaucratic 
government (CG4, CG5, see empathy in next section for discussion).  
Family 
Family was the most important variable for Entrepreneur Construction to enter and 
stay in China (CG1); in addition, being a father enhanced his determination to stay in 
China and develop a successful business (CG2). Entrepreneur Construction kept 
exploring opportunities including using his networks to promote innovative building 
materials and introducing foreign companies to right distributors.  
Personal goals 
Entrepreneur Construction’s personal goals of being and entrepreneur and his 
knowledge in painting industry drove him to set up a construction company (CG1). 
His positive predispositions, personal goals and family significantly increased the 
non-economic value of the firm. The initial and most vital variable for Entrepreneur 
Construction to make decision was to support and stay with his family in China.    
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5.2.2.2Positive emotions and actions 
I identified three positive emotions from critical incidents: confidence, passion, and 
empathy (see Table 5-22). Entrepreneur Construction’s passion was originated from 
his personal attachment to China. Entrepreneur Construction said Chinese market 
was a rising star with great potential. It was a paradise for entrepreneurs who 
understood Chinese business environment. Entrepreneur Construction was confident 
about his venture for his expertise and knowledge of China thus minimized his risk 
perception and encouraged the entry plan. Entrepreneur Construction increased his 
commitment and introduces more services to his customers 3 months after entry. The 
birth of his son motivated him to work harder and make more money (CG2) to 
provide a better life for family.  
Passion Confidence Empathy 
Incidents Actions Incidents Actions Incidents Actions 
CG1 Married 
and have a 




A1 Set up 
Firm G 
CG1 Married 








CG 4 Informal 
institutions 






















A4 Learn and 
follow, build 
more guanxi 
CG: critical incident of firm G, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased commitment, 
A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding rules) 
Table 5-22: Positive emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm G critical incident table, source: 
author 
Entrepreneur Construction experienced formal and informal institutional problems in 
China. He said these problems could be found all over the world. Discussing these 
problems with his Chinese friends and his wife allowed him to view this problem 
from their perspectives (CG4+CG5). Thus, he used to a more positive attitude and 
local way to solve problems. Entrepreneur Construction had similar conclusion like 
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Entrepreneur Metal regarding the right attitude to survive in China, to show empathy, 
to learn and self-control.    
5.2.2.3Negative emotions and actions 
I identified two negative emotions from critical incidents: anger and fear (see Table 
5-23). Entrepreneur Construction experienced negative incidents influencing his 
operation in China, but these events left positive outcomes to Firm G’s development. 
For instance, Entrepreneur Construction was angry about unspoken rules, corruption, 
overly bureaucratic government and delayed payment (CG4). Anger drove him to 
seek for solutions and consult experienced entrepreneur or locals. Through this 
action, he learnt to identify the similarity and difference between Taiwanese and 
Chinese and used this finding to smoothly handle these problems.  
Fear                     Anger Disgust 




A2 No immediate 
actions, accept the 
inevitable result of 
one child policy 
CG 4 Informal 
institutions such as 
unspoken rules 




  CG5 Overly 
bureaucratic 
government 




CG: critical incident of firm G, see Appendix C 
A: entrepreneurs’ actions (A1: increased commitment, A2: no changes, A3: decreased commitment, 
A4: learning and adaptation, A5: international exit, see Appendix B for coding rules) 
Table 5-23: Negative emotions and actions, summary of Appendix, Firm Construction critical incident 
table, source author 
Entrepreneur Construction categorized two major problems that may result in 
negative emotions: (1) problems from formal and informal institutions such as 
maintaining guanxi with government, understanding unspoken rules and employee 
and employer conflicts. This problem could result in serious conflicts and depress 
entrepreneurs. He tries to stay calm, be open-minded and listen to other people.  
My best advantage to survive is China is I am not stubborn. I am very flexible and 
open to any suggestions. I heard too many stories in China, including European 
investors. These people, including some Taiwanese, are too civilised, too stubborn 
and live in their own world. They lock themselves in 5 star hotels and eat KFC every 
day, how can they understand China and manage Chinese? You have to talk to 
locals and understand what they are thinking… Don’t be so quibble, what’s the 
point to argue with your staff for taking commissions from a bulb even all bulbs in 
the factory. Taking commission makes them become more responsible about quality 
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because they want to make it long-term. You just need to control the large spending, 
others can let it go. 3~5 % of total spending is a reasonable range if this makes my 
staff happier and work harder (Quote G1, entrepreneur)     
Another problem in China was the deteriorated environment including rising costs, 
lack of skilled labour, and intense competition. In facing these problems, 
Entrepreneur Construction accepted and tried to stay positive. Entrepreneur 
Construction told me that entrepreneurs should be aware of these problems but not 
overly panic since all companies, including your competitors, were facing the same 
problems. “You should stay positive and prepare to pursue new opportunities”.  
In general, fear and anger had little negative impact on Entrepreneur Construction’s 
predispositions and willingness to stay in China. He used a positive attitude to 
analyse and solve the problem, and most importantly, he learnt from the problem. 
The knowledge from this learning process enhanced his capability and confidence in 
solving future difficulties, making him capable and hence willing to stay in China.  
Entrepreneur Construction was determined to stay in China for his positive 
predispositions to China, personal goals, and most importantly, his family. He said 
he set up Firm G for his family; his family was his top priority in making any 
decisions.    
5.3 Summary 
In summary, this chapter summaries critical incident table of each firm and presents 
findings from Taiwanese firms that exit/stay in China. This chapter presents an in-
depth within case analysis of exit/stay firms. It provides a historical development of 
each of the case firms and an insight into entrepreneurs’ individual variables in 
decision-making (Theme A), entrepreneurs’ negative/positive emotions and actions 
(Theme B) and entrepreneurs’ definitions and the outcome of international exit 
(Theme C).  
Analysis in this chapter confirms that international exit is not a rational and pure 
economic-driven decision. The non-economic value of owning the firm is 
highlighted and the emotional decision-making is emphasized. Entrepreneurs are not 
rational economic men who carefully calculate consequences; alternatively, they 
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exercise judgment and engage in mindful practice guided in part by their emotions 
and individual variables. It is true that good organizational performance and strategic 
importance increase the survival rate, but in my cases, entrepreneurs are sometimes 
driven by “other more important reasons” to make decisions.  
This chapter provides a thematically analysed within case company profiles, which 
enables the study to prepare for the cross case analysis and discussion to be presented 
in the next chapter in relation to the theoretical literature reviewed. 
  




Chapter 6 : Discussion 
 
This chapter integrates the research questions developed in the literature review 
(chapter 2 and chapter 3) with the empirical findings in the previous chapter.  It 
analyses the decision-making of international exit using the three themes (see section 
6.1): individual variables, the role of entrepreneurial emotions and decision-making 
processes of international exit. It provides a novel explanation for international exit 
compared to conventional International Business (IB) literature including 
international exit (Coucke and Sleuwaegen, 2008; Geroski et al., 2010; Fisch and 
Zschoche, 2011), de-internationalization (Benito and Welch, 1997), and foreign 
divestment literature (Boddewyn, 1983). I examine why and how Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs invested in China make international exit decisions from an individual 
and non-economic perspective instead of the economic perspective found in the 
mainstream IB literature.  
This research enriches the international exit literature in the IB field using data from 
an emerging economy and theories from the Entrepreneurship field. Additionally, it 
contributes to the exit literature in the entrepreneurship field by presenting empirical 
data of cross-border activities, showing how institutional distances, cultural conflicts, 
and political tensions influence entrepreneurs’ decision-making. In doing so, my 
thesis responds to McDougall-Covin et al.’s (2014) call, bridging International 
Business (IB) and Entrepreneurship field. It adds to current decision-making model 
of international exit in IB field by combining the knowledge of Entrepreneurship 
field with my empirical evidence.  
IB literature often uses an array of economic variables including macro environment 
(Geroski et al., 2010; Swoboda et al., 2011), institutions (Chung and Beamish, 2005), 
industrial condition (Shaver et al., 1997; Coucke and Sleuwaegen, 2008), 
organizational characteristics and resources (Mata and Portugal, 2000; Bercovitz and 
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that result in foreign divestment, de-internationalization and international exit. These 
studies examine variables resulting in poor performance or strategic changes, which 
are considered to be the cause of international exit in mainstream literature (e.g. 
Benito and Welch, 1997; Boddewyn, 1983).  
I question whether these economic variables are the only and principal variables that 
influence entrepreneurs in making international exit decisions? Benito et al. (2009) 
indicate the tendency to confuse measurability with importance. That is, economic 
variables are easier to measure or estimate. Thus, March (2006) indicates that 
scholars tend to consider economic variables as more real than those that cannot be 
easily measured, though the latter may be more important. This chapter reveals the 
ambiguous reality of decision-making of international exit, to uncover the important 
but more difficult to measure non-economic variables, referred as variables that may 
be less relevant to organization performance but important for entrepreneurs in 
decision-making.  
According to IB literature, poor financial performance (Boddewyn, 1983; Li and 
Guisinger, 1991; Jackson et al., 2005 ; Coucke and Sleuwaegen, 2008) and strategic 
change (Tsang and Yip, 2007; McDermott, 2010; Fisch and Zschoche, 2012) are two 
major economic reasons of international exit. Following this economic perspective, 
environmental and organizational variables should be able to justify the decision of 
international exit. Interestingly, these economic variables (section 2.3.1 and section 
2.3.2) cannot fully explain international exit of my case companies.   
Figure 6-1 categorises five exit cases according to their financial statements and 
entrepreneurs’ opinions. Firm A, B and C located in Quadrant I are inconsistent with 
current literature that firms exit host country for poor performance or less strategic 
importance. Entrepreneur Brush, Machine and Paint agree the strategic importance 
and profitability of their ventures in China. Thus, their exit decisions are non-rational 
from the economic perspective. Entrepreneur Food and Fruit also challenge current 
international exit literature. These two firms have experienced a consecutive five-
year financial loss since establishment, and Firm E is not strategically important to 
the entrepreneur. These two failing firms should have been closed earlier but 
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persisted until 2013. Moreover, the two entrepreneurs shut down the firm not only 
for the poor performance but also for other non-economic reasons.  
 
Figure 6-1: Typology of international exit, source: author 
This finding challenges IB literature (see section 2.3) that firms exit resulted from 
poor performance and strategic changes. My findings indicate that strong 
performance and strategic importance are potentially (though not necessarily 
sufficient) reasons for an entrepreneur to continue their internationalization.  I follow 
Staw’s (1981) argument around escalation of commitment and DeTienne et al. (2008) 
study of the persistence of underperforming firms that viewed international exit by 
only economic variables is clearly insufficient to explain the unexpected exit of 
Entrepreneur Brush, Machine and Paint and the blind persistence of Entrepreneur 
Food and Fruit. To provide a more in-depth understanding of international exit, I 
now examine why entrepreneurs make the decision to internationally exit from a 
non-economic perspective. 
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6.1 Discussion Map  
This section signposts this chapter; the structure of which addresses the main 
research question, three research themes, subsidiary research questions, and data. In 
this section, I examine the usefulness and feasibility of my theoretical framework 
(Figure 4-1) by using my data; the five exit cases and two stay cases. This discussion 
chapter is presented in three themes similar to Chapter 3. Table 6-1 presents the data 
and literature using in each theme. To enhance my arguments, many sentences are 
ended with a quotation or critical incident code, (e.g. Quote A1, CA1); Appendix C-1 




Why do Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs who have invested 
in China exit? 
Data demonstrating themes  Literature  
Theme A Why do entrepreneurs make the 
international exit decision? 
Viewed from an individual and 
non-economic perspective 
Individual variables section of 
each case 
Critical incident and quotation 
table in Appendix C 
Section 3.1 
Theme B How do incident-generated 
emotions shape entrepreneurs’ 
actions in internationalisation from 
entry, operations to exit decisions? 
The positive emotions and actions 
section of each case 
The negative emotions and actions 
section of each case 
Critical incident and quotation 
table in Appendix C  
Section 3.2 
Theme C How do entrepreneurs make the 
decision of international exit and 
what is the outcome?   
The entrepreneurs’ definition, 
reasons, and consequence of exit 
section of each case 
Critical incident and quotation 
table in Appendix C 
Section 3.3 
Table 6-1: Subsidiary questions and data of each theme, source: author 
In the following sections, firstly, I explain why entrepreneurs make international exit 
decisions from a non-economic perspective (Theme A).  Secondly, I examine how 
entrepreneurs make international exit decisions by examining the causality of 
incident-generated emotions and entrepreneurs’ actions in internationalization 
(Theme B). Lastly, I summarize Theme A and B and then present the revised 
theoretical framework of how entrepreneur makes international exit decisions 
(Theme C).     
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6.2 Theme A: Individual variables resulting in international exit 
To answer the subsidiary research question, section 6.2.1 presents the non-economic 
variables emerging from the data, focusing on how non-economic variables drive or 
impede international exit decisions. Section 6.2.2 follows Zellweger and Astrachan’s 
(2008) argument that a value of a business is built upon financial and emotional 
value. This section explores how individual variables decrease non-economic value 
of the firm and result in international exit.   
Section 0 investigates the role of Chinese informal institutions and their impact on 
firm’s economic and non-economic value. This finding supports Xu and Meyer’s 
(2012) argument that institutional problems (including less efficient market, 
government interruption, network/guanxi based behaviour, and higher risks and 
uncertainty) distinguish international operations in emerging economies from those 
in developed economies. The institutional distances (part of liability of foreignness) 
increase the difficulty of foreign operation, and highlight the role of entrepreneurs’ 
predispositions to host country.   
6.2.1 Individual variables of international exit  
This section focuses on individual variables influencing international exit decision. 
Much of IB literature on international exit assumes that organizational performance 
and strategic changes are two key reasons for international exit. That is, 
entrepreneurs make the exit decision based on firm’s current/future economic value. 
As suggested in Figure 6-1, this statement inadequately explains my five exit cases. 
Following the debate in literature chapter, its reason could be that each entrepreneur 
has subjective threshold of performance (Gimeno et al., 1997; DeTienne and Cardon, 
2012). Therefore, to provide a more persuasive view of the international exit 
decision-making, I centre-stage individual variables in decision-making including 
entrepreneurs’ predispositions, family, and personal goals. The three variables may 
not have direct impact on organizational performance but affect entrepreneurs’ 
decision-making.  
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The role of individual variables in exit decisions is shown in the escalation of 
commitment (Staw, 1981), threshold theory (Gimeno et al., 1997) and persistence 
(DeTienne et al., 2008) in the literature on underperforming firms. Staw (1981) 
suggests three non-economic exit barriers including entrepreneurs’ motivation to 
justify previous decisions, norms of consistency, and perceived future outcome. 
DeTienne et al. (2008) extend this view by indicating the impact of environmental 
munificence, personal commitments, personal options, and previous experiences on 
making decisions to persist in underperforming firms. Both studies highlight the fact 
that heterogeneity amongst entrepreneurs can create unique exit barriers for each 
firm. Following this logic, I examine the heterogeneity among the entrepreneurs to 
uncover the individual variables resulting in international exit decisions. The next 
section discusses the first individual variable, entrepreneurs’ predispositions to China.  
6.2.1.1 Negative predispositions to China resulting in negative interpretation thus 
international exit 
This section examines the importance of entrepreneurs’ negative predispositions to 
host country in making exit decisions. The evaluation of environment and 
organization is a series of subjective selection and individual cognition (Nadkarni 
and Barr, 2008) that builds upon individual background, experience, knowledge and 
practice (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009). Because of the political tension between 
Taiwan and China, most of the informants connect their business operation with this 
cross-straits relationship. Some entrepreneurs exhibited strong negative 
predispositions to China while others refused to talk about this issue initially, but 
expressed their positive predispositions to China in the later stage. My data suggests 
that entrepreneurs’ predispositions to China can shape their perception of external 
changes and that external changes can also alter their predispositions. Entrepreneurs’ 
predispositions may be adjusted but they appear difficult to reverse.   
As shown in section 4.2.1, the entrepreneurs’ predispositions refer to a liability, a 
tendency to act in a particular way, or to hold a particular attitude. As suggested in 
section 1.2, due to the political tension and historical connection, Taiwanese 
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entrepreneurs usually have a predisposed attitude toward China before entry. This 
initial piece of information influences subsequent judgements.  
Table 6-2 presents entrepreneurs’ predispositions to China and their impact. 
Entrepreneur Fruit, Metal and Construction show their positive predispositions and 
attachment to China (Quote E5, F3, G2 and case description). The positive 
predispositions enhance entrepreneurs’ willingness to stay in China for the non-
economic gain they made. Although Entrepreneur Brush and Food do not show 










Chinese formal institutions, 
political system and living 
environment (-P) 
CB3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12,13  
CC6, 7, 11 
Divestment, reject 
opportunities, 
adaptation, exit China 
Machine, 
Paint 
Chinese people and their ways of 
doing things, informal institutions 
(-P) 
CB3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 
CC5, 6, 10 
Divestment, reject 
opportunities, 







Brush, Food  
Attachment to China (P) 
CE1, 9, CF 1, 5, 10, CG 1, 4, 5 
Positive predispositions to China  
CA6, 11, CD6, CD9  
Entry, stay, increase 
commitment in China, 
learning and adaptation 
Table 6-2: Critical incidents and predispositions, source: author 
Entrepreneurs with negative predispositions to China usually use these to negatively 
interpret critical incidents. In this case, the entrepreneurs judge critical incidents 
through their negative predispositions, thereby, making it easier to exit China despite 
good performance and strategic importance of their firms. For example, Entrepreneur 
Machine had negative predispositions to Chinese environment and Government. He 
felt depressed and insecure in China (Quote B3, B12). Thus, he downsized his 
venture to reduce his stay in China although this action negatively impacted upon 
Firm B’s organizational performance. Moreover, he rejected opportunities to 
improve its financial returns. His negative predispositions can be found in many 
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critical incidents (Table 6-2). His negative predispositions prevented him from 
further commitment in China despite the potential for great profit (Quote B5).  
Because of his political preference, Entrepreneur Paint had negative predispositions 
towards the Chinese Government before he entered China. His negative 
predispositions negatively impacted on Firm C’s operations in terms of entry time 
and opportunity exploration. His negative image towards the Chinese Government 
was extended to Chinese people and institutions in the later stages. For example, 
Entrepreneur Paint caught his Sales Manager taking commissions and he concluded 
that all Chinese staff was unreliable (Quote C5). Consequently, he applied a 
militaristically formal management system to strictly control his sales; this 
significantly increased operating costs and led to more employee-employer conflicts. 
In addition, Entrepreneur Paint rejected promising opportunities and expansion to 
avoid further commitment since he felt insecure and risk adverse in China (Quote 
C6).  The negative predispositions strengthen the negative impact of critical incidents, 
and result in risk-adverse decisions.  
By comparison, Entrepreneur Fruit and Construction experienced the same event but 
exhibited a more positive attitude toward solving the problems. Entrepreneur Fruit 
believed in China as a positive predisposition (Quote A4). He viewed the critical 
incident as a result of poor management systems and responded by improving his 
accounting system. Entrepreneur Construction considered bribery and unethical 
commission to be part of operating costs and responded by paying bonuses to his 
staff (Quote G1). They accepted and learnt the Chinese ways of doing things since 
their attachment to that country minimised the negative impact of critical incidents.  
Entrepreneurs with positive predispositions were found to have a lower risk 
perception and a more optimistic market evaluation, and therefore, were more likely 
to explore opportunity and increase commitments (Quote E6, F3).  
These findings support the argument in section 3.1.1 that entrepreneurs’ 
predispositions are the outcome of individual learning in the host country. With 
repeated negative experience and emotions, entrepreneurs’ negative predispositions 
become part of their habitus, and entrepreneurs associate critical events with specific 
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context. Hence, when this context emerges that negative emotions will be recalled 
and affects the decision-making. That is, entrepreneurs are used to interpreting things 
negatively instead of fairly judge information, and they may incrementally extend 
negative predispositions to perceive everything (e.g. Entrepreneur Machine and 
Paint). The predispositions are like lenses that entrepreneurs look at everything 
through.  
Using a learning perspective to explain the role of predispositions in decision-making, 
the decision is the result of interplay and iteration between individual learning 
(Vygotsky, 1997), organizational practice (Jarzabkowski, 2003) and  context 
(Hofstede, 1980; Nutt, 2008). If entrepreneurs have negative predispositions through 
this process, they may automatically interpret critical incidents through a negative 
lens and view it as negative experience. In Entrepreneur Machine’s case, his repeated 
negative experience result in negative predispositions, affecting his judgment of 
critical incidents. In Entrepreneur Paint’s case, his pre-existing negative 
predispositions to Chinese Government delayed his investment plan and affected his 
judgments. Both entrepreneurs learnt that Chinese were unreliable and Chinese 
Government was hostile, hence, it increased their risk perception while decreased the 
opportunity pursuit and their willingness to stay.   
In comparison, if entrepreneurs have positive predispositions (Entrepreneur Brush, 
Food, Fruit, Metal, Construction), they are more likely to interpret critical incidents 
through a positive lens and minimize the negative impact. Entrepreneurs’ positive 
predispositions can reduce their risk perception since they learn mostly positive 
things in the host country. For example, Entrepreneur Brush, Fruit and Construction 
used a relatively positive attitude to judge the unethical behaviours of their staff. 
They tend to see things from the bright side thus lower their risk perception and 
increase the chance of opportunity pursuit. In Entrepreneur Fruit’s case, he rapidly 
expanded his business for his over-optimistic market evaluation. This also resulted in 
his persistence in keeping an underperforming firm.  
Sapienza et al. (2006) argue that entrepreneurs’ experience is a positive variable to 
venture survival since it reduces the liability of newness while enhancing opportunity 
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recognition. However, my data shows entrepreneurs with negative predispositions 
usually make pessimistic judgments according to their perceived negative 
experiences. Following Fern et al. (2012), their experiences are like an “iron cage” 
constraining firm’s strategic choices and limiting firm’s future development.  In 
addition, Echoing Shepherd (2003) I find that that cumulated experience may not 
always lead to better decision-making outcomes.  
This section indicates entrepreneurs’ predispositions constitute their rules of thumb. 
Positive predispositions are associated with a more exploratory behaviour while 
negative predispositions are connected with exploiting and risk-averse behaviour. 
Both predispositions may have negative and positive impacts on organizational 
operation. Entrepreneurs’ experience is not necessarily positive to organizational 
survival since it is interpreted by their different predispositions. Bourdieu (1990) 
suggests entrepreneurs’ predispositions may be changed by experience. My data 
indicates entrepreneurs may enhance or reduce their current predispositions but they 
are difficult to reverse (Kahneman, 2011), particularly for those entrepreneurs with 
strong predispositions. For example, Entrepreneur Food’s predispositions can be 
shifted from being neutral to being positive through learning and adaptation, but 
Entrepreneur Machine’s very negative predispositions are difficult to shift to positive 
ones since he isolated himself from locals (no learning) due to his strong negative 
predispositions to China (see section 6.3.1.3 for further discussion).  
Rational decision-making literature assumes people process information fairly, 
aiming to achieve rational optimum. Following this concept, conventional 
international exit literature suggests international exit is driven by organizational 
performance and strategic direction to achieve the maximum economic returns 
(Boddewyn, 1983; Benito and Welch, 1997; Benito, 2005). Nevertheless, my data 
challenges this view, finding that entrepreneurs who have negative predispositions to 
China tend to be more pessimistic, risk-adverse and hence avoid further commitment 
despite good company performance. Moreover, consistent with Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) and Vygotsky (1997), the predispositions from socio-historical 
experience may be adjusted, but is hard to reverse. Entrepreneurs with negative 
initial image tend to strengthen these predispositions thus hard to reverse them. 
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Negative predispositions result in risk-adverse or pessimistic attitude because the 
entrepreneurs tend to interpret things negatively. It decreases entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to stay in China and the perceived non-economic value of owning the 
firm, thus increasing entrepreneurs’ threshold of performances.    
6.2.1.2 Inconsistency with family interests resulting into negative non-economic 
value 
Sui (2014) reports that 90 % of Taiwanese firms are family businesses. Kontinen and 
Ojala (2010) indicate the different characteristics between non-family and family 
business are the involvement of the family in the ownership and management of the 
firm. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) suggest that socio-emotional wealth preservation is 
the most important differentiator of the family firm as a unique entity and, as such, 
helps explain why family firms behave distinctively. That is, a family business is 
built on the interests of both family and firms. Following this definition, although 
selecting a family business is not one of my sampling criterion, all of my case 
companies are family businesses. Thus, the seven entrepreneurs are also family 
business owners in this research. This section examines the role of family in 
decision-making in internationalization and extends the socio-emotional wealth 
concept.  




Brush Dispute with general manager 
to ensure full family control  (-
F) 
CA1, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14 
To ensure fully family control, 
entrepreneur refused to allocate 
shares to general manager. General 
manager resigned and resulted in 




Lack of appropriate family 
members to inherit the 
business   (-F) CB 9, CE 8 
Entrepreneurs rather sold/ closed 










Entered China or expanded 
business to provide a better 
life for family (+F) 
CA1, 7, 14, CB1, 4, 9, CE1, 
CF7, 10, CG1, 2 
Entered China, opportunity 
implementation, and stay/ exit China.  
Table 6-3: Critical incidents and family, source: author 
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Table 6-3 shows how family control and business succession influence entrepreneurs’ 
decision-making (Entrepreneur Brush, Machine and Fruit). For the three 
entrepreneurs, their children are the only successors of their business, so ensuring a 
successful business succession and family control are their top priority. Consistent 
with the finding, Professor Tang who researches Taiwanese family business said in 
Sui (2014): “In Taiwan, though, it's still the emperor's style of succession. No-one 
outside can tell what will happen - it's the founder's decision.” Entrepreneurs 
consider their ventures as personal belongings, which can only be shared with their 
family. Although the mainstream family business literature predicts that family firms 
are more risk adverse in making decisions than non-family firms (Basu et al., 2009), 
consistent with  Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011), my data indicates that family business 
owners could be extremely risk-taking to ensure the family control of the business.   
Entrepreneur Brush will take any actions to ensure full control of the family business 
including international exit. The unexpected exit is a reflection of socio-emotional 
wealth (SEW) preservation that passing his business to his children and protecting 
them from external threats. SEW refers to the non-economic aspects of the firm that 
meet the family’s affective and material needs (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Although 
SEW is viewed as an organizational level concept in Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011), my 
finding indicates SEW is also applicable to individual level analysis. SEW not only 
explains why family firms behave differently to other firms but also illustrates why 
family business owners behave differently to other business owners. Using 
psychological ownership theory to support this argument, family business owners 
commit, control, and view their businesses as the extension of self-identity (Pierce et 
al., 2001). Hence, it is no doubt that family business owners will generate negative 
emotions once the psychological ownership is challenged by non-family members 
(Brundin et al., 2014). My data agreed with this viewpoint and found entrepreneurs 
integrate their individual psychological ownership with the SEW of their family 
businesses. That is, if the ownership of the business is challenged, including family 
and psychological ownership, entrepreneurs’ negative emotions will be generated 
(e.g. Entrepreneur Brush). Necessary actions will be taken to protect the 
psychological and family ownership.  
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Generation in control is viewed as a characteristic in family business and this is 
Entrepreneur Brush’s first priority in current stage. It is like his inviolate rules. 
Although collaborating with non-family professionals can reduce company risks and 
receiving numerous financial returns, He still wants his children to have full control 
of the company. The role of preservation of socio-emotional wealth can be found in 
his rejection of an acquisition offer from a MNE and conflicts with his previous 
general manager. Adding to Zellweger et al. (2011) that family owners are less likely 
to sell their business, my case provides empirical evidence that those entrepreneurs 
may not sell or shut down their foreign business for economic reasons. They would 
rather take actions to protect family interests at any costs (including sell their 
business).  
The role of the family is also shown in choosing exit strategies. Entrepreneur 
Machine decided to exit for a new personal goal and his aversion to China. 
Following DeTienne and Chirico (2013), he has three potential entrepreneurial exit 
strategies: (1) shutting down or selling Firm B (cessation-based/financial reward 
strategy) (2) passing it to his daughter (stewardship based strategy, family member) 
or (3) hiring non-family managers (stewardship based strategy, non-family member). 
Entrepreneur Machine selected a cessation-based strategy since his daughter refused 
to take over Firm B. Entrepreneur Fruit also presents a similar story that he shut 
down the business because his daughters had other commitments. This finding 
provides empirical evidence for Detienne and Chirico’s (2013) argument that a 
stewardship-based exit strategy is usually the first choice for family business owners 
to preserve family SEW. Interestingly, when entrepreneurs cannot find a suitable 
family successor, they would rather shut down or sell their businesses instead of 
searching for non-family successors.  
In addition to SEW, meeting the family’s needs also drives entrepreneurs’ decision-
making. Entrepreneur Brush, Machine and Construction suggest they set up a 
business to make more money and provide a better life to their family. Entrepreneur 
Construction clearly indicated he set up his business in China for his family. 
Entrepreneur Fruit said he set up the business not for profits, but rather for fun and 
for his daughters. Furthermore, Entrepreneur Metal collaborated with the Chinese 
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Government for his son, although he understood that was a risky and unwise 
decision. In this case, the firms are created to meet the non-economic motives of the 
family collective and thus entrepreneurs are less sensitive to financial performance. 
Echoing DeTienne and Chirico (2013), this firm has high SEW thus significantly 
reduces the threshold of performance.  
My empirical evidence support the following propositions from Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2011):   
a) Family business entrepreneurs are more willing to make decisions with 
greater risk if it is necessary to preserve SEW.  
Entrepreneur Fruit’s persistence in underperforming Firm supports:  
b) Family business entrepreneurs are more willing to make decisions leading to 
below-target performance relative to their past performance or the 
performance of their competitors if these choices enhance SEW.  
SEW increases the non-economic value of the firm, thus compensates the economic 
loss and decreases entrepreneurs’ threshold of performance.   
Additionally, SEW not only positively impacts on the entrepreneurs’ willingness to 
stay in China but also affects the entrepreneurs’ exit strategies. My findings he with 
DeTienne and Chirico (2013) that transferring a successful and high SEW business 
to the next generation is the entrepreneur’s first priority. However, under the 
circumstance where the next generation refuses the take over the business, 
entrepreneurs are still less likely to hire professional managers, even though it is an 
economic rational decision.  
c) Preserving SEW and family members’ needs are critical tasks for family 
business entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs may make a decision based upon 
family interests instead of organizational interests. 
For Becker (1981), these decisions may be described as altruism, which is associated 
with efficiency and economic rationality in family firms. However, this section 
challenges this view since these decisions are irrelevant to neither economic actions 
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nor rationality. Entrepreneur Brush said his firm was the extension of his family 
carrying family value, culture and belief. Thus, entrepreneurs would rather close the 
firm rather than allowing non-family members to join the board of directors. Other 
entrepreneurs also behave in similar ways where they feel obligated to sacrifice their 
own economic/ non-economic benefits for their children. For example, although 
Entrepreneur Machine felt uncomfortable, he kept on running his business in China 
to financially support his daughter’s life in USA. Entrepreneur Metal set up a joint 
venture for his son although he could foresee a failure. They felt it was their 
responsibility to feed, support or even develop a comfortable future for their children. 
Accordingly, I found there was something more than SEW for entrepreneurs to make 
decisions. It is not only how a family is emotionally attached to this venture; rather 
how the entrepreneurs can use this venture to achieve the greatest perceived benefits 
for their family, particularly the next generations. It is a Taiwanese father’s wish that 
benefits their children at any costs, and there are no expected returns, boundaries or 
guidelines. This finding is consistent with Confucianism culture that it is a natural 
law that parents sacrifice for their children and vice versa. 
Sharma and Manikutty (2005) propose that, among other factors, culture has an 
impact on attachment and on decision-making of family firms, and this may differ 
depending on whether it is in a collectivistic or an individualistic society. Hofstede 
indicates that Taiwan, with a score of 17, is a collectivistic society. Hence, it is 
expected that Taiwanese entrepreneurs use the family as the unit to make decisions 
and family play a more vital role in this society. Confucianism enhances this belief 
that relations with others are the most important criteria in making judgments. That is, 
an entrepreneur is not an economic rational person in making decision but a 
relational person who considers family (usually children)’s welfare in making 
decisions. Echoing Hatem (2012), the second generation usually drives international 
strategic direction using the overall family resources to pursue their own personal 
initiatives. My data suggests second generation is the key reason for entrepreneurs to 
enter, stay or and exit China.  
Although organizational performance is important, in an entrepreneurs’ mind, there 
may be something more important than financial performance. Family and SEW are 
   
213 
 
rarely discussed in international exit literature since even the family business 
literature suggests family ownership have either no or only minor effects on 
organizational performance (Tsao et al., 2009; Sacristán-Navarro et al., 2011). 
Family SEW and goals may have little connection with firm’s economic value but 
significantly affect firm’s non-economic value. Applying SEW in decision-making 
explains the otherwise inexplicable exit of Entrepreneur Brush and the exit strategy 
of Entrepreneur Machine and Fruit. The next section discusses the third individual 
variable: personal goals.  
6.2.1.3 Not achieving personal goals resulting in decreased non-economic value 
Entrepreneurs’ behaviour is driven by multiple goals. From a conventional viewpoint, 
entrepreneurs set up foreign ventures to achieve profit maximizing in the short or 
long-term (Dunning, 1988a). My data suggests a different story, i.e. that 
entrepreneurs have multiple goals when starting a foreign venture, many of which are 
non-economic including the desire to prove himself (Entrepreneur Brush, Machine, 
Paint, Food, Fruit and Metal), personal interests (Entrepreneur Machine, Food, Fruit, 
Metal and Construction) and of course, to make more money. Although the desire to 
prove himself (or “gain face” in Chinese) and personal interests have no direct 
impact on organizational profit maximization, consistent with Headd (2003) and 
Chrisman et al. (2012), entrepreneurs’ non-economic goals still play a role in 
decision-making in terms of resource allocation, strategic direction, and threshold of 
performance.  
My data suggests entrepreneurs make international entry and exit decisions for 
personal and emotional reasons (see Table 6-4). Although this decision may be 
justified by economic variables, entrepreneurs’ goal is usually the key to determine 
when and what kind of business they are going to do. Consistent with Morton and 
Podolny’s (2002) study that entrepreneurs who have love in their business behave 
differently from those who only want to make profit; in my cases, entrepreneurs who 
set up the business for personal goals tend to be less sensitive to poor financial 
performance and persist in their business.  
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Entrepreneur Food and Fruit are good examples of the role of personal goals in 
persisting with failing businesses. Although these two firms have poor financial 
performance in China, their entrepreneurs persisted for five-years for personal 
reasons. Entrepreneur Food learnt from his experience in Taiwan that his persistence 
could eventually lead to a success. Thus, he kept his poor performing business with 
this belief and love to French dessert. Entrepreneur Fruit was also driven by his 
personal interests in promoting fruit from Taiwan. His expansion plans were usually 
driven by this goal instead of careful evaluation and rational judgment. This business 
was not for making profit but for entrepreneurs’ personal goal.  
Table 6-4: Critical incidents and personal goals, source: author 
Echoing Csikszentmihalyi (1990) conclusion that people enjoy the greatest happiness 
by doing something they want to do and are good at, they became less sensitive to 
financial loss substituting instead emotional gain. I extend this view to decision-
making that entrepreneurs who enjoy running their foreign ventures are more tolerant 
to financial loss since they enjoy doing business in China. The joy increases the non-
economic value of the firm and enhances their willingness to stay in China. 
However, this situation changes when entrepreneurs shift to their personal goals. 
Kahneman (2011) indicates that people frequently change their goals thus their 
Personal 
goals (G) 








Self-achievement or face (+G) 
CA1, CA2, CA6, CA7, CB1, CB2 CC1, 
CC2, CD1, CE1, CE3, CE5, CF1, CF2, 
CF3, CF5 








CB4, CD1, CD2, CD3, CD4, CD7, CE1, 
CE3, CE5, CF6, CF10, CG1, CG3 








Brush Relocate factory to Vietnam for children 
and dominate global market  (-G) CA14 
International exit 
Machine Wish to have a healthy and relax life 
instead of working in China (-G) CB9  
International exit 
Paint Shift focus from painting industry to 
construction industry (-G) CC6 
International exit 
Food Shift focus from dessert to bakery (-G), 
CD8 
International exit 
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attention can be distracted from current preferences and unwittingly create a new 
commitment (Cho and Hambrick, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2011). I advance this 
argument that the shift of personal goal could result in dramatic changes in 
internationalization including international exit since entrepreneurs relocate 
resources to pursue new goals.  
In the late stage of internationalization, Entrepreneur Paint made up his mind to exit 
China when he found a more attractive business. His attention shifted from a painful 
Chinese investment (due to negative predispositions) to construction business in 
Taiwan. The new goal and entrepreneurs’ strong negative predispositions to China 
overcame the economic exit barrier: good performance and strategic importance of 
Firm C and the non-economic exit barrier: Entrepreneurs’ face (Quote C1). 
Similarly, Entrepreneur Machine exited China to pursue a better life and escape from 
the nasty environment despite the high economic value of his venture. In 
comparison, for those entrepreneurs who enjoyed their business in China, they also 
exited China as a result of a shift of personal goals. Entrepreneur Food had to make 
this difficult decision to pursue another opportunity. Entrepreneur Fruit had to give 
up his favourite business to ensure the survival of his core business. It is interesting 
to point out that entrepreneurs who exit China with positive predispositions are more 
likely to enter China again. For example, Entrepreneur Food will open a bakery in 
China and Entrepreneur Fruit is interested in reopening his business once he is free 
from current duty. For those entrepreneurs who have aversion to China, they may 
establish the business again in any country except China (see section 6.4.1 for further 
discussion).  
Headd (2003) and Morton and Podolny (2002) indicate that entrepreneurs’ personal 
goals can play a role in resource allocation and strategic direction. I advance their 
arguments by explaining why entrepreneurs’ personal goals can diverge the decision-
making from profit maximization. Using the concept of Gimeno (1997), the non-
economic gains of entrepreneurs reduce their unique threshold of performance. 
Conversely, if the venture is inconsistent with entrepreneurs’ personal goals, it will 
lower the non-economic value of owning the firm and increase the threshold of 
performance. The next section summarises three individual variables by presenting 
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how individual variables compose the non-economic value of the firm and affect 
threshold of performance.  
6.2.2 Negative non-economic value encouraging international exit 
My data supports the argument that international exit is entrepreneurs’ personal 
choice (Headd, 2003) since only by including non-economic variables of 
entrepreneur, the unexpected international exit and blind persistence in business can 
be explained. Echoing DeTienne et al. (2008) that entrepreneurs has idiosyncratic 
threshold of performance and Zellweger and Astrachan (2008) that a value of a 
business is built on financial and emotional gain, this section indicates that 
international exit is resulted by firm’s low or negative value, which is the sum of 
economic and non-economic value. Economic value can be viewed from two 
perspectives: organizational performance and strategic importance. This section 
discusses the composition of firm’s non-economic value.   
Figure 6-2 presents the composition of non-economic values: positive/negative 
predisposition to China, family, and personal goals. Negative predispositions to 
China reduce the non-economic value (Entrepreneur Machine and Paint) while 
entrepreneurs’ positive predispositions (Entrepreneur Brush, Food, Fruit, Metal and 
Construction) increase the non-economic value. Family refers to family control of 
business, business succession within family, and family interests. If the business 
operation in China is consistent with entrepreneurs’ family interests, they are 
motivated to stay in China (Entrepreneur Metal and Construction). Alternatively, if 
this operation endangers the preservation of family socio-emotional wealth, 
entrepreneur would rather shut down the company instead of risking loss of family 
control (Entrepreneur Brush).  Moreover, in exit strategy, entrepreneurs choose 
shutting down the firm rather than hiring non-family mangers since they view this 
company as an extension of their family.  




Figure 6-2: Non-economic value of firm, source: author 
Entrepreneurs are motivated to stay in China if their ventures are consistent with 
their personal goal (Entrepreneur Food and Fruit). Their emotional gain of doing 
business in China is the substitute of financial performance, thus significantly 
reduces their threshold of performance. These entrepreneurs define their current loss 
as an investment for future development (Entrepreneur Food) or the costs of 
happiness (Entrepreneur Fruit). This view is consistent with Choo and Wong’s (2006) 
research that Asian entrepreneurs are more likely to be driven by non-economic 
goals.  
Non-economic value is built on entrepreneurs’ predispositions, family, and personal 
goal as suggested in Figure 6-2. In general, lower non-economic value of the firm 
results in entrepreneurs’ higher threshold of performance. Conversely, higher non-
economic value of the firm reduce entrepreneurs’ threshold of performance. Figure 
6-3 shows the threshold of performance (TP) in my five exit cases has increased due 
to firm’s lower non-economic value. Entrepreneurs require higher economic gain to 
compensate their non-economic loss. If the firm fails to meet the new TP, 
international exit becomes the outcome. The shift of TP in each case is explained 
below.  
For Entrepreneur Brush, Firm A had very high economic value for its good financial 
performance and strategic importance (1ST market dominator). Initially, the non-
economic value (NEV) is high since this venture was consistent with entrepreneurs’ 
Negative/Positive 
predisposition (P) 
Personal goal (G) 




Inconsistent  - 
Achieving + Not 
achieving - 
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goal (dominating Taiwanese market) and family socio-emotional wealth. In making 
international exit decision, the conflicts with previous general manger endangered 
the family control of Entrepreneur Brush, thus significantly decreased the non-
economic value (New NEV) and result in new higher TP. Entrepreneur Brush shifted 
his goal from Anhui expansion to the Vietnam relocation to ensure full family 
control. The economic value of firm also decreased for less strategic importance. 
Hence, Firm A failed to meet new TP and international exit decision was made.  
Firm B had very high economic value for its good financial performance and 
strategic importance (2nd market dominator). The non-economic value was low for 
entrepreneurs’ negative predispositions to China but Firm B’s high economic value 
still met the high TP. In making international exit decision, Entrepreneur Machine’s 
new goals (enjoying a more comfortable life), the failed stewardship-based exit 
strategy (daughter refused to take over) and his aversion to China resulted in 
international exit for the unmet new higher TP. Firm C had high economic value for 
its growing financial performance and strategic importance. The non-economic value 
was low for entrepreneurs’ negative predispositions to China. In making international 
exit decision, entrepreneur shifted his goal from being successful in Chinese market 
to the construction business in Taiwan. He closed Firm C for his aversion to China 
and new personal goals.  
Firm D had low economic value for its poor financial performance. Entrepreneur 
Food persisted in the underperforming firm for five-years for the high non-economic 
value composed by his personal interests and goals. In making international exit 
decision, entrepreneur shifted his interests from dessert to bakery industry that 
decreased non-economic value of the firm and resulted in higher new TP. Firm E had 
low economic value as a result of its poor financial performance. Entrepreneur Fruit 
persisted in the underperforming firm for 4 years for his positive predispositions to 
China, family needs, and personal goals (opening a small outlet and promoting fruits 
from Taiwan). In making international exit decision, Entrepreneur Fruit shifted his 
focus from Firm E 




Figure 6-3: Shift of threshold of performance, source: author 
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to other businesses. Coupled with the failed stewardship-based exit strategy 
(daughter refused to take over), he closed Firm E. Figure 6-3 shows how the non-
economic value of owning the firm results in international exit. In this research, I am 
not suggesting entrepreneurs are non-rational. On the contrary, every entrepreneur 
makes logical decisions; yet the criteria for judging whether these decisions are good 
or bad vary between each entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs have idiosyncratic threshold of 
performance building on non-economic variables. My five exit cases are non-rational 
if viewed from economic value of the firm; however, by including non-economic 
value of the firm, the international exit decision is well supported. 
6.2.3 The context: Chinese institutions   
Section 3.3.2 argues Chinese institutions play a vital role in decision-making but lack 
of systemic research in international exit literature (Belderbos and Zou, 2006). 
Economic activities cannot be analysed without consideration of the formal and 
informal institutional context in which they occur (North, 1990). Mathews (2009), 
Peng et al. (2008a) and Xu and Meyer (2012) investigate the impact of emerging 
economies institutions on internationalization and suggest how institutional factors 
resulted in different strategies. The context of decision-making distinguishes the 
internationalization in emerging economies from developed economies since 
institutions signal which choice is acceptable in terms of ethical and cognitive 
consideration (Tonoyan et al., 2010). Hence, this section discusses the role of 
Chinese institutions in foreign operation and how it affects the international exit 
decisions.  
Table 6-5 summarises different types of institutional problems from critical incidents. 
My data suggests the fast changing Chinese formal institutions increase difficulties in 
business operation. Formal institutions problems include government policy and 
interference. In addition to the political tension suggested in section 1.2.1.2, other 
institutional problems are associated with thin formal institutions and informal 
institutional distances. In terms of thin formal institutions, the relocation of Firm F 
shows its negative impact on foreign ventures. Firm F “voluntarily” relocated the 
factory to outskirt of city to avoid conflicts with local government. As a small and 
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foreign business owner, Entrepreneur Metal reluctantly increased operational costs to 
follow the local government’s instruction since good political tie is essential to 










SARS, media manipulation and lack of 
freedom of speech CB5, CB6 
Mistrust Chinese government and 
worried about the property right 
in China  
Land expropriation CF4 Relocate factory without 
compensation 
Political tension between Taiwan and 
China 
CB11, CC11 
Mistrust Chinese government and 
worried about the property right 
in China 
Western development policy, one child 
policy and labour insurance policy and 
other regulations 
CG8, CA3, CF8 
Rising costs, relocation, change 







due to cultural 
difference and 
value and moral 
conflicts.  
 
Bribery, corruption and facilitation fees 
to government or individual 
CA4, CB11, CC7, CD9, CE9, CF10, 
CG6, CG7 
Additional costs and the 
importance of political ties/ 
guanxi 
Protectionism of local market, delay 
payment and bad debts 
CC4, CC9, CD9, CE9, CF10, CG6 
Additional costs and efforts to 
enter into market  
Unethical staff reveal customer list and 
new product design CB3, CB8, CF12 
Financial loss 
Unethical staff take commission from 
competitors or suppliers CA11, CC5, 
CC10, CE4 
Financial loss and decrease 
market shares 
Employee requested for double 
compensation for car accidents CD6, 
CD9 
Additional compensation  
Table 6-5: Critical incidents associated with Chinese institutions, source: author 
Accordingly, political ties (relationship with government) largely substitutes thin 
formal institutions in China in terms of property rights, arbitrary enforcement of 
business regulations, resource acquisition and opportunity identification. When 
Entrepreneur Brush talked about the formal institutions, Western development and 
labour insurance policy, his emphasis was the rising difficulty to negotiate or bribe 
the local government to delay the policy implementation (CA3). This shows informal 
institutions have more authority than formal institutions in China that results in 
arbitrary enforcement of business regulation and highlights the impact of political 
ties. Entrepreneur Fruit said, “if you have guanxi (political ties) in China, nothing 
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can trouble you”. Echoing Sheng et al. (2011) and Zhou (2013), my findings suggest 
in thin formal institutions, political ties have greater effects than in developed 
countries.  Political ties are not only beneficial for performance but also crucial for 
survival. Thus Entrepreneur Metal rather suffers from financial loss than endangers 
political ties. The maintenance of political ties results in higher operational costs and 
has negative impact on the performance and survival of foreign ventures. Similar 
findings also found in Russia as suggested in Doern and Goss (2014).  
 
Another difficulty is problems associated with informal institutional distances such 
as unspoken rules and employee and employer (Chinese-Taiwanese) conflicts. 
Unspoken rules refer to behaviour constraints imposed in markets, industry, or 
societies that are not voiced or written down. These rules exist in unspoken and 
unwritten format and are usually concealed from new comers and foreigners. Due to 
the thin formal institutions, unspoken rules commonly exist in every industry, market, 
and regions in China (CIER, 2012). There is no clear guideline to operate in China, 
even there is, merely following the instructions is insufficient to survive in China. All 
case companies experienced the disruption of unspoken rules in operation, and most 
entrepreneurs paid a great expense to learn the unspoken rules. Some entrepreneurs 
hired local management team (Entrepreneur Brush, Machine and Metal) while others 
sought for assistance from locals or experts (Entrepreneur Food and Construction).  
Employee and employer conflicts are also the result from institutional distances. This 
conflict strengthens the Entrepreneur Machine and Paint’s negative predispositions to 
China.  They view these incidents as institutional problems that could not be solved 
(Quote C4, B12). Interestingly, Entrepreneurs Brush and Fruit considered these 
unethical behaviours as a management problem, which could be solved by 
establishing a good system.  
My finding echoes the argument in section 2.2.2 that institutions are more influential 
in emerging economies (Peng et al., 2009) and shape foreign entrepreneurs’ 
behaviour in internationalization. Entrepreneurs follow Chinese institutions and have 
to do something that they may not have done in other developed countries or home 
   
223 
 
countries (e.g. corruption).  Again, entrepreneurs can be viewed as a heterogeneous 
group in facing institutional problems. Some entrepreneurs may internalise Chinese 
institutions thus enhance their positive predispositions to China. They accept the 
Chinese way of doing thing and they are “smart” enough to learn and excel at it (e.g. 
Entrepreneur Brush, Fruit, Metal, Construction,). Other entrepreneurs may resist 
Chinese institutions thus enhance their negative predispositions to China. They may 
bribe, but their own informal institutional make them feel uncomfortable (e.g. 
Entrepreneur Machine, Paint). This enhances their negative predispositions and vice 
versa.  
Tonoyan et al. (2010) suggest that the entrepreneurs’ likelihood of engaging in 
corruption is linked to the culturally bounded social norms and justified by “if others 
behave illegally, so can I”. However, my finding argues even entrepreneurs from the 
same cultural background have different interpretation and degree of acceptance of 
corruption. Why some entrepreneurs can internalise Chinese informal institutional 
while others cannot and what is the outcome of it? Theme A suggests entrepreneurs’ 
predispositions to China are one of the answers, and Theme B would elucidate this 
topic in section 6.3.1.3.  
6.2.4 Summary  
Theme A highlights the role of firm’s non-economic value in decision-making 
including international entry, strategic choice, and international exit.  To answer the 
subsidiary research question: “Why do entrepreneurs make the international exit 
decision? Viewed from an individual perspective”, I summarise individual variables 
and their impact from the data, indicating three non-economic variables: 
entrepreneurs’ predispositions to China, family, and personal goals. Firstly, the 
evolution and the role of entrepreneurs’ negative predispositions on decision-making 
have been examined. Secondly, the socio-emotional wealth of family and family 
interests reduce entrepreneurs’ threshold of performance by increasing the non-
economic value of the firm. Finally, if entrepreneurs are in the state of flow, doing 
something they are interested in and good at, the non-economic value of the firm 
increased. Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3 present how the three entrepreneurs’ non-
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economic variables change the non-economic value of the firm thus affect 
entrepreneurs’ threshold of performance and result in exit. The context of Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs invested in China and its impacts are also discussed. Chinese 
institutions not only affect firm’s economic value but also non-economic ones (e.g. 
negative predispositions). Instead of viewing the impact of Chinese institutions on 
organization, I examine its influence on entrepreneur and how it shapes the decision-
making of internationalization.   
In summary, Theme A does not argue that economic variables are not important in 
making decisions. Instead, I indicate that firms’ economic value (organizational 
performance and strategic importance) play a vital role in making international exit 
decisions. Entrepreneurs may try to make an economically rational decision; 
however, there is something more important in their life that diverge their decisions 
from rational optimum. This study presents non-economic variables that may 
influence entrepreneurs’ decision-making, including their predispositions, family and 
personal goals.  
In addition to economic gain and loss, entrepreneurs can be confronted by non-
economic gain and loss resulted from non-economic variables. Positive emotions can 
be elicited for achieving personal goals (Entrepreneur Brush, Machine, Paint, Food, 
Fruit, Metal and Construction), meeting family needs (Entrepreneur Brush, Machine, 
Fruit, Construction and Metal) or feeling attached to business and local environment 
(Entrepreneur Fruit, Metal and Construction). Negative emotions can be elicited for 
entrepreneurs’ negative predispositions to China (Entrepreneur Machine and Paint), 
losing family control (Entrepreneur Brush) and not achieving personal goals 
(Entrepreneur Machine and Paint). The elicited positive and negative emotions 
would result in different actions in internationalization (Baron, 2008). Theme B 
discusses how incident-generated emotions shape the action in internationalization.  
6.3 Theme B: Entrepreneurs’ emotions and actions in international exit 
This section answers the subsidiary research question “How incident-generated 
emotions shape entrepreneurs’ actions in internationalization”. Following 
entrepreneurial emotion literature, I examine how emotions shape entrepreneurs’ 
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preferences or actions in internationalization. My data presents the impact of positive 
(confidence, passion, empathy) and negative (fear, anger and disgust) emotions on 
international exit. A conceptual model has been developed to show how 
entrepreneurs elicit different emotions in response to critical incidents 
(environmental/organization/ individual variables) and how emotions shape their 
actions. The concepts of emotional gains and costs are proposed. This section argues 
entrepreneurs’ positive emotions increase their emotional gains (non-economic gains) 
of internationalization while negative emotions increase the emotional costs (non-
economic loss). In addition to financial gains and costs, emotional gains and costs are 
also significant for entrepreneurs to make decisions. To stay in China, entrepreneurs 
not only need to achieve financial survival but also emotional survival.     
This section discusses six types of emotions and how they shape entrepreneurs’ 
behaviours. I particularly focus on the role of empathy and its impact on individual 
learning, for its uniqueness in the context of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in 
China. The role of empathy is rarely discussed in Entrepreneurship field. Huy (1999) 
suggests empathy is beneficial in accepting new things. Actions associated with 
empathy (such as forgiving, understanding, put yourself in other people’s shoes) are 
positive to entrepreneurs’ learning and adaptation in cross border activities since 
entrepreneurs need to overcome liability of foreignness resulted from institutional 
distances. Peng et al. (2008) indicate the institutional distance is more impactful for 
foreign ventures invested in emerging countries than developed countries. The 
research context, Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China, emphasizes the role of 
institutional distances thus highlights entrepreneurs’ empathy.  
6.3.1 Positive entrepreneurial emotions and international exit 
This section examines three positive emotions: passion, confidence and empathy (see 
section 4.6.2.1 for definition). My data suggests positive emotions enhance 
entrepreneurs’ persistence and commitments in internationalization. Following Baron 
(2008), positive emotions affect entrepreneurs’ cognition through the perception of 
external environment, creativity, heuristics and memory. My data shows positive 
emotions are helpful to venture growth including innovation (Baron and Tang, 2011), 
   
226 
 
opportunity evaluation and implementation (Dimov, 2010) and commitment level 
(Foo et al., 2009). It is precise since positive emotions signal that everything goes 
smoothly and a positive future; this motivates entrepreneurs to commit more to 
achieve the goals (Baron, 2008).  However, positive emotions may not be totally 
beneficial in the internationalization process. My data suggests entrepreneurs who 
experience positive emotions in their business may over-estimate future returns and 
persist with poor-performing ventures long after they should have shut down. This 
deadlock persistence could costs huge financial loss.  
In general, my findings relating to passion and confidence agree with current 
conceptual framework and literature in entrepreneurial emotion studies. Passion and 
confidence drive growth strategy and positive actions such as opportunity 
exploration and increasing commitment. Echoing Sapienza et al. (2006) that firm 
growth is not equal to firm’s survival, a high level of confidence or passion may 
result in negative impact on organizational performance and international exit. 
Empathy is found important in my data but rarely discussed in Entrepreneurship field. 
Huy (1999) suggests radical changes and difference may elicit empathy to accept 
changes and take actions. This section advances this argument that empathy can 
minimise the institutional distance, facilitate learning and develop institution-specific 
capability of surviving in China.  
6.3.1.1 Passion resulting into higher commitment level and opportunity 
recognition 
My data indicates passion motivates international entry and drives entrepreneurs’ 
persistence. Passion provides emotional support to overcome challenges in 
internationalization, which increases their chance of opportunity discovery and 
venture growth (Foo, 2011). Taken Entrepreneur Food and Fruit for example, despite 
the poor financial performance, they increased the commitment by introducing a new 
product line and aggressive market expansion. Due to their entrenched longing for 
the opportunities, which they can identify with, opportunity discovery is increased.  
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Entrepreneurs’ passion is usually elicited by personal goals. Entrepreneur Brush is 
ambitious and aims to become the market leader in Taiwan and worldwide. His 
enthusiasm of being the global market leader drives him to keep identifiing new 
opportunities and expanding production capability. Entrepreneur Food also show his 
passion in French dessert business. His passion was originated from his love in 
French dessert and his goal to introudce it to more people. Echoing the finding in 
Theme A, the non-ecnomic value of the venture has increased when passionate 
entreprneurs achieved their goals. They may have lower threshold of performance for 
being passionate. Hence, I agree with Bird’s (1989) view that passionate 
entrepreneurs tend to be more optimistic and committed despite the poor 
performance in their business.  Consistent with this, Cardon et al. (2009) argue that 
entrepreneur driven by passion is characterised by creative problem-solving, 
persistence, and fully committed. This passionate mind-set is reflected in Table 6-6 
showing passion is associated with actions of increasing commitment and 
opportunity recognition (see Appendix C-2 for detailed information).  



















Brush 3 1 0 0 1 
Machine 2 0 0 0 0 
Paint None identified 
Food 5 0 0 0 0 
Fruit 3 0 0 0 0 
Metal 3 0 0 0 0 
Construct
ion 
2 0 0 0 0 
Total 18 1 0 0 1 
*Each emotion may associated with more than 1 action 
Table 6-6: Passion and actions, source: author 
Passionate entrepreneurs achieve the greatest happiness when doing something they 
are committed to (Quote D1, E3).  This emotional gain can somehow compensate the 
financial loss, thus Entrepreneurs Food and Fruit continuously identify new 
opportunities and increase their financial commitment despite the outlet’s poor 
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financial performance. They kept pursue opportunities for their enthusiasm of this 
business and aimed to solve current problems by effortful actions such as introducing 
new product lines, entering new markets, and designing new Marketing strategy. 
Table 6-6 provides empirical evidence to Bird’s (1989) and Cardon et al.’s (2009) 
argument above.  
My data agrees with Foo (2011) that passion is positive to opportunity discovery; 
however, my data also indicates that passion limits entrepreneurs’ attention. 
Passionate entreprenurs choose options consistent with their passion rather than most 
potential and productive one. Morton and Podolny (2002) indicate that entrepreneurs 
driven by love behave differently from those driven by money in designing strategies. 
Entrepreneurs’ passion is not only positive to commitment level and opportunity 
exploration but also drives the strategic direction. For example, Entrepreneur Food 
tried to promote high quality French dessert but failed due to the high price. His 
passion drove him to choose the relatively difficult and costly way to solve problems 
(CD7). He could have changed his recipe and reduce price (easier and recommended 
by industiral experts), but he chose to exit China, re-enter in the future and sell 
French bread in order to attract custoemrs and promote high quality dessert. Cardon 
et al. (2009:520) agrees with this finding that “passionate entrepreneurs are 
resistant to explore alternative options, fearing that doing so may dilute and distract 
the intense positive experience”. Therefore, Entrepreneur Food rather rejected the 
efficient problem-solve approach with his passion and exited China. 
Additionally, passioante entrepreneurs are usually more involved in their buseinss. 
Entreprenuer Brush sacrificed his leisure time for the busienss (Quote A11). 
Entrepreneur Food carefully recorded every dessert he ate to improve his receipe (his 
dessert encyclopedia). Entrepreneur Fruit sacrificed his weekend and spent 70% of 
his working time although he had other businesses to manage. Their passion lead to 
gearter commitment (personal and financial) and the owner sacrifice has a positive 
effect on venture growth (Kozan et al., 2012) and survival.  
Passionate entrepreneurs are usually more tolerant to deteriorated environment for 
their goals. They are willing to commit and more alerted and optimistic about 
   
229 
 
opportunities. From my results, I can conclude that passion provides emotional 
energy that propelled to cope with challenges and pursue opportunities. Although 
passionate entrepreneurs may exit China to pursue their goals (e.g. Entrepreneur 
Brush, Food); in general, they are more willing to commit, persist and involve in 
their foreign venture. 
6.3.1.2High confidence levels encouraging commitment level and persistence in 
business 
My data suggests high confidence level increases entrepreneurs’ commitment and 
persistence in the foreign venture. Dimov (2010) indicates that confidence refers to 
entrepreneurs’ belief in the venture and their own abilities. One example is 
Entrepreneur Machine who shows strong confidence in his products that increased 
his level of commitment (Quote B11). His confidence minimises his perceived 
threats of intensive competition and rising costs, which are major difficulties for 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China as indicated in section 1.2.1. 
Echoing Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) and Dimov (2010), entrepreneurs’ 
confidence can lower their risk perception. Entrepreneurs experienced heightened 
sense of control and subsequently increase their commitment to pursue maximum 
returns. The entrepreneurs’ confidence signals that things are going well at the 
moment and it is time for expansion.  These results are reflected in Table 6-7 
showing confidence is connected with increasing commitment and opportunity 
implementation. As entrepreneurs feel they are capable of coping with challenges, 
they take initiative to develop and expand their business. For instance, Entrepreneur 
Fruit is confident about his ability of take advantage from local institutions; he used 
this ability to obtain free advertising from the local government and achieve efficient 
expansion (Quote E9).  In general, as shown in Table 6-7, entrepreneurs show 
confidence in most opportunity pursuit or dramatic strategic changes (learning and 
adaptation).  
However, a high level of confidence may lead to business failure due to 
overestimated performance resulted from the illusion of control (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). Entrepreneur Food believed in his 
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product and considered current failure as part of future success. The high level of 
confidence in his product supported him to persist in a failing business; thus the sad 
outcome was the overexpansion and subsequent business closure of his outlet. 
 


















Brush 3 1 0 2 1 
Machine 3 0 0 0 0 
Paint 2 0 0 0 0 
Food 5 0 0 0 0 
Fruit 3 0 0 0 0 
Metal 5 0 0 1 0 
Construct
ion 
1 0 0 1 0 
Total 22 1 0 4 1 
*Each emotion may associated with more than 1 action 
Table 6-7: Confidence and actions, source: author 
Similarly, Entrepreneur Fruit had no experience in the industry. Instead of using 
financial tools to evaluate his expansion rationally, he rapidly expanded his store 
with an intuitive prediction of future market potential evaluation. Entrepreneur Brush 
also experienced great financial and emotional costs for being too confident. He 
(wrongly) believed his capability of managing a distant plant (Anhui) and chaos 
resulted by previous general manager’s resignation. As a result, he was forced to shut 
down Anhui plant due to conflicts with local government and exit China to escape 
from her harassment.  
My data suggests different sources of confidence: resource richness (Entrepreneur 
Brush, Paint, Fruit, Metal), entrepreneurial experience (Entrepreneur Brush, Food, 
Metal), industrial experience (Entrepreneur Brush, Machine, Paint, Food, 
Construction), and international experience (in the host country) (Entrepreneur Fruit, 
Metal, Construction). Dimov (2010) suggests confidence built on industrial 
experience have direct effects on venture emergence. However, my data shows 
confidence built on industrial experience is not necessarily positive to venture 
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survival. Entrepreneur Food had 15 years’ experience but failed while Entrepreneur 
Metal had no industrial experience but survived. Thus, what type and what level of 
confidence is more likely to contribute to venture survival require further 
investigation. A quantitative research testing entrepreneur’s different types/level of 
confidence and exit rate may answer the question.  
In summary, entrepreneurs’ confidence is a guiding factor in opportunity pursuit and 
strategic changes (Dimov, 2010). A high level of confidence is positive to venture 
growth (Dimov, 2010) and entrepreneur’s persistence in the foreign venture (Staw, 
1981). However, venture growth and survival are two distinct ideas (Sapienza et al., 
2006) and  the procrastination in business closure may result in great financial loss 
(Shepherd et al., 2009). My findings suggest it is true that a high level of confidence 
is positive to the emergence and growth of foreign ventures but not necessarily 
positive to survival.  
6.3.1.3 Empathy towards other cultures enhancing the development of institution-
specific capability 
This section finds empathetic entrepreneurs are likely to minimise the liability of 
foreignness/institutional distances, learn and develop institution-specific capability 
of surviving in China. This section answers the question raised in section 0 why 
some entrepreneurs can internalise Chinese informal institutional while others cannot 
and what is the outcome of it from an individual learning perspective. Empirical data 
shows Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China are a heterogeneity group. 
Comparing to those entrepreneurs with negative predispositions to China, 
entrepreneurs with positive predispositions interpret the same institutional problems 
in different ways (section 6.2.1.1). It is found that those entrepreneurs with positive 
predispositions to China (Entrepreneur Brush, Food, Fruit, Metal, Construction) tend 
to show more empathy in critical incidents (see Table 6-8).     
Empathy involves internalising the frame of reference of another; it has cognitive, 
affective and behavioural dimensions (Triandis, 1979; Nelson-Jones, 1983). From a 
Rogerian perspective (1957:210), empathy is more than user-centred sympathy 
(sharing the emotions of others affectively and behaviourally whilst keeping a 
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cognitive distance): only in the last century have the two emotions become clearly 
differentiated (Gladstein, 1983).  Sympathy can be passive, even negative, whereas 
empathy suggests a positive, altruistic engagement by providers with users.  From a 
psychiatric perspective, Krznaric (2014) emphasises that empathy is not blind 
acceptance of the user’s viewpoint, rather it is to support from the perspective of 
shared feelings and understanding, even where support conflicts with the users stated 
desires or interpretations. Thus, this research defines empathy as understanding, 
forgiveness, the recognition of other person’s suffering, and most importantly, the 
willingness to improve the situation through learning and putting yourself in other 
person’s shoes (internalisation).  
Empathy and actions 

















Brush 0 0 0 3 1 
Machine 0 0 0 0 0 
Paint None identified 
Food 0 0 0 2 0 
Fruit 0 0 0 3 0 
Metal 0 0 0 2 0 
Construction 0 0 0 2 0 
Total 1 0 0 12 1 
*Each emotion may associated with more than 1 action     *Firm B is sympathy 
Table 6-8: Empathy and actions, source: author 
Table 6-8 presents entrepreneurs’ actions in response to empathy reflecting that 
empathetic entrepreneurs usually learn from critical incidents and/or adapt to local 
culture. In general, entrepreneurs experience negative emotions (e.g. anger) toward 
institutional difficulties. However, empathetic entrepreneur found it easier to learn 
and adapt to local culture. Table 6-8 shows that Entrepreneurs Brush, Food, Fruit, 
Metal, Construction commit to learning and adapting to local culture due to their 
empathic nature. The above entrepreneurs are open-minded and often put themselves 
in their staff’s shoes. Instead of judging incidents from their perspectives 
(Taiwanese), they interpret from their staff’s views (Chinese). For example, 
Entrepreneur Brush and Construction both considered taking commission to be a 
mean to ensure production efficiency and manufacturing quality. This ability enables 
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them to have a forgiving attitude toward staff corruption (Quote G1 and A4). 
Entrepreneur Food holds similar views and suggests studying Chinese history and 
communicating with locals is beneficial for easing the stress resulted from cultural 
conflicts (Quote D9).  
In comparison, Entrepreneur Machine and Paint elicit continuous and strong negative 
emotions due to Chinese institutions. As an experienced entrepreneur in China, 
Entrepreneur Machine understood the reasons behind unethical behaviours. However, 
he could not accept Chinese value and adapt to Chinese mind-set. He showed 
sympathy to local staff but still felt uncomfortable to live in China (Quote B12). The 
major difference between empathy and sympathy is empathy necessarily requiring 
doing something about it (Gladstein, 1983). Entrepreneur Machine is lack of 
motivation to learn and adapt to local culture.  As an opponent to Chinese 
Government, Entrepreneur Paint showed neither empathy nor sympathy to critical 
incidents. In facing staff corruption, he radically changed management system to 
ensure full control of his staff. Entrepreneur Metal criticized his action and warned 
this may result in serious conflicts with staff (Quote F2). Accordingly, Entrepreneur 
Paint’s solution may temporally solve problem but would result in negative impact in 
long-term.  
In summary, to answer the question raised in section 6.2.1.1 that why some 
entrepreneurs can internalise Chinese informal institutions while others cannot, I 
found empathetic entrepreneurs usually internalized themselves with Chinese mind-
set and thus more likely to learn and adapt to local culture. They frequently 
communicated with locals and attributed the problem to their lack of understanding 
of local culture. They tried to understand the feelings/thoughts of the other people 
but not attempt (like sympathy) to share the feelings of the other (Goldie, 2000). 
Conversely, entrepreneurs who showed no empathy usually isolated themselves from 
Chinese society (Quote B10). They lacked motivation to learn and adapt to local 
culture because they believed this was the external problem that could not be solved 
(Quote B12, C2, C4). As indicated by Baron-Cohen (2011), such people are capable 
of cruelty, imprisoned in a self-focus.   
   
234 
 
Accordingly, being empathetic is beneficial for entrepreneurs to learn from Chinese 
institutions and develop institution-specific capability of surviving in fast-changing 
Chinese institutions. Sapienza et al. (2006) point out similar concept that developing 
dynamic capability in response to fast changing environment is necessary for firm’s 
survival. Much literature focuses on the negative impact of institutional problems 
(Chung and Beamish, 2005; Meyer et al., 2011; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). 
However, for those entrepreneurs who develop the institution-specific capability, 
they are more likely to survive in China and less likely to exit for institutional 
distances (Sapienza et al., 2006). Adding to the finding in predispositions (section 
6.2.1.1), entrepreneurs with positive predispositions to China are more likely to show 
empathy in critical incidents. Entrepreneurs’ positive predispositions seem to be the 
source of empathy and being empathic strengthen the positive predispositions to 
China. Accordingly, the connection of positive predispositions and empathy is found, 
to elucidate how these two elements shape entrepreneurs’ learning as shown in Table 
6-8, next section provides an in-depth analysis.   
6.3.1.4 Positive predispositions and empathy enhance individual learning in 
internationalization 
This section suggests the source and outcome of being empathetic, indicating 
empathy increases the possibility of double loop learning that entrepreneurs perceive 
that the cause of the problem was about them, and they re-examine their underlying 
assumptions and internalise local culture (Figure 6-4).  
Figure 6-4 presents the source, role and outcome of empathy in entrepreneurs’ 
learning in internationalization. The source of empathy should be entrepreneurs’ 
positive predispositions to China. Since entrepreneurs are embedded and emotionally 
committed to China, they are likely to show curiosity, challenge existing prejudices 
and open up to local institutions that enable them to be empathetic in institutional 
problems (Krznaric, 2014).  
Ucbasaran et al. (2011) suggest that the strong emotions generated by failure prompt 
entrepreneurs to blame more on others than themselves for self-esteem. However, I 
found empathetic entrepreneurs are more likely to attribute the cause of 
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failure/negative experience to themselves such as poor management structure (e.g. 
CA11, CE4) or unfamiliar with local culture (e.g. CE2, CD9, CF12).  As a result, the 
entrepreneurs are motivated to restructure organization, learn from the experience, 
embrace local culture and develop institution-specific capabilities. Echoing Jenkins’s 
(2012) research, entrepreneurs who reflect on their role in contributing to the failure 
(e.g. institutional problems) are more likely to have double loop learning, which 
changes their underlying assumption and enables them to internalize the Chinese 
institutions (e.g. Entrepreneur Brush, Food, Fruit, Metal, Construction). They learn, 
accept and enjoy Chinese ways of doing things. For example, Entrepreneur Brush 
view staff corruption as a management problem. He improves the system and 
understands the reasons of his staff’s unethical behaviour and accepts it. He is 
internalized with Chinese institutions.  
 
Source of empathy 
Positive predispositions 
 






















the possibility that 
entrepreneurs attribute 
the failure/problem to 
themselves (e.g. 
management problem or 
unfamiliar with local 
culture) 
 
Figure 6-4: Empathy and individual learning, source: author 
   
236 
 
Conversely, entrepreneurs who attribute the causes of the failure to external factor 
such as Chinese institutions) are more likely to have single loop learning, which 
means they changes their strategy and plans to solve the problem. Take Entrepreneur 
Paint for example, he attributes the staff corruption to Chinese informal institutions, 
thus he divests and uses a militaristically formal management style to control his 
staff. This strategy may work initially, but it increases the employee-employer 
conflicts in the long-term. The Entrepreneur Machine said: “I tried but I found I was 
in vulnerable position. This is a trend and I can’t change it”. Thus he does not intend 
to learn from local culture since he viewed it as an external problem. In general, the 
two entrepreneurs are still doing things in Taiwanese ways and resisting local culture. 
This finding challenges IB literature that organization learns and benefited from their 
internationalization experiences (e.g. Johanson and Vahle, 1977; Sapienza et al., 
2006). Instead, entrepreneurs should be viewed as a heterogeneity group in learning 
(Shepherd, 2009). This research suggests entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host 
country and empathy would affect the degree of learning from institutional problems.  
In terms of how empathy affect international exit decisions. This research suggests 
learning can increase the trust of Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Chinese Government, 
people or business environment (Quote E6, F2). Hence, they are more likely to 
commit to their business and identify opportunities. This statement supports Bandlj’s 
(2008) argument that positive emotions form the trusting relationship that led to 
international opportunity pursuit. Unlike other emotions such as passion, fear, anger 
and confidence, empathy is a social emotion strongly linked to the formation of trust, 
considered crucial in economic process (Kramer, 1999; Bandelj, 2009). Beckert 
(2005) argues trusts in market has to be understood as an interaction between trust 
giver and trust taker, and the trust taker performs actions such as commitment and 
other trustworthiness actions to win the trust giver’s trust. Giddens (1991: 19) 
indicates that trust “presumes a leap to commitment, a quality of faith which is 
irreducible”. Coupled with my finding, there is a positive relationship between 
empathy, learning and trust building (Figure 6-4). Hence, empathy enhances 
entrepreneurs’ understanding and trusts in their business and host country, thus 
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reduce the institutional distances and entrepreneurs’ risk perception and uncertainty 
level in China.  
In summary, this section examines the source and outcome of empathy, indicating 
being empathetic increase the possibility of double-loop learning and the 
internalization of Chinese institutions. As a result, empathetic entrepreneurs are 
likely to minimise institutional distances, enhance their trust and commitment in host 
country and less likely to exit for institutional reasons.  
6.3.2 Negative emotions resulting into international exit 
This section examines three negative emotions: fear, anger and disgust. Negative 
emotions are often associated with pessimistic thinking and may serve as a 
moderator of factors known to influence international exit. In tandem with Baron 
(2008) who stated that negative emotions reduce the vigour and faith of individuals, 
the intense negative emotions significantly reduce the non-economic value of the 
firm. Entrepreneurs try to escape from the source of negative emotions such as their 
ventures in China and this may result in international exit.  
In general, negative emotions have a negative impact on firm’s non-economic value 
thus may result in an international exit. Interestingly, the three negative emotions, 
fear, anger and disgust identified from my data appear to have different impact on 
entrepreneurs’ actions. A fearful entrepreneur usually has higher risk perception and 
prefers to decrease commitments or maintain status quo. A disgusted entrepreneur 
avoids psychic incorporation or further contacts with a repellent object and takes 
aggressive actions to escape from the unfavourable source. Anger is a negative 
emotion; however, my data shows it is connected with entrepreneurs’ learning and 
adaptation. In addition, an angry entrepreneur usually has positive future prediction 
and feels that they are capable of solving the problem (source of anger). This section 
examines the negative emotions and identifies the uniqueness of each negative 
emotion. As the pursuit of happiness is part of human nature (Kahneman, 2011), I 
conclude by suggesting that when entrepreneurs are losing emotional energy to 
persist in business in China due to intense negative emotions (except anger); 
international exit occurs. 
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6.3.2.1 Fear resulting in decreased commitment and risk aversion 
Fear is an unpleasant emotional state induced by a (wrongly) imagined threat. People 
are likely to feel fear when they feel uncertain and lack confidence to deal with a 
negative event (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). My data suggests that entrepreneurs 
experience fear due to increased costs, intensive competition, Chinese institutions, or 
staff conflicts.  
Fear results in higher risk perception, in some extreme cases, fearful entrepreneurs 
select negative information to make decisions and overestimate the influence of 
threats. Entrepreneur Paint extended his fear and distrust of unethical staff to every 
Chinese including his business partners (Quote C4, C5). His fear limited his 
expansion plans, opportunity pursuit and significantly increased his operational costs 
(sending management team from Taiwan and using militaristically formal 
management style). Echoing Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) heuristics study that 
people tend to exaggerate the extreme case and generalise it to everything, a fearful 
entrepreneurs may wrongly imagine or overestimate the threats.  


















Brush 0 2 1 1 2 
Machine 0 4 3 1 2 
Paint 0 4 1 0 1 
Food 0 0 0 1 0 
Fruit None identified 
Metal 1 0 0 1 0 
Construct
ion 
0 1 0 0 0 
Total 1 11 5 4 5 
*Each emotion may associated with more than 1 action 
Table 6-9: Fear and actions, source: author 
Table 6-9 shows that entrepreneurs usually do nothing in response to their fear. They 
may decrease commitment, learn and adapt (mostly adaptation) to local environment, 
or decrease commitment, but they are less likely to increase commitment as shown in 
Table 6-9. In line with Foo (2011) and Welpe et al. (2012), fear is usually associated 
with higher uncertainty perception, and therefore, decreases the entrepreneurs’ 
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exploitation of opportunities. A radical change or an occurrence of unpredictable 
events challenges the source of cognitive and emotional stability and attacks 
entrepreneurs’ basic assumptions (Huy, 1999), thus strong defensive mechanisms 
including fear is triggered. Fearful entrepreneurs prefer to maintain status quo since 
they are lack of confidence to solve the source of fear. It triggers risk aversion 
actions although it is non-rational for other people. For example, Entrepreneur Paint 
was scared that Chinese Government would punish him for his political preference 
while his general manager and business partners viewed it as “a nonsense imagined 
by a DPP supporter”. His distrust to Chinese staff and institutions elicited fear of 
losing money or control of the company. Fear is not only negative to entrepreneurs’ 
current commitment but also to future opportunity recognition due to pessimistic 
future prediction. Built on their fear of Chinese institutions and Chinese staff, 
Entrepreneurs Machine and Paint rejected promising opportunities despite the 
positive evacuation of future returns (CB13, CC7, CC11). They viewed it as a “not 
worthy action” for their high-risk perception and emotional costs (being scared).  
Echoing Welpe et al. (2012), my results suggest that fearful entrepreneurs make 
pessimistic risk assessments and decrease their propensity to exploit opportunities. 
Table 6-9 indicates that fear also resulted in international exit. Although 
entrepreneurs did not take immediate action (no changes) in response to their fear to 
some critical incidents, it created an unfavourable environment with (wrongly) 
imagined threats.  Hence, entrepreneurs want to escape from their personal trauma 
that contributed to the final international exit decision. It is concluded that fear leads 
to pessimistic future prediction, thus results in risk aversion decision-making, which 
indirectly leads to international exit.  
It is interesting to point out that fear may be overcome. Entrepreneur Food was 
scared of Chinese institutions but this feeling was minimised through his learning 
and adaptation process (CD9). Similar case can be found in Entrepreneur Metal that 
he overcame his fear of rising costs and developed new products when most of his 
friend chose to exit China (CF5). It may be assumed that if entrepreneurs are 
determined to stay in China (e.g. passion in French dessert and family and 
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attachment to China); they are motivated to find a solution and overcome their fear. 
Otherwise, they may use a more exploiting strategy and remain status quo.    
6.3.2.2 Anger propelling positive actions which improves unfavorable situations 
Lerner and Keltner (2001) and Welpe et al. (2012) view anger as having a positive 
impact on opportunity exploratory even though it is a negative emotion.  In contrast 
to fear, being angry gives entrepreneurs the strength to deal with adverse situations. 
Using appraisal tendency framework (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006) to explain this 
situation, feeling angry means another person should be responsible for the negative 
events, and the self still have chance to improve the situation. Thus, angry 
individuals have lower risk perceptions and more optimistic future predictions. These 
predictions lead to a strong urge to take action in order to change the current situation 
(Lerner and Keltner, 2001); for example, in the early stage of his internationalization, 
although Entrepreneur Paint shut down the Shanghai Marketing office due to poor 
performance and unethical behaviour of his sales, he was still confident about the 
future of the company. Entrepreneur Brush also took a series of actions such as 
organizational restructure in response to his anger elicited by conflicts with previous 
general manager (Quote A10).  

















Brush 0 0 1 4 0 
Machine 0 0 1 2 1 
Paint 0 1 1 2 1 
Food 0 0 1 2 0 
Fruit 0 0 1 3 0 
Metal 1 0 0 2 0 
Construct
ion 
0 0 0 2 0 
Total 1 1 5 17 2 
*Each emotion may associated with more than 1 decision 
Table 6-10: Anger and actions, source: author 
Table 6-10 shows that anger leads to a variety of actions including learning and 
adaptation, decreased commitment, increased commitment even international exit. 
Instead of stating anger results in particular actions, it provides the emotional energy 
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for entrepreneurs to take actions of getting rid of their unfavourable situations. Quote 
A10 provides best support for this argument. Unlike fearful entrepreneurs, angry 
entrepreneurs tend to be more proactive in problem solving. Angry entrepreneurs 
usually feel that they are offended or injured. Entrepreneur Paint felt his staff 
betrayed him. Entrepreneur Brush felt he was underestimated by previous general 
manager and wanted to prove that “this firm can survive without her”. Thus, both 
entrepreneurs took aggressive action such as shut down Shanghai office and 
organizational restructuring.  
Entrepreneur Firm Machine is another example that he found his competitor 
introduced the same design to market one week after his product launch.  He was 
angry with his staff hacked into firm's intranet and stole the latest design to 
competitors who subsequently imitated his products. In anger, he made major 
decisions to solve these problems by restructuring the R&D department in China and 
later on, setting up a new R&D centre in USA.  His anger drove him to re-build the 
system and increases commitments in R&D, which proved to be a wise decision in 
the late internationalization. Entrepreneur Metal also took similar actions in response 
to imitation issue.  
This finding is consistent with Welpe et al. (2012) that anger makes individuals eager 
to act by attacking. As a result, anger encourages entrepreneurs to take critical and 
risk-taking actions due to their optimistic views of success. From my evidence, 
although anger is a negative emotion, it leads to optimistic prediction thus motivates 
entrepreneurs to improve current situation. The positive outcome of anger 
distinguishes it from other negative emotions such as fear and disgust. Disputing 
Baron (2008) and Foo et al. (2009), I found that not all negative emotions are bad for 
entrepreneurial process and long-term commitment. For instance, the negative 
emotion; anger drives positive predictions and actions by increasing the 
entrepreneurs’ confidence and decreasing his risk aversion (London et al., 1971). 
6.3.2.3 Disgust resulting into aversion and international exit 
Disgust is fundamentally a negative emotion and a defensive mechanism to avoid 
psychic incorporation or further contacts with a repellent object (Rozin et al., 2008). 
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From action-tendency perspectives, Hayton and Cholakova (2012) suggest that 
disgusted individuals trigger goals to expel current activities and avoid further 
involvement.  
In my findings, Entrepreneurs Machine and Paint reported their strong 
dismissiveness of unfavourable environments, institutional problems, and conflicts 
with staff that triggered their anger to turn to disgust in the late stage of 
internationalization, thus led to international exit. Entrepreneur Machine found it 
difficult to tolerant and thus evoked a desire to purge the current activity due to his 
disgust with unacceptable objects, interpersonal conflicts and moral offense (Quote 
B10).  Thus, he aimed to escape from current unpleasant situation at any costs. As 
can be seen, he has shifted his personal goal from making money to enjoy his life. As 
suggested in Theme A, the shift of his goal decreased the non-economic value of 
Firm B and made him even more difficult to tolerate the unfavourable environment.  
Table 6-11 shows disgusted entrepreneurs make the decision to escape from doing 
business in China, including relocating the R&D office to USA (Entrepreneur 
Machine), divesting the firm (Entrepreneur Brush, Machine, Paint), and eventually, 
exiting China. Despite good financial performance of Firm B and C, the financial 
income is insufficient to compensate the entrepreneurs’ emotional suffering.  


















Brush 0 0 1 0 1 
Machine 0 1 3 1 4 
Paint 0 0 0 0 2 
Food None identified 
Fruit None identified 




Total 0 1 4 1 7 
*Each emotion may associated with more than 1 decision 
Table 6-11: Disgust and actions, source: author 
The conflict with his ex-general manager disgusted Entrepreneur Brush and resulted 
in his exit decision. Unlike Entrepreneur Machine and Paint, he felt comfortable 
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about Chinese institutions and living environment. The reason behind international 
exit was his determination to ensure full control of the firm, which was the source of 
the serious conflict with previous general manager. Despite the disputes, 
Entrepreneur Brush showed empathy to her aggressive behaviour to retrieve the 
control of Firm A. He was sick of fighting with a close friend. To escape from this 
situation and ensure full family control, Entrepreneur Brush exited China (Quote A9).  
I disagree with the economic rational perspective by arguing that disgusted 
entrepreneurs are likely to decrease their commitment level or even exit the host 
country at any costs. It is true that a high performing organization encourages 
entrepreneurs to persist in internationalization due to monetary income. However, 
once individuals get their basic needs met, more income does not make more 
happiness (Kahneman, 2011). For instance, Entrepreneur Machine felt that he 
preferred to pursue a more comfortable life and escape from the source of disgust 
rather than increase his monetary income (Quote B8).  
This behaviour by the Taiwanese entrepreneurs supports DeTienne et al. (2008)’s 
argument that even the most extrinsically motivated entrepreneurs are driven by 
personal factors. Since entrepreneurs often invest not only financial resources but 
also personal time and efforts (Kozan et al., 2012), some entrepreneurs do not even 
try to justify their decision with economic reasons. For instance, Entrepreneur 
Machine lamented that, “exiting China is a rational decision for myself and not for 
my company”. Echoing Theme A, entrepreneurs’ willingness to stay in China was 
determined by the economic and non-economic value of the firm. My evidence 
suggest disgust significantly decreases the non-economic value of the firm thus 
rapidly increases the threshold of performance. It can be deduced that disgust reduces 
the entrepreneurs’ tolerance of conflicts and triggers their desire to escape from 
current activity, thus decreasing their commitment level, leading to international exit. 
6.3.3 Summary and the framework of entrepreneurs’ emotions and actions 
My research emphasizes the non-economic value of the foreign venture through 
provoking the importance of entrepreneurs’ emotions citing empirical data. 
Following entrepreneurial emotion literature (e.g. Baron, 2008), Theme B examines 
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how entrepreneurs’ incident-generated emotions shape their preference and 
behaviours. This research views entrepreneurs’ emotions as highly significant since 
they influence entrepreneurs’ perceptions and shape their behaviour.  As such I 
describe the role of emotions in each critical incidents and how it contributes to 
different actions in Figure 6-7.  
 
Figure 6-5: The role of affect in Entrepreneurship, source: Baron (2008, p335)  
 
Figure 6-5 shows Baron’s (2008) model of how emotions affect entrepreneurs’ 
actions. Foo et al. (2009) extend this view by exploring the role of negative and 




Figure 6-6: The relationship between emotions and efforts, source Foo et al. (2009, p1087) 





The logic underlying Figure 6-7 is as follows: firstly, entrepreneurs elicit emotions in 
response to critical incidents. Secondly, incident-generated emotions affect 
entrepreneurs’ cognitive process and resulted in difference judgement and 
perceptions (Baron, 2008). Although I highlight the positive relationship between 
empathy, learning and trust building, this section mainly examines the cause and 
effect between emotions and entrepreneurs’ actions. Further study may be conducted 
on how entrepreneurs’ emotions affect cognitive process and to what extent as 
suggested by McDougall-Covin et al. (2014) and Jones and Casulli (2014b).  
Finally, entrepreneurs act in accordance with their subjective evaluation. Positive 
actions are accompanied by optimistic future prediction, lower risk perception, and 
may be beneficial for foreign venture’s long-term operation and growth such as 
increasing commitment, opportunity recognition and implementation, learning and 
adaptation. Negative actions refer to actions of decreasing commitment such as 
divestment and international exit. Doing nothing (no changes) is neither a positive 
nor negative action, and due to its close relationship to fear, it is put in the box of 
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Figure 6-7: Emotions and actions framework, source: author 
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usually aims to improve the current situation with an optimistic view of success. 
Thus anger is in the same box with positive emotions.  
In Chapter 2, I argue the field of international business including international exit 
and decision-making has reached the point where more than rational perspectives 
have come to dominant the field. Keupp and Gassmann (2009), Jones et al. (2011) 
and McDougall-Covin et al. (2014) also call for more ideas from Entrepreneurship 
field to provide a more real life story to decision-making of internationalization. As 
an emerging star in the Entrepreneurship field, entrepreneurial emotions make IB 
studies more comprehensive and closer to the messy reality. It is time to 
acknowledge emotions are as important as conventional cognition, which usually 
assumed purely rational. I do not attempt to separate emotions from cognition or 
argue that decision-making is purely emotional. Instead, I aim to indicate that this 
study stresses a merger of the two, i.e., emotions and cognition are parts of each 
other.  
This view is consistent with Hellgren and Melin (1993) that splitting emotions from 
cognition is not fruitful. Bechara et al. (2000) support this view by their neurologist 
experiments that people are making decision through a complicated process which 
includes both emotions and cognition. Viewing emotions and cognition as part of 
each other explains unexpected decisions in internationalization. Fineman (2000) 
indicates emotion serve as a lubricant rather than an obstacle to rationality.  
“They (emotions) make impossible decision possible; they help do the prioritising, 
resolve tie breaks, and ease the dilemmas. What is important, worth thinking about, 
is cued by feelings- including those of the ’gut’. So let hunches, excitement, fear, 
unease or comfort, be your guide.” (Fineman 2000: 11) 
Accordingly, there is no such thing as purely economic rational decision-making. 
Otherwise my five exit cases would not exist and no entrepreneurs would regret their 
decisions. The concepts of emotional gains and costs are emerged from my data. This 
section argues entrepreneurs’ positive emotions increase their emotional gains (non-
economic gains) of internationalization while negative emotions increase the 
emotional costs (non-economic loss). In addition to financial gains and costs, 
emotional gains and costs are also significant for entrepreneurs to make decisions. To 
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stay in China, entrepreneurs not only need to achieve financial survival but also 
emotional survival since emotions and cognition are intertwined. Current literature 
suggests entrepreneurs make international exit decisions because they fail to achieve 
financial survival (cognition and rational decision-making). This research argues 
entrepreneurs can also make exit decisions for not achieving emotional survival 
(emotion driven decision-making). To provide a satisfied explanation of international 
exit decisions, it is compulsory to investigate entrepreneurs’ cognition (financial 
survival) as well as emotions (emotional survival).  
Emotions provide the ‘gut’ to make decisions, and this is why we have such a 
diversified and vibrant world.  As a result, entrepreneurs of my five exit cases are 
capable of making a satisfied decision instead of a rational decision. Entrepreneurs’ 
unexpected exit (Entrepreneur Brush, Machine, Paint) and persistence in 
underperforming business (Entrepreneur Food, Fruit) cannot be explained by rational 
decision-making but can easily find an answer in emotion driven decision-making. 
Consistent with my argument in Theme A that it is compulsory to include non-
economic value of the firm in decision-making, viewed emotions as part of decision-
making provides a better explanation to real business world and perfectly explain 
unexpected behaviours of entrepreneurs. The next section Theme C, summaries the 
discussion chapter by presenting a revised theoretical framework. 
6.4 Theme C: The decision making of international exit 
Following the discussion of Theme A and Theme B, the economic and non-economic 
value of the firm determines entrepreneurs’ willingness to stay in China and result in 
international exit. Theme B further indicates the role of entrepreneurial emotion is 
the “gut” to entrepreneurs to take action. Consistent with Damasio (1994) that people 
cannot make decisions without emotions, I identify six most frequently generated 
emotions from the data including passion, confidence, empathy, fear, anger, and 
disgust.  I systemically examine the six emotions and connect each emotion with 
actions. Theme A identifies entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables resulting in 
international exit while Theme B explains how these variables influence 
entrepreneurs’ actions through emotions, highlighting the connection of empathy and 
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individual learning.  Theme C aims to provide an overview of the decision-making of 
international exit by redefining international exit using my data, updating the 
decision-making framework of international exit in Figure 3-3, and discussing the 
outcome of international exit.  
6.4.1 My definition of international exit and outcomes 
To understand how entrepreneurs make international exit decision, this section firstly 
compares my definitions of international exit with my data. In section 2.2.1.3, I 
synthesise the definition of exit literature from IB field (Benito and Welch, 1999) 
and Entrepreneurship field (Detienne et al., 2008) and define international exit as 
“the entrepreneurs’ response to poor organizational performance, strategic change 
and/or unmet personal expectation. It is the process by which entrepreneurs of 
privately held firms discontinue the operation of foreign ventures and completely exit 
the host country”. 
Table 6-12 presents entrepreneurs’ characterisation of international exit. This table 
supports my argument that international exit is entrepreneurs’ choice. I agree with 
Benito and Welch (1997) that international exit could be the result of poor 
performance or strategic change. However, this research suggests performance and 
strategic importance should not be the only criteria to judge a successful venture. 
Furthermore, a successful venture is not necessarily a surviving one; entrepreneurs 
may close a successful venture for personal reasons. The evidence is provided in 
Table 6-12. 
Echoing Gimeno (1997), entrepreneurs have idiosyncratic threshold of performance 
that results in different definition of international exit. As indicated in Theme A, 
economic value of the firm is not the only criterion of the decision-making of 
international exit. It seems clear that high economic value leading to survival do not 
necessarily correspond with whether an entrepreneur perceives the venture as 
successful one. Entrepreneur Paint provided evidence for this argument that although 
Firm C is strategically important and well performing (in the late stage), 
Entrepreneur Paint does not consider it worth the efforts. He could not persist in 
China for the non-economic loss and failed to meet his initial goal: to defeat his 
   
249 
 
major competitor in China. Building on this idea, Entrepreneur Brush and Machine 
achieved their initial goal of international entry; they perceived their venture 
successful at closure. But they still exited China for non-economic variables.  
In comparison, Entrepreneur Food perceived his venture as a half failure. He 
persisted in his poor performing firm for its non-economic value. Viewed from 
economic perspective, Firm D should be a failure for the great financial loss resulted 
from blind persistence. However, viewed from the entrepreneurs’ perspective, this 
foreign operation taught him a valuable lesson for future entrepreneurial activities. 
Entrepreneur Food did not view his firm as a failure; instead, he perceived this exit 
as a necessary step to future success. Entrepreneur Fruit had similar thoughts. He 
established Firm E for non-economic goal. Although Firm E was a failure from an 
economic perspective, his great emotional gain balanced the negative impact and 
positively contributed to the possibility to restart Firm E. 
In summary, my finding supports Gimeno et al.’s (1997) argument that each 
entrepreneur has idiosyncratic threshold of performance. I extend this view to that 
the threshold of performance is built on individual and non-economic variable such 
as personal goals, predispositions to China and family (Theme A). It is agreed by 
threshold theory that a good performing venture is not always a successful one. 
This research found a successful venture is not necessarily going to survive since 
entrepreneurs may have something more important to pursue (Quote B4, A6).  The 
next section discusses the outcome of international exit.  










Definition of international exit Consequence 




“My Chinese factory is a success, it helps me dominate Taiwanese market and expand to international market. Now the 
mission is complete and I want to create a more sustainable business for my children…instead of letting my children to 
deal with Bao and the sophisticated guanxi, I prefer to relocate to Vietnam and let my children participate from the 
beginning…Vietnam is the future, at least for next 20 years”  (Quote A6, Entrepreneur) 
Financial gain 
 




“No, Firm B is not a failure. Firm B is very important for me … Now I am too old to work in fast-changing China; I 
want to enjoy my life, maybe travel around the world with my wife. I feel relieved when leaving China. I was lucky to 
enter into China early. I make a profit by selling my land and property … But in long-term, shutting down my China 
factory means the end of my all business within 10 years…it is very difficult to survive without the factory but we don’t 











 “Entering China is a big mistake. It’s a waste of money and time. You can make money from many businesses… . It 
was so unpleasant to run a business in China, I can’t do it anymore … I rather make money in other ways”(Quote C2, 
Entrepreneur) 
“My boss feels embarrassed to exit China, it’s about his face, he failed to defeat Y company and no one dare mention 
this in front of him now.”(Quote C8, Manager) 
Financial loss 
 




“I always think what is failure…I think it could be just a process…I sold Mille-crepe 10 years ago but lost lots of money 
in the beginning because Taiwanese only likes sponge cake. I insisted in this product and everyone thought I was crazy. 
Surprisingly, 3 years ago, Mille-crepe became a super star…if I shut down my venture before, than I was failed. But I 
persist and I succeed. I mean, sometimes financial performance means little to me. I believe time and efforts can solve 
all problems. If you persist and keep going, you can be successful one day…I think the real failure is when you can’t see 
the future, you don’t believe in future, or yourself doesn’t want that future…I don’t think my exit is a failure (laugh), 
maybe 50-50…I did learn a lot from this experience, and I see new opportunity (bakery industry)… I will be back” 
(Quote D6, Entrepreneur) 
Financial loss 
Fruit Okay/ Poor 
financial 
performance 
“No I am not regretting about this (set up Firm E), it’s a great fun…of course I lost a lot (money), too ambitious; I was 
not familiar with this industry and knew little about fruit inventory control and preservation. Although I outsourced this 
to a professional company but I was too busy to manage it… I have experience, equipment and network, actually I was 
going to invest in ice cream made by Taiwanese fruit last year, but have no one to manage the shop. It’s interesting to 
open a small store selling something I like. (Quote E11, Entrepreneur) 
Financial loss 
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6.4.2 Outcome of international exit 
The section discusses the outcome of international exit from a learning perspective. 
International exit can be an important source of learning for entrepreneurs. Lessons 
learned from previous experience can be factored into future decision-making, 
improving the chance of success in following entrepreneurial process (Cope and 
Watts, 2000; Jenkins et al., 2014). My evidence indicates that some but not all 
entrepreneurs learnt from their international exit experience and perceived this 
experience could increase the chance of success in the future (Entrepreneur Food and 
Fruit). It also rejects the rosy notion of international exit that entrepreneurs receive 
constructive feedback from their previous experience and use it for next 
internationalization (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).  
Non-economic gain/loss and reasons of international exit are reasons for this 
interesting result. Firstly, international exit is a negative event usually resulting in 
damaging effects and entrepreneurs’ grief since entrepreneur view their ventures as 
the extension of their identity or as their babies (Shepherd and Cardon, 2009; 
Shepherd et al., 2009).  Emotional costs (grief) is usually associated with sadness, 
anger, pessimistic and future uncertainty which are negative for opportunity 
identification and business operation (Jenkins et al., 2014). Empirical data suggests 
this negative emotion may be diluted because entrepreneurs have other business to 
commit to or something more interesting to do (e.g. Entrepreneur Brush, Machine, 
Paint, Food and Fruit), non-economic gain because they have positive memory to 
recall (e.g. Entrepreneur Food and Fruit), or getting rid of unfavourable situation (e.g. 
Entrepreneur Machine and Paint). Once entrepreneurs recover from their grief, they 
accept the nature and causes of their loss and ready for a new journey (Shepherd, 
2009).  
However, can entrepreneurs recover from their international exit experience, learn 
from the experience and use this experience to renter into China? Table 6-12 shows 
the Entrepreneur Machine and Paint would not enter China again. Their strong 
negative predispositions and intense negative emotions prevent them from 
identifying opportunities in China and entering China again. The main reason for 
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them to exit China is their aversion to everything in Chinese, and this image has been 
rooted in their minds. They may recover from their exit experience but would never 
recover from the high emotional costs resulting from experience in China. Taken 
divorce for example, people may recover from divorce and marry again, but most 
people marry to new person instead of ex-wife/husband. In comparison, the 
international exit of Entrepreneur Food and Fruit are more like a separation instead 
of divorce. The entrepreneurs are reluctant to make the exit decision because they 
still believe in the future of their ventures (see Table 6-12).  They enjoy doing 
business in China and separate for future reunion. This positive thinking enhances 
their learning of international exit for future re-entry.  
My results provide fresh insights into an emerging debate relating to business closure. 
Some scholars believes closure experience provides an opportunity for learning 
(McGrath, 1999) while others argue it may be difficult for entrepreneurs to learn 
from this experience (Shepherd, 2003). My findings show both arguments have some 
validity. Exit provides a chance for learning, but only under certain conditions 
(Jenkins, 2012). I extend the debate to the context of internationalization and 
international exit. If entrepreneur exit China due to lack of experience, over 
expansion, shift of goal and family reasons (Entrepreneur Brush, Food, and Fruit), 
entrepreneurs are more likely to learn from experience for future re-entry. 
Alternatively, if entrepreneur exit China because of negative predispositions to China, 
it is less likely to learn from this experience for future re-entry. Therefore, learning is 
potential but not a necessary outcome of international exit. Adding to the Uppsala 
model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) and international new venture theory (Oviatt and 
McDougall, 1994), international experience is not necessarily contribute to future 
international operation; instead, it may result in entrepreneurs’ stereotype and 
impedes internationalization. Similar discussion can be found in section 6.3.1.3. 
The next section concludes the chapter by presenting the revised theoretical 
framework. 
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6.4.3 Revised international exit framework 
Figure 6-8 presents the revised framework of international exit decision-making. It 
highlights the following points. In the first stage (information and critical incidents), 
as discussed in Theme A, international exit is a complex decision building on 
entrepreneurs’ economic and non-economic variables (critical incidents). Thus, 
entrepreneurs’ variables including personal goals, predispositions to host country and 
family should be taken into consideration like organizational and environmental 
variables. Entrepreneurs generate emotions in response to the critical incident and 
new information. Thus, in the second stage (entrepreneurs’ incident generated 
emotions), six emotions identified from my data are added. The result in Theme B is 
merged with theoretical framework to provide an in-depth understanding of an 
emotion driven decision-making process.  
Entrepreneurs’ incident generated emotions shape their evaluation of the value of 
owning the firm. Thus, in the third stage (evaluation), I extend the threshold theory 
indicating that non-economic value of owning the firm determines entrepreneurs’ 
threshold of performance. That is, entrepreneurs need to achieve not only financial 
survival (economic value of the firm) but also emotional survival (non-economic 
value of the firm) to maintain their foreign operations. In the fourth stage (actions), 
entrepreneurs’ subjective evaluation of the firm results in different actions including 
opportunity pursuit, doing nothing, divestment or international exit.   Finally, 
echoing Vygotsky (1997) and Shepherd (2009), entrepreneurs should be viewed as a 
heterogeneous group in learning from internationalization experiences. Each 
entrepreneur will have a different level and type of learning from their actions, and 
use the learning outcome for future decision-making in internationalization. In 
summary, this revised framework (Figure 6-8) highlights the role of entrepreneurs’ 
variables, emotions, non-economic value of the owning firm and individual learning.  
 
 







Figure 6-8: Revised international exit framework, source: author 
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Chapter 7 : Conclusion 
 
This research develops a new research perspective into the processes of 
entrepreneurs’ decision-making in the context of international exit. There have been 
few empirical studies featuring the entrepreneur as the unit of analysis in 
internationalization study (McDougall-Covin et al., 2014) and examining 
international exit in the emerging economies (Peng and Yuan, 2008). This thesis 
adopts theories from Entrepreneurship field to investigate the role of entrepreneur in 
international exit in the context of emerging economies.  
The three themes combined present a comprehensive picture of why and how 
entrepreneurs make international exit decisions. Firstly, entrepreneurs’ non-economic 
variables resulting in international exit (including entrepreneurs’ predispositions to 
host country, personal goals and family) are discussed. Secondly, an emotional 
perspective is adopted in examining how entrepreneurs make decisions in 
internationalization. Finally, a learning framework is developed to illustrate how 
entrepreneurs make international exit decisions in emerging economies.  
This chapter draws the final conclusion from my research. Section 7.1 presents an 
overview of each chapter. Section 7.2 discusses the theoretical contribution to the 
fields of International Business (IB) and Entrepreneurship. Section 7.3 focuses on 
managerial implication and section 0 offers implication for public policy. The 
research limitation is discussed in section 7.5. Section 7.6 summarizes this chapter 
and this thesis by presenting future research opportunities and my publication plan. 
  
7.1 Overview of the thesis chapters   
Figure 7-1 shows the overview of this thesis. The gaps identified in the literature that 
lead to the formulation of the research questions are presented along with the 
methodological choices applied. The main findings and the contributions to the fields 
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 Figure 7-1: Overview of the thesis, source: author 
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Chapter 1 introduces the general background of the research, including an overview 
of the key theories in international exit literature in IB field and exit literature in 
Entrepreneurship field. The main research questions and subsidiary research 
questions are then introduced. This thesis uses entrepreneur as the unit of analysis 
and a non-economic perspective to examine why Taiwanese entrepreneurs exit China. 
The research questions are introduced to highlight the new knowledge that this study 
attempts to offer to IB and Entrepreneurship field. The methodological choices of 
this study are presented to justify the design of this study, the unit of analysis and 
sample selection. Definitions of key concepts are reviewed to ensure compatible 
terminology with current literature.  
In addition, section 1.2 uses Taiwanese Government research and statistic data to 
provide an overview of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. The investment 
trend, historical and cultural background, and political tensions between Taiwan and 
China are also discussed. This chapter aims to present the unique investment context 
of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. The historical bonds, political tension, 
and self-identity and perception of cross-strait relationship highlight the role of 
entrepreneur in decision-making process. This section shows that the cross-strait 
relationship and institutional distances affect the general investment trend. But 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs may act differently according to their perception of Chinese 
Government, political preference and ethnic identity.  
Chapter 2 reviews the international exit literature in IB field from an economic 
perspective. The evolution of theories in internationalization is firstly introduced. 
The shortage of individual analysis in IB field is highlighted. To define international 
exit, the Foreign Divestment, De-internationalization, International Relocation 
literature are examined, together with Entrepreneurial exit literature in 
Entrepreneurship field, Section 2.2.1.3 presents my proposed definition of 
international exit. Economic variables resulting in international exit are also 
examined from different perspectives; units of analysis range from geographical 
areas, countries, industries, to organizations. The main research question is built on 
three research gaps in current international exit literature: the lack of international 
exit research, the under-researched role of entrepreneur in decision-making 
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process, and the shortage of emerging economy based model. Three research 
themes are developed to answer the key research question, and subsidiaries research 
questions are designed in response to research gaps in literature and findings in pilot 
study (see section 2.5).  
Chapter 3 narrows down to literature relevant to the three research themes: 
Entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables in international exit, entrepreneurs’ 
emotions and actions, and the decision-making of international exit and its 
outcomes. Theme A targets entrepreneurs’ predispositions, personal goals and family. 
Theme B focuses on entrepreneurial emotion literature to explore how entrepreneurs’ 
emotions shape their actions. Theme C examine Boddewyn (1983), Benito and 
Welch (1997)’s decision-making model in international exit. These, combined with 
aforementioned research gaps, contribute to the development of a theoretical 
framework for further examination.  
Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology. This study is under a critical realist 
research paradigm, and applies a multiple case studies approach to theory building. 
The research uses a qualitative approach, based on multiple case studies of 
Taiwanese firms invested in China. The rationale behind case selection and the data 
collection methods are also addressed in order to justify the choice of interviewing 
method and critical incident techniques. The data analysis follows with-case and 
cross case analytical approach, and the data is categorised by the three themes. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with the reflection of ontological, epistemological and 
methodological appropriateness.  
Chapter 5 shows the finding of the five exit and two stay cases. The within case 
analysis is presented in the following three themes based on the subsidiary research 
questions: non-economic variables resulting in exit, positive/negative emotions and 
actions, and entrepreneurs’ definition, reasons and consequence of exit. In Appendix 
C, each case has a critical incident table showing events that entrepreneurs consider 
important in decision-making in internationalization.  
Chapter 6 presents the cross-case analysis and discusses the findings of this research 
with current literature. Theme A identifies three entrepreneurs’ non-economic 
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variables resulting in international exit: predispositions to host country, personal 
goals and family. My data supports the argument that international exit is 
entrepreneurs’ personal choice (Headd, 2003) since only by including non-economic 
variables of entrepreneur, the unexpected international exit and blind persistence in 
business can be explained. DeTienne et al. (2008) argue that entrepreneurs has 
idiosyncratic threshold of performance and Zellweger and Astrachan (2008) indicate 
that the value of a business is built on economic and non-economic gain. Using 
threshold theory to explain why entrepreneurs make exit decisions, the three 
individual variables affect firm’s non-economic value and lower non-economic value 
of the firm increases entrepreneurs’ threshold of performance.  
Theme B views the entrepreneurs’ emotions as highly significant since they 
influence entrepreneurs’ perceptions and shape their behaviours. Passion, confidence, 
empathy, fear, anger and disgust are identified and discussed. Empathy is highlighted 
for its uniqueness in the context of Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China.  That 
is, the informal institutions in China and the institutional distance between Taiwan 
and China allow entrepreneurs to show (no) empathy toward institutional/cultural 
conflicts. The connection between entrepreneurs’ positive predispositions, empathy, 
individual learning, trust building and liability of foreignness is discussed. Theme C 
concludes Chapter 6 by presenting entrepreneurs’ definition of international exit and 
the outcome. A revised framework is presented suggesting entrepreneurs’ 
international exit decisions should be resulted by both economic and non-economic 
variables and it is a dynamic and individual learning process. 
This chapter explains the contributions of this study to the fields of IB and 
Entrepreneurship. The directions for future research and the limitation of the thesis 
are also presented. 
7.2 Theoretical contributions of this research 
This research enriches the international exit literature in IB field by the emerging 
economy data and theories from Entrepreneurship field (section 7.2.1). Moreover, it 
contributes to the exit literature of Entrepreneurship field by presenting empirical 
data of cross-border activities, showing how the institutional distances influencing 
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entrepreneurial decision-making (section 0). Finally, section 7.2.3 presents the 
contribution to research setting, highlighting how a unique setting, Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs invested in China, contributes to current literature 
7.2.1 Contributions to International Business and Management theories 
This thesis responds to McDougall-Covin et al. (2014) and Jones et al. (2011)’s call 
of bridging the IB and Entrepreneurship field. It adds to current decision-making 
model of international exit in IB field by combining the knowledge of 
Entrepreneurship field with my empirical evidence.  
7.2.1.1 Exploring international exit by using the entrepreneur as the unit of 
analysis 
IB researchers often use organization as the unit of analysis, suggesting that 
international exit is the organizational responses to external environment (Benito and 
Welch, 1997; Box, 2008). I challenge this literature and argue the importance of 
entrepreneurs and their heterogeneity. Theme A identifies three individual variables 
arguing that even entrepreneurs from the same cultural background make different 
decisions under similar circumstance. I contribute to the international exit literature 
by focusing on the individual entrepreneur, which is significant yet under-researched. 
Entrepreneurs view their ventures as the extension of their identity (Shepherd et al., 
2009). It is inevitable that they (un)consciously use their habitus, personal goals or 
family interests to make judgments. This research uses theories from 
Entrepreneurship field such as threshold theory and entrepreneurial emotion 
literature to centre-stage the role of entrepreneurs. An entrepreneurs should be views 
as an active agent but not the context in decision-making (Whittington, 2006). This 
research opens the black box of the “non-rational variables” and systemically 
examines them instead of viewing them as the impediment in rational decision-
making (e.g. Simon, 1955).  
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7.2.1.2 Exploring international exit by a non-economic and emotional perspective 
Echoing Jones and Coviello’s (2011) claim, I argue current internationalization 
literature misses a key element in internationalization decision-making: international 
exit.  Instead of testing another organizational or environmental variable as most IB 
researchers do, I make a contribution by providing empirical evidence of 
entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables and emotions in international exit literature.  
This research develops a new framework illustrating how entrepreneurs make 
international exit decisions. Compared with conventional international exit 
framework (e.g. Boddewyn, 1983; Benito, 1997), the revised framework presents a 
non-economic perspective in decision-making. Echoing threshold theory (Gimeno et 
al., 1997) in Entrepreneurship field, my data suggests entrepreneurs’ predispositions 
(Vygotsky, 1997), socio-emotional wealth of the family (Detienne and Chirico, 
2013), and entrepreneurs’ goals (Chrisman et al., 2012) are variables that may 
change firm’s non-economic value and entrepreneurs’ willingness to stay in China. 
In response to these variables, entrepreneurs elicit emotions that shape their actions 
in internationalization. A non-economic and emotional perspective is brought to the 
emerging international exit literature. Each variable highlights future research 
opportunity and sheds the light on research in internationalization at individual level.  
7.2.1.3 Chinese institutions and cultural intelligence: the role of entrepreneurs’ 
predispositions and individual learning 
Researchers of Strategy-As-Practice (SAP) highlight the individual practitioner’s 
involvement in strategizing episodes (Pettigrew, 1992; Whittington, 2006; 
Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009). They develop the concept of “practice” in 
strategizing. However, SAP mainly focuses on large multinational companies and 
group decision-making; there is a shortage of studies on entrepreneur’s decision-
making process. The investigation of entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country 
provides fresh insights into this area. An individual’s (entrepreneur) tendency to act 
in a particular way may re-shape an organizational practice.    
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Mainstream IB literature discusses learning from an organizational perspective (e.g. 
Johanson and Valhe, 1977). It focuses on organizational instead of individual 
behaviours in learning. Although International Entrepreneurship (IE) researchers 
emphasize the role of individual by suggesting an experienced entrepreneur is the 
key to successful internationalization (McDougall and Oviatt, 1994), the 
heterogeneity of learners (entrepreneurs) is still under-explored.  
This research contributes to IB field by introducing the impact of individual 
cognition- entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country on decision-making. It is a 
rarely discussed but vital topic in IB field (Jones and Coviello, 2011). Additionally, 
the focus on entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country respond to another call- 
the shortage of emerging economy-based model in internationalization as indicated 
in section 2.2.2. This research provides empirical evidence to the two gaps and 
illustrates what type of institutional problems that foreign entrepreneurs would 
encounter in China. It extends the current understanding of institutions in emerging 
markets, arguing that thin Chinese formal institutions results in greater operational 
and emotional costs.  
Sapienza et al. (2006) indicate that the learning capability is positive to the survival 
of foreign venture by minimising institutional distances. Other studies including 
Cope (2011) also find the positive connection of entrepreneurs’ learning and 
organization survival. However, how to develop the capability and why some 
entrepreneurs can effectively learn from local environment while others cannot is 
still a question. This thesis provides explanations from entrepreneurs’ perspectives- 
empathetic entrepreneurs are easier to accept changes (Huy, 1999) and learn from 
foreign environment. Thus, empathetic entrepreneurs are more likely to learn and 
adapt to local environment and hence minimize the institutional distance. They are 
less likely to exit for cultural conflicts.  
Jenkins et al. (2014) argue that learning is a unique process shared by how 
entrepreneurs perceive the cause of an event. In my findings, entrepreneurs with 
negative predispositions to host country are less likely to adapt to local environment 
(Chinese informal institutions) since they perceive the cause of the negative event are 
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related to other people/ situation (e.g. Chinese government).  They frequently use a 
problem–solving strategy to overcome problems caused by external factors (Jenkins 
et al., 2014). They are less motivated to learn since they view the problem as 
“Chinese people, institutions, or government’s faults”. In addition, their 
predispositions also limit their strategic choices and opportunity identification. In 
comparison, entrepreneurs with positive predispositions to host country are more 
likely to show empathy and minimize the institutional distance through learning. 
They perceive the cause of negative event are about them (e.g. poor management), 
thus they are more likely to re-examine their strategies, adjust their value and adapt 
to local environment.  
This finding contributes to learning theory in IB field. Current IB literature assumes 
organizations automatically learn from internationalization experiences (e.g. Uppsala 
model) but my findings suggests entrepreneurs should be viewed as a heterogeneous 
group in learning. Entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country affect their 
perceptions of incident and individual learning process in internationalization. The 
outcome of individual learning changes entrepreneurs’ predispositions and affects 
next decision-making process (Vygotsky, 1997). It is a dynamic and idiosyncratic 
process building on entrepreneurs’ social and historical experiences. It is true that 
entrepreneurs can learn from their internationalization experience; however, the 
degree of learning varies and the learning outcome is not necessarily beneficial to 
future internationalization.  
Another contribution related to entrepreneurs’ predispositions is the connection with 
cultural intelligence. In global leadership literature, Moreley et al. (2010) indicate 
entrepreneurs need to possess certain capabilities to effectively operate and survive 
in global markets. They require different cultural intelligence to survive in difference 
markets. This research suggests the perception management (positive 
predispositions) and emotional management (being empathetic) enhance 
entrepreneurs’ mental flexibility when confronted with cultural difference thus make 
them curious and interest in other culture. My finding confirms the development of 
cultural intelligence (e.g. guanxi and political ties) and emotional intelligence (see 
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section 7.2.2.3) is as important as other rational intelligence. Further discussion of 
Chinese cultural intelligence is shown in section 7.3.   
7.2.2 Contributions to the Entrepreneurship Theories 
This research extends the threshold theory by examining business closure in the cross 
border activities in emerging economies. A new framework of entrepreneurs’ 
decision-making in international exit is developed, highlighting the centrality of 
entrepreneurs and their emotions in decision-making.  
7.2.2.1 Threshold theory and Chinese institutions 
Theme A contributes to threshold theory and the exit literature. Threshold theory 
indicates entrepreneurs’ alternative financial income affects their exit decisions. 
DeTienne and Chirico (2013) extend this theory by developing a conceptual 
framework showing how socio-emotional wealth influences the exit strategy. This 
thesis supports their arguments and provides empirical evidence to the propositions. 
In addition, I extend their research by investigating other non-economic variables 
(personal goals and predispositions) and focusing on firm exit instead of 
entrepreneurial exit. The concept of firm’s non-economic value (Zellweger and 
Astrachan, 2008) is brought to explain the shift of entrepreneurs’ threshold of 
performance. Threshold theory shows how entrepreneurs’ personal income and 
switching costs affect the exit decision. This research contributes to this theory by 
suggesting the role of entrepreneurs’ perceived non-economic value of owning the 
firm and proposing the concept of emotional survival. That is, entrepreneurs not only 
need to achieve financial survival (personal and organizational) but also emotional 
survival to sustain their foreign operations.  
Another important contribution of this research is that I introduce the concept of 
international exit. Current exit literature in Entrepreneurship field focuses on 
entrepreneurial exit and examines exit decisions in domestic context. The cross-
border and emerging economies data brings fresh insights into the exit literature. The 
institutional distances and turbulent business environment in emerging economic 
emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs’ non-economic variables and emotions. For 
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example, entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country and their emotional costs of 
foreign operations are the new findings of this research. My thesis brings theories in 
Entrepreneurship field to explain IB phenomena; meanwhile, it also nurtures 
Entrepreneurship field by providing new findings highlighting the role of emerging 
economies institutions and institutional distances.  
Bruton et al. (2010) argue that the institutions have proven to be powerful in 
examining Entrepreneurship topics in cross-border activities that institutional 
environment limits entrepreneurial opportunities and thus affect new venture creation. 
The institutions in emerging economies are having a significant impact on 
internationalization strategies in IB field (Peng et al., 2009; Kiss et al., 2011). 
Similarly, institutions affect entrepreneurial processes and behaviours (Goss and 
Doern, 2014). My analysis suggests that institutional environment in China is 
markedly different from those in more developed economies. Institutional problems 
and institutional distances bring fresh insights into current Entrepreneurship literature. 
This dynamic and turbulent research context not only has a significant impact on 
organizational economic costs (Peng et al., 2009) but also on entrepreneurs’ 
emotional costs (Goss and Doern, 2014) in foreign operations. Consequently, exit 
decisions in this setting should be viewed through a different lens and the concept of 
entrepreneurs’ emotional survival is therefore developed. An emotion-driven 
decision-making process emerged from my data, showing there is no such thing as 
purely rational decision-making. 
7.2.2.2 Family Business in internationalization 
Family business scholars indicate that the internationalization of family businesses is 
developing into a significant research area (Kontinen and Ojala, 2010). It is 
important to investigate family business as a distinct entity, aiming to identify their 
specific features in the context of internationalization research area. This research 
makes two contributions to family business literature: the qualitative data of family 
business internationalization and the cultural impact on family business. Firstly, 
Kontinen and Ojala (2010) point out that little knowledge of the internationalization 
processes of family business actually exists, suggesting a need great deal of 
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verification (both qualitative and quantitative). This research provides the qualitative 
evidence for future investigation. This research extends the concept of family socio-
emotional wealth (SEW) (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011) by testing it on individual 
decision-making.  SEW is not only applicable to organizational behaviour but also to 
entrepreneur’s behaviour.  My analysis suggests SEW explains why family firms 
behave differently to other firms as well as why family business owners behave 
differently to other business owners. Family business owners consider the welfare of 
their family before making decisions.  
Secondly, Bruton et al. (2010) suggest institutions play a significant role in 
internationalization. It is found in my data that Confucianism and the collectivist 
society increase the impact of family on entrepreneurs’ decision-making. This 
finding echoes Sharma and Manikutty’s  (2005) conceptual paper and contributes to 
family business research, suggesting the role of family varies with culture/ 
institutions.  
7.2.2.3 Entrepreneurial emotions and cross border activities 
This research emphasizes the role of emotions in decision-making, which has long 
been underestimated (Baron, 2008; Cardon et al., 2012; Hayton and Cholakova, 
2012). Scholars have reviewed the relationship of emotions and decision-making 
(Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Lerner et al., 2004), arguing that the field of 
entrepreneurship could also be nurtured by the inclusion of entrepreneurial emotions 
(Baron, 2008; Cardon et al., 2012).  Research is now turning to focus on emotions 
and how they affects the entrepreneurs’ decision-making in terms of opportunity 
discovery (Hayton and Cholakova, 2012), opportunity pursuit (Baron, 2008; Foo, 
2011), and venture termination (Shepherd and Cardon, 2009; Shepherd et al., 2009). 
However, these studies are mostly conceptual ones and target early stage of venture 
creation.  
This thesis contributes to entrepreneurial literature by providing empirical and 
qualitative data from emerging economies and investigating the holistic international 
entrepreneurial process. The grounded approach allows me to discover emotions that 
are rarely discussed before (e.g. disgust and empathy) and add knowledge to this area. 
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By introducing the role of emotions into internationalization activities, I contribute to 
decision-making literature with an explanation that it is an emotion driven process 
and present the positive and negative outcomes of emotions. In general, 
entrepreneurs with positive emotions are more likely to persist in their business 
venture and discover opportunities resulting from their optimistic predictions of 
success (Baron and Tang, 2011; Foo, 2011).  Interestingly, my analysis indicates that 
although positive emotions such as confidence and passion are essential elements for 
organizational growth, they are not necessarily lead to successful internationalization. 
On the other hand, entrepreneurs with intense negative emotions are usually more 
pessimistic thus tend to decrease their commitment level (Baron, 2008; Foo, 2009). 
My analysis tells a different story that although anger is viewed as a negative 
emotion, it provides emotional energy for entrepreneurs to re-examine, adjust, and 
solve problems to improve current situation. Therefore, anger could have a positive 
impact on commitment level and organizational operations.  
Another important contribution to entrepreneurial emotion literature is the discovery 
of empathy and its impact on individual learning. I found disgust and empathy, 
which were rarely discussed in entrepreneurial emotion literature. It is evident that 
empathetic entrepreneurs are more likely to adapt to local institutions and minimize 
the negative impact of institutional distances (section 7.2.1.3). I examine the source, 
formation, and the impact of empathy on international commitments (Figure 6-4). 
The positive relationship between entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host country, 
empathy, learning and adaptation provides an in-depth and holistic explanation to the 
role of empathy in international entrepreneurial process.  
Emotional survival is another new concept proposed in this research. My analysis 
suggests negative emotions usually increase entrepreneurs’ emotional costs of 
foreign operation while positive emotions usually increase their emotion gains. High 
emotional costs would result in higher threshold of performance and international 
exit. Thus, to sustain the foreign operation, entrepreneurs not only need to achieve 
financial survival but also emotional survival. 
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7.2.3 Contributions to the research setting 
The selected research setting extends our understanding in two aspects: family 
business and Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. Firstly, conventional 
theories (e.g. Boddewyn, 1983; Benito and Welch, 1997) based on developed 
countries MNEs cannot provide comprehensive understanding of those in emerging 
countries. Our current understanding of other types of ventures (e.g. Family business, 
SMEs) and their decision-making in international exit has been limited (Mudambi 
and Zahra, 2007; Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2013).  This research contributes to 
the research setting by providing data from privately owned SMEs and family 
business.  
Secondly, this study contributes by offering a unique setting: Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs invested in China. Taiwan and China, where few studies have done 
despite the unique historical connection and political tension. Politically, Taiwanese 
and Chinese Government are conflicting regimes but their people, history, cultural 
background and economy are closely intertwined. This interesting phenomenon 
creates a complicated and unique business environment thus requires more attention 
(Hsing, 1998). Taiwanese entrepreneurs may choose China due to short psychic 
distances, but how they operate in China and how they response to the increasing 
political tension and the rapid-changing environment remains interesting.  
Although Taiwanese entrepreneurs are considered as the latecomers in international 
market, they have achieved great success in China (Hsing, 1998; Mathews, 2006).  
Several issues have been raised in discussing Taiwanese entrepreneurs in China.  
According to OLI model, cheap labour costs and large market are two incentives for 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs.  From the Uppsala model’s view, Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
invest in China for a short psychic distance. However, section 1.2.1.2 indicates that 
the political tensions between Taiwan and China increases the psychic distances and 
results in a major exit trend. This thesis explains the cause of the exit trend, the role 
of political tension and how Taiwanese entrepreneurs perceive and respond to the 
institutional distance.  
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The research setting of this study aligns with the suggestion of Jones and Coviello 
(2011), Meyer et al. (2012) and McDougall-Covin et al. (2014) who call for 
internationalization studies focusing on different research settings including 
emerging economies, different types of ventures, post-entry development and 
individual level analysis. The research setting of this thesis not only answers research 
questions but also provides fresh insights into future international exit research in 
emerging economies. An emerging economy based framework is provided showing 
how entrepreneurs from newly developed economy invest and exit an emerging 
economy. Compared with Boddewyn (1983) and Benito and Welch’s (1999) models 
that target on developed-developed economy, my research highlights the thin formal 
institutions and the powerful informal institutions in China and how this context 
affects the economic and emotional costs for foreign entrepreneurs invested in China. 
This research answers the question that what entrepreneurs are more likely to survive 
in China and how they develop institution-specific capability through individual 
learning.  
7.3 Managerial Implications 
This section addresses how the generated results can be applicable to managers and 
entrepreneurs operating in foreign markets. It is evident from my data that the role of 
entrepreneur is crucial in making decisions in internationalization. In line with the 
outcomes discussed in the thesis, managerial implications are provided for other 
entrepreneurs who pursue a successful and sustainable development of their ventures 
in emerging economies. The managerial recommendations are listed and discussed 
below. 
Morley et al. (2010) suggest practitioners often ask the question “What competencies 
should we build our global leadership programs upon”. Scholars try to provide 
conceptual framework to answer this question (e.g. Bird and Osland, 2004; Morley et 
al., 2010) but there is a shortage of empirical supports. This thesis provides empirical 
data and suggests several capabilities that practitioners should develop to survive in 
foreign markets. The cultural intelligence and the emotional intelligence are 
discussed below.  
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Cultural intelligence-Positive predispositions: Entrepreneurs should reflect upon 
that their predispositions to host country affect their decision-making in terms of 
information selection and interpretation. In my data, entrepreneurs with positive 
predispositions are more likely to adapt to Chinese institutions and minimise 
institutional distances that help increase the survival rate of foreign ventures. 
Entrepreneurs have pre-existing predispositions to China but it may be changed by 
their experience. For example, Entrepreneur Machine and Food did not have strong 
predispositions to China before entry but Entrepreneur Machine ended up with strong 
negative predispositions while Entrepreneur Food was attached to China. The actions 
they took in response to critical incidents, particularly those related to institutional 
distances varied. Entrepreneur Machine avoided communication and interaction with 
locals while Entrepreneur Food actively joined local society and read about Chinese 
history. Thus Entrepreneur Food is more likely to build positive predispositions to 
China through communication and learning.   
Entrepreneur Food’s positive predispositions are the key to learn and adapt to local 
institutions. This positive predispositions can be developed through individual 
learning. This perception management enhances entrepreneurs’ mental flexibility 
when confronted with cultural differences and make them curious and interest in 
other culture (Morley et al., 2010). This argument, together with my findings in 
section 6.2.1.1, indicates entrepreneurs can develop their global competencies 
through managing their predispositions to host countries. This cultural intelligence is 
as important as other intelligence (e.g. rational, verbal and quantitative intelligence) 
for a global leader (Alon and Higgins, 2005). The cultural intelligence in Chinese 
market in discussed below.  
Cultural intelligence of China: Learning and adaptation are important factors to 
build positive predispositions, decrease institutional distances, enable opportunity 
identification and survive in emerging economies. Poor cultural adaption and 
intelligence lead to negative predispositions, unnecessary conflicts and leadership 
failure (Alon and Higgins, 2005). The first step to develop cultural intelligence is to 
recognize cultural differences.   
   
271 
 
Due to the thin formal institutions in China, informal institutions largely substitutes 
formal institutions in terms of property right, arbitrary enforcement of business 
regulations, resource acquisition and opportunity identification. This increases the 
difficulty and costs for foreign entrepreneurs operating in China since informal 
institutions are usually invisible and unwritten. My findings show that entrepreneurs 
have two reactions towards informal institutional distances: resistance or 
internalisation. For those entrepreneurs who resist local informal institutions, they 
usually need to pay higher operational costs to “keep” their own ways of doing 
things and they may have higher emotional costs due to institutional distances. For 
those entrepreneurs who embrace local culture, they are easier to develop cultural 
intelligence such as guanxi. According to Entrepreneur Metal and Construction, this 
is a more efficient way to operate in China.  
Political ties, guanxi and being Zhongyong are the cultural intelligence to survive in 
China. Maintaining a good relationship with Chinese Government is important. In 
addition, other guanxi such as relationship with suppliers and customers are also 
crucial. It is agreed that network is positive to opportunity identification. In China, 
guanxi (network) is not only an access to opportunity but also a shortcut to 
opportunity pursuit since informal institutions are more influential than formal 
institutions. Therefore, instead of building guanxi alone (which is usually time-
consuming and costly), collaborating with local companies or hiring local managers 
may be a better way to enter Chinese market.     
As suggested by Entrepreneur Metal, entrepreneurs should be Zhongyong to survive 
in China. It is based on 3 principles: 1) self-control, self-learning, and self-regulated 
2) empathy and forgiveness 3) being sincere and faithful. Being Zhongyong is like 
the double loop learning that changes entrepreneurs’ assumptions of certain events. 
In my cases, it changes entrepreneurs’ perception of corruption and employee-
employer conflicts by minimizing the institutional distances. Thus, entrepreneurs 
may act like a local in problem-solving and resource-seeking. For example, 
Entrepreneur Construction viewed bribery and commission as an operational cost 
instead of unethical events and Entrepreneur Fruit viewed staff corruption as the 
result of poor management but not institutional problems.  
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I do not suggest that entrepreneurs should be a Chinese to survive in China; instead, I 
argue entrepreneurs should be open-minded to try to understand local culture. 
Entrepreneurs should jump out of comfort zone and avoid the “we are better than you” 
pre-existing image. Only by understanding local culture and communicating with 
locals, foreign entrepreneurs can learn to what extent they should localize the 
company and implant their own culture.  
Emotional intelligence: For entrepreneurs, understanding the impact of emotions 
allows them to learn to manage or even take advantages of their emotions. Like 
cultural intelligence, emotional intelligence is also vital for entrepreneurs operating 
in foreign markets (Alon and Higgins, 2005; Bird et al., 2010). Entrepreneurs should 
appreciate emotions as something natural and essential in decision-making. The 
effective management of their emotions enables them to reduce the emotional costs 
and achieve emotional survival. Emotions can be the drive of opportunity 
identification, organizational changes, and learning which are positive to 
organizational development. Entrepreneurs should have “an awareness of, and 
sensitivity to, the emotions and feelings of others” (Bird et al., 2010: 817) to develop 
their emotional intelligence to survive in China. As indicated in my findings, being 
empathetic is positive to the development of emotional intelligence. It is worth time 
and effort to perceive, identify, and understand the impact of emotions and try to 
manage it in everyday life. Entrepreneurs’ emotional intelligence is positive to 
organizational performance (Staw, 1981) and the development of global leadership 
competencies (Alon and Higgins, 2005).  
7.4 Policy Implications 
Most of the policy recommendations derived from this research are targeted a 
national and government level rather than an industry level. This is due to the fact 
that this research does not focus on particular industry but provides important 
suggestions for Taiwanese and Chinese Government. It is agreeable that Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs invested in China play a significant role in economic development in 
both countries. Despite the political tension, Taiwan and China are closely 
intertwined in terms of economic development. As suggested in Theme A, 
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Taiwanese entrepreneurs’ predispositions to China, which are built on their social 
and historical experiences, affect their willingness to stay in China. Thus, it can be 
predicted that deteriorated cross-strait relationship may increase the exit rates. 
Viewed from Chinese Government’s perspectives, Chinese institutions such as 
unspoken rules and bribery are major difficulties that Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
experience in China. Although these difficulties are inevitable in this fast-changing 
emerging economy, Chinese Government should offer a communication platform for 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs to seek for helps. Instead of letting them discover the 
unspoken rules through negative experience, local government may offer a workshop 
or database to help new investors understand informal institutions to minimise the 
institutional distances.  
Viewed from Taiwanese Government’s perspectives, Entrepreneur Metal indicated a 
lack of systemic support from Taiwanese Government in foreign investment. In 
addition, the investment plans and regulations are frequently changed by the political 
tension between two governments. He calls for a more open and transparent 
regulations and Taiwanese Government should minimise the effect of political 
tension on economy activity. In addition, Taiwanese Government should offer 
consultation service to entrepreneurs interested in overseas opportunities.  Chinese 
institutions are a major difficulty for Taiwanese entrepreneurs; however, most 
entrepreneurs are not aware of this problem until they actually operate in China. 
They usually seek support from their friends and are unaware of the Straits Exchange 
Foundation, which can offer consultation services.  
The role of institutional distances, predispositions to China, and individual learning 
imply Taiwanese Government should provide adequate resources, information and 
practical guidelines to get entrepreneurs prepared for the institutional distances and 
show them where, how and when to seek for helps. It is agreeable that understanding 
local culture is beneficial for business survival. Taiwanese Government should 
provide information about China from economic perspective instead of political one 
to avoid the pre-existing negative predispositions to China.  
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Finally, it is important to point out that current political tension between Taiwan and 
China may affect long-term cross-strait economic development. As indicated in 
Figure 6-8, entrepreneurs learn from their current actions and it may change their 
predispositions. A single government action (e.g. blocks websites, news) may 
significantly change entrepreneurs’ predispositions (e.g. Entrepreneur Machine). 
Hence, both countries should be careful in making any political announcement and 
actions.  
7.5 Evaluation of the thesis 
This section firstly evaluates the significance of theoretical and methodological 
contributions. The generalization to other contexts is discussed. It also looks at the 
limitation of this research. 
7.5.1 Evaluation of theoretical contributions 
This thesis aims to explore the role of entrepreneur in decision-making in the context 
of international exit in emerging economies. The theoretical contributions of this 
research highlight how and why the key active agents, entrepreneurs, make a non-
rational international exit decision. The thesis integrates concepts from various 
strands of International Business (IB) and Entrepreneurship literature. The 
entrepreneurial exit and emotions literature in Entrepreneurship field and foreign 
divestment, de-internationalization literature and institution-based view in 
International Business (IB) field are combined to examine the exit of Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs invested in China. 
The theoretical contribution of this research adds to knowledge of bridging the IB 
and Entrepreneurship field. The Entrepreneurship theory provides fresh insights to IB 
field through highlighting the authority of entrepreneurs and presenting the non-
economic gain of owning a firm. The IB theory adds to Entrepreneurship field 
through presenting the dynamic business context and the role of institutions. The 
research setting contributes to both fields through adding empirical data from 
emerging economies. It answers four scholarly calls from different fields: firm’s 
post-entry development (Jones and Coviello, 2012), the linkage of theory to 
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emerging economies (Xu and Meyer, 2012), the role of entrepreneur and their mind-
set in internationalization (McDougall-Covin et al., 2014), and the role entrepreneurs’ 
emotions in shaping entrepreneurial process (Cardon et al., 2012).  
In summary, the theoretical contribution of this thesis enhances the understanding of 
international exit in emerging economies through entrepreneurs’ perspectives and 
generating new concepts from emerging areas in Entrepreneurship field. The new 
concepts are evident through the investigation and research process of this thesis.  
The next section discusses the possibility to generalise the finding to other emerging 
economy contexts.  
7.5.2 Generalisation to other emerging economy contexts 
The findings and arguments in my thesis may be applicable to other emerging 
economy contexts. The argument that entrepreneurs are the key active agents in 
decisions making is applicable to firms from developed and developing economies. It 
is true that individual variables may have different degrees of impact on decision-
making process in different contexts. For instances, entrepreneurs’ predispositions to 
host country, institutional distances and informal institutions may be less significant 
in countries with thick formal institutions (Peng et al., 2009). However, family and 
personal goals are influential for entrepreneurs from other contexts. For example, 
Hatem (2012) highlights the role of family (second generations) in 
internationalization strategies in north Africa region and Choo and Wong (2006) 
indicate Singaporean entrepreneurs’ non-economic goals drive their decision-making 
process. Entrepreneurs’ emotions, as suggested by Shepherd (2009), play a vital role 
in every exit decision.  
Hence, the conclusions drawn from my research might therefore applicable to firms 
in other contexts, particularly for those firms from developed economies invested in 
emerging economies. Institutional distances play a vital role in this research and is 
closed intertwined with my findings of predispositions and emotions.  Entrepreneurs 
from developed economies may experience greater distances when investing in 
emerging economies thus highlight the role of entrepreneurs’ predispositions to host 
country, empathy and disgust. Applying my theoretical framework to other emerging 
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economies contexts may achieve similar results; however, researchers should not 
assume that any or all characteristics will be shared but use a grounded approach to 
uncover shared characteristics.  
7.5.3 Validity and reliability 
The threat of validity and reliability in qualitative research is mentioned by Miles and 
Huberman (1994). Construct validity is described as “a procedure which refers to the 
quality of conceptualisation or operationalization of the relevant concept” (Gibbert, 
2008:1466). Construct validity was ensured in this study by using multiple sources of 
evidence and by having interviewees review drafts and critical incident tables of the 
case study reports.  
Reliability describes the minimisation or elimination of random error, in other words 
researchers should come to the same conclusions if they conduct the study following 
the same steps (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). In this research, reliability was sought by 
using a case study protocol and the detail illustration of data collection, coding and 
analysis process (Chapter 4). Data were collected from different sources (Table 4-5) 
for a data triangulation purpose (Table 4-7). The analysis is reliable in terms of 
replicability because coding rules have been documented and the coding procedure is 
illustrated in section 4.6.2.1 (Bryman and Bell, 2007). However, Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) indicate that the attempt to replicate the data collection may not succeed for 
the subjective participants.  
7.5.4 Limitations of the research 
Although every effort was made to conduct a research with high standards and high 
quality, as with any research, there are limitations to this study. Qualitative and case 
study research is generalizable to theoretical propositions but not to populations 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). That is, this research aims to achieve analytical 
generalization instead of statistical generalisation. Due to the emergent nature of the 
topic and the lack of in-depth understanding of the context and issue, following, the 
case study method is selected to acquire knowledge, explore new area, and build the 
theory (Tan and Nojonen, 2011).  
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In addition, the context of this research is Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China. 
Due to institutional, national, and cultural difference, the decision-making of 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs may not represent other foreign entrepreneurs including the 
US, UK or Germany. For example entrepreneurs or top management team of 
Western large multinational companies usually make decisions according to careful 
analysis and reports. The ownership structure influences the decision-making and the 
exit rate in internationalization (Liu et al., 2011). Different culture (collectivism 
verses individualism) may also affect the decision-making in terms of pursing group 
or individual interests (Sharma and Manikutty, 2005). Another limitation is the 
subjectivity due to the retrospective and self-report design. Some data were collected 
after many years and the memory can be fallible (Blaikie, 2010). Employing a 
critical incident technique only minimised the effect of retrospective bias, but cannot 
eliminate them.  
Finally, this thesis does not incorporate an industry-specific view as it investigates 
cases from different industrial backgrounds. It is difficult to carry out a sector 
specific study since there are insufficient cases for individual industrial sectors 
(Turcan, 2006). Moreover, this thesis focuses on Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in 
China. Compared with sector specific variables such as competition level, context 
specific variables such as institutions should have more impact on entrepreneurs’ 
mind-set.   
7.6 Future research 
In general, there are four future research opportunities emerged from my research. 
Firstly, acknowledging the value of non-economic variables and emotions opposes a 
view that entrepreneur is rational. Emotions are compulsory in decision-making; the 
problem is, to what extent. Further discussion may build on answering this question. 
Ji and Dimitratos (2013) examine the impact of culture on degree of rationality and 
Choo and Wong (2006) argue Singaporean entrepreneurs are more likely to be driven 
by non-economic variables. Sharma and Manikutty (2005) propose that, among other 
factors, culture has an impact on attachment and on decision-making of family firms, 
and this may differ depending on whether it is in a collectivistic or an individualistic 
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society. That is, an entrepreneur from a collectivistic society may be less monetary- 
driven and more family-driven. My findings also show similar results and 
entrepreneurs frequently reference Confucianism as the key variables in their 
decision-making. They seem to have different definitions and emphasis of the role of 
family in their business operation. An in-depth investigation of cultural impact and a 
cross-country comparison would be an interesting topic.  
Secondly, my research uses the research setting-entrepreneurs from newly developed 
economy invested in emerging economy.  Other setting may be applied such as 
developed-emerging (e.g. UK-China), emerging-emerging/developing (e.g. China-
Brazil; China-Vietnam) or emerging-developed economies (e.g. China- USA). My 
research finds institutional distances is a major source of negative critical incidents, 
and frequently generates strong positive/negative emotions. It remains an interesting 
question of what emotions entrepreneurs may elicit in response to different 
institutions.  
Thirdly, my findings suggest empathy is positive to entrepreneurs’ learning and 
adaptation of local institutions. Conversely, what are the emotions that may impede 
entrepreneurs’ learning process? Disgust may be the answer since it is a defensive 
mechanism to avoid psychic incorporation or further contacts with a repellent object 
(Rozin et al., 2008). Further research on disgust is thus required to provide an 
overview of entrepreneurs’ learning in internationalization. Additionally, confidence 
has both positive and negative effects on venture survival. My data suggests the 
sources of confidence could be resource richness, entrepreneurial experience, 
industrial experience, and international experience (in the host country). What type 
and what level of confidence is more likely to contribute to venture survival require 
further investigation. A quantitative research testing entrepreneur’s different 
types/level of confidence and exit rate may answer the question.  
Finally, this research mainly examines emotions separately. Brundin et al. (2008) 
suggest confidence can moderate the effect of other emotions. As suggested in my 
critical incident tables, single incident can elicit more than one emotion. The 
relationship between emotions may be examined in future research, such as an 
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empathetic entrepreneur is less likely to feel negative emotions or a passionate 
entrepreneur is more likely to overcome their fear. The relationship between anger 
and confidence is also interesting since my data suggests angry entrepreneurs usually 
have higher confidence level, which supports them to take actions. London et al. 
(1971) suggest similar concepts but a more in-depth analysis is required.  
7.7 My publication plans 
The results of my thesis will be submitted in journals for publication. Current 
publication plans are listed below 
Submitted and waiting for reply 
The first paper presents the finding in Theme B, focusing on how entrepreneurs’ 
emotions shape their actions in internationalization.   
1. The role of entrepreneurs’ emotions in international exit strategies: A study of 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs invested in China (Journal of Business Venturing). 
Future submission plans 
The second paper highlights the connection of being empathy, individual learning, 
institutional distances, trust building and entrepreneurs’ commitment level in foreign 
markets. I will focuses on the aspect that learners should be viewed as a 
heterogeneous group in learning (section 6.3.1.3). 
2. Minimizing the institutional distances in foreign investment: empathy, 
learning and trust building (Journal of Business Venturing). 
The third paper presents my revised theoretical framework in Figure 6-8 and Theme 
A results, highlight the individual variables that results in international exit decisions.  
3. Understanding international exit decisions, viewed from an individual and 
non-economic perspective (International Business Review).  
The fourth paper is a literature review paper of 136 articles relevant to international 
exit, foreign divestment, de-internationalization, international relocation and foreign 
business closure (Appendix A). This review presents current understanding of 
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international exit in IB field and identifies the need of an emerging economy-based 
model, behavioural turn, and an individual level analysis.  
4. International exit- a critical review and research agenda (International 
Business Review). 
The fifth paper discusses the rationality in decision-making process and develops a 
theoretical framework of non-rational decision-making process using a learning 
perspective.  
5. Non-rationality and learning in strategic decision processes (Long range 
planning, rejected and planning for another submission) 
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Appendix A-1: Environmental level variables 
Category Variables Studies 




expansion and crisis 
 
Geroski, Mata and Portugal 
(2010)  




The founding conditions are vital variables of firm’s survival. 
The effect of GDP and industry competition is long-term 
while the effect of resources is immediate.   
Swoboda, Olejnik, and 
Morschett (2011) 
Quantitative study, 325 
Germany firms survey 
Firm performance and external environment are related to 
mode reductions (e.g. divestment or exit) while internal 
environment and managerial attitudes connected with mode 
increases (e.g. expansion) 
Child, Chung and Davies 
(2003) 
Quantitative study, 615 
HK firms in China 
Although favourable economic condition is positive to foreign 
firms’ survival rate, strategic managerial action also plays a 
role to improve performance and survival rate.    




Quantitative study, 2200 
Sweden firms, cohort 
study 
The decreasing risk during macroeconomic expansion 
contributes to firm’s survival rate while economic downturn 
increases the exit rate 
Labour Costs 
 
Fisch and Zschoche (2012)  Quantitative study, 
Germany MNEs  
Firms divest a foreign location due to rising and uncertain 
labour costs.  Foreign firms shift production to locations with 
opposite labour costs developments 
Coucke and Sleuwaegen 
(2008) 
Quantitative study, 
manufacturing firms in 
Belgium 
Firms relocate their production base to lower wage countries 
(e.g. from EU to non EU countries) to improve their chance of 
survival.  
Economic gap between 
host and home country 
Tsang and Yip (2007). Quantitative study 
Singapore firms, archives 
analysis 
When the home country economic condition is better than host 
country, the greater economic distance between home and host 
country, the higher survival rate of FDI firms 




Institutions Institutional changes 
 
Chung and Beamish (2005) Quantitative and 
longitudinal study, 
archives analysis, Japanese 
firms in emerging markets 
Wholly-owned and ownership concentrated subsidiaries are 
more likely to survive in post crisis institutions due to 
effective response. Manufacturing firms are also more likely 





Geroski, Mata and Portugal 
(2010),  
 




Industry concentration has long-term effect on firm’s survival. 
High and low industrial competition are both negative to firm 
survival.  The density of upstream suppliers also influence 
firm’s survival rate.  
Mitchell, Shaver and Yeung 
(1994) 
Quantitative study, survey 
34 Canadian firms in USA 
High and low foreign presences are both negative to firm’s 
survival. High foreign presence industry is too competitive 
while low foreign presence industry is lack of supply chain. 
Shaver, Mitchell and Yeung 
(1997) 
Quantitative study, 354 
foreign manufacturing 
firms in USA 
Firm’s previous international experience contributes to foreign 
survival. In addition to own experience, firm can also obtain 
the knowledge from industry. Greater foreign presence in 
industry will facilitate the industry knowledge spill over, 
which contributes to the survival of foreign firms.   
Coucke and Sleuwaegen 
(2008) 
Quantitative study, 
manufacturing firms in 
Belgium 
Although higher industry concentration is negative to firm’s 
survival, MNEs are less sensitive to this situation compared 
with domestic firms.  
Industry life circle/ 
Dominant design 
 
Klepper (2002)  
 
Domestic Exit 
Quantitative and cohort 
study, firms from 4 USA 
mature industries 
The appearance of dominant design and the industry life circle 
determine the survival of new entrants. In general, firms 
entering earlier may have longer life spans, but only until the 
emergence of the dominant design (Klepper, 2002; Suarez and 
Utterback, 1995).  
Diversified and routinized MNEs are more like to survive 
before dominant design while innovative and entrepreneurial 
firms are more likely to survive after dominant design (Lin 
and Huang, 2008). 
Lin and Huang (2008) 
Domestic Exit 
Quantitative and cohort 
study, Taiwan firms 
Suárez and Utterback (1995) 
Domestic Exit 
Quantitative study, 6 
industries 
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Appendix A-2: Organizational level variables 
Category Variables Studies 
Authors Methods Finding 
Firm 
characteristics 
Size Bercovitz and Mitchell 
(2007) 
Quantitative and longitudinal study, 
USA medical industry, 681 firms 
Greater business scales and scope are positive to firm’s survival due 
to resource richness and flexibility. 
Sales Fotopoulos and Louri 
(2000) 
Quantitative study, Greek 
manufacturing firms 
Greater sales and profitability are positive to firm’s survival, thus 
firms established during economic recession are more likely to exit. 
Ownership 
structure 
Mata and Portugal 
(2000) 
Quantitative and longitudinal study, 
Portugal government database  
Ownership structure affects the chance of divestment but have no 
significant influence on business closure.  
Chen and Wu (1996) Quantitative study, 1,338 foreign-
owned (mainly Japan and USA) 
firms operating in Taiwan  
Foreign ownership is shown to be positively related to survival. 
Fully-owned subsidiaries are less likely to exit since they enjoy 
more competitive advantages of headquarter. Also, the lack of local 
participation also increases exit costs since foreign owners cannot 
transfer equity shares within the firm. 
Kronborg and Thomsen 
(2009) 
Quantitative study, foreign 
subsidiaries in Denmark, 
comparison study of foreign and 
domestic companies 
The exit risk for foreign owned companies is half of domestic 
companies due to the resources, expertise and experience of parent 
company.  However, this foreign survival premium decreases over 
time due to the rapid growth in the number of foreign subsidiaries.   
Firm resources General 
human capital 
Westhead, Wright and 
Ucbasaran (2001) 
Quantitative and longitudinal 
survey, 621 UK firms in 
manufacturing and service industry 
The general human capital of entrepreneurs increases the possibility 
to export. Although it has not significant effect on survival, it 
significantly improves performance.  
Mata and Portugal 
(2000) 
Quantitative and longitudinal study, 
Portugal government database 
Greater human capital discourages both exit and divestment 




Westhead, Wright and 
Ucbasaran (2001) 
Quantitative and longitudinal 
survey, 621 UK firms in 
manufacturing and service industry 
Firms with sufficient financial capital and access to financial capital 






Westhead, Wright and 
Ucbasaran (2001) 
Quantitative and longitudinal 
survey, 621 UK firms in 
manufacturing and service industry 
Firms with management know-how are more likely to export, 
which is positive to long-term growth and performance. Industry-
specific knowledge is positive to firm’s internationalization and 
performance.    
Li (1995) 
 
Quantitative study, Foreign 
subsidiaries of USA computer and 
Previous international experience can overcome liability of 
newness and foreignness, and is positive to firm’s survival.  




Shaver, Mitchell and 
Yeung (1994) 
Quantitative study, 354 foreign 
manufacturing firms in USA 
Previous international experience, especially current host country 
experience helps managers to identify the industrial knowledge 
spill-over and is positive to firm’s survival.  
Delios and Beamish, 
(2001) 
Quantitative study, 3,080 
subsidiaries of 641 Japanese firms 
Parent firms’ foreign experience is positive to new subsidiaries’ 
survival.  Kim et al. (2012) further indicate inter subsidiaries’ 
learning also increase the survival rate. The exchange of knowledge 
and experience between subsidiaries-headquarter and subsidiary-
subsidiary, the cumulative experience in internationalization 
enhances the survival in all subsidiaries.  
Kim, Lu and Rhee 
(2012) 





Brüderl and Preisendörfe 
(1998) 
Domestic Exit 
1700 Germany start-ups, 
interviews, quanta 
By testing 1700 Germany start-ups, the network compensation 
theory (network can compensate the lack of other resources) does 
not find empirical confirmation; however, network enhances firm’s 
performance and survival of start-ups.  
Manolovaa, Manevb and 
Gyoshevc (2010) 
Quantitative study, 623 INVs in 
Bulgaria 
Firm’s and personal networks facilitates the speed of 
internationalization, and the survival of INV depends on the speed 
that firm’s transfer founder’s personal networks to inter firm 
network 
Zhou (2013) Quantitative study, 1946 Chinese 
entrepreneurial firms 
Firms with political connections are easier to survive in China 
because entrepreneurial firms with political connections enjoy more 
security in terms of property rights and resources.  
Entry strategy Entry time Isobe, Makino and 
Montgomery (2000) 
Quantitative study, 220 Japanese 
joint ventures in China 
Early entrant and high commitment level (see entry mode) with 
condition of strategic importance and the support from 
infrastructure and parent company are positive to firm survival and 
growth.   
Kronborg and Thomsen 
(2009) 
Quantitative study, foreign 
subsidiaries in Denmark, 
comparison study of foreign and 
domestic companies 
Foreign entrants enjoy greater chance to survive, and this survival 
premium is even more significant for early entrants.  However, this 
survival premium is decreasing and even gone over time as more 
and more foreign competitors enter the market.   
Sapienza, De Clercq, and 
Sandberg (2005) 
Quantitative study, Belgium firms 
survey  
Early foreign entry is positive to organisational learning in both 
international and domestic markets 
Zaheer and Mosakowski 
(1997) 
Quantitative study, 2667 
international banks 
The passive learning will gradually reduce mortality risk and 
eventually increase survival rate. 






Isobe, Makino and 
Montgomery (2000) 
Quantitative study, 220 Japanese 
joint ventures in China 
High commitment level (see entry mode) with condition of strategic 
importance and the support from infrastructure and parent company 
are positive to firm survival and growth.   
Li (1995) Quantitative study, Foreign 
subsidiaries of USA computer and 
pharmaceutical industries 
Higher commitment level such as greenfield is positive to foreign 
survival compared with joint venture and acquisition. 
Shaver (1998) Quantitative study, 213 FDI entries 
by 177 firms in USA. 
Conventionally, greenfield is positive to firm’s survival. However 
this advantage disappears when firm “self-selected” greenfield 
strategy based on industrial condition and firm’s capabilities.  
Location 
choice 
Fotopoulos and Louri 
(2000) 
Quantitative study, Greek 
manufacturing firms 
Urban location is positive to survival due to agglomeration 
economies and market-pull factors. 
Shaver and Flyer (2000) Quantitative study, USA 
manufacturing industries 
Stay in agglomeration is negative to leading firms (imitation) but 






Li (1995) Quantitative study, Foreign 
subsidiaries of USA computer and 
pharmaceutical industries 
A higher exit rate for diversified subsidiaries than single focused 
subsidiary, which stick with parent firm’s main products.  
Stearns, Carter, Reynolds 
and William  (1995) 
Domestic Exit 
Quantitative study, USA firms 
survey 
Diversified product strategy is positive to firm survival. 
Christensen, Suárez and 
Utterback (1998) 
Domestic Exit 
Quantitative study, high-tech 
industry 




Zaheer and Mosakowski 
(1997) 
Quantitative study, 2667 
international banks 
Liability of foreignness will have negative impact on firm survival 
but diminish overtime.  
Mata and Portugal 
(2002) 
Quantitative and longitudinal study, 
Portugal government database 
Compared the survival rate of domestic and foreign firms, the 
authors found out liability of foreignness actually has no significant 




Isobe, and Beamish. 
(1997) 
Quantitative study, Japanese 
international joint ventures (IJV) 
Indicating two types of venture termination: intended and 
unintended. IJV exit market when their initial goal achieved 
(intended) or when unanticipated crisis that emerge in the external, 
internal, or inter-partner conditions after 
the establishment (unintended). 
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Appendix B: Coding rules and definitions-Data analysis 
Coding rules of institutions, Theme A 
Code Definition Examples 
Formal institutions  Government policy and interferes: difficulties 
resulted by government or lack of regulations 
including expropriation (take private property for 
public use) without suitable compensation, changing 
policy, political system and tension.  
Working with government is just like working with snakes, they may bite you. But it’s okay, 
I never expect I can keep my shares forever …At least we obtained some guanxi through 
this collaboration. As a businessman, it’s pointless to challenge Chinese government. This 
problem is just like what I had in 2005 (plant relocation). I felt a bit angry, but it’s okay. 
Well, this is China, you don’t want to risk your relationship with government for the sake of 




Difficulties associated with informal institutions, 
focusing on industry and market institutions, 
including bribery, local protectionism, and norms that 
may increase operational costs.  
There are too many unspoken rules in China…in addition to corruption, gifting, and 
facilitation fees, you also need to DONATE to local education system, residential welfare. 
There are many unspoken rules here and only insiders know how to deal with it. For 
example, you need to bribe the distributor to display the product, but how, who, when, what 
to bribe is a technique. You can’t survive in China without knowing all these (unspoken 
rules.) “ (Entrepreneur, Firm A) 
Employee-employer/ cultural conflicts 
Difficulties associated with informal institutions, 
focusing on dispute with employees or locals due to 
cultural difference and value or moral conflicts.  
 
“I am driven by responsibility instead of passion now, I have to feed my family and my 
workers have to support their families too…I hired local mangers to help me…but they still 
disappointed me sometimes, I think I will never use to the Chinese way of doing things” 
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Coding rules of Individual variables, Theme A 




A strong dislike or 
disinclination to specific 
event or Chinese 
environment/ 
institutions/ people 
When I first enter into China, Chinese government was more humble and always tries to help. Although they asked for 
bribery, they knew it was unethical and felt embarrassed. Now they think it is your job to bribe them and they accept only 
high value and trendy products, I remembered I gave a laptop to them (government office); they returned it and said they 
want latest apple products… I usually give higher pay to my staffs to ensure their loyalty, but they still steal my design and 
sell to my competitor to make extra money, I can’t remember how many times my workers steal critical components and 
parts to sell to my competitors for profit. Chinese people have become money-orientated and shameless, neglecting 
traditional virtues, moral, and ethics. They can do anything to be rich. I am sick of it” (Entrepreneur, Firm B) 
Family Family socio-emotional 
wealth, family control of 
the business, or family 
need and interests 
I have no vacations and no personal life in the past 20 years, I fully committed to my business and even my wife and 
children had to come to my factory to help in the weekend, we spent all our leisure time in this company...this is how I 
create and maintain my venture…shutting down Danyang is a sad decision, but it is a necessary step to protect and 
continue my business. I know Bao and I don’t think my children and handle her in the future. We commit so much in this, 
I can’t take any risks (of losing family control)…although I feel sorry for her, I must do it. (Entrepreneur, Firm A)  
Personal Goals Personal goal/ personal 
achievement (the dream 
come true) or shift of 
personal goal/interest 
 For me, making money is not my first priority anymore. For example, if you are very hungry, you need to do your best to 
fight for the food. But if you are not hungry, why you need to sacrifice everything for food? I don’t need many zeros in my 
bank accounts.  I just need enough money to support my life. I find there are something more interesting, I missed my life 
in USA, I visit Metropolitan Museum of Art every weekend and have a walk with my wife in the Brooklyn Bridge … it’s 
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Coding rules of emotions, Theme B 
Code Definition Keywords Examples 
Passion Passion is an intense positive 
emotion whose empirical referents 
or objects usually involve venture-
related opportunities, tasks, or 
activities and that has a 
motivational effect that stimulates 
entrepreneurs to overcome 
obstacles and remain engaged. 
(Cardon et al., 2009: 512) 
Passion is an emotional energy, 
drive and spirit (Bird, 1989)  
Be cheerful, exited, 
enthusiastic or energetic about 
the critical incident including 
business operation, 
opportunity, tasks and / or 
activities and give 
entrepreneurs emotional 
energy to doing something 
I felt very relaxed and happy in Firm E; it was interesting to meet so many different 
people. I stood on the top of a bench and explained how to select and eat Taiwanese 
fruit…The Nanjing people love me and my Taiwanese accents (laugh). I had 5 TV 
interviews, 3 newspaper reports, and 1 magazine interviews, I became the celebrity in 
Nanjing and everyone knows me (laugh)…It was a great fun and I feel so proud in 
front of my friends (Quote E3, Entrepreneur,). 
Confidence Confidence reflects two 
personal beliefs: (1) that it is 
feasible; and (2) a belief in one's 
ability to succeed (Dimov, 2010) 
Being fearless, proud, strong 
or daring about the critical 
incident including business 
operation, opportunity, tasks 
and / or activities. Usually 
entrepreneurs are optimistic 
about the opportunities, 
problem or business operation.  
I felt like innovation can be the solution. Previously, my profit range was 5-7% and 
now is much higher. Rising costs is not a problem anymore, I have orders for the next 
15 months and my customers are still queuing. Yes I keep investing in the lab. This is 
my competitive advantage… (entrepreneur Metal) 
 
Empathy Empathy involves internalising the 
frame of reference of another ( 
Triandis 1980) 
Empathy is to step into the shoes of 
another person, aiming to 
understand their feelings and 
perspectives, and to use that 
understanding to guide our actions 
(Krznaric, 2014). It is usually 
associated with understanding, 
forgiving and most importantly, the 
willingness to improve the situation 
Showing the attempt/curiosity 
to understand and learn local 
institutions and judge their 
behaviours from their own 
perspective not yours (avoid 




I solved at least 30 cases of employer and employee conflicts…Most of cases were 
because of the attitude of Taiwanese entrepreneurs. They were too arrogant, lack of 
communication and treat their staff like a machine. This (management style) worked 
well 20 years ago but not now...the old fashion way is not working anymore, you 
have to respect your staff, listen to their opinions, and use rewards instead of 
punishments. … You need to be considerable, humble, understanding your staff and 
most importantly, build up a systemic management style and be hard-working to be 
their model… (Quote F2, Entrepreneur). 
 
Note: entrepreneurs usually show his understanding of the situation, try to find the 
reasons of (negative) events (not avoid, not escape), and interpret from Chinese 
perspective.  








through learning and put yourself in 
other person’s shoes 
 
Fear Fear is a typical negative and an 
avoidance-oriented emotion signals 
threat and the incapability to 
control the situation (Welpe et al., 
2012).     
 
Being afraid, scared, 
frightened, nervous or shaky 
about the critical incident 
including business operation, 
opportunity, tasks and / or 
activities. 
It was unbelievable, my full-time sales works for my competitors for commissions. 
Everyone thinks they work for my competitors. They are so greedy and always try to 
take advantages of others…I am not surprised if Chen told me they (sales) run away 
with my money and inventory…  No, I don’t have expansion plan; it’s scary to leave 
my business to these people (Quote C4, Entrepreneur). 
Anger Anger has been found when the self 
has been offended or injure, 
additionally, another person (not 
the self) should be responsible for 
this negative event (Lerner and 
Tiedens, 2006). 
Being irritable, furious, or 
raging about the critical 
incident including business 
operation, opportunity, tasks 
and / or activities.  
My competitors keep stealing my new design. I was irritated that I doubled my R&D 
budget to speed up the innovation process. These dirty players will never catch up 
with me (Quote B9, Entrepreneur) 
Disgust Disgust is a negative emotion and a 
defensive mechanism to avoid 
psychic incorporation or further 
contacts with a repellent object 
(Rozin et al., 2008) 
Being sick of, hate or loathing 
about the critical incident 
including business operation, 
opportunity, tasks and / or 
activities. 
Their food is unhygienic even poisonous, their people never follow the rules, arguing 
and shouting everyday…this is not the life I want… I’ve had enough of China (Quote 
B10, Entrepreneurs)  
 
Note: In general, entrepreneurs should show his “dislike”, “aversion” or “hate”  
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Coding rules of actions, Theme B 
Code Definition Examples 




commitments in current 
project or identify and 
implement new 
opportunities.  
I keep finding potential location and partners in China. I’ve been to Sichuan, Shanghai, Beijing…except those 
stores, I also worked with Taobao and opened a online shop…. I know this is my problem…if I am very excited 
about something, I am blind…I was too optimistic about my products in Shanghai…I think sometimes you need 
to be crazy to set up a venture (Entrepreneur, Firm D) 
A2: No changes Entrepreneurs do nothing, 
remain status quo 
My Italian friend invited me to open a business selling gelato, gelato ingredients and equipment in China, I 
know there was a market and very possible to succeed…but I was too tired to run more business in China. I 
don’t want to commit more in China. It’s enough. Don’t want to worry about my design, property, and my 
staffs. I am afraid of Chinese government… (Entrepreneur, Firm B) 
A3: Decrease commitment Entrepreneur decreases 
commitment in current 
projects, shut down 
departments/ offices or 
downsize but still stay in 
China.  
“The rent was extremely high in Shanghai and my sales were out of control. I can’t tell you how angry I was 
that time. Bad news every day…Yes I admit that the Shanghai office was a big mess so I shut it down 
reluctantly. I can fix this problem by focusing on a smaller market instead of the whole Jiangsu province. ” 
(Entrepreneur, Firm C) 
 





Entrepreneurs actively seek 
for suggestions and advices 
from experts or locals to 
learn from local culture. 
Entrepreneurs are usually 
open-minded, open for 
communication and 
discussion. They may take 
actions including resource 
reconfiguration or 
organizational restructure to 
adjust to a Chinese setting. 
China is a very unique market; they have been isolated for years that create a very different consumption style. 
For example, when my boss (Firm C) entered into China, we said we are going to sell PU because it is the best 
anti-leak paint, advanced and cheap. PU is our golden hen (best –selling product) in Taiwan. Jiangsu rains a lot 
and has serious leaking problems; we thought we could successfully enter into market… But we were wrong, in 
terms of product and pricing strategy. First, Chinese painters were used to another traditional material called 
Curve (paint), which was old fashion and no one used it anymore. We couldn’t persuade painters to use PU 
because they were connected to Curve suppliers and used to Curve. Second, our pricing is wrong. The original 
strategy was 500 RMB per unit and gave 100 RMB to distributor, but this one didn’t work. We had to increase 
the price to 700 RMB per unit and gave 300RMB to distributor, thus they were motivated to promote your 
products…Innovative and good products are not necessary work in China. The most important thing is how you 
share the profit with distributors and how you promote. Promoting a product is not by imagination and it is 
unpredictable. You have to learn carefully and use a humble attitude to learn from locals. I like to spend time 
with my retailers, talk to builders and workers. I found the way they use paint is totally different from 
Taiwanese and its very interesting. My understanding of this market was mostly from these informal 
conversations. This is something you never learn from reading a Marketing report. This is why many large 
foreign companies visit me for market information and collaboration. I know how to modify the product to 
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Chinese style and how to communicate with Chinese distributors. (Entrepreneur, Firm G (Ex general manger of 
Firm C) 
 
A5: International exit Entrepreneurs completely 
withdraw the commitment 
and discontinue its operation 
in China by different means 
including sell-off, business 
closure or relocation to other 
countries.   
“My Chinese factory is a success, it helps me dominate Taiwanese market and expand to international market. 
Now mission is complete and I want to create a more sustainable business for my children…instead of letting 
my children to deal with Bao and the sophisticated guanxi, I prefer to relocate to Vietnam and let my children 
participate from the beginning…of course its exhausted to rebuild a factory in a new country, but I can do it, 
just like 20 years ago…I am excited about this; I know this is my best chance to dominate the global brush 
market. The production costs in Vietnam is really low, and I can use Vietnam as the production base and set up 
Marketing and assembling factory in European country… Vietnam is the future, at least for next 20 years”  
(Entrepreneur, Firm A) 
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Appendix C-1: Quotation tables 




A1 There are too many unspoken rules in China…in addition to corruption, gifting, and facilitation fees, you also need to DONATE to local education 
system, residential welfare. There are many unspoken rules here and only insiders know how to deal with it. For example, you need to bribe the 
distributor to display the product, but how, who, when, what to bribe is a technique. You can’t survive in China without knowing all these (unspoken 
rules.) (entrepreneur) 
 
A2 I have no choice…I have to choose between her or my children’s future, besides, her management style was not suitable anymore, workers hated 
dictatorship and need some respects… I have to ensure the control of my company, I am not giving anyone my company shares, this company can 
survive without Bao, now I can make some changes and make it better. (entrepreneur) 
 
A3 It was horrible and scary, I received phone calls every 2 hours with a crying (his staff) or outrage (Bao) woman on the phone, it drove me crazy…Bao 
tried to destroy these kids (Chinese management team) because of their betrayal, no one follow her and everyone support her resignation. I have to 
send a Taiwanese team to manage this crisis and stay there every day… most importantly, I need to protect the customer information and ensure daily 
operation, Bao knows the factory and she wants to destroy it, it was a nightmare… (entrepreneur) 
 
A4 Being a boss, you have to close your eye sometimes particularly in China…Commission is a common issue in China, although she (purchasing 
manager) is a bit greedy…of course I was angry but I kind of understand. The traditional Chinese management style is everything unclear and no one 
wants to take responsibility. They follow orders instead of regulations. There is a reason for it…I think it’s time to change. My staff is used to my 
management style and Taiwanese system, thus I want to incrementally make some changes... don’t judge them by your moral standard...You should 
rely on a proper management system but not the morality of staff. I will build a good system and everything will be fine…I know it is painful for them, 
but I learned many things can be avoided if you have good management system (entrepreneur) 
A5 Everything just out of control. They took over the factory and shout on my managers and government did nothing…I talked to someone and 
understood why government allow the riots. Boa’s attitude offended the local government and those injured workers; she was too aggressive and hurt 
the “face”…I have to do it myself to show my respect and make them feel better. (entrepreneur) 
A6 My Chinese factory is a success, it helps me dominate Taiwanese market and expand to international market. Now mission is complete and I want to 
create a more sustainable business for my children…instead of letting my children to deal with Bao and the sophisticated guanxi, I prefer to relocate to 
Vietnam and let my children participate from the beginning…of course its exhausted to rebuild a factory in a new country, but I can do it, just like 20 
years ago… I am excited about this; I know this is my best chance to dominate the global brush market. The production cost in Vietnam is really low, 
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and I can use Vietnam as the production base and set up Marketing and assembling factory in European country… Vietnam is the future, at least for 
next 20 years (entrepreneur) 
A7 If I am for my own good or for my business’s own good, I should sell my company to American (largest paint brush manufacturer), they gave me 
really good offer and I could be part of them…but what I am going to give my children and how about my staff? I have to be responsible although it’s 
not easy…(entrepreneur) 
 
A8 My husband is too optimistic I can’t remember how much he loss by being optimistic…Me and his staff warned him about Bao but he never listens. 
He thought we were biased and narrow-minded. He always says everything works well …no he wouldn’t change this character (being confident and 
optimistic), this is just his style” (entrepreneur’s wife) 
 
A9 I know she (Bao) is hard to accept this, managing factory for 20 years and no one speaks for her when she quit…she commits a lot, almost the best 
time of her life, she is emotional attached with the company and must feel upset and angry …I know why she wants some company shares but I can’t 
give her…its awful to fight with someone you closely work with, I don’t want to do this…the only thing I can do is to sell Danyang and share (the 
money) with her” (Entrepreneur) 
 
A10 My boss usually announces a new policy after shouting with Bao, particularly when Wu (second GM) quit the company and Bao told him no one can 
manage the company except her…my boss slapped the door and told her he will do it (entrepreneur) 
 
A11 I have no vacations and no personal life in the past 20 years, I fully committed to my business and my wife and children had to come to my factory to 
help in the weekend, we spent all our leisure time in this company...this is how I create and maintain my venture…shutting down Danyang is a sad 
decision, but it is a necessary step to protect and continue my business. I know Bao and I don’t think my children and handle her in the future. We 
commit so much in this, I can’t take any risks (of losing family control)…although I feel sorry for her, I must do it. (entrepreneur) 
 
A12 “I had 6 brothers and 1 sister and only my father made money, thus I was very poor when I was young. I worked 12 hours per day in construction site 
to pay for my tuition fees. My first job was a sale, and I worked from 6:00 am until 10 pm to visit customers and 24 hours on call... There were no 
vacations and no personal life in the past 20 years, I fully committed to my business and even my wife and children had to come to my factory to help 
in the weekend, our family gathering time were all spent in this company...this is how I create and maintain my venture, my family and myself were 
closely attach to this venture…shutting down Danyang is a sad decision, but I consider it as a necessary step to protect and continue my business. I 
know Bao and I don’t think my children and handle her in the future. We commit so much in this, I can’t take any risks…although I feel sorry for her, 
I must do it. (entrepreneur) 
A13 You should blame on yourself before blaming on others, and treat other people as you would yourself. By thinking in this way, you can win the loyalty 
and respects from your staff and learn how to operate in China (entrepreneur) 
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B1 I am driven by responsibility instead of passion now, I have to feed my family and my workers have to support their families too…I hired local mangers to 
help me…but they still disappointed me sometimes, I think I will never use to the Chinese way of doing things (entrepreneur) 
 
B2 I love my work and commit much of my time in, I was just like a working machine…In USA, I found there were something interesting…I visited 
Metropolitan Museum of Art every weekend and walked in the Brooklyn Bridge…I found life can be so peaceful and easy (entrepreneur) 
B3 I know the truth and I know that SARS was very serious, but Chinese government manipulate the media and rewrite the story…there was no freedom of 
speech, at least not in the public, the government can do anything and pretend nothing happen, the worst part is, most Chinese believes in their 
government and there is no objection…I am worried about the disease and SARS, and I am scared of this kind of power” ” (Entrepreneur) 
 
B4 I make a profit by selling my land and property since I was first mover and land was cheap 20 years ago. But in long-term, shutting down my China 
factory means the end of my all business within 10 years. Most companies want to deal with factory instead of trader now, it is very difficult to survive 
without the factory now but we don’t want the factory anymore. This is my daughter’s choice and she should be responsible for what she decides. She 
wants to be an artist and move to USA in the future. I am old and I am so sick of working in China, I want to enjoy my life and maybe travel around the 
work with my wife. I feel so relieved when leaving China (entrepreneur) 
B5 My Italian friend invited me to open a business selling gelato, gelato ingredients and equipment in China, I know there was a market and very possible to 
succeed…but I was exhausted and don’t want run more business in China (entrepreneur)  
B7 All my friends warned me about the production efficiency …my neighbour (the owner of nearby factory) told me my staff finish early everyday … but I 
am happy with the performance now; there is a room to improve, but I but I rather stay in Taiwan (entrepreneur) 
B8  For me, making money is not my first priority anymore. For example, if you are very hungry, you need to do your best to fight for the food. But if you are 
not hungry, why you need to sacrifice everything for food? I don’t need many zeros in my bank accounts.  I just need enough money to support my life. I 
find there are something more interesting, I missed my life in USA, I visit Metropolitan Museum of Art every weekend and have a walk with my wife in 
the Brooklyn Bridge … my daughter is young and she should have a try in China, but she rejected… it is time to shut down the factory, it’s not worthy to 
sacrifice my life for money (entrepreneur) 
B9 My competitors keep stealing my new design. I am so furious that I doubled my R&D budget to speed up the innovation process. These dirty players will 
never catch up with me (entrepreneur) 
B10 Their food is unhygienic even poisonous, their people never follow the rules, arguing and shouting everyday… I don’t trust their food, you know I have to 
bring my own food to China…I bring my own magazine and books…no I don’t have social activities, I stay in my dorm room after work, I don’t know 
how to talk to Chinese… this is not the life I want (entrepreneur) 
B11 My design has best CP (cost/performance) value in the industry…I never worry about the increasing costs and competition. I strongly believe that 
technology and innovation can compensate the negatives (entrepreneur) 
B12 When I first enter into China, Chinese government was more humble and always tries to help. Although they asked for bribery, they knew it was unethical 
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and felt embarrassed. Now they think it is your job to bribe them and they accept only high value and trendy products, I remembered I gave a laptop to 
them (government office); they returned it and said they want latest apple products… I usually give higher pay to my staff to ensure their loyalty, but they 
still steal my design and sell to my competitor to make extra money, I can’t remember how many times my workers steal critical components and parts to 
sell to my competitors for profit. Chinese people have become money-orientated, they neglect traditional virtues, moral, and ethics…Yes I understand this 
is inevitable and in a transition economy, and I know they just want to have a better life. But it’s hard to accept this. I want to believe in “human goodness 
by nature”* but they just disappointed me. They can do anything to be rich. I can’t work with this kind of people (entrepreneur) 
*Confucianism, believe in people are born good  
 




C1 My boss is afraid of losing face…after all, he is a successful and rich entrepreneur in Taiwan, and everyone will make fun on him if he exits China within 
3 years…besides, Y (their main competitor) is successful in China and my boss doesn’t want to surrender (general manager) 
C2 Entering China is a big mistake. It’s a waste of money and time. You can make money from many businesses, like my construction business, I am 
building villa in Taiwan and its very interesting. This one (China) is annoyed and difficult… Chinese government ask for money, my sales steal money, 
my suppliers always delay, my customer never pay on time, people is the biggest problem when investing in China. I rather make money in other ways 
(Entrepreneur) 
C3 My boss doesn’t like Chinese government, so whatever happen, he blames on the government, which makes things worse (general manager) 
  
Sun supports green party, that’s why he never likes Chinese government… Sun thinks it is a conspiracy that Chinese government trying to take over 
Taiwan through economic collaboration, it is a nonsense. He entered into China reluctantly and always think from the pessimistic side, he could have 
made things better…I don’t think he will enter into China again,  (entrepreneur’s friend) 
   
 
C4 It was unbelievable, my full-time sales works for my competitors for commissions. Everyone thinks they work for my competitors. They are so greedy 
and always try to take advantages of others…I am not surprised if Chen told me they (sales) run away with my money and inventory…  No, I don’t have 
expansion plan; it’s scary to leave my business to these people. They are just like their government and I can’t trust them, I hate/dislike doing business 
with them (entrepreneur)  
C5 Chen’s suggestion to stay and expand in China is rational. I am making money and there is market potential…but is it worth my energy? I have sleepless 
nights due to worries about my Chinese business. I am worried about my sales, the government, the taxation officers, the workers…(entrepreneur) 
C6 We had an offer from A (the niece of authority), he was interested in our products and controlled the distribution channel of B city…Other company also 
used same strategy to enter into C city…but my boss rejected because he didn’t trust locals…(general manager) 
C7 “The rent was extremely high in Shanghai and my sales were out of control. I can’t tell you how angry I was that time. I received bad news every 
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day…Yes I admit that the Shanghai office was a big mess so I shut it down reluctantly. I can fix this problem by focusing on a smaller market instead of 
the whole Jiangsu province.  (entrepreneur) 
 
 
C8 My boss feel embarrassed to exit China, it’s about his face, he failed to defeat Y company and no one dare mention this in front of him now. (general 
manager) 




D1 I visited Paris 20 years ago and I tasted local dessert and bread, I was astonished by the amazing flavour and I want my family and friends to taste it too. I 
felt my old job (instant food industry) was so boring and I want to sell dessert. Taiwan was a traditional market and only accepts sponge cakes that time. I 
spent years in kitchen to develop a new recipe that Taiwanese likes… I found substitute for cream and cheese and developed a special way to preserve 
fresh fruit to extend expire date…I experienced some failures but now people (Taiwanese) like my products. ..It is exited that people like my cakes. I want 
to promote it to more people, I enjoy in seeing people eating my cake. (entrepreneur) 
 
D2 I keep finding potential location and partners in China and expanding my business. I know this is my problem…if I am very excited about something, I am 
blind…I like to follow my intuition, although many of them had been proven wrong (laugh)…I think sometimes you need to be crazy to set up a venture 
(entrepreneur) 
D3 Do you know how these people make money?  They kept the price label and just changed Taiwanese dollar to RMB…they were xxx (emotional language) 
crazy and treated Chinese like idiots who paid 5 times more to buy the same product…H company knew the situation and ignored it…in fact H company 
was one of these greedy company…they took advantage on their own people and Chinese. That’s why this shopping mall closed…and I felt embarrassed 
that this was not the only case in China.  This explains why Chinese are rude to Taiwanese…because we are bad to them too…   (entrepreneur) 
 
D4 I was unhappy about the disputes with my local business partners (Shanghai and Sichuan) such as the bribery, unreasonable commission, delay 
payment…but after the conflicts with Company H, I feel it was nothing to complain about Chinese, even my own people tried to take advantage of us, 
how I can complain about Chinese. We are not better than them. This is human nature and real business world, it normal to face this kind of xxx 
(emotional language) things. (entrepreneur) 
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D5  I am always confident about my product, maybe too confident (laugh)…I mean it’s upset to realize my current products was too advanced for Chinese 
market but it’s okay…Chinese follows the trend of Taiwan, about 5-10 years difference. I still have chance, if I open a bakery and stay here, maybe I can 
introduce Mille Crepe again in the future ” (entrepreneur)      
“ I mean, sometimes financial performance means little to me; I believe it’s just a matter of time... If you persist and keep going, you can be successful 
one day…(entrepreneur) 
D6 I always think what is failure…I think it could be just a process…I sold Mille-crepe 10 years ago but lost lots of money in the beginning because 
Taiwanese only likes sponge cake. I insisted in this product and everyone thought I was crazy. Surprisingly, 3 years ago, Mille-crepe became a super 
star…if I shut down my venture before, than I was failed. But I persist and survive, I succeed. I mean, sometimes financial performance means little to 
me; I believe it’s just a matter of time... If you persist and keep going, you can be successful one day… I think the real failure is when you can’t see the 
future, you don’t believe in future, or yourself doesn’t want that future…I don’t think my exit is a failure (laugh), maybe 50-50…I did learn a lot from this 
experience, and I see new opportunity (bakery industry)… I will be back (entrepreneur) 
D7 I met a friend who was the department store manager in Shanghai and accepted his invitation to open a dessert shop. I was too confident about my product 
and thought I could compete with French brand including Paul and Laduree there with much lower price. I didn’t realize that Shanghai people buy the 
French dessert for the brand image and the feeling of outstanding and this is what I can’t give them, I focus on wrong market. (entrepreneur) 
 
D8 I know everyone is doing this in China; I was in instant food industry. A drop of strawberry flavorings can make a litre of strawberry juice and save 95% 
of total costs…Natural and high quality food does not have market here. If I add some chemical flavorings and lower the price, I can definitely find lots of 
customers.  I know everyone is doing this (adding artificial flavorings) in Chinese market, I was in instant food industry and I was an expert of it. I know 
how to make the best and cheapest dessert by a list of chemical flavourings and preservations that you have never seen in your life.  But this is not French 
dessert anymore. I want to sell real French dessert and sell good food…(entrepreneur) 
D9 Yes I agree with Ming (entrepreneur of Firm E), at first I was anxious and sometime angry about the “Chinese ways of doing things”. Ming introduces me 
to some Chines friends, they are very nice people and we discuss the cultural difference. ..I read Chinese history and Mao’s bibliography, I also read the 
cultural revolution, you should read it too, and it helps you to understand why Chinese behave in this way. It explains why Chinese workers are less 
motivated and dishonest, they just want to protect themselves... Well there are many differences; mostly we misunderstand each other…  (entrepreneur) 




E1 I want to do something interesting. I like to talk to customers, the consumers, and promote the product face to face. It’s boring to talk through email and 
contracts and fight for 2% or 3 % every time…I saw opportunity of TPSM, I didn't need to pay to rent for the first six months, which meant I just need to 
pay the labour costs and electricity, this was the best chance for me to try something different…(entrepreneur) 
 
E2 My father likes to talk to different people particularly Chinese who are interested in Taiwanese culture and stuffs. He invited Chinese he met on the plane 
and be their tour guides in Taiwan at least 5 times. One time, I went out with him to buy lots of mangos and pineapples for his new Chinese friends. He 
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said they were complaining about the quality of Taiwanese mango, and he wanted to reverse their image. My father found what they ate before was fake 
Taiwanese mango sold by unethical retailer. The retailer changed the origin of the mango and destroyed the reputation of Taiwanese mango.  I think this 
may be the reason he wants to open the fruit shop, and we supported him although we disagreed with his crazy expansion. But he is the boss…”(Quote E2, 
entrepreneur’s daughter) 
E3 I felt very relaxed and happy in Firm E; it was interesting to meet so many different people. I stood on the top of a bench and explained how to select and 
eat Taiwanese fruit…The Nanjing people love me and my Taiwanese accents (laugh). I had 5 TV interviews, 3 newspaper reports, and 1 magazine 
interviews, I became the celebrity in Nanjing and everyone knows me (laugh)…It was a great fun and I feel so proud in front of my friends (entrepreneur) 
E4 He enjoyed opening a fruit shop, but he didn’t think carefully before the opening 2nd and 3rd shop… The fruit shop was like a big hole, my husband kept 
pouring money into and nothing came out...(entrepreneur’s wife) 
E5 In general, Chinese are very friendly to Taiwanese. I heard many failed stories and owners blamed on corrupted government and unethical staff. It is not 
right. The reason why they have chance to destroy your company is because of yourself. There people go to erotic places or treat their staff like a donkey. 
Of course they failed. You have to respect them, talk to them and learn from them… (entrepreneur) 
E6 Those people (DPP) always talked about independence of Taiwan every day, of course Chinese government has to warn them …most Chinese people 
agree that Taiwan is an independent country and they like us, so no need to be afraid or be aggressive to all Chinese people… In fact, Chinese government 
is nice to Taiwanese (entrepreneurs); we enjoy more benefits than other foreign ventures…  ”(entrepreneur) 
 
E7 It (counterfeit financial statement) was a shock…I was angry about my accountant, but I knew this is a common thing if you didn't establish a proper 
accounting system in China, think about how much they earn every month and you will understand...to solve this problem, I spent a fortune to establish a 
proper accounting system and sent my Taiwanese accounting manager to check finance statements regularly (entrepreneur) 
E8 They (competitors) sent me black mail and used price-cutting strategy, it was very annoyed but I took it as a challenge and I was going to fight back… I 
advertised on newspaper and local TV (entrepreneur) 
E9 Well it’s true that they take bribery, and it’s not acceptable in many countries …but this is the Chinese way and I learnt to accept it and follow it. 
Corruption never bother me, I am accustomed to the Chinese way of doing business. It’s a big problem for those who are not familiar with. For me, it’s 
like a shortcut to success. To think of it, it is much cheaper and more effective in achieving my goals.  (entrepreneur) 
E10 No I’m not going to sell Firm E. Everyone knows I open this store, what if those people destroy my reputation…No I won’t hire professional managers, 
this business is just for me and my family, it’s more like a personal investment (entrepreneur) 
E11 No I am not regretting about this (set up Firm E), it’s a great fun…of course I lost a lot (money), too ambitious; I was not familiar with this industry and 
knew little about fruit inventory control and preservation. Although I outsourced this to a professional company but I was too busy to manage it… I have 
experience, equipment and network, actually I was going to invest in ice cream made by Taiwanese fruit last year, but have no one to manage the shop. 
It’s interesting to open a small store selling something I like (entrepreneur) 








F1 Working with government is just like working with snakes, they may bite you. But it’s okay, I never expect I can keep my shares forever. There is a 
Taiwanese old saying, losing something means gaining something. I mean, this joint venture is more like a shortcut to make easy money, and my Nanjing 
factory is the proper way. I don’t like easy money, thus I wouldn’t feel sorry for losing it. At least we obtained some guanxi through this collaboration. 
For me, this problem is the same like what I had in 2005 (plant relocation). I felt a bit angry, but it’s okay. Just let everything just back to normal track” 
“Working with government is just like working with snakes, they may bite you. But it’s okay, I never expect I can keep my shares forever …At least we 
obtained some guanxi through this collaboration. As a businessman, it’s pointless to challenge Chinese government. This problem is just like what I had in 
2005 (plant relocation). I felt a bit angry, but it’s okay. Well, this is China, you don’t want to risk your relationship with government for the sake of 
money. (entrepreneur) 
 
F2 I solved at least 30 cases of employer and employee conflicts. Although I am a Taiwanese, I have to say we are wrong. They are lack of “Zhongyong”… 
Most of cases were because of the attitude of Taiwanese entrepreneurs. They were too arrogant, lack of communication and treat their staff like a machine. 
This (management style) worked well 20 years ago but not now. Due to the one child policy, the young generations are the precious of family; you can’t 
imagine what Chinese parents can do for their child…Thus, the old fashion way is not working anymore, you have to respect your staff, listen to their 
opinions, and use rewards instead of punishments. 20 years ago, Chinese workers could worked 16 hours per day to make money, but now, if you ask your 
workers to take extra hours they may just quit because they want to enjoy their life. They are the boss now. Many Taiwanese don’t see this change and use 
Army management style, that’s why they experienced so many problems. You need to be considerable, humble, understanding your staff and most 
importantly, build up a systemic management style and be hard-working to be their mode…. (entrepreneur) 
F3 My wife, my sons, and my grandchildren are all here, I am rooted in Nanjing…I am a Taiwanese and I love Taiwan, but Nanjing is my home, I have 
nowhere else to go…  What would you do if you experience problems in your home town, you can’t escape, and you have to solve it because this is your 
home. Many of my friends retreat to Taiwan or shut down their business (in China) because they have plan B. But I don’t, China is my home and I must 
stay here. I commit so much in China and I will stay here…  There are still chances in China, this is a huge market and we have advantages. You must 
stay determined to survive in China now, I have to say it is much difficult than before to maintain a business in China, and I am lucky because I enter 
much earlier than others… yes I agree with my son that there are problems, but compared to other markets like USA and Europe, China is much better. 
Every country has their own problems; I think Chinese government can manage it. (entrepreneur) 
 
F4 I have more than 1000 employees, and this means 1000 families are rely on me. It is a heavy burden, but it is also my responsibility to ensure the 
operation of my firm. I am an old-fashion person, and I don’t like to fire my employees for efficiency and performance, that’s American way not Chinese 
way. Each entrepreneur should be responsible for his or her people (employees). When they enter your company, it is your job to carefully manage your 
   
317 
 
company and support their life; it is a heavy load and a long road. * I told my two sons if they want to sell my business in the future, they have to find a 
way to settle down these employees. They should to be appreciated because employees make the money to support their (his two sons) life (entrepreneur)  
 
F5 I don’t like China. I spent 5 years in USA and lived in UK with my wife for another 5 years. I don’t like the living environment in China.  But as a son, 
it’s my responsibility to take care of my father’s business since this company is just as important as his life… I wouldn’t make any changes before my 
father leave (pass away), but I am thinking about other options… I feel stressful in China, everything is so complicated particularly interpersonal and 
government relationship…There were too many problems in China, such as the huge debt of local government, estate bubble, the political system; these 
will cause a huge problem, maybe another financial crisis in the future.  …I respect my father that he can learn from Chinese institution and used to it.  
But I can’t. I may sell the business in the future, but who knows, the plan will never catch up with changes. (Entrepreneur’s son, Sam) 




G1 My best advantage to survive is China is I am not stubborn. I am very flexible and open to any suggestions. I heard too many stories in China, including 
European investors. These people, including some Taiwanese, are too civilised, too stubborn and live in their own world. They lock themselves in 5 star 
hotels and eating KFC every day, how can they understand China and manage Chinese? China is not a country that you can follow the rules. For example, 
my staff takes commissions from suppliers. It sounds unacceptable and bad for company development. I know it and I pretend I don’t know. In China, you 
need to close one eye sometimes. Don’t be so quibble, what’s the point to argue with your staff for taking commissions from a bulb even all bulbs in the 
factory. Taking commission makes them become more responsible about quality because they want to make it long-term. You just need to control the 
large spending, others can let it go. 3~5 % of total spending is a reasonable range if this makes my staff happier and work harder (entrepreneur)     
 
G2 I can do business everywhere; I can go back to Taiwan stay in Firm C or create my business. I can go to Vietnam with my friends. I can go to Thailand. 
My customers invite me to be the consultant. But I just want to stay in Nanjing because my family is here. My baby is just 2 years old and I want to 
participate his childhood. I don’t have high expectation for my life. I only need a house, a car, a dog and enough money to support my family. I don’t have 
much ambition and don’t need much money. I only hope my family can be happy and healthy every day, that’s it. (entrepreneur) 
 
G3 China is a very unique market; they have been isolated for years that create a very different consumption style. For example, when my boss (Firm C) 
entered into China, we said we are going to sell PU because it is the best anti-leak paint, advanced and cheap. PU is our golden hen (best –selling product) 
in Taiwan. Jiangsu rains a lot and has serious leaking problems; we thought we could successfully enter into market… But we were wrong, in terms of 
product and pricing strategy. First, Chinese painters were used to another traditional material called Curve (paint), which was old fashion and no one used 
it anymore. We couldn’t persuade painters to use PU because they were connected to Curve suppliers and used to Curve. Second, our pricing is wrong. 
The original strategy was 500 RMB per unit and gave 100 RMB to distributor, but this one didn’t work. We had to increase the price to 700 RMB per unit 
and gave 300RMB to distributor, thus they were motivated to promote your products…Innovative and good products are not necessary work in China. 
The most important thing is how you share the profit with distributors and how you promote. Promoting a product is not by imagination and it is 
unpredictable. You have to learn carefully and use a humble attitude to learn from locals. We are different and you need to show your respects. This is 
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why many large foreign companies visit me for market information and collaboration. I know how to modify the product to Chinese style and how to 
communicate with Chinese distributors.” (Empathy, Entrepreneur, Firm G (Ex general manger of Firm C) 
 
Appendix C-2: Critical incident tables 





What happened How the 
entrepren
eur feel  












entry, set up 
Danyang 
factory 
I had 6 brothers and 1 sister and only my father made money, thus I was 
very poor when I was young. I worked 12 hours per day in construction site 
to pay for my tuition fees. My first job was a sale, and I worked from 6:00 
am until 10 pm to visit customers and 24 hours on call...I set up this business 
because I want to prove if you are hardworking enough, you can be 
successful...My family deserve a better life. 
 
I want to dominant Taiwanese market so I must do the vertical integration, 
to control the quality, reduce and costs and protect my designs… Many 
people thought I was crazy to invest in China, but I knew I was 
right...Government incentives, the land is very cheap and they even recruit 
workers for you. The labour costs was just half or less than Taiwan and I can 
find all material in China such as bristle, timber…I have everything I need 
in China, manufacturing in Taiwan is out of date (20 years ago). 
  
Entrepreneur Brush is a visionary entrepreneur. He predicted China would 
be the next star 20 years ago so he entered into China. He is a workaholic 
and very confident about his investment. He invited my boss to join him but 
he hesitated. Entrepreneur Brush entered into China in the best time. 
(Entrepreneurs’ friend)  






















Brush factory is just my first step; I want to control the timber too. By doing 
so, no one can compete with me in this market. To build my brush kingdom, 
I need to have control of my critical components… being a survivor is not 


















There are too many hidden costs in China…in addition to corruption, 
gifting, and facilitation fees, you also need to DONATE to local education 
system, residential welfare. There are many unspoken rules here and only 
insiders know how to deal with it. For example, you need to bribe the 
distributor to display the product, but how, who, when, what to bribe is a 
technique. You can’t survive in China without knowing all these (unspoken 
rules.) Now the government wants to increase GDP, they ask you to pay 
labour insurance. The western policy is the same, they increase local tax in 
first line cities then you have to move to western China. If you don't want, 
you need to “discuss” with the government again. You have no voice in this 
country.  Every year I have to pay at least 20% more wage to my workers, 
this is very scared. We cannot afford this, and this is why you need to 
“discuss” with government. 













and accidents:    


















I was horrible; there were 5 hand-cut accidents and 2 injuries. I was very 
scared to pick up a phone call from China. Sometimes I woke up in the night 
and thought someone lost his hand in my factory again... it’s enough, Anhui 
was not ready for production and foreign ventures…I was sick of hearing 
any hand-cut accidents, these people never followed the rules. 
It was irritable that no one helps us to solve the riots. Anhui Government 
said it was our “internal problem” and refused to talk to us. These people 
asked for unreasonable compensation. ..no no it was pointless to talk to 
them. They wouldn’t do this without Anhui Government’s permission. I 
used my guanxi in Danyang to find out who is in charge, and talked to his 
supervisor.   
Note: Although Entrepreneur Brush express fear and anger in this critical 
















hidden costs due 
to the China 
Fear No immediate 
actions, but 
connected 
See CA3 A2: no changes A5 
 
Formal and informal 














Rising costs in 
Danyang and 




















This time I am going to set up a brush company; this is what I am familiar 
and good at.  I want to use Danyang as R&D centre and Anhui as production 
centre. And next step is entering European market, using my low costs 
products.  
It’s not a problem now, I build a good relationship with Anhui government 
and we are good friends. It was misunderstanding. I talked to someone and 
understood why government permitted the riots. Bao’s attitude offended the 
local government and those injured workers; she was too aggressive and hurt 
the “face”…I showed my respect and we are okay now. It was our fault and 
they just did their jobs. ..no no in general they (local government) are good, 
they are nice to Taiwanese entrepreneurs. I need to spend time and efforts to 
build guanxi with them, but this guanxi is very useful…I know many 
entrepreneurs complain about the corruption and guanxi, but its improving 
now. They are friendly if you know how to talk to them.  
  
Note: Confidence, passion and empathy are interviewed. Confidence and 
passion drive the expansion plan, and empathy allow entrepreneur restart 
Anhui (as his expansion plan). Empathy allowed him to communicate with 
Anhui Government to achieve mutual understanding thus he is capable and 
willing to restart Anhui. 
A1: increased 
commitment 





















Reject If I am for my own good or for my business’s own good, I should sell my 
company to American (largest paint brush manufacturer), they gave me 
really good offer and I could be part of them…but what I am going to give 
my children and how about my staff? I have to be responsible although it’s 
not easy… 
Yes I felt exited when I heard it. It means my company is an emerging star. I 
am their competitor instead of suppliers now.  
 
Note: Confidence and passion are interviewed. 















and hired new 
GM (Wu) 
I have no choice…I have to choose between her or my children’s future, 
besides, her management style was not suitable anymore, workers hated 










company, I am not giving anyone my company shares, this company can 








due to the 
disputes with 












My company can survive without Bao. I establish it 15 years ago and of 
course I know how to manage it. (entrepreneur) 
 
My boss usually announces a new policy after shouting with Bao, 
particularly when Wu (second GM) quit the company and Bao told him no 
one can manage the company except her…my boss slapped the door and 
told her he will do it (Manager) 
 
My husband is too optimistic I can’t remember how much he loss by being 
optimistic…Me and his staff warned him about Bao but he never listens. He 
thought we were biased and narrow-minded. He always says everything 
works well …no he wouldn’t change this character (being confident and 
optimistic), this is just his style (entrepreneurs’ wife) 
 
Note: confidence and anger are interviewed. Driven by anger to make the 





























Being a boss, you have to close your eye sometimes particularly in 
China…Commission is a common issue in China, although she (purchasing 
manager) is a bit greedy…of course I was angry but I kind of understand. 
The traditional Chinese management style is everything unclear and no one 
wants to take responsibility. They follow orders instead of regulations. 
There is a reason for it…I think it’s time to change. My staff is used to my 
management style and Taiwanese system, thus I want to incrementally make 
some changes... don’t judge them by your moral standard...You should rely 
on a proper management system but not the morality of staff. I will build a 
good system and everything will be fine…I know it is painful for them, but I 
learned many things can be avoided if you have good management 
system…. (entrepreneur) 
 
You should blame on yourself before blaming on others, and treat other 
people as you would yourself. By thinking in this way, you can win the 
loyalty and respects from your staff and learn how to operate in China 








Note: Although he experienced anger initially, empathy allows him to learn, 
understand, and adapt to local culture and anger kind of encourage him to do 






































It was horrible and scary, I received phone calls every 2 hours with a crying 
woman (his staff) or outrage (Bao) woman on the phone, it drove me 
crazy…Bao tried to destroy these kids (Chinese management team) because 
of their betrayal, no one follow her and everyone support her resignation. I 
have to send a Taiwanese team to manage this crisis and stay there every 
day… most importantly, I need to protect the customer information and 
ensure daily operation, Bao knows the factory and she wants to destroy it, it 
was a nightmare…  
 
I know she (Bao) is hard to accept this, managing factory for 20 years and 
no one speaks for her when she quit…she commits a lot, almost the best 
time of her life, she is emotional attached with the company and must feel 
upset and angry …I know why she wants some company shares but I can’t 
give her…its awful to fight with someone you closely work with, I don’t 
want to do this…the only thing I can do is to sell Danyang and share (the 
money) with her) 
 
Note: The four emotions were intertwined, but empathy drove him to 
communicate with Bao. Anger and fear drove him to build a new system 
(since Bao may took the customer secrets). In the end, he was disgusted by 
these events (it was a nightmare) and tried to escape.  




























with Bao and 
accept her 
I have no vacations and no personal life in the past 20 years, I fully 
committed to my business and my wife and children had to come to my 
factory to help in the weekend, we spent all our leisure time in this 
company...this is how I create and maintain my venture…shutting down 
Danyang is a sad decision, but it is a necessary step to protect and continue 
my business. I know Bao and I don’t think my children and handle her in the 
future. We commit so much in this, I can’t take any risks (of losing family 
control)…although I feel sorry for her, I must do it. I just want to end this 
asap 
A3, but result in A5 
Family 
Aversion to conflicts 
with Bao  
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offer. Agree to 
sell Danyang 




Note: Disgust and empathy are interviewed. He shows empathy but he can’t 







Give up Burma 
and Indonesia 











Exit China and 
relocate to 
Vietnam 
My Chinese factory is a success, it helps me dominate Taiwanese market 
and expand to international market. Now mission is complete and I want to 
create a more sustainable business for my children…instead of letting my 
children to deal with Bao and the sophisticated guanxi, I prefer to relocate to 
Vietnam and let my children participate from the beginning…of course its 
exhausted to rebuild a factory in a new country, but I can do it, just like 20 
years ago… (laugh) I know my wife is anxious, but I know what I am 
doing…she is too pessimistic…  I am excited about this; I know this is my 
best chance to dominate the global brush market. The production cost in 
Vietnam is really low, and I can use Vietnam as the production base and set 
up Marketing and assembling factory in European country… Vietnam is the 
future, at least for next 20 years” 
A5: international exit 
Family 
Aversion to conflicts 
with Bao  
Personal goal 
 
   
324 
 
Critical incidents of Firm B, Machine 
Code Year What happened How the 
entrepreneur 
feel 
Action Entrepreneur or other people’s description Code (Variables) and 
others 








Like I said, I was young and wanted to have a try, I wanted to produce 
my designs. At first I tried to set up a factory in Taiwan but soon gave 
up. I couldn't find proper location and the labour cost was high. So I 
just went to China.  
Yes of course family was one of my reasons. You always want to do 
something for your family. Make more money, buy a bigger house, 
send children study abroad…. (entrepreneur) 
  




CB2 1996 Entered into 





in Nanjing  
My design has best CP (cost/performance) value in the industry…I 
never worry about the increasing cost and competition. I strongly 
believe that technology and innovation can compensate the negatives 
(entrepreneur) 
A1: expansion  
Personal goal 
 




Anger, fear Strictly control 




My competitors keep stealing my new design. I am so furious that I 
doubled my R&D budget to speed up the innovation process. These 
dirty players will never catch up with me 
This country has no intellectual property rights. Chinese Government 
encourages their people to imitate foreign company’s intellectual 
assets.  I can see fake iPhone, fake Nike fake Google, everything is 
fake here. Chinese people think it’s not a big deal to steal other 
people’s design. It’s scary to set up R&D office here; my competitors 
may have my new design even before I introduce it. (entrepreneur) 
A4: adaptation 







CB4 2000 Moved to USA 
for family reasons 
for 3 years 
Confidence 
Relax 
Open USA R&D 
office 
I had some school friends in USA; they were researchers in the 
university. I collaborated with their team and we developed a new 
machine, it saved at least 20% of energy. It was a superstar.   
I love my work and commit much of my time in, I was just like a 
working machine…In USA, I found there were something 
interesting…I visited Metropolitan Museum of Art every weekend and 
walked in the Brooklyn Bridge…I found life can be so peaceful and 
easy…(entrepreneur) 
Note: entrepreneur felt comfortable in USA, which  
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CB5 2002 SARS in China, 
locked in the hotel 
Fear 
 
x I know the truth and I know that SARS was very serious, but Chinese 
government manipulate the media and rewrite the story…there was no 
freedom of speech, at least not in the public, the government can do 
anything and pretend nothing happen, the worst part is, most Chinese 
believes in their government and there is no objection…I am worried 
about the disease and SARS, and I am scared of this kind of power 
(entrepreneur) 
 








CB6 2003 Want to reduce 
the stay in China 













I am driven by responsibility instead of passion now, I have to feed 
my family and my workers have to support their families too…I hired 
local mangers to help me…but they still disappointed me sometimes, I 
think I will never use to the Chinese way of doing things 
“All my friends warned me about the production efficiency …my 
neighbour (the owner of nearby factory) told me my staff finish early 
everyday … but I am happy with the performance now; there is a 
room to improve but I rather stay in Taiwan. Its pointless sacrifice 
your happiness for money (entrepreneur) 
Note: Entrepreneur Machine felt uncomfortable in China, but he still 
had family to support (daughter in USA). Family needs drove him to 









CB7 2005 Unethical 
behaviour of staff 
(hacked customer 
lists for profit) 
Fear, disgust Shut down 
Nanjing office  






Aversion to Chinese 
staffs 
CB8 2008 Similar design 








Aversion to Chinese 
staffs 
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CB9 2012 Aversion to China 
and daughter 
(successor) 
refused to run 
Firm B in China. 
 







Become a trader 
instead of 
manufacturer 
I make a profit by selling my land and property since I was first mover 
and land was cheap 20 years ago. But in long-term, shutting down my 
China factory means the end of my all business within 10 years. Most 
companies want to deal with factory instead of trader now, it is very 
difficult to survive without the factory now but we don’t want the 
factory anymore. This is my daughter’s choice and she should be 
responsible for what she decides. She wants to be an artist and move 
to USA in the future. I am old and I am so sick of working in China, I 
want to enjoy my life and maybe travel around the work with my wife. 
I feel so relieved when leaving China”  (entrepreneur) 
 
For me, making money is not my first priority anymore. For example, 
if you are very hungry, you need to do your best to fight for the food. 
But if you are not hungry, why you need to sacrifice everything for 
food? I don’t need many zeros in my bank accounts.  I just need 
enough money to support my life. I find there are something more 
interesting, I missed my life in USA, I visit Metropolitan Museum of 
Art every weekend and have a walk with my wife in the Brooklyn 
Bridge … my daughter is young and she should have a try in China, 
but she rejected… it is time to shut down the factory,  it’s not worthy 
to sacrifice my life for money (entrepreneur) 
 
He was a strange person, most entrepreneurs want to expand their 
business to make more money, and he told me he had enough for rest 
of his life...He shut down Chinese facility, this was absolutely insane, 
it was a suicide mission because professional buyers prefer to buy 
machines from a factory not a trader (Lee, entrepreneur’s business 
partner).  





























See CB6 CB11 
Note: Entrepreneur blame employee-employer conflict on Chinese 
informal institutions (culture) 
Note: Although entrepreneur hire local managers, the main purpose is 
to avoid further contact with locals and he isolated himself from other 
Chinese. “Most time I stay in the dorm room, I don't know how to talk 







Aversion to Chinese 
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learning, it merely an adaptation. It was more like avoidance strategy. 
Entrepreneur perceived this as informal institutional problems that 







and China, media 
control and lack 
of freedom of 














the time stay in 
China, move 





I tried but I found I was in vulnerable position. This is a trend and I 
can’t change it (entrepreneur) 
When I first enter into China, Chinese government was more humble 
and always tries to help. Although they asked for bribery, they knew it 
was unethical and felt embarrassed. Now they think it is your job to 
bribe them and they accept only high value and trendy products, I 
remembered I gave a laptop to them (government office); they 
returned it and said they want latest apple products… I usually give 
higher pay to my staff to ensure their loyalty, but they still steal my 
design and sell to my competitor to make extra money, I can’t 
remember how many times my workers steal critical components and 
parts to sell to my competitors for profit. Chinese people have become 
money-orientated, they neglect traditional virtues, moral, and 
ethics…Yes I understand this is inevitable and in a transition 
economy, and I know they just want to have a better life. But it’s hard 
to accept this. I want to believe in “human goodness by nature”* but 
they just disappointed me. They can do anything to be rich. I can’t 
work with this kind of people (entrepreneur) 
*Confucianism, believe in people are born good  
A3, A5 
Formal institutions 







Poor food safety 
and unhygienic 
food 





Their food is unhygienic even poisonous, their people never follow the 
rules, arguing and shouting everyday… I don’t trust their food, you 
know I have to bring my own food to China…I bring my own 
magazine and books…no I don’t have social activities, I stay in my 
dorm room after work, I don’t know how to talk to Chinese… this is 
not the life I want (entrepreneur) 
A2, A5, Aversion to 
Chinese institutions 









to set up a joint 
ventures 
Fear (of further 
commitment) 
Exhausted 
Reject My Italian friend invited me to open a business selling gelato, gelato 
ingredients and equipment in China, I know there was a market and 
very possible to succeed…but I was exhausted and don’t want run 
more business in China (entrepreneur) 
 
If Entrepreneur Machine expands his factory, he could be the market 
A2: nothing change  
Negative 
predispositions 
Aversion to Chinese 
institutions and 
environment and 
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leader in China, even in the global market. He was too risk-adverse. I 
tried to persuade him to enter Sichuan with me but he rejected. He 
rather be my consultant and gave me his secret recipe…yes he told me 
about his Italian friends, although I did not understand why he was 




Critical incident of Firm C, Paint 
Code Year What happened How the 
entrepreneur 
feel 
Action Entrepreneur or other people’s description Code (Variables) 
and others 
CC1 2005 Market expansion Confidence Set up a factory and sales 
office in China, focus on 
Great Jiangsu market  
My boss is afraid of losing face…after all, he is a 
successful and rich entrepreneur in Taiwan, and 
everyone will make fun on him if he exits China within 3 
years…besides, Y (their main competitor) is successful 
in China and my boss doesn’t want to surrender, he 







CC2 2006 Market expansion Confidence Set up second Sales office in 
Shanghai, entered into 
Shanghai market 
Entrepreneur Paint was confident to enter into China 
since he identified the lack of medium-price products in 
China (CC1). He indicated high-end products such as 
Dulux and low- end products like local brands dominated 
China. There was a shortage for the middle range, which 
was his cash cow in Taiwan. Additionally, his 
competitor, Y entered in 1995 and achieved great 








CC3 2006 Unique local regulations 
of paint transportation 
Anger Change strategy, invested in 
transportation and follow 
local rules 
We need to buy a special van to ship paints and apply for 
licenses for safety reasons. We don't have this problem in 
Taiwan…no no no I mean buying the van is okay, it’s 
their regulation, we talked to two sales, one is local 
company and the other one is a national brand. We want 
A4: learning and 
adaptation 
Institutions 
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to buy the can from the big company but the sale of the 
local company told me he can get me the license in 1 
week. In general it takes 3 months…      
CC4 2006 Protectionism of local 
market 




CC5 2008 Unethical sales and 
unmet performance 
Anger Shut down Shanghai office 
and focus on smaller market, 
less than 300 km diameter 
“The rent was extremely high in Shanghai and my sales 
were out of control. I can’t tell you how angry I was that 
time. I received bad news every day…Yes I admit that 
the Shanghai office was a big mess so I shut it down 
reluctantly. I can fix this problem by focusing on a 
smaller market instead of the whole Jiangsu province. ” 











CC6 2011 Entrepreneur need cash 
in his new businesses 
(construction business in 
Taiwan), his aversion to 





Exit China “ Entering China is a big mistake. It’s a waste of money 
and time. You can make money from many businesses, 
like my construction business, I am building villa in 
Taiwan and its very interesting. . It was so unpleasant to 
run a business in China, I can’t do it anymore … Chinese 
government ask for money, my sales steal money, my 
suppliers always delay, my customer never pay on time, 
people is the biggest problem when investing in China. I 
rather make money in other ways”(Entrepreneur) 
Firm C is doing well in China; we finally entered into the 
market and are making profit now... We should not have 
exited China. But this is my boss’s choice, he likes 
construction and hates China (General Manager) 
 
“My boss feel embarrassed to exit China, it’s about his 
face, he failed to defeat Y company and no one dare 



















Formal institutions and 
Evil Chinese government 
Fear, anger-
>disgust 
Rejected Chen’s proposal to 
expand the market in 2009 
and result in exit decision 
“My boss doesn’t like Chinese government, so whatever 
happen, he blames on the government, which makes 
things worse” (General manager) 
 
“Yes I never like Chinese. They take advantage on 
Taiwanese, you heard what they called us, Taiwan, the 
province of China…Also, I heard too many stories about 
how Chinese steal the company design, money even the 
ownership. Chinese people are just like their 
government”(Entrepreneur) 
 
Chinese government ask for money, my sales steal 
money, my suppliers always delay, my customer never 
pay on time, people is the biggest problem when 
investing in China. I rather make money in other ways 
(Entrepreneur) 
 
“We all know he wouldn’t stay long in China, he is green 
party (Taiwan independence supporter). Usually they 
can’t survive in China or never go to China. They hate 
China and always think pessimistically, how can they 







(Aversion) to China  
 
CC8 2005  
until 
now 
Rising costs, rents and 
salaries, Delayed 
payment, bad debt, price 
competition 







Unethical behaviour of 
staff, including taking 
commission, steal 
company products, be 









Downsize, focus on smaller 
marketreject expansion 
plan Strongly associated 
with international exit 
“It was unbelievable, my full-time sales works for my 
competitors for commissions. Everyone thinks they work 
for my competitors. They are so greedy and always try to 
take advantages of others…I am not surprised if Chen 
told me they (sales) run away with my money and 
inventory…  No, I don’t have expansion plan; it’s scary 
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their government and I can’t trust them, I hate/dislike 
doing business with them”.   







Invitation from local 
distributors and authority 
for business 
collaboration 
Fear Reject “We had an offer from A (the niece of authority), he was 
interested in our products and controlled the distribution 
channel of B city…Other company also used same 
strategy to enter into C city…but my boss rejected 
because he didn’t trust locals…” 






Critical incidents of Firm D, Food 





Action Entrepreneur or other people’s description Code (Variables) 
and others 







I visited Paris 20 years ago and I tasted local dessert and bread, I was 
astonished by the amazing flavour and I want my family and friends to 
taste it too. I felt my old job (instant food industry) was so boring and I 
want to sell dessert. Taiwan was a traditional market and only accepts 
sponge cakes that time. I spent years in kitchen to develop a new recipe 
that Taiwanese likes… I found substitute for cream and cheese and 
developed a special way to preserve fresh fruit to extend expire date…I 
experienced some failures but now people (Taiwanese) like my products. 
..It is exited that people like my cakes. I want to promote it to more 












I keep finding potential location and partners in China. I’ve been to 
Sichuan, Shanghai, Beijing…except those stores, I also worked with 
Taobao and opened an online shop…I saw attended many exhibitions and 
saw lots of opportunities. I know this is my problem…if I am very excited 
about something, I am blind… I think sometimes you need to be crazy to 
set up a venture…(entrepreneur) 
A1: expansion,  
Personal goal 
 







See CD1+CD2 A1: expansion,  
Personal goal 
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I met a friend who was the department store manager in Shanghai and 
accepted his invitation to open a dessert shop. I was too confident about 
my product and thought I could compete with French brand including 
Paul and Laduree there with much lower price. I didn’t realize that 
Shanghai people buy the French dessert for the brand image and the 
feeling of outstanding and this is what I can’t give them, I focus on wrong 
market (entrepreneur) 
Note: entrepreneur described his Shanghai business. He agreed he was too 
confident about his product (according to his experience in Taiwan) thus 
did not actually investigate why Shanghai people buy French dessert 
(entrepreneur) 
A1: expansion,  
Personal goal 
 








Do you know how these people make money?  They kept the price label 
and just changed Taiwanese dollar to RMB…they were xxx (emotional 
language) crazy and treated Chinese like idiots who paid 5 times more to 
buy the same product…H company knew the situation and ignored it…in 
fact H company was one of these greedy company…they took advantage 
on their own people and Chinese. That’s why this shopping mall 
closed…and I felt embarrassed that this was not the only case in China.  
This explains why Chinese are rude to Taiwanese…because we are bad to 
them too…  ” (Quote D3, entrepreneur) 
 











Yes I agree with Entrepreneur Fruit, at first I was anxious and sometime 
angry about the “Chinese ways of doing things”. Entrepreneur Fruit 
introduces me to some Chines friends, they are very nice people and we 
discuss the cultural difference. ..I read Chinese history and Mao’s 
bibliography, I also read the cultural revolution, you should read it too, 
and it helps you to understand why Chinese behave in this way. It 
explains why Chinese workers are less motivated and dishonest, they just 
want to protect themselves... Well there are many differences; mostly we 
misunderstand each other…   













“Natural and high quality food does not have market here. If I add some 
chemical flavouring and lower the price, I can definitely find lots 
customers. I know everyone is doing this (adding artificial flavouring) in 
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Hangzhou dessert anymore. I want to sell real French dessert and sell good food…” 
(Entrepreneur) 
 
“I am always confident about my product, maybe too confident (laugh)…I 
mean it’s upset to realize my current products was too advanced for 
Chinese market but it’s okay…Chinese follows the trend of Taiwan, about 
5-10 years difference. I still have chance, if I open a bakery and stay here, 
maybe I can introduce Mille Crepe again in the future ”  (Entrepreneur) 
 
“I plan to open bakery chains in China. I see opportunities…. I am very 
excited….” (Entrepreneur) 
 
 “My husband is very confident and optimistic about his investment, 
although he doesn’t make any money. He spent more than 20 years in 
cake and pastry. I know he is looking another chance to prove 
himself…”(Entrepreneurs’ wife) 
 
















I always think what is failure…I think it could be just a process…I sold 
Mille-crepe 10 years ago but lost lots of money in the beginning because 
Taiwanese only likes sponge cake. I insisted in this product and everyone 
thought I was crazy. Surprisingly, 3 years ago, Mille-crepe became a 
super star…if I shut down my venture before, than I was failed. But I 
persist and survive, I succeed. I mean, sometimes financial performance 
means little to me; I believe it’s just a matter of time... If you persist and 
keep going, you can be successful one day… I think the real failure is 
when you can’t see the future, you don’t believe in future, or yourself 
doesn’t want that future…I don’t think my exit is a failure (laugh), maybe 
50-50…I did learn a lot from this experience, and I see new opportunity 























I was unhappy about the disputes with my local business partners 
(Shanghai and Sichuan) such as the bribery, unreasonable commission, 
delay payment…but after the conflicts with Company H, I feel it was 
nothing to complain about Chinese, even my own people tried to take 



















advantage of us, how I can complain about Chinese. We are not better 











Critical incident of Firm E, Fruit 
Code Year What happened How the 
entrepreneur 
feel 
Action Entrepreneur or other people’s description Code (Variables) 
CE1 2009 Nanjing government 
incentives and a wish 
to open a fruit shop to 
help Taiwanese 
farmers, want to 
develop other types 










I want to do something interesting. I like to talk to customers, the 
consumers, and promote the product face to face. It’s boring to talk 
through email and contracts and fight for 2% or 3 % every time…I 
saw opportunity of TPSM, I didn't need to pay to rent for the first six 
months, which meant I just need to pay the labour cost and 
electricity, this was the best chance for me to try something 
different… (entrepreneur) 
 
“My father likes to talk to different people particularly Chinese who 
are interested in Taiwanese culture and stuffs. He invited Chinese he 
met on the plane and be their tour guides in Taiwan at least 5 times. 
One time, I went out with him to buy lots of mangos and pineapples 
for his new Chinese friends. He said they were complaining about the 
quality of Taiwanese mango, and he wanted to reverse their image. 
My father found what they ate before was fake Taiwanese mango 








(see Quote E6) 
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mango and destroyed the reputation of Taiwanese mango.  I think 
this may be the reason he want to open the fruit shop, and we 
supported him although we disagreed with his crazy expansion. But 
he is the boss…”(Quote E2, entrepreneurs’ daughter) 
 
“Those people (DPP) always talked about independence of Taiwan, 
of course Chinese government has to warn them …most Chinese 
people agree that Taiwan is an independent country and they like us, 
so no need to be afraid or be aggressive to all Chinese people… In 
fact, Chinese government is nice to Taiwanese (entrepreneurs); we 
enjoy more benefits than other foreign ventures…  ” (entrepreneur) 
  




I sold my fruit lower than the market price and they lost 
customers...It happened before, when I first entered into China I 
made lots of mistakes and receive black mails regularly…no I was 
not afraid, nothing to be afraid, they were just saying. I felt angry but 
it was true that my price was much lower than market price. I sold 
fruits for fun but they were not. They were doing business...Like I 
said, China had many unspoken rules and you just need to learn and 
follow (see CE9) (entrepreneur) 
 
A4: learning and 
adaptation  
 
CE3 2010 Rising sales revenue, 
government support 








I felt very relaxed and happy in Firm E; it was interesting to meet so 
many different people. I stood on the top of a bench and explained 
how to select and eat Taiwanese fruit…The Nanjing people love me 
and my Taiwanese accents (laugh). I had 5 TV interviews, 3 
newspaper reports, and 1 magazine interviews, I became the celebrity 
in Nanjing and everyone knows me (laugh)…It was a great fun and I 
feel so proud in front of my friends (entrepreneur). 
Yes I felt confident that time, well I saw lots of opportunities and my 
store was crowded with customers that time. I had a brand and I had 












“It (counterfeit financial statement) was a shock…I was angry with 
my accountant, but I knew this is a common thing if you didn't 
establish a proper accounting system in China, she only earned 3,000 
yuan per month and it was normal that she was lured to do this, 
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particularly when she knew I seldom checked the financial statement  
…to solve this problem, I spent a fortune to establish a proper 
accounting system and sent another accountant to check financial 
statements regularly” (entrepreneur) 








“He enjoyed opening a fruit shop, but he didn’t think carefully before 
the opening 2nd and 3rd shop… The fruit shop was like a big hole, 







CE6 2011 Disputes with 
landlords in Nanjing 




I have nothing to say about this, Entrepreneur Food explained 
everything, (see CD5). It was ridiculous…(entrepreneur) 
A3: divestment 









None of us know how to preserve the fruit. I thought just need to put 
them in the fridge. We have many rotten mangos and sour 
pineapples…I decided to buy from professional importers rather than 
import myself. (entrepreneur) 
A4: learning and 
adaptation 
CE8 2013 Unmet performance, 
too busy to manage 
the fruit store and 
daughters are not 
interested in this 
business (no one can 
manage the business) 
Grief 
Hope 
Exit No I’m not going to sell Firm E. Everyone knows I open this store, 
what if those people destroy my reputation…No I won’t hire 
professional managers, this business is just for me and my family, it’s 
more like a personal investment (entrepreneur) 
 
No I am not regretting about this (set up Firm E), it’s a great fun…of 
course I lost a lot (money), too ambitious; I was not familiar with this 
industry and knew little about fruit inventory control and 
preservation. Although I outsourced this to a professional company 
but I was too busy to manage it… I have experience, equipment and 
network, actually I was going to invest in ice cream made by 
Taiwanese fruit last year, but have no one to manage the shop. It’s 










Choose to close 
















In general, Chinese are very friendly to Taiwanese. I heard many 
failed stories and owners blamed on corrupted government and 
unethical staff. It is not right. The reason why they have chance to 
destroy your company is because of yourself. There people go to 
erotic places or treat their staff like a donkey. Of course they failed 
(entrepreneur) 
 
“Well it’s true that they take bribery, and it’s not acceptable in many 
countries …but this is the Chinese way and I learnt to accept it and 
follow it. Corruption never bother me, I am accustomed to the 
Chinese way of doing business. It’s a big problem for those who are 
not familiar with. For me, it’s like a shortcut to success. To think of 
it, it is much cheaper and more effective in achieving my goals.”  
(entrepreneur) 





(see Quote E5) 
Critical incident of Firm F, Metal  
Code Year What happened How the 
entrepreneur 
feel 
Action Entrepreneur or other people’s description Code 
(Variables) 
CF1 1999 Identified the 
opportunity in 
China and 





Set up 1st 
factory in 
Nanjing 
My friend invited me to go to China set up a plant for his company, well it 
sounds not bad, we all know Taiwan is a small market. For future 
development, I need to find a large and potential market for my company. I 
know how to manage people and he will send technicians. I have customers 
before I set up the business...Besides I want to see where my grandparent 
lives. My father always talks about his hometown…I want to have a try, to 









CF2 2000 Identified the 






My technicians told me it’s (green products) the future star, I did some 
research, talked to my customers and I felt there was a market. So I did it. 
Its exited to see Jo doing experiments, feels like I also contribute to the 
society by developing this new materials, I also support other university labs 
to develop new products, hope one day I don't need to purchase patent from 






































I didn't want to talk about this…okay, first I received a notice from 
government asking us to move…I moved but receive nothing from the 
government, they only gave me the land…Of course I was angry, they took 
my land for their relatives. But what can you do? This is China and this is 
their ways. I was benefited from this before so I was prepared. This is the 
price you should pay in China. So I told myself at least I build a good 
relationship with them. I have a relocation plan anyway.  (entrepreneur) 
Note: Empathy is not very strong, but he tried to understand “this is China” 












Aware of the 



















This is a trend and I can’t escape from it. No negotiation with Chinese 
government, if they say 20%, you have to do it.  It’s scary to pay this 
amount. The only thing in my mind that time was “I must find a solution for 
this, I have more than 1000 employees, and this means 1000 families are 
rely on me. It is a heavy burden, but it is also my responsibility to ensure the 
operation of my firm”... (entrepreneur) 
 
I felt like innovation can be the solution. Previously, my profit range was 5-
7% and now is much higher. Rising cost is not a problem anymore, I have 
order for the next 15 months and my customers is still queuing. Yes I keep 
investing in the lab. This is my competitive advantage… (entrepreneur) 
Exit China is never my father’s options, I remembered many of his friends 
moved to Vietnam and they invite him to join them. But he said no and hired 
Jo. It was a risky decision. I meant, we were just a traditional manufacturing 
firm with low profitability and my father hired a team of experts to do 
R&D…Yes I did ask him why, he said, what can I do, I don’t want to go to 


























CF7 2008 Invitation from 
Chinese air 
force to set up a 
joint venture 
Confidence Second 





I can’t tell you too much about this. This was an offer from the grandparents 
of my daughter in law. My second son liked this plan and I had to give face 
to my daughter in law…They had guanxi and I had the technology they 
need. So we worked and built up a plant. Yes, in the short-term, it was a 













CF8 2011 Army want to 







shift the focus 
to Nanjing 
factory  
We have serious disputes with Chinese army; they want more control and 
more shares. I know they will take over the company one day, we are going 
to lose everything, and you can’t fight with Chinese Government. I don’t 
like China. I spent 5 years in USA and lived in UK with my wife for 5 
years… I feel stressful in China, everything is so complicated particularly 
interpersonal and government relationship…(entrepreneurs’ son) 
 
I don't think it's a big problems, the worst case is they take everything…I am 
not saying I am happy with it, just this is an inevitable trend and I can 
foresee it before I collaborate with them, so I use this network to develop my 
core business. I never expect I can make big money from this; this is just for 
my second son and his wife…(entrepreneur) 








































My wife, my sons, and my grandchildren are all here, I am rooted in 
Nanjing…I am a Taiwanese and I love Taiwan, but Nanjing is my home and 
I must stay here. I commit so much in China … There are still chances in 
China, this is a huge market and we have advantages…yes I agree with my 
son that there are problems, but compared to other markets like USA and 
Europe, China is much better. Every country has their own problems; I think 
Chinese government can manage it. (entrepreneur) 
 
I solved at least 30 cases of employer and employee conflicts. Although I 
am a Taiwanese, I have to say we are wrong. They are lack of 
“Zhongyong”… Most of cases were because of the attitude of Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs. They were too arrogant, lack of communication and tried to 
train their staff like a machine. This (management style) worked well 20 
years ago but not now. Due to the one child policy, the young generations 
are the precious of family; you can’t imagine what Chinese parents can do 
for their child…Thus, the old fashion way is not working anymore, you have 
to respect your staff, listen to their opinions, and use rewards instead of 
punishments. 20 years ago, Chinese workers could worked 16 hours per day 
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may just quit because they want to enjoy their life and their parents can feed 
them. They are the boss now. Many Taiwanese don’t see this change and use 
militaristically formal management, that’s why they experienced so many 
problems. You need to be considerable, humble, understanding your staffs 
and most importantly, build up a systemic management style and be hard-
working to be their model…(entrepreneur) 
 
I have more than 1000 employees, and this means 1000 families are rely on 
me. It is a heavy burden, but it is also my responsibility to ensure the 
operation of my firm. I am an old-fashion person, and I don’t like to fire my 
employees for efficiency and performance, that’s American way not Chinese 
way. Entrepreneurs should be responsible for their people. When they enter 
your company, it is your job to carefully manage your company and support 
their life; it is a heavy load and a long road. I told my two sons if they want 
to sell my business in the future, they have to find a way to settle down these 
employees. They should to be appreciated because employees make the 








Anger Commit more 
in R&D, faster 
than the 
competitors 
Chinese are copycat, they buy your product, copy it, change package and 
launch their new products. There is no way to stop it, the only thing we can 











What happened How the 
entreprene
ur feel 





Married and have 







and set up 
Firm G 
I’ve been the general manager for Firm C for many years; it sounds 
not bad to be my own boss. (entrepreneur) 
China is a huge market and I can sense opportunities. I know this 
industry very well and it’s interesting to bring something new to this 









I can do business everywhere; I can go back to Taiwan stay in Firm C 
or create my business. I can go to Vietnam with my friends. I can go 
to Thailand. My customers invite me to be the consultant. But I just 






to make more 















My baby is just 2 years old and I want to participate his childhood. I 
don’t have high expectation for my life. I only need a house, a car, a 
dog and enough money to support my family. I don’t have much 
ambition and don’t need much money. I only hope my family can be 
happy and healthy every day, that’s it...I have to be more 
hardworking now, need to prepare the education expenses and even 
the first instalment for his house. (entrepreneur) 
 
A1: increase commitment 
Family 
Personal goals 

















China is a very unique market; they have been isolated for years that 
create a very different consumption style. For example, when my 
boss (Firm C) entered into China, we said we are going to sell PU 
because it is the best anti-leak paint, advanced and cheap. PU is our 
golden hen (best –selling product) in Taiwan. Jiangsu rains a lot and 
has serious leaking problems; we thought we could successfully enter 
into market… But we were wrong, in terms of product and pricing 
strategy. First, Chinese painters were used to another traditional 
material called Curve (paint), which was old fashion and no one used 
it anymore. We couldn’t persuade painters to use PU because they 
were connected to Curve suppliers and used to Curve. Second, our 
pricing is wrong. The original strategy was 500 RMB per unit and 
gave 100 RMB to distributor, but this one didn’t work. We had to 
increase the price to 700 RMB per unit and gave 300RMB to 
distributor, thus they were motivated to promote your 
products…Innovative and good products are not necessary work in 
China. The most important thing is how you share the profit with 
distributors and how you promote. Promoting a product is not by 
imagination and it is unpredictable. You have to learn carefully and 
use a humble attitude to learn from locals. I like to spend time with 























A4: learning and 
adaptation 
Institutions 
Positive predispositions  
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paint is totally different from Taiwanese and its very interesting. My 
understanding of this market was mostly from these informal 
conversations. This is something you never learn from reading a 
Marketing report. This is why many large foreign companies visit me 
for market information and collaboration. I know how to modify the 
product to Chinese style and how to communicate with Chinese 
distributors. (entrepreneur) 
 
My best advantage to survive is China is I am not stubborn. I am very 
flexible and open to any suggestions. I heard too many stories in 
China, including European investors. These people, including some 
Taiwanese, are too civilised, too stubborn and live in their own 
world. They lock themselves in 5 star hotels and eat KFC every day, 
how can they understand China and manage Chinese? You have to 
talk to locals and understand what they are thinking. China is not a 
country that you can follow the rules. For example, my staff takes 
commissions from suppliers. It sounds unacceptable and bad for 
company development. I know it and I pretend I don’t know. In 
China, you need to close one eye sometimes. Don’t be so quibble, 
what’s the point to argue with your staff for taking commissions from 
a bulb even all bulbs in the factory. Taking commission makes them 
become more responsible about quality because they want to make it 
long-term. You just need to control the large spending, others can let 
it go. 3~5 % of total spending is a reasonable range if this makes my 
staff happier and work harder” (entrepreneur)     
Note: entrepreneur was angry in the beginning, but he learnt to calm 
down, analyse, and seek for help. He is still angry but anger will not 




















Yes the Chinese custom is horrible. They delayed my shipment again 
and again for some stupid reasons. But this happened in everywhere. 
Government is the most inefficient organization, this rule applies to 
every country…usually I just wait. But I can use my guanxi if 
necessary… 
 (entrepreneur) 























x Yes I am aware of these problems…yes a bit worried about it, but 
what can I do? This is the macro environment problems…I think we 
should be aware of these problems but not overly panic since all 
companies, including your competitors, are facing same problems. 
You have to stay positive and be ready to pursue new opportunities. 
There is an old Chinese saying that chances are only for those who 
are ready. (entrepreneur)     
 
A2: do noting 
Institutions, labour costs 
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Appendix D: Consent for Participation in Interview Research  
 
